INTRODUCTION
Based on the British Defense Regulations (BDR) from the British Mandate for PalestineFootnote 1, the State of Israel outlawed the Islamic Movement Northern Faction in Israel (IMNF) on November 17, 2015, accusing the group of incitement, racism, and terrorism. The group's controversial leader, Sheykh Raed Salah, who is widely viewed as the protector and defender of Al-Aqsa Mosque, was sentenced to 9 months in prison.Footnote 2 A year later, Sheykh Kamal Khatib, former deputy leader of IMNF, declared that IMNF had been a tool to serve the Islamic project and that, regardless of having been outlawed, the movement “would find a “thousand ways” to serve that project.”Footnote 3 This paper explains Israel's decision to outlaw the movement and examines the methods and strategies adopted by the IMNF and Salah that prompted the state's actions.
Drawing upon interviews with IMNF key figures and publications, other Arab political figures and activists (see the Appendix for details), and material from the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, I argue that outlawing the IMNF represents a dramatic shift in Israeli policy for two main reasons: first, because for decades Israel had been characterized by a reluctance to take decisive action against a group whose direct involvement in terrorism has never been proven, and second, because historically, Israel had viewed Arab nationalism, not Islamism, as its main threat.Footnote 4 Although there has been a real worry in Israel regarding the growing Islamist challenge, I further contend that the decision was based on political and personal calculations rather than on national and regional security pressures. As for IMNF motivations and actions that prompted Israel's decision, I argue that the movement bolstered its power, popularity, and survival from its ability to escape alienation in the Jewish state by shifting its focus to issues concerning the general Muslim Ummah (Muslim community) rather than the plight of Palestinians in Israel.Footnote 5 Even so, while Salah's fascination with al-Aqsa appeals more strongly to Muslims outside of the state of Israel than those within it, his actions are of far greater consequence to internal concerns than to regional affairs, in that they disrupt politics and highlight the continually disaffected status of the Palestinian people.Footnote 6
I rely on the trapped minority model, which suggests that trapped minorities are alienated and marginalized on two different fronts—within their home state and their mother nation—in order to explain the IMNF methods that eventually provoked the policy change. The trapped minority model is applied to indigenous minorities (seen as more complicated minorities) rather than an immigrant or exiled minorities (simple minorities) when members of this minority are spread across two or more political entities. Members of trapped minorities are indigenous people who claim rights to the land and are caught in dual marginality by being held between these two centers of political gravity. Transnationalism is presented as an alternative for the trapped minority.
While the model was developed and applied to trapped national/ethnic minorities such as the Palestinian national minority in Israel, I find its application useful to explain the IMN, which is a subgroup of that minority. In this application, I also replace the mother nation with the Islamic Ummah with which the IMNF identifies. Characterized by five main features, the model seems an even better fit, sometimes, to explain subgroup rather than a minority as a whole: (1) The indigenous minority is defeated and faces a historical trauma, becoming a marginalized minority by the victorious hegemonic majority. (2) The trapped minority becomes marginalized twice: by its host state and by its mother state/nation. (3) The trapped minority faces internal divisions stemming from the debate over its position between the host state and the mother nation and has difficulty in forming unity. (4) The trapped minority remains non-assimilating by choice; the more hostile the relationship between the state and the minority, the more likely it is that the host state will regard the trapped minority quest to maintain a separate national identity as dangerous. (5) The trapped minority is inevitably influenced by relations between its host state and its mother state (Rabinowitz Reference Rabinowitz2001, 64–85).
This paper comes at a time when the clash between Islamist movements and their mother or host states has been intensifying in many Middle Eastern countries and has become central to recent scholarship on Islamism, which seeks to govern according to principles of religion and objects to many Western values, especially since the so-called “Arab Spring.”Footnote 7 This paper contributes to the understanding of dynamics within Islamist movements and their challenges through the examination of Islamism in Israel.
