It does not take too long reading the news to see that US–China relations are not exactly at a high (or even a normal low). From their tensions over trade and technology, to their clashes over Xinjiang that spilled over to the 2022 Winter Olympics, the United States and China have repeatedly shown that they are not just geopolitical rivals, but rivals with deep differences on the basics of justice and political life. In the heat of deep, cross-cultural differences like these, editors Zhibin Xie, Pauline Kollontai, and Sebastian Kim’s Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Social Justice: A Chinese Interdisciplinary Dialogue with Global Perspective provides timely and provocative insight on what it means for individuals and institutions “to do justice, and to love kindness” (Micah 6:8 [English Standard Version]) in China and worldwide.
With contributions from fourteen scholars in numerous countries and disciplines, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Social Justice wrestles with the concepts announced in its title by moving well beyond the confines of Rawlsian ethics or Lockean political philosophy. Instead, the fourteen chapters challenge readers to think deeply about justice with tools from Confucian thought, Christian ethics, and the lived experiences of people in China, the United States, Australia, Israel, and beyond. Readers who chew on the book’s material patiently and charitably, will find themselves richly rewarded.
The book begins by exploring a Confucian conception of social justice. As Yunping Wang explains in chapter 1, a Confucian take on social justice would start from inherently relational ideas of human nature, virtue, and the good life (13). Rather than conjure up independent individuals controlling their own destinies without outside interference, a Confucian notion of the good life envisions relational beings living together in harmony, fulfilling the familial and societal roles they owe one another (12–13). The reason, then, for a ruler to provide materially for the ruled—that is, to bring about what some might call social justice—is not that the ruler must fulfill the individual rights of his subjects (13); rather, it is that a ruler should be benevolent, and the virtue of benevolence does not accord with letting one’s community die from starvation (13).
Focusing further on virtue, Yong Li (chapter 2) affirms the argument that Confucianism can ground human rights in human moral potential—a potential that differentiates humans from animals (24). In other words, whereas Western theories might argue that human beings have rights because they are autonomous, rational agents, Confucianism can argue that humans have rights because they have the capacity to act morally—whether that moral behavior be motivated by emotion or by reason (29). Li supports moral capacity as a basis for human rights because (A) all humans have moral capacity, and (B) moral capacity can set boundaries on the list of human rights, by limiting them to things conducive to one’s moral growth (30).
While Li creatively explains the merits of a Confucian grounding of human rights, one salient question remains unanswered. Why exactly does a person’s capacity to act morally entitle a person to human rights? Perhaps moral capacity, unlike intelligence or athletic capacity, is shared by all humans, as Li argues. But more explanation is needed as to why moral capacity, qua moral capacity, serves as a basis for human rights. What is it about the ability of a human to live virtuously, that gives a human dignity, and thereby demands the human be properly treated?
Lap Yan Kung (chapter 5) does not answer this question head-on, but provides readers with visceral hints. Kung explains how Chinese Christians have exhibited dignity in their response to the Chinese government’s cross-removal campaign in Zhejiang Province. As Kung explains, dignity both inheres in all humans and varies in accordance with one’s possession of virtue (70). The more virtuous and excellent a human, the more the human radiates an “inflorescent dignity” expressing his or her intrinsic value (70). As Kung writes, by embodying virtue through their “non-violence and forgiveness, persistence in truth, and … hope,” Chinese Christians have radiated dignity in their responses to religious persecution (82).
Certainly, Kung does not precisely explain how virtuous behavior expresses dignity. But perhaps the lack of an analytical explanation is part of the point. Like the beauty of a mathematical “eureka!” or the glory of parents choosing to die for their children, something ineffable, baffling, and sublime shines when humans—amid pain and persecution—nevertheless respond with forgiveness and faith. Kung captures the substance of this mystical “something” as “dignity”—an expression of a human’s intrinsic value (70). Regardless of whether readers agree with Kung’s naming of this something, they can find enrichment simply by visualizing the resilience of those persecuted living with goodness and integrity.
