In this book, Steven Saxonberg provides cross-regional comparisons of transitions from communism with cases of nontransitions. Along with an examination of the well-known European cases, he incorporates the less-studied examples of transition from communism in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Ethiopia. Building on Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan’s (1996) work in Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Saxonberg expands their terminology and categorization of communist regimes to include failed totalitarianism, regimes where the Communists try but never succeed in instituting totalitarianism. He explains the development of the five categories of communist regime types (totalitarian, early post-totalitarian, freezing post-totalitarian, maturing post-totalitarian, and failed totalitarian) as the result of different stages of legitimacy in communist regimes. During the totalitarian period, communist regimes have hegemonic control over society. When they are post-totalitarian regimes, “pragmatic acceptance” replaces ideological legitimacy for most citizens. In addition, the author also labels North Korea, Romania before 1990, Cuba, and Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milošević as patrimonial communist regimes.

Using the categorization of different types of communist regimes as a starting point, Saxonberg then develops a theory that incorporates structural and emotive factors to explain the development of revolutionary moments in communist states. A revolutionary situation will occur when there is an economic downturn and widespread expectations for reform, the regime undertakes actions that anger the population, and the opposition intellectuals are able to ally with the workers and communicate with the public (p. 23). The different regime types explain the outcome (revolt, negotiated pact, or failed transition) when a revolutionary situation arises. For example, Saxonberg argues that there is a higher probability of revolutions in cases of freezing post-totalitarian regimes or patrimonial communist regimes than in maturing post-totalitarian regimes. Romania under Nicolae Ceauşescu was a totalitarian patrimonial regime, and therefore any transition was likely to be a revolution because there was no reformist faction within the Communist Party leadership available to negotiate a pact with the opposition.

Saxonberg makes several valuable contributions to the study of communist regimes, transitions, and nontransitions in this book. The inclusion of cases of both transition and nontransition (Cuba, Vietnam, China, and North Korea) is an important and unique contribution to the literature about regime transitions, as scholars rarely study the null cases in conjunction with successful cases of transition. The extensive cross-regional approach and the inclusion of cases of both transition and nontransition enable Saxonberg to discover important patterns about regime stability and regime change. For example, as long as a regime has “pragmatic acceptance,” then regime change is unlikely. Therefore, even though Vietnam and China have lost their ideological legitimacy by adopting capitalist reforms, the Vietnamese and Chinese are willing to accept Communist Party rule as long as they continue to ensure economic growth.

An additional insightful aspect of Saxonberg’s theory is his discussion concerning how the interests of intellectuals, workers, and professionals differ. The author argues that the professionals are hesitant to join any protest movements because their career is “highly dependent” on membership or connections with the Communist Party (p. 169). Therefore, successful regime change requires an alliance between the intellectuals and workers, which in turn depends on the ability of the intellectuals, such as students, to communicate with the workers. He expands our understanding of how these alliances developed by documenting the creative ways in which intellectuals can communicate with workers in repressive societies. In the case of Czechoslovakia, students gained access to factories by traveling with famous Czechoslovak actors and actresses (pp. 214–15). Along with these contributions, the discussion of why Stalin and Mao do not form patrimonial regimes—due to their ideological commitment to communism and poor relations with family members—is fascinating. Overall, Saxonberg provides a clear, well-argued, and compelling explanation of why regime change occurred in the Soviet Union and Central Europe.

The author’s desire to present a comprehensive, cross-regional theory of transitions and nontransitions from communism does present a few challenges for his argument. First, there are some questions about the categorization of regime types. Saxonberg labels the cases of Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Grenada as failed totalitarianism. However, in the case of Nicaragua, he himself acknowledges that many scholars would dispute this depiction of the 1980s Sandinista regime (p. 52). Furthermore, the Sandinistas’ decision to allow free elections raises questions about the claim that they wanted to develop a totalitarian regime. In addition, it is confusing that Saxonberg categorizes Yugoslavia under Milošević as nontransition but Romania under Ion Iliescu as a transition. He argues that Milošević was a Communist who never denounced Marxist-Leninism (p. 8). However, given that Milošević allowed multiparty and semifree elections (p. 9), it is hard to see how Yugoslavia during the early 1990s is different from Romania, which was also ruled by a former Communist with questionable democratic credentials.

Second, within Saxonberg’s own discussion, there are exceptions to his theory about the causes of transition and nontransition. For example, he argues that successful revolutions involve a coalition between intellectuals and the workers. However, in the East German case, Saxonberg acknowledges that this did not occur (p. 199). He also points out that in Romania, there was “no network of dissenting intellectuals” available to coordinate with workers to organize a revolt against the regime (p. 199). Given the exceptions to his argument within his own cases, it is hard to evaluate how important the alliance between workers and intellectuals really is for explaining successful revolutions. The case of Cuba is also problematic for Saxonberg’s theory, as he does not fully explain why there has been no transition. As the author documents, the Cuban regime has lost ideological legitimacy and pragmatic acceptance, it has experienced economic crisis, and under Raoul Castro there have been expectations of reform that have not been fully realized (pp. 311–15). According to Saxonberg’s argument, Cuba has almost all of the conditions for revolt, but revolt has not occurred.

Third, although the growing literature about authoritarian persistence and durability does not usually examine communist countries, engaging and debating this literature in connection with these cases would have been a helpful and interesting contribution. As China and Vietnam have moved beyond communism, arguments about how authoritarian regimes maintain power are especially relevant to these two cases. Discussing or integrating arguments such as Jason Brownlee’s about the importance of ruling party cohesion for authoritarian persistence (Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, 2007) or Steven Levitsky and Lucian Way’s arguments about the coercive capacity of the regime (Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War, 2010) would enhance the explanations of nontransition. For example, Brownlee’s insights about the methods used by authoritarian regimes to maintain elite unity would enrich Saxonberg’s discussion of the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party leadership has managed to prevent major elite defections.

Despite these issues, Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism demonstrates impressive research about a wide range of cases, a task rarely undertaken by most scholars. In addition, Saxonberg makes important contributions to the study of regime change by improving our knowledge of events in these specific cases and our general understanding of communist transitions and nontransitions.