THE PALESTINIAN TRAUMA
From a historical perspective, many mark the beginning of the Islamic political organization or Islamism in Palestine as the 1936 visit of Abd El-Rahman al-Banna, brother of Muslim Brothers (MB) Movement found Hasan al Banna, to Palestine during the Arab Revolt against the British Mandate, and his meeting with Amin Al-Husseini, the Palestinian Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. A decade later the first branch of the MB was established, and it was not long before the movement had 25 branches and about 20,000 members (Daoud Reference Daoud2016a; Israeli Reference Israeli1993, 16–18).
Besides the national, political, and social-economic nakba (or, catastrophe)Footnote 8, Palestinian Muslims who remained in Israel faced also a religious nakba. The Islamist movement, which developed under the mandate period, suffered a major setback: all the movement's institutions in the newly formed Jewish state were shut down, and the movement was unable to recover. Moreover, the Arab leadership fled; Palestinians in Israel were left without religious guidance or religious courts, and access to Islam was hindered. More than 113 mosques (of the 313 total at that time) were destroyed, and many others were confiscated and turned into bars, clubs, or museums; some were turned into synagogues (Hussein Reference Hussein2015). Muslims in Israel were also banned from fulfilling one of the most important religious duties: traveling to Mecca for pilgrimage.Footnote 9
Based on the BDR, which parallel the regular legal system, the newly established government imposed military rule (1948–1966) over its Palestinian citizens, placing almost unlimited restrictions on civilian freedoms.Footnote 10 The military rule aimed to co-opt them, preventing them from serving as a “fifth column,” preventing Palestinian “infiltration,” and controlling their land and resources to help absorb the new Jewish immigrants (Lustick Reference Lustick1980, 63). Abolishing military rule took place only when the defense establishment believed that its goal of “breaking” the Arabs in Israel had succeeded (Shapira Reference Shapira and Benyamin1998, 658). Under this rule, Israel outlawed several Palestinian movements, all secular, including the Nasserist Harakat al-Ard (The Land's Movement), established in 1958, and the parliamentary movement “Socialist List.” The Israeli Communist Party was the only Arab non-Zionist party (which comprised both Palestinian and Jewish members) allowed by law to exist, and it enjoyed a special status as the only party to speak for the “heart” of Palestinians in Israel. Unlike the IMNF that emerged later, these outlawed movements were not particularly popular among Palestinians in Israel. Traumatized by the war, the Palestinians focused primarily on survival, and thus Palestinian minority political activism was relatively passive (Haklai Reference Haklai2011, 5–6, 71–73). Palestinian citizens kept their distance from political activity for fear of the regime's reactions. The adaptive political behavior of Arab citizens during the 1960s was an expression of their fear and desperation (Daoud Reference Daoud2009, 29).
Ending military rule did not extirpate legal, social, economic, and political discrimination against the Palestinian citizens of Israel. The 1970s, however, witnessed a significant improvement in the economic and living conditions of the Palestinians in Israel, and with increasing education, especially at the college level, Arab students became heavily politicized on Israeli campuses. Also during these years, the Islamic Movement (IM) started to form. It emerged in the early 1980s, after a decade of underground operation, as a new political force among the Palestinians in Israel. Unlike all other Arab parties, whether outlawed or functioning, this was the first and only organized party articulating Islamist views.
The revival of Islamism in Israel in the 1970s existed in a more complicated environment than in other Middle Eastern countries, being part of a “minority guest culture within an inhospitable Jewish majority host-culture” and facing the trauma of complete incompatibility with Jewish-Zionist ideology (Ghanem and Mustafa Reference Ghanem and Mustafa2014, 346). The fact that it had no chance of ruling or acquiring state power because of its minority status further distinguishes it from other Islamist movements in the region (Rubin Reference Rubin2014, 13–14). Since the Palestinian MB leadership was never allowed to gain traction in the Israeli new state, the IM in the 1970s was not an extension of it. According to MK Masuod Ghanayem, the IM in Israel “was not rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood's presence in Palestine during the British Mandate period but was influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in its theological and political thought.”Footnote 11
MARGINALIZED TWICE
The trapped minority model suggests that neither the host state nor the mother nation is “in a position to offer members of the trapped minority a viable option of full incorporation” (Rabinowitz Reference Rabinowitz2001, 64–85). While this characteristic applies fully to the Palestinian minority in Israel as a whole, it fits the IMNF only partially. With some modification, however, it can serve as an interesting tool for explaining the IMNF’s methods.