Whereas chapters 1, 2, and 5 focus more on justice and dignity, chapters 7 and 8 center on love and affection. In chapter 7, Pan-chiu Lai discusses how Christians—particularly those in Hong Kong—might express patriotism. Lai argues that patriotism as an affection is natural and should not be forbidden (112); neither should it be forced (112) or placed above love of God and family (114). Moving beyond affection, Lai exhorts Christians to act in love of country, by responsibly, forgivingly, and earnestly seeking the welfare of their neighbors (112–13).
In chapter 8, Zhibin Xie argues that love can shape the pursuit of justice in China. Within love, he explains, justice becomes more than a “political idea,” a matter of “institutional arrangements” or “rational measures” (123). Instead, he explains, social justice becomes something motivated by, and constitutive of, one’s care for neighbor—one’s “concern with the moral worth” of fellow humans (124), including the weak and poor.
Indeed, Xie’s proposal that love guide the pursuit of justice in China merits affirmation. Loving another necessarily entails—and also goes beyond—seeking that another be treated justly; thus, it makes sense that when people pursue social justice out of love, they will not only better bring about justice, but also meet needs (such as the need for “warmness and care”) that the “cold face” of justice may not address (124). Nonetheless, to better communicate how love transforms justice, Xie’s chapter could have further explained why justice without love in China is “much concerned with rational, institutional aspects” (126). Specific examples showing how justice as commonly understood in China is “cold” (124), “rational” (126), or “political” (119), would clarify how social justice without love and within love are meaningfully different.
In between the more conceptual chapters thus far reviewed, chapters 3, 4, and 6 highlight more specific stories and events that readers might—mostly on their own initiative, for better or for worse—connect to themes of dignity, justice, and love. In chapter 3, David Tombs challenges readers to (re)reflect on the cross in light of the horrific sexual violence in the Nanjing Massacre (39–47), and the sexual humiliation and violence associated with Roman crucifixion (37–38). Also looking to history, Zhifeng Zhong (chapter 4) details how four prominent Christians—Mingdao Wang, Y. T. Wu, Hudson Taylor, and Timothy Richard—responded to religious persecution in China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
In chapter 6, Jieren Hu, Tong Wu, and Jingyang Fei return to the present and explain how “petition social workers” in Shanghai resolve disputes between local officials and discontented citizens (“petitioners”). As they explain, by empathetically listening to petitioners, providing relevant information, and facilitating negotiations for compensation (92–95), petition social workers foster social stability without resorting to litigation or force.
While the effectiveness of petition social workers “remains to be seen” (98), the very concept of them challenges readers to think of ways through which citizens and government officials might resolve their disputes outside the courtroom and even ballot box—ways that tap into the relationships, emotion, and spirituality that make us fully human. For American audiences, this is all the more relevant, as tensions fester between cops and communities, and as discontentment bubbles over immunity doctrines that make it harder for citizens to bring government officials to court.
The remaining chapters—9 to 14—take readers to contexts beyond China. Whereas chapters 9 and 10 tackle social justice at a more abstract level, chapters 11 to 14 dive into praxis. In chapter 9, James Skillen sifts through conceptions of social justice and political science across two millennia of Christian intellectual history. He observes that the biblical tradition never affirms humanity’s absolute sovereignty; instead, God alone is absolutely sovereign, and under God, humans exercise individual and institutional authority and responsibility (139). Social justice, Skillen explains, must consider all the diverse spheres wherein humans have responsibilities—not only the sphere of government, but also that of family, business, education, and so forth (139).
Though Skillen’s concluding paragraphs on social justice seem somewhat divorced from his historical survey, his essay serves as a useful primer (or refresher) on church‑state relations in the West. Readers might use his essay and its citations as launching points to compare the legal‑political heritage of the West with that of China.
