As a statement about government power and constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court case McCulloch v. Maryland is second only to Marbury v. Madison in its lasting influence. In McCulloch (1819), the Supreme Court adopted a broad construction of Congress's powers and of the “necessary and proper” clause that enabled those powers. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall argued that the Constitution was established by the American people, understood as a nation and as the seat of sovereignty. As the people, through the Constitution, granted Congress legislative power over certain things, so is that power complete; federal laws made under those powers are superior to any state law (e.g., a tax) that operates to challenge or impede it. McCulloch thus announced one of the earliest and most important interpretations of the Constitution in American politics, a nationalist interpretation. The immediate beneficiary of Marshall's opinion was the leading national policy of the time, the Second Bank of the U.S. (2BUS). Its status grew through the constitutional sanction for its existence (as a “necessary and proper” means to revenue policy) and its constitutional immunity from state taxes.
In Aggressive Nationalism, historian Richard E. Ellis observes that “no in-depth study” exists of the case. Academic discussions of McCulloch are limited to surveys of constitutional law and to biographies of John Marshall. They both view the case and its issues simply from Marshall's perspective, that is, uncritically. By contrast, Ellis examines the case via the arguments of the “losing side” (i.e., Maryland). This method leads to a broad examination of the context of McCulloch: early nineteenth-century controversy over not only political economy, but also which level of government—state or national—would direct it. In his detailed discussion, Ellis presents strong evidence that Justice Marshall decided the case not in its own, rather narrow, legal terms but as a means to assert a nationalist interpretation of the Constitution and thereby to solidify the national institution of the Bank. Aggressive Nationalism should interest scholars of constitutional politics and American political development as much as students of American history and constitutional law.
Ellis begins his discussion by describing the country's spectacular economic advancement during the early 1800s. During this period of great flux (punctuated by the War of 1812), Americans established a wide, thriving market that integrated a range of economic interests within and across the states. Transcending the limits of the prior, more barter-based economy, this economic growth depended on loans and credit. Initially, this money came through notes issued by local banks, which were chartered by their state governments. In 1816, Congress chartered its own bank, the Second Bank of the United States, to be the government's fiscal agent (holding the federal government's money) but also to influence the market for money, lending its capital (including federal revenue it held) at interest and investing in local bank notes. To lend locally and to purchase those notes, the Bank—by its own decision, not Congress's—created branches in several states, supplied them with national capital, and set their business practices. One of the Bank's most influential and decried practices was the strict demand for gold and silver as redemption for the notes that it bought, in volume, from local banks. Since local banks normally kept little in specie, they were forced to contract the number and value of notes that they issued, and thus their profits, sharply.
As it presented an economic threat to local banks, so did the 2BUS also test the states' presumed power to govern banks within their borders, in particular their jurisdiction to charter and tax banks. Ellis points out that an important pillar of the states' opposition was its argument that the Bank, by its very congressional charter, was hardly a public corporation like the post office or the army. Eighty percent of its stock was owned by private investors, who not only collected dividends but also appointed 80 percent of the Bank's board of directors. During the Panic of 1819, that board directed the Bank to sell shares recklessly and take profits quickly—a practice that only cast further doubt on the Bank's beneficence and fueled Americans' desire to assert some control over the institution.
This economic and political strife provides the broad background for the particular details of the McCulloch case. Maryland sued McCulloch, the cashier of the Maryland branch of the 2BUS, to collect an annual tax of $15,000 that the state levied on all banks operating without a state-granted charter. At that time, several states hostile to the Bank—in particular, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee—levied much more burdensome taxes, aimed at driving out the Bank's branches in those western states. By contrast, the Maryland tax was “substantially less,” and it operated on a high-volume, eastern-shore branch, making it unlikely that the tax would threaten the Bank's viability or profitability there. Maryland's purpose in taxing the Bank's branch was only to gain revenue (especially to meet the state's large expenses from the War of 1812). To the extent that Maryland's tax assessment represented a political principle, it was not the Bank's unconstitutionality. Instead it was the constitutionality of the state's power to tax the Baltimore branch “in the same manner with other corporations and other property,” in the words of Maryland's attorney.
Despite the legal points made by the plaintiffs, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion did not address either the rightful power of the states or the private character of the Bank (or the legitimacy of the Bank's establishing its own local branches). Instead, through a lengthy obiter dictum, Marshall replied to or addressed very different propositions: the constitutionality of the 2BUS, a broad interpretation of Congress's powers, and the origins and theory of the union. What accounts for this divergence? In the spirit of his book's title, Ellis argues that Marshall wished to align the Court with nationalist politicians like Henry Clay, John Calhoun, and Daniel Webster (counsel for the Bank in McCulloch, whose arguments Marshall incorporated into the substance of his obiter dictum). This association was to grant the Constitution's approval or protection to that era's far-reaching (and controversial) national economic policies. McCulloch reinforced the 2BUS not only by establishing its exemption from Maryland's tax but also by serving as precedent in Osborn v. Bank of the United States (1824), in which the Marshall Court perfunctorily struck down an Ohio tax on the Bank's branch there. But McCulloch also had the effect of legitimizing proposals for a system of roads and canals across the country; like the Bank, such internal improvements entailed a larger, more active national government, intervening in the states under a broad construction of Congress's express and implied powers.
As Ellis notes, conventional scholarship on McCulloch discusses the decision in Justice Marshall's terms, focusing on his reading of the Constitution, his premise of a national, sovereign “We the People,” and his rigor in demonstrating Congress's powers and the states' limitations. This formal or nonhistorical approach certainly has merit—since the Constitution as a written law must be intelligible to be applicable—and Ellis's book does not attempt to rebut Marshall's theory or logic. Yet, if the Constitution can or ought to be understood apart from—or above—partisan politics of this or that time, the same cannot be simply said of judicial review. The Court's most controversial examples—its most far-reaching statements about the Constitution—have come as it has taken cases that enter into (and try to settle) deep political disputes: Dred Scott v. Sanford, Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, Bush v. Gore. The evidence that Aggressive Nationalism impressively marshals suggests that McCulloch v. Maryland belongs on that list.