The conditional integration of Palestinian citizens into state institutions has created a complex reality in which the system simultaneously includes and excludes them. Living on the margins of Israeli society, both economically and politically, has opened the door for more radical Islamism to take root among Palestinians. Israel, as the host state, grants its Palestinian Arabs permission to remain in the new state, political rights including Israeli citizenship, the right to vote and run for public office, and free speech and movement (Ghanem Reference Ghanem2001a). Still, the state refrains from offering its Palestinian citizens full incorporation, and it excludes them from positions of power. As a Jewish state, rather than a state of all its citizens, Israel discriminates against Palestinian Arabs legally and economically.Footnote 12 And yet, Palestinians in Israel experience an accelerated process of modernization, including adopting democratic values and respecting the law. These values filter down to virtually all levels of the Palestinian family unit. Palestinians also benefit hugely from the compulsory education law, and overall, Palestinians in general and Muslims, in particular, are more educated, having fewer children, and more active on social media than ever before; these are all developments that the IM leaders (of both factions) cannot ignore (Daoud April 2016; Peleg and Waxman Reference Peleg and Waxman2011, 32–46).
Tal Nachman (Reference Nachman2000, 1–15) has argued that extreme Islam in Israel, as in the entire Arab world, is not a purely religious-political movement. Its roots grow from economic distress, social gaps, and a lack of faith in government agencies. Nachman further suggests that it is in the best interest of the state to address these problems. In contrast, Raphael Israeli rejects “deprivation, neglect and under-development compared to the Jews” (Israeli Reference Israeli1993, 149–150) as reasons for the rise of the IM in Israel and considers such explanations to be too simplistic in nature. Providing a more valid argument, Israeli questions why Islamist parties were not popular among Palestinians prior to the 1980s and why better off, educated, and professional Muslims were drawn into the movement. He suggests its rise is “part of the universal wave of return to Islam” (Israeli Reference Israeli1993, 149–150) sweeping the region rather than a result of the Palestinian conflict with Israel and its associated troubles (Rubin Reference Rubin2014, 13–14).Footnote 13 Thus, excluded from their mother nation, Palestinian citizens found themselves in an awkward situation, carrying the Israeli citizenship and living in a state that was at war with its own people (Peri Reference Peri and Benyamin1998, 343–357; Rekhess Reference Rekhess2014, 188). Elie Rekhess (Reference Rekhess2014) uses the “1948 Paradigm” concept to explain the contradictory policies established by the state of Israel in regard to its Palestinian citizens. These policies offer Palestinians full citizenship yet simultaneously exclude them from nation building and view them as a security threat (Rekhess Reference Rekhess2014).
They were also treated as suspect by other Arab countries and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords by Israel and the PLO hurled Palestinians in Israel into a new crisis, for it neglected them, did not recognize them as an essential part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and dismissed them as an “internal Israeli” issue. Feeling cast aside by the PLO, most of the Palestinian leadership in Israel concluded that their future lay within the borders of Israel and not within a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. They thus turned their attention to the struggle for equality and integration within Israel, demanding collective rights and an acknowledgment by the state of their identity as an indigenous national minority (Daoud Reference Daoud2009, 39–40). The IMNF, I would argue, adopted another strategy to deal with this exclusion and its further alienation from other Arab parties. Salah drew closer to Islamist movements more aligned with his views such as the Palestinian MB's branch Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) in the Gaza Strip and to countries such as Qatar and Turkey, which both gave Palestinians substantial financial and political support.
In sum, the characteristic of exclusion from the mother nation does not fit the IMNF. The opposite is true; outside entities offered the IMNF, support, recognition, inclusion, and even finances to pursue its agenda in the host state. Interestingly, the IMNF did face dual marginalization, but not from its host state and mother nation; instead, the IMNF was marginalized by its host state (Israel) and other Palestinian groups active in Israel, as the following section will demonstrate.
