Against a Hindu God: Buddhist Philosophy of Religion in India examines and interprets Ratnakīrti's (c. 1000–1050 ce) anti-īśvara arguments, which target the rational theology championed by the Nyāya school of Hindu philosophy. Ratnakīrti stands as one of the last great masters of India's Yogācāra Buddhism. As the inheritor and interpreter of more than a half century of sophisticated philosophical reflection, he is a worthy subject for the kind of close study that Parimal G. Patil provides. Moreover, because Ratnakīrti—as noted by Patil—tends to present his opponents' views fairly and thoroughly, his work is a fitting place to become acquainted with the broader dialectic between Nyāya and Buddhism over the status of īśvara. Owing to its “transdisciplinary” nature (pp. 5–8), this book is intended for students and scholars of Buddhist philosophy and religion, Indian philosophy more generally, and those interested in philosophy of religion, language, and epistemology, regardless of whether they are familiar with South Asian culture and history.

Against a Hindu God is structured as follows: First, there is a discussion of methodological concerns and strategy (chapter 1). Next, Patil provides a nuanced interpretation of Nyāya epistemology and natural theology (chapter 2). Chapter 3, the fulcrum of the book, examines Ratnakīrti's case against Nyāya's argument for īśvara, with extensive focus on the epistemology of inference. This is followed by a fairly thorough interpretation of Ratnakīrti's account of apohavāda, which provides insight into his critique of Nyāya's approach to inductive generalization (chapters 4–5). Finally, there is a consideration of why Ratnakīrti and his forbears consider epistemological reflection and good epistemic habits that are crucial for Buddhist practice (chapter 6).

Patil has a number of objectives. There are narrow aims: a close reading and interpretation of Ratnakīrti's criticism of Nyāya's argument for God; an explication of the epistemological issues that undergird Ratnakīrti's arguments and illustrate that his broader concern with the nature of reasonable belief and rationality; a study of Ratnakīrti's development of the apoha theory of meaning (and, as Patil argues, mental content); and an illustration of the large degree to which Ratnakīrti's theory of inferential reasoning presupposes a coherent and compelling articulation of the apoha theory. Beyond this, Patil has broader disciplinary aims: to illustrate that scholarly work on classical South Asia (particularly Buddhism) may (or should sometimes) be done in such a way that the relevance of the original texts and thinkers are evident to those who work outside South Asian studies (p. 4). Related to this, he wants to illustrate that working through a classical text “from the inside”—by thinking through the arguments provided and not merely considering socioeconomic influences—is an important way to study South Asian traditions, a method that has been wrongly devalued by many in the discipline (pp. 6–8).

In large measure, Patil succeeds. Regarding his narrow aims, Patil provides the most cogent explanation and interpretation of Ratnakīrti's criticism of Nyāya's argument that I have seen. He identifies the core epistemological issues, and his treatment of them is lucid, philosophically subtle, and historically sensitive, as is his explication and interpretation of Ratnakīrti's version of the apoha theory. He also deftly ties the two together. Ratnakīrti's chief criticism is that Nyāya epistemology has no resources to rule out potential counterexamples to putative inductive generalizations (vyāptis), and therefore does not allow for successful inference. But unless Ratnakīrti can provide such resources, his position could degenerate into an undesirable inductive skepticism. Patil illustrates that Ratnakīrti's development of the apoha theory provides a method to rule out even potential counterexamples, and therefore is a key plank in his argument against Nyāya.

To succeed in Patil's broader aims, Against a Hindu God should be the kind of book that is attractive and useful across disciplines, and an example to South Asianists of the importance of studying texts “from the inside.” From the point of view of philosophy (my discipline), I think that Patil clearly succeeds on the first objective. He is remarkably conversant in contemporary philosophy, and deploys much philosophical skill in his analysis of Ratnakīrti. Non-Indianist philosophers of religion (and language) who are willing to work through the text will be rewarded and impressed, and they likely will come away with an appreciation for the enduring value of classical Indian thought. The degree to which the second objective is met is unclear, as time is needed to gauge such developments. In chapter 6, Patil amply illustrates that for Buddhist thinkers, at least, there is a clear connection between philosophical theorizing and sādhana. Therefore, it seems that understanding how they philosophized is an entirely reasonable approach to the study of their religious lives.

The biggest obstacle to Patil's convincing doubters of this fact, I think, is that for the untrained, it simply is not easy to follow vigorous philosophical argumentation. This is par for the course in philosophy, and no fault of his. But to the degree that he wants to keep the attention of those who are wary of philosophy, he could have done more “framing” work earlier in the book, illustrating in more detail how Ratnakīrti's apoha doctrine and his atheism flow from his core commitments to classical Buddhist attitudes. While such loose ends are tied up in chapters 5 and 6, the reader must work though about 100 pages of dense argumentation to get there.