Corruption is a slippery concept. Although in some respects it appears to be a measurable phenomenon, it is also a complex idea that requires a sense of sociopolitical, cultural, and ethical context to be rendered intelligible. Does this context-dependence leave us in the realm of cultural and moral relativism, where one man’s bribe is another man’s gift, or can we generate some higher order generalizations about the causes and consequences of corruption while remaining sensitive to contextual nuances? Some researchers may cast corruption as an individual behavior, while for others evoking corruption means assessing and making judgments about the quality of institutions in a particular society. When taking this latter approach, what standards do researchers use to assess institutional quality? What criteria for “good governance” do anti-corruption efforts use, and what outcomes do they aim to produce? How should researchers navigate the proliferation of quantitative data sets, rankings, and indices purportedly measuring corruption and quality of government?
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, recognizing that corruption is about institutions and not just individual behavior, tackles the governance criteria question head-on. She comprehensively and critically surveys available data sets, engages in her own quantitative and qualitative research, and thereby builds a defense of modernity, and what she takes to be its central norm of “ethical universalism,” as both the goal and the measure by which governance should be assessed. Her approach to corruption is holistic and aims at broad generalizability, analyzing both formal and informal institutions in both historical and contemporary case studies to offer a model of how corruption might be brought under control in any society (an admittedly rare achievement). For Mungiu-Pippidi, corruption control is about more than punishing individual norm or law violators; it is about building a modern impartial state in symbiosis with a free, individualist, market-oriented society—it is about travelling, in her words, “the road Denmark.”
By contrast, the collection of essays edited by Peter Hardi, Paul M. Heywood, and Davide Torsello offers both behavioral and institutional views of corruption, and professes no generalizable standard but rather a series of explorations drawn from different disciplines: business, law, political science, philosophy, and anthropology among others. The extent to which these disciplines share any common standards regarding the definition of corruption and its opposite is left to the reader to decide. Several of the authors (Davide Torsello, Italo Pardo, Giulianna Prato) take an ethnographic approach to their case studies; the influence of anthropology is strong here. Eschewing anything like Mungiu-Pippidi’s overarching conclusions, this volume’s intervention in debates on corruption and its control remains pluralist and relativistic, not in the sense that pluralism and relativism might be considered defensible moral or philosophical standpoints, but rather in the sense that the volume refrains from presenting an overarching model or perspective. It is, its editors say, a “conversation” between disciplines and approaches. But conversation implies some common vocabulary and an intentional exchange of ideas. These aims can be difficult to achieve in edited volumes, as scholars may polish off their contributions without bothering to explicitly engage those with whom they share a common book cover. Inter-disciplinarity exacerbates this challenge. While Mungiu-Pippidi maps the road to Denmark, Hardi, Heywood, and Torsello offer a series of paths wandering through different institutional and ethnographic landscapes, but with no agreed destination.
Although Mungiu-Pippidi unashamedly embraces a Eurocentric vision of modernity, and might thus be dismissed by the post-moderns and post-colonials on this basis alone, her understanding of modernity is deep and nuanced. She writes, “European control of corruption can be regarded as almost the only historically successful process of state building in which a long transition to ethical universalism has resulted in an equilibrium where opportunities for corruption are largely checked by societal control of rulers and reasonable reciprocal control by the government. This evolution cannot easily be separated from the general European advancement to government accountability and rule of law” (p. 58). In Mungiu-Pippidi’s view, ethical universalism is the central norm that underpins both the modern state and the market: “Individualism and universalism, not collectivism and particularism, are the main norms both in interpersonal relations and the relationship between the state and individual… government is impartial and, when implementing laws and policies, treats citizens as mere individuals… Citizenship in a modern sense and market relations are possible only because of this impersonality and impartiality (the supply and demand mechanism, not kinship, determines price)” (p. 15). The alternative to a modern, “open access,” state-society complex governed by core norms of ethical universalism is a “limited access” order, governed by patronage and particularism (pp. 18–19). Thus, it appears that only deviations from the modern ideal can be cast as corrupt, though one might inquire whether patrimonial orders might have their own version of corruption, which implies that they might have some form of integrity as well.
Be that as it may, Mungiu-Pippidi recognizes that modernity can essentially be faked. “Many developing countries have set up a superstructure of rational-legal administration, which nonetheless continues to rest on a deep foundation of patrimonial rule and particularistic behavior. The practice of modernization that is top-down driven thus creates a steady gap between an official norm and a nominal goal on one side and the actual practices and rules of the game in a society” (p. 97). This observation forms the crux of her critique of the policies of the international, anti-corruption community of advocates, policy advisers, and consultants. Recognizing the frequent disparity between how institutions are described on paper and how people actually live, Mungiu-Pippidi musters impressive reams of empirical data to triangulate between official laws and norms and unofficial but routine practices, and produce evaluations of governance that take both into account. Worth recognizing also in this context, though not adequately emphasized, is that many so-called modern European states themselves merely simulate modernity, at least as it is defined as an ideal in this book.
