David Meyer's book retells the history of innovation in the U.S. machinery industry from a sociologist's point of view. It sets out to show that the networks of innovation that characterize the Silicon Valley today had a much earlier antecedent in the antebellum East of the United States. Then as now, much technical knowledge was transferred through high-skilled workers in the early stages of their careers, when they switched jobs frequently. Although it took nineteenth-century “job-hoppers” many more years to make the jump than it would take today's Silicon Valley engineers, Meyer makes this point convincingly. His proof comes through in many case studies of young machinists between 1790 and 1860 whose migratory patterns and network ties transferred knowledge about best-practice technologies to their new employers and, later on, friends.
Social elites played an important role in the construction and growth of the machinists' networks. Initially, information about new types of machinery such as Boulton and Watt's double-acting engine percolated through members of the political elite, including Thomas Jefferson and John Adams (p. 33). In other cases, representatives of the legislative and executive branches in Washington were the first to learn of a new patent application (p. 190). Patronage of the social, political, and economic elite powered the rise of Philadelphia and New York as centers of steam engineering (p. 42). In New York, for example, leading foundry owners cooperated with the elite in the founding of the Franklin Institute in 1824 (p. 115).
But wealthy politicians and businessmen also provided critical political contacts and financial support to cover the large capital outlays required for the establishment of iron foundries (pp. 31, 138). In an environment of social connections between elite families and machine shops, sons of prominent families were attracted to the machinist's profession (p. 273). The Brandywine Valley residents John Poole and Edward Bancroft epitomized the movements of the sons of the professional and business elite into machinist careers. They shamelessly drew on the financial resources of their elite families and on the network ties of these family members. Charles DuPont—member of the wealthy Du Pont family of gunpowder manufacturers, and a founder of the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia—provided a loan of 100 dollars to underwrite Poole and Bancroft's first trip to learn about machine manufacture in other factories (pp. 139–40).
Always in short supply, talented machinists were able to force employers to make peace with the fact that they might leave and transfer the skills that they had acquired to competitors (pp. 72, 170). The example of locomotive manufactures illustrates this:
The job-hopping of top machinists early in their career transmitted technical skills and crated strong network bridges among the leading machinists and their firms, facilitating know-how trading about the construction of engines and sustaining a community of practice of locomotive building. Consequently, even the big three of Baldwin, Norris, and Rogers could not exert structural constraints on other producers to prevent them from acquiring top machinists and technical innovations in locomotive building. (p. 171)
The geographic focus of machinist networks resulted in a substantial amount of persistent geographic concentration. Between 1790 and 1820, for example, one-third of all steam-related patents originated from New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore (p. 36). At the same time, 70 percent of all U.S. patents originated from these cities and their hinterlands. New York City and its New Jersey satellites accounted for 23 percent of the East's patents (p. 37). In 1840 Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore housed over 40 percent of U.S. and 55 percent of the East's machinery manufacturing (p. 129). In 1860 as few as 31 counties housed 82 percent of the value of machinery production (p. 142). In textile machinery, Boston and Providence accounted for roughly two-thirds of the nation's industry (p. 213). Machinists within these centers integrated into a community of practice, which strengthened their competitive advantage (p. 129). Incremental improvements of technologies, such as improvements in wheel and axle machining or repair strategies for locomotives, were transferred within these networks (p. 19)
Networks also served to connect and transfer knowledge across industries. For at least four decades after 1860, machine tools formed a set of skills that were transferred across many types of firms. Because the size of each individual industry was too small to support specialization (except for sewing machines and another few other industries) there was no room as yet for a specialized machine tools industry (pp. 21, 277). Firms did not specialize in one line (p. 276). Larger, practicing communities encompassed multiple industrial sectors as some machinists moved across them during their careers. As a result, machinists acquired skills that could be transferred through a broad range of industries. For example, the Matteawan Company and the Providence machine shops were prominent trainers of machinists of locomotives, even though they built few locomotives (p. 276).
Once embedded in these networks, knowledge survived the departure of individuals and firms. Individuals could have short or long careers, and companies could survive for a brief time or last for decades, but knowledge of their technical skills and innovations remained accessible within the network of machinists. Networked Machinists provides a rich and convincing narrative of the origins, structure, and the influence of these networks.