THE INTERNAL CHALLENGE
The Palestinian Democratic for Peace and Equality (DFPE), founded in 1977 as an Umbrella organization including several groups with a dominant Israeli Communist party leadership, was very critical of the IM and accused it of harboring regressive political and social positions aimed at taking women “backwards.” (Daoud, Fall 2016). IM's stunning 1989 victory, when it defeated DFPE popular candidate and former mayor Hashem Mahameed in local elections in Umm el-Fahm, further contributed to the DFPE's hostility toward the new force. This was especially important due to Umm el-Fahm's status as the largest Palestinian Muslim city in Israel and the second largest Arab city in Israel by population. Salah was only 31 years of age when he became mayor of his hometown. He served the city for 15 years (three terms) and, in 2000, resigned to focus his attention on al-Aqsa.
Facing DFPE hostility, the IM wanted to prove that it was not a reactionary movement but a moderate one. However, the IM often contradicted itself and on many occasions, it was attacked by other Arab parties and activists over its conservatism (Daoud Reference Daoud2009, 69–70). One example of the IM's conservatism occurred during the 1980s when some IM members called for an end to the mixed educational system, specifically in areas where the movement was powerful, such as in Umm el-Fahm. These attempts were widely condemned by Palestinians in Israel.
The increased emphasis on wearing strict Islamic dress also provoked criticism. DFPE former Knesset member Afo Aghbaria claimed that “legendary numbers” (80%) of women in Umm el-Fahm wore hijab as a result of the IMNF's pressure on the parents, attributing the trend to the “Islamic wind that started to blow in the Arab World, which made IMNF more extreme” (Daoud Reference Daoud2016b, 37). The leader of the DFPE, MK Ayman Odeh, criticized the niqab and was sharply rebuked by IMNF supporters. While accusations of forcing women to wear the hijab or other “Islamic dress” were dismissed by IM members and IM women (Daoud, ibid, 37–38), Amal from Tamra city, who is married to an IMNF member, dared to speak about a different reality: “I did not want to wear the hijab. My husband forced me. He joined IMNF, and it was not acceptable that a wife of an IMNF member goes unveiled.” (Daoud Reference Daoud2017a, Reference Daoudb).
The use of religion for political gain by the IMNF was another topic of criticism. Aghbaria said: “We refuse to allow the mosques to become a focus for political activism. They should stay only a place for prayer and worshiping.”Footnote 14 However, as a populist movement, the IMNF sponsored different activities inside the mosques besides religious activities and worshiping. One mosque in Umm el-Fahm, for example, was also a center of other activities including social activities, sport, and even medical assistance (Aburaiya Reference Aburaiya2004, 443). Aghbaria also accused IMNF members of using violence in Umm el-Fahm by attacking the office of the Communist party in the city where young members, male and female, worked together at night. However, Zaki Ighbariyyeh, a member of the IMNF, reacted:
In the early 1970s, with the beginning of the IM, several mutual attacks between the IM and the Communist party took place in Umm el-Fahm. That was 30 years ago. Today all parties in the city are involved in the Popular Committee, and we have mutual respect for each other. However, there are people with the old mentality still living the dreams of the USSR.Footnote 15
FACING DIFFICULTIES FORMING A UNITED FRONT – THE SPLIT
In 1979, young Palestinian men, citizens of Israel, who were attracted to religion and studied in Islamic colleges in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) started to organize underground under the name Usrat al-Jihad (Family of the Jihad). The movement's founder, Sheykh Abdallah Nimr Darweesh was among the first students to study Islam in Nablus in the West Bank. However, the movement was uncovered by the Israeli security forces and accused of terrorist activities, Darweesh and other members were jailed for 3 years.
Upon the release of Darweesh in 1981, along with the other notable leaders in the organization, Usrat al-Jihad, was renamed the IMFootnote 16 and established itself as a pragmatic, reformist, and moderate social religious organization with Darweesh at its head (Ghanem Reference Ghanem2001a, 124; Rubin Reference Rubin2015). Sheykh Raed Salah, who was one of the Usrat al-Jihad released members, became a senior leader under Darweesh in a movement that denounced terrorism and violence, recognized the state, and accepted the status of Arabs as a minority, within a Jewish majority nation (Kiwan Reference Kiwan2010, 196; Rubin Reference Rubin2014),Footnote 17 that embraced four identities: Muslim, Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli (Ghanem Reference Ghanem2001a, 125–128).