Just as Skillen’s chapter might serve as a primer, Sebastian Kim’s chapter (10) can serve as a box of conceptual tools. Here, Kim seeks theologies that promote support for society’s poor and marginalized, not as a discretionary matter of compassion, but as an obligatory matter of social justice (156). To that end, he discusses a theology of the common good, liberation theology, and public theology, as well as Confucian ideas of datong (great unity or community) and ren (benevolence), and Mohist ideas of jianai (inclusive care) and jiaoli (reciprocal well‑being).
In chapter 11, Kjetil Fretheim takes readers from concept to living practice. As Fretheim explains, Christian diaconia (social practice)—from individual acts of charity to institutional aid and policy advocacy (167)—can serve as a “foundation and expression of human rights” (170). While Fretheim appropriately reminds readers that praxis is as important as theory, he could further explain how Christian diaconia serves as a “foundation” for human rights. Does he mean that social practice offers a justification for—or a testament to—the existence of human rights? Or does he mean that social practice can illustrate how to fulfill the obligations generated by a right?
Consistent with Fretheim’s emphasis on praxis, chapters 12 to 14 focus on the practice of religious clergypersons and courts in Australia, America, and Israel. In chapter 12, Clive Pearson discusses how the Uniting Church of Australia preaches and practices responsibility—a “middle axiom” accessible to both people inside and outside the church (174). In chapter 13, R. Drew Smith transports readers to Detroit and Pittsburgh, describing how local clergypersons in these cities challenged the ways that powerful corporations treated labor. Smith emphasizes that for change to happen in a city, its corporate leaders, workers, and unions must envision a “shared stake,” rather than see themselves as clashing interest groups (199). Finally, taking readers to Israel, Pauline Kollontai (chapter 14) argues that for Israel to reconcile its identity as a modern, democratic state with its patriarchal rabbinical courts (Beth Dins), it must end the jurisdictional monopoly that Beth Dins have over spheres of life such as marriage and family: people—especially women, she argues—should be able to address such matters in secular courts as well (215).
Together, these chapters illustrate how people, especially people of faith, might rethink and live out justice and love in China and worldwide. Chapters 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8 reflect more abstractly on dignity and charity, human rights and human responsibilities, in Chinese contexts. Chapters 3, 4, and 6 offer specific examples of how state authorities (or, in chapter 3, invading soldiers) have interacted with people, and using these examples, challenge readers to reflect critically on suffering, justice, relationships, and governance. Chapters 9 and 10 present historical and contemporary approaches to church‑state relations and the realization of social justice. Finally, chapters 11 to 14 discuss how justice, care, and responsibility are practiced (properly or poorly) by religious charities, clergypersons, and courts throughout the world.
Admittedly, this volume is not without its flaws. For one, readers will need to adjust to splashes of awkward grammar: sometimes, a sentence’s articles do not quite match the nouns that follow, and nouns that are meant to be plural are instead singular. Such bumps are perhaps inevitable in a truly global compilation.
More importantly, it is unclear how the chapters—particularly those in part two—relate to each other and the volume as a whole. The editors offer introductory and concluding remarks, but could provide more commentary on the relationships between the volume’s chapters—for example, they might explain shared themes, pinpoint slight disagreements, or categorize arguments. Understandably, this task is particularly difficult when bringing together insights from scholars across multiple countries and disciplines. But precisely in international, interdisciplinary efforts, the task of coherence becomes all the more pressing: otherwise, readers are left somewhat confused, as the author of this review was, about the rationale for selecting these chapters (and not others). The editors do well to cherish a diversity of perspectives, but they could do more to make this volume a “dialogue” (as the book purports to be in its title) rather than a something-of-everything stew.
These criticisms notwithstanding, the book’s effort to wrestle critically with weightier matters—justice, human nature, religion—in Chinese and global contexts, is critical given the growing distrust between China and much of the West. These chapters show that amidst all of our differences, we share common human longings for what is good, virtuous, and right. They also show that amidst all our similarities as human beings, we have crafted different ways of understanding and achieving a just society—ways that need not remain solitary, but can be shared through volumes like this one, to further the common good.
