Among the enormous number of histories of Darwin and evolutionary theories, there has long been a gap about language. This is perhaps a sign of the academic separation between scholars who privilege language as the ground in terms of which to understand everything else and biologists – and those drawn to the history of biology – who cannot imagine what could be more fundamental than the processes which interest them. Be this as it may, here for review is a history that fills the gap, a history meticulously researched and referenced, a resource which future studies of the fate of evolutionary theories should take on board. It is also an extremely good historical narrative about the science of what links and what divides humans and animals, the boundary along which, so many people have thought, runs the wall of language. ‘Disagreements over animal language are often disagreements over the principles that should guide objective inquiry into the human–animal border’ (pp. 4–5). In addition, no one will doubt, the question of ‘the simian tongue’, whether monkeys have language, has seized and still does seize the public imagination. This study does the topic justice, discussing ‘the principles that should drive objective inquiry’ (like eliminating anthropomorphism) as well as the substantive content of results. There is less on the public reaction, at least for the later period. The book is a fine accomplishment, accessible and well written, highly informative and reflectively structured around ‘the big question’ of the evolution of language, a question as relevant to modern scientists as to historians of biology or the human sciences.
The issues have been very complex – what, after all, is a language? – and following them has involved cutting across nineteenth-century philology, modern linguistics, anthropology, psychology, anatomy and evolutionary biology, in all their varieties. It has also involved moving between different kinds of representations of the issues in highly technical sciences, in world views and in journalism. Gregory Radick is consistently thoughtful about this. He structures his account around, in his judgement, a key experiment and a key claim: the use of a machine, initially the phonograph, to record monkeys or apes and then to play back to the animals their own voices or the voices of their own kind, work which led to the dramatic claim that some animals at least have the capacity for semantic reference. Radick is particularly fascinated by the historical fact that the phonograph was used in this way in the 1890s, and that such work basically disappeared, only to return in the 1970s, producing the major evidence for animal semantics. Radick uses what might at first glance look like a historical curiosity to explore in historical detail why certain scientific questions become the ‘natural’ ones to ask and what the shaping of disciplinary practices had to do with this. The study therefore focuses on the central question of change in science – as a pointed conclusion well brings out.
The book begins with the arguments of the Sanskrit scholar Max Müller for a ‘language barrier’ ring-fencing ‘the human’, arguments he formulated at just the time Darwin published on evolution. It then moves through the debate over the localization of language in the brain, and associated argument over the anatomical possibility of animal language, to comparative psychology after Darwin and the formulation of Lloyd Morgan's ‘canon’, a much-cited principle to restrict anthropomorphic enthusiasm in descriptions of what animals can do. Radick then brings in the work of the self-made ‘Professor’ Garner (about whom he previously published in this journal, in the year 2000), who used the phonograph for playback with monkeys in zoos, claimed – to popular fanfare and delight – that apes have language, and then went to West Africa to produce more farce than science, though a number of people, including Robert Yerkes (who founded a major primate laboratory), took his questions very seriously. Subsequently, both comparative psychologists and anthropologists moved away from the kind of speculative evolutionary work, with built-in assumptions about the hierarchy of human types, that Garner exemplified. Then, beginning with the field studies of British ornithologists, the new European ethology of the 1930s, a new science of ‘communication’ and a post-war reshaping of physical anthropology brought the whole area of the comparability of human language and animal communication back to the centre of scientific as well as public interest. Radick gives prominence to the English-born biologist Peter Marler, later head of the Rockefeller University field centre for animal behaviour studies, and traces in detail the route which led him from chaffinch song to support for playback experiments with the alarm calls of the vervet monkey in the Amboseli reserve in Kenya. It was possible to interpret these calls as demonstrating animal semantics, and the book ends with this claim in the years around 1980. Such field studies shifted attention away from the previous efforts, endlessly argued over and embedded in the disciplines of psychology, to teach language to chimpanzees (Washoe, Sarah and others) – shifted attention from experimental psychology to the field, the animals' natural world, to which the public was beginning to attach significant moral qualities.
The study is very complete in its own terms, and the vivacity as well as authority of the author's voice makes for a very satisfying read. There are relevant and evocative illustrations. If I have a query, it is to wonder what alternative plots might be possible; that is, to ask what other stories might we tell about ‘the simian tongue’ and the human–animal border. Does the story have to focus on the playback experiment? Would another author, with other enthusiasms, tell a significantly different story? The account so well put forward here begins from a point which, I would think, biologists will very much welcome and identify with – they will look back and see where their work and practices have come from. But I wonder whether other stories about changing theories of language, with their implications for being human and for being animal, might be told.