Although Mungiu-Pippidi values modernity, she assumes neither that modernization is inevitable, nor that it is out of reach for those societies lacking proper structural antecedents. Rather, she investigates the question of whether it is possible to develop control of corruption through human agency and if so, what sort of agency is required in different institutional contexts. To do so, she has to eliminate historical, structural, and cultural determinist arguments—arguments which suggest that certain societies are doomed to corruption because of their history, culture, religion, or region. Does previous status as a colony affect a society’s ability to modernize and to develop corruption control? Does a legacy of communism? The bulk of the book systematically analyzes, using large data sets and both historical and contemporary case studies, how sustainable corruption control can be achieved.
A key contribution aiming at a more scientific understanding of corruption is the development in Chapter Four of a “parsimonious cross sectional ‘equilibrium’ model,” which tests for a host of independent variables (including physical integrity, region, a number of institutional factors, and economic indicators) to assess the impact of these factors on three distinct dependent variables representing different measures of corruption control (pp. 122–24). Recognizing that a particularistic, limited access (i.e. corrupt) political order can be a stable equilibrium, Mungiu-Pippidi argues that “[w]hat is needed is complex state building and deep democratization; empowering the losers under current institutions; the upsetting of the current equilibrium and the achievement of another, superior equilibrium. Cases such as Uruguay, Costa Rica, Estonia, and Georgia prove that this is possible” (p. 129). I am not in a position to critique Mungiu-Pippidi’s methodology, but the careful construction of broad and deep foundations of theory and evidence on which she erects her conclusions and policy suggestions should be clear even to the methodology-averse reader. The book makes and systematically defends a bold argument.
There is no overarching argument to be gleaned in the slim volume put together by Hardi, Heywood, and Torsello, where there are almost as many definitions of corruption as there are chapters. Scholars working on the problem of corruption will find in the volume a wealth of leads on how the problem has been approached in the fields of business, anthropology, and law; several of the essays contain useful literature reviews. Two chapters explore anti-bribery laws and their enforcement, one by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Sinead Hunt on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and another by Celia Wells on United Kingdom laws focusing on transnational corporate bribery. The volume’s emphasis on integrity also balances the negative connotations of focusing primarily on corruption; Paul Heywood and Jonathan Rose explore not only how corruption might be curtailed, but also how integrity might be fostered. They distinguish between “compliance-based” approaches, which focus on corruption prevention, and “values based” approaches, which focus on integrity promotion (p. 116), coming down cautiously on the side of the latter (which in turn leads us into the realm of virtue ethics and away from a strict legalism). Several contributors realize that equating corruption with illegality unnecessarily limits the scope of the concept, as it is possible to have legalized corruption. As Gary Weaver and Cynthia Clark note in their chapter, taking a compliance-based approach by sanctioning corrupt acts may actually undermine ethical behavior by framing the choice to do the right thing in terms of self-interest (avoiding punishment) rather than ethics (p. 141). This suggests that ironically some anti-corruption efforts may corrupt the mind, so to speak, by casting the problem of corruption as one of noncompliance with rules rather than as a failure to exercise ethical judgment—a drastic narrowing of our understanding of human agency.
The chapter by Wim Dubbink explores dimensions of human maliciousness that extend so far as to include corruption of thought and speech, and thus touches on the problem of corruption of the mind. Referring to the Old Testament story of Cain and Abel, Dubbink draws on Kant’s Critique of Judgment (sadly a work almost never referenced by political scientists) to emphasize that it is not just the fratricide but the evasion of “am I my brothers’ keeper” that is the problem: The former is merely a crime, the latter is a denial of ethical responsibility. This denial is an act of “redescription” of an action, and this redescription, according to Dubbink’s reading of Kant, corrodes our way of understanding social reality. Therefore, corruption may be a much deeper problem than either behavioral or institutional approaches realize—our very way of thinking and speaking about social reality may be corrupted by the way we try to evade the consequences of our actions and lie to others and ourselves about our motivations and reasons. Do we not routinely “redescribe” certain problems so as to absolve ourselves of doing anything about them?
The papers in the Hardi, Heywood, and Torsello volume emerged from two workshops organized by the Center for Integrity in Business and Government at the Central European University Business School, financed by the CEU and the Siemens Integrity Initiative. The book does not mention this, but the Siemens Integrity Initiative funding is part of a 2009 settlement between Siemens and the World Bank over corruption allegations. One might view the settlement optimistically as a case of public institutions (in this case the Word Bank) turning some tiny fraction of the proceeds of corporate corruption into an opportunity to fund anti-corruption activities (in this case a workshop for academics), or one might see it as a case of corporate “greenwashing.” Perhaps these two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Mungiu-Pippidi’s work has been funded by a variety of sources, but the most substantial one is the European Union Seventh Framework Project grant of 10 million Euros. I take note of the funding issue because the question of whether and under what conditions money corrupts any activity is central to corruption scholarship, and should remain so. Researchers are themselves not immune from such questions.