However, in 1996, the IM split into two factions over conflicting positions on the Oslo Accords and candidacy within national elections.Footnote 18 The two factions split along lines of leadership, ideology, and geography (Daoud Spring 2016, 1).Footnote 19 The more pragmatic IM Southern Faction (IMSF) under the leadership of the movement's founder, Darweesh, recognized the Oslo Accords, and members ran for national elections as part of a coalition of other Arab parties. The Northern Faction, on the other hand, led by Salah, opposed the Oslo Accords and active participation in national elections. They believed that participation would imply recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, and they considered the Knesset to be “the supreme establishment of the Zionist project” (Ghanem and Mustafa Reference Ghanem and Mustafa2014, 346). Thus, IMNF was viewed by many observers and the state as the more radical of the two factions.Footnote 20 While the IMSF chose to accept its inferior minority status by adapting to the political game of running in national elections and coordinating with state institutions (Daoud, April 2016, 8), IMNF chose a more radical route. However, it continued to claim that it is a moderate movement.
Even after the IM movement was outlawed, Salah's powerful yet controversial deputy, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, emphasized that the movement would only use “political, social and preaching” tools rather than violence against Israel's decision (Daoud Reference Daoud2017a, Reference Daoudb) Emphasizing moderation, Khatib also said in an interview: “We were always in the internal Palestine (Israel) and still consider ourselves amongst the moderate school. Thus, we rejected, and still reject, the thinking and fatwas (Islamic verdicts) that come from those who are far from our reality and the peculiarities of our circumstances in the internal Palestinian.”Footnote 21 In correspondence, Ibrahim Sarsour, a senior leader of the IMSF, illustrated some main differences between the two factions, saying, “The difference between us and the Northern Faction is that we want to be an integral part of the Israeli society and build bridges … while the Northern faction prefers to cut with every path of life in the state” (Daoud, Spring 2016, 7).
With many failed efforts to unite the IM, all other major Arab political parties including the secular DFPE and NDA (secular National Democratic Alliance) chose unity in the 2015 national elections. Shunning parliamentary works as a strategy for its political activism, the IMNF stood alone, choosing to escalate its discourse, methods, and practices against the state as well as toward some basic convictions among Palestinians in Israel who rejected Islamization and the ability of radical Islam to challenge their inferior status in Israel. Keeping unity “is the answer against the biggest challenge for us as a minority in Israel,” said IMSF MK Ghanayem (Daoud, Spring 2016, 15). However, this unity has never included the IMNF, which has alienated itself from Palestinian groups to associate with the broader Ummah.
THE TRAPPED MINORITY IS UNLIKELY TO ASSIMILATE
Palestinians in Israel are not only a non-assimilating ethnic and national minority, but also a minority that has been increasingly demanding a “practical equality and partnership” change in Israel, transforming it from a “Jewish state” to a state of all its citizens (The Future Vision 2006). The Land Day, which started in 1976 as a general peaceful strike by Palestinians in response to the Israeli government's decision to continue its policy of confiscating Palestinian lands, turned into a bloodbath as six Palestinian demonstrators were shot to death by the Israeli police. It was a turning point in the struggle between Palestinian citizens and the state, Palestinian citizens would no longer be a quiet minority; their challenges to the state would increase both inside and outside formal politics and organizations. Some of these new movements started to voice opposition to the nature of the state (Haklai Reference Haklai2011). The 2006 “Future Vision” document, shaped by main Arab political parties and movements in Israel, represented a growing assertiveness and political awareness among the Palestinian leadership. The document demanded state recognition of the Palestinian minority in Israel as an indigenous national minority, as well as recognition of the Palestinian 1948 nakba. It also demanded equality and inclusion for Palestinian citizens and the right for Muslims and Christians to operate their holy sites.
Haklai (Reference Haklai2011, 178) argues, however, that the reality of Israeli politics, and particularly the dynamics of intra-Jewish politics, “makes accommodating the minority unlikely in the foreseeable future.” A growing number of young Muslims returning to religion is another indication that the option of assimilating is not applicable in the case of the Palestinian minority, the majority of whom are Muslim. “Religion is the salvation of our youth these days,” said one of the IM members in the Negev area, where the IM has been very popular (Miller Reference Miller2017). The Islamic dress had spread, as hijab has become very noticeable in public places and on Israeli campuses (Daoud, Fall 2016). While not necessarily indicating religiosity, this is an expression of a distinct identity of Muslim Palestinians in Israel.
With some modifications of the terms above, this assessment explains the recent clash between the state and the IMNF, as well as with Palestinian citizens in Israel. Relationships between minority and majority have been deteriorating in the last two decades. It seems that though the IMNF claims recognition of the state and acceptance of a minority status within a Jewish majority (Ghanem Reference Ghanem2001a, 125–126), actions of the IMNF deliver a different message. These claims were insufficient reasons for the state to continue to tolerate IMNF. Salah has tried to walk a fine line between his ideological and civic commitments; however, his politicizing of the al-Aqsa Mosque and attempts at the Islamization of Palestinian citizens of Israel, along with his vitriolic propaganda against Israel's practices towards al-Aqsa, made the clash with the state inevitable. Outlawing the IMNF no doubt marks a dramatic shift and a new era in the relationship among the state, the IMNF, and Israel's Arab minority in general.
With no exception, all Arab Knesset members from different political parties, including secular DFPE and NDA, considered the ban as directed against the whole Palestinian minority. NDA former leader Awad Abd el-Fattah said that Arab political parties and movements are facing an “unprecedented bloody incitement” (Almasar 2017); the worst of it was the outlaw and jailing of IMNF leader Salah as well as arrests of several NDA activists. According to Abd el-Fattah, Israel's objective is to reshape the political map of Palestinian citizens and reduce the danger they pose to the “Zionist project” (Almasar 2017). Deputy Khatib also said that, even after the outlaw, Israel continues to target the Islamist project and Palestinians in general (Daoud, March 2017, 7).
TRAPPED MINORITIES ARE “INEVITABLY” INFLUENCED BY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HOST STATE AND THEIR MOTHER STATE
Some critics of Israeli policy charge that the Jewish state deliberately encouraged the founding of Palestinian Hamas or facilitated its creation in order to fight the secular PLO leader Yasser Arafat. The PLO, an umbrella Palestinian organization considered a terrorist group by Israel, waged many attacks and kidnappings against Israel and Israelis in the 1970s and 1980s. Critics believe Israel saw Hamas as the counter organization to secular PLO and facilitated the creation of Hamas in 1987. In the 1980s, Israel also allowed the IM in Israel to function under the law; interestingly, this occurred while MB were persecuted and outlawed in other Middle Eastern countries, notably Egypt. Indeed, claims about connections between Israel and the IM in Israel are very old. Several members of the Communist party in Israel strongly believe that the IM was created by Israeli Shabak (the internal Israeli security agency) to counter the Communist party. Former Communist Knesset member Afo Aghbaria from Umm el-Fahm, Salah's city, viewed the rise of the IM in Israel as a ploy by Israeli intelligence to fight the strong nationalist Communist party and the DFPE. He said, “The Islamic Movement in Israel was created exactly the same way Hamas was created: to fight the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization]. It is obvious that the movement is the creation of the Israeli intelligence” (Daoud, Fall 2016, 27).
However, the relationship between the two groups has been not easy, especially after Hamas won democratic elections in 2006 and tightened its grip over the Gaza Strip. Israeli cabinet reaction to Hamas taking control of the PA (Palestinian Authority) was swift and direct: “Israel views the rise of Hamas as a dangerous milestone that turns the PA into a terrorist authority” (Jewish Virtual Library 2003). Since then, Israel has been at war with Hamas and tensions in Gaza have intensified in the past few years, resulting in three wars (2008–09, 2012, and 2014) (Foreign Policy 2014). Salah's and the IMNF alleged continued connections with Hamas and transferring money to it (Haklai Reference Haklai2011; Rubin Reference Rubin2015, 143)Footnote 22 and increased terrorist attacks by ISIS on the West, accompanied by political and personal difficulties, created a perfect opportunity for Prime Minister Netanyahu to establish the dramatic policy of outlawing the IMNF.
