Svat Soucek has written a comprehensive, readable, and scholarly account of the history of the Persian Gulf. At the very beginning, he deals with the emotional issue of its name and shares the results of admirable research in ancient and medieval sources. He shows how the Greek historians and geographers—who encountered this body of water when the Achaemenian great kings controlled both its shores—referred to it as Persikos Kolpos, terminology that would travel to the West in its Latin form of Sinus Persicus. The author dates the earliest appearance of that terminology to about 494 B.C.
The author calls the term “Arabian Gulf” a neologism. He argues that the ancient and medieval geographers, if they employed such a term at all, used it to refer to the Red Sea. In its current use, he shows it to be a product of 20th-century nationalism, ironically reinforced by the American Department of Defense. That department—perhaps because of its lucrative arms sales to the Arab states of the region—still insists on using the aberrant terminology in defiance of the rest of the U.S. government.
The author's discussion of the name “Persian Gulf” is useful, but is perhaps too long and detailed for the general reader. By providing such an exhaustive account of the issue, the author sometimes crosses the boundary between scholarship and polemic. In this work, he has overdone the argument. Less would be more.
The author provides a thorough and coherent account of the region's history through the medieval and early modern period. He notes how a mixed Persian and Arab population inhabited (and still inhabits) the port cities on both shores. Until the discovery of oil, however, the ports on the Iranian side were more prosperous because of their connections to a hinterland that offered opportunities for trade. Despite these important commercial ties, however, governments on the Iranian plateau generally ignored the Gulf and the coastal lowlands. Describing the situation in the early 19th century, Soucek writes (pp. 144–45),
In the case of Iran, this [indifference] was a paradox; its long coastline along the two gulfs placed it in a unique position to become the major naval power there, with all the benefits of trade and access to the Indian Ocean, but the new Qajar government, like most of its predecessors, displayed little initiative in that direction.
Why were the rulers of the Iranian heartland so uninterested in the Gulf? Of course human and physical geography had a great deal to do with their attitude. The lands of the Persian Gulf coast were remote, poor, and unhealthy. With the coming of steam navigation, communication with the Indian subcontinent was easier than with the Iranian heartland. From Bandar Lengeh or Bandar Abbas it was much easier to reach Bombay and Karachi by sea than to make the difficult overland trip to Isfahan or Tehran. As late as the 1970s, paved roads ended a few hours east and south of Shiraz. There were also cultural differences between the peoples of Iran's coastal lowlands (the so-called garmsirat) and the plateau. The former spoke Baluchi, Arabic, and southern Iranian languages (Bastaki and Kumzari) incomprehensible to Persian speakers. Furthermore, Sunni Islam continued to predominate in the region, even after 1500, when the Safavids imposed Shiʿi Islam as the state religion of their empire.
Alongside its thorough scholarship, however, this book contains some jarring misstatements that better editing and fact checking could have corrected.
• The author overstates the power of Iran's Qajar rulers, who, throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, presided over their country's descent into bankruptcy and vassalage to Russia and Britain. For example, he refers to “an ever more determined Qajar Iran” and the “consolidation of Qajar Iran as a henceforth united kingdom” (pp. 199–200). Although scholars have used many adjectives to refer to Qajar Iran, “determined” and “consolidated” are not usually among them. Qajar Iran was too feeble even to stop the British from placing their political resident (“the uncrowned king of the Persian Gulf” in Curzon's phrase, p. 451) at Bushehr, on sovereign Iranian territory.
• The book refers to American “defense treaties” and “military bases” in Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait (p. 201). Although Washington has military arrangements with these countries, the language as it stands overstates the reality.
• The author attributes Dubai's economic success to its “enlightened and participatory government” (p. 202). Enlightened, perhaps. Participatory is a stretch.
• The author's references to “Saudi Arabia” are anachronistic (pp. 135, 145, 149) when discussing the first Saudi emirate of the late 18th and early 19th century.
On a larger scale, the author has resuscitated the unfortunate “Iran as gendarme of the Gulf” language of the 1970s. He argues that Iran (albeit a democratic Iran without the Pahlavi dictatorship) would have been the best American ally in the region and the best guardian of the Persian Gulf against Soviet or Soviet-inspired influence. He writes, “Had the democratic regime striven for by Dr. Mosaddeq been allowed to take root, the United States could not have had a better ally, nor the Gulf a better guardian” (p. 201). Yet, this sort of Cold War thinking about Iran's role was the very reason Washington had turned against Mosaddeq in 1953 and had given unqualified support to the Shah for decades as the key to resisting Soviet influence. As for Tehran being a guardian of the Gulf, at the time, Iran's (Arab) neighbors in the area held other ideas about regional security—ideas the author seems to ignore.