IMNF AND THE STATE
In explaining Israel's decision and motivations to outlaw the movement, I rely on policy analysis that suggests it is generally difficult to modify or overturn policies because institutions are complex and actors protect the existing model even if it is a suboptimal one (Pierson Reference Pierson2000). Thus, public policies and formal institutions are designed to be difficult to change so that past decisions encourage policy continuity. In addition, to introduce a major change, policymakers must wait for a critical juncture or a window of exceptional opportunity called conjuncture (Cerna Reference Cerna2013).
Peter Hall argues that in democracies, politicians compete for office using new approaches to old dilemmas, “precisely by propounding new solutions to collective problems which appeal to the electorate” (Hall Reference Hall Peter1993, 289). Indeed, the struggle of how to deal with the IM, especially since the 1996 split and the increased radicalization of Salah after the two Palestinian Intifadas, is certainly not a recent dilemma. Craig Larkin and Michael Dumper have suggested that the IM in Israel, in general, represents a unique challenge to Israel. Because IM members are Israeli citizens, the state cannot confront them the way it does Hamas; at the same time, it cannot ignore the movement's growing influence and spread (Larkin and Dumper Reference Larkin and Dumper2012, 31–52).
Israel's relatively liberal policies concerning freedom of expression allowed the IM to take advantage of the state's “high tolerance” for refusing to moderate its actions and discourse, argues Israel Israeli. The closing of the newspaper Sawt al-Haq wal-Hurriya in 1990 for a meager 3 months by the Minister of Interior, for example, was seen as a sign of weakness on Israel's part, and the success of other Islamist movements in the region empowered the groups further (Israeli Reference Israeli1993, 152–160).
Salah's convictions for incitement, spreading lies, assaulting a police officer, maintaining ties with Hamas, and leading a violent protest, are not new developments either (Rubin Reference Rubin2015). However, the Israeli state has never had a coherent policy for dealing with Palestinian political organizations that challenge its structure and framework. In fact, before outlawing the IMNF, Israel never had a formal policy concerning the IM as a whole.
Interestingly, Palestinians in Israel had almost never been involved in terrorism in the past, and there are only isolated examples of such activity being carried out by isolated members of the IMNF. Further, that activity was always followed by immediate condemnation from the Arab public. Aluf Hareven, for example, argues that since the establishment of the state, the violence between Arabs and Jews has been incredibly minimal. Based on the assessments of most Israeli security agencies, 99.9% of Arabs in Israel have never been involved in violent activities against the state. Hareven attributes this to two main factors: Israel's strong enforcement of law and order and available extra-parliamentary resources, such as strikes, that allow Arabs to express and achieve political goals (Hareven Reference Hareven1998, 629–630).
Speaking on some recent cases of Palestinian Muslims in Israel joining ISIS, MK Masoud of the Southern Faction considers ISIS to be deviant from Islam. He and Khatib of the IMNF emphasized the moderation of their movements and their commitment to respecting the rule of law.Footnote 23 Salah has also condemned ISIS and its “bloody” practices, speaking about the importance of including all different religions in one united community (Abu Elnaser Reference Abu Elnaser2014). Refusing to call ISIS a terrorist group, Salah has emphasized that he rejects ISIS thinking and practices and that al-Baghdadi does not represent him, as al-Baghdadi poses an obstacle for the moderate Islamic project. According to Salah, the MB is the only global Islamist organization today that can carry on the Islamist project, and he believes the IMNF views the MB as an example of a moderate Islamic project that should be followed (BBC Arabic 2015). Salah also expressed his belief that ISIS was created by anti-Islamist forces to re-control the Islamic and Arab worlds and that ISIS is distorting the Islamist project (Alhyat 2015). And yet, Hajjar of the IMNF attributed a “small” increase in women wearing the niqab in Israel to the rise of groups supporting ISIS in Israel. She said, “This is especially increasing among those of the strict Salafi stream that emerged recently.”…“These people see al-Baghdadi as their leader, and the group is growing very fast because of events in the Middle East.”Footnote 24
I would highlight two major events that eventually led to the escalation between Israel and the minority on one hand and Salah on the other hand: the al-Roha incident in 1998 and the October habbeh incident in 2000. During the al-Roha incident, which started in September 1998, Israeli military forces confiscated thousands of acres of Palestinian farmland in the al-Roha region near Umm el-Fahm. Sheykh Salah was then mayor of Umm el-Fahm and, along with others, led the protests against these confiscations. Violence erupted in September, and Israeli security forces attacked residents and students in Umm el-Fahm with tear gas and rubber bullets, resulting in hundreds being jailed, injured, or hospitalized, including Salah himself (Adalah 2000).
The October 2000 events known as October habbeh, a mass protest of Palestinian citizens expressing solidarity with their people amidst the Second Intifada (Kemp Reference Kemp and Migdal2004, 73), was another landmark moment in the status of Palestinian Arabs in Israel and their dynamic relationship with the state. The event saw 13 Palestinians, 12 of whom were citizens of Israel, killed by Israeli police. The October 2003 Or Commission, which was created to examine the reasons behind the habbeh, highlighted the state's treatment of its Palestinian citizens as inherently disloyal criminals and potential criminals, its refusal to condemn past killings of Palestinians, and its failure to bring responsible parties to justice (Ghanem Reference Ghanem2001b). Additionally, the committee condemned a decades-long policy of state discrimination against Palestinians, noting, “Government handling of the Arab sector has been primarily neglectful and discriminatory” (Jewish Virtual Library 2003). The habbeh was a milestone for Israeli Palestinians in general and for Salah in particular; the leader was accused of “transmission of repeated messages encouraging the use of violence and the threat of violence as a means to achieve the goals of Israel's Arab sector.” The committee added that it was proven that Salah “held mass assemblies and used propaganda to incite the public and create an inflammatory atmosphere regarding the sensitive issue of the al Aqsa mosque.” However, the committee did not recommend any charges against Salah since he had resigned his position as mayor of the city of Umm el-Fahm shortly before these events (Jewish Virtual Library 2003, Clause 10).
Nevertheless, the state took action against Salah, limiting his travel outside of Israel and to Jerusalem. Furthermore, Salah was shot in the head in 2010, and that incident was reported in al-Jazeera as an assassination attempt, although this claim was never proven (Woodward Reference Woodward2010). “Considering Salah's vocal opposition to Israeli practices in occupied territories, it is no wonder that Israel is trying to criminalize his political activity, silence him, restrict his movement and deter his community,” reads The Electronic Intifada (2010). In light of the incident, Salah stressed that his faction was not a one-person movement but rather a jamaa, or group, echoing ideas previously articulated by Hasan al-Banna, placing Jerusalem's al-Aqsa at the forefront of its struggle with the state. The group's other activities, such as its campaign to boycott Israeli products produced in the OPT, took on a complementary nature in light of its mission to defend al-Aqsa. In 2010, Salah started an annual tradition of holding a meeting every September in Umm el-Fahm titled “Al-Aqsa is in Danger.” It drew 60,000 attendees in Salah's hometown, the center of the IMNF. Salah's activism for al-Aqsa won him the International King Faisal Award for services to Islam on January 29, 2013, for being “one of the most prominent personalities” in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1948 (Palestine Today Agency 2013). Even IMNF women have been drawn into the campaign for al-Aqsa (called Mourabitat). Their role has increased significantly in the past few years; several female activists from the IMNF were investigated by the Israeli police in Nazareth, and their institution, Women for al- Aqsa, was shut down (Daoud Fall 2016, 29).
As a new approach toward the IMNF, Israeli senior officials considered outlawing the group “the most comprehensive move” to give the police and Shabak the “maximum tools” to deal with the organization. Netanyahu's press release explained the motives:
For years, the northern branch of the IM has led a mendacious campaign of incitement under the heading “al Aqsa is in danger” that falsely accuses Israel of intending to harm the al-Aqsa Mosque and violate the status-quo. In this context, the northern branch has established a network of paid activists (Mourabitoun/Mourabitat) in order to initiate provocations on the Temple Mount. This activity has led to a significant increase in tensions on the Temple Mount. A significant portion of recent terrorist attacks has been committed against the background of this incitement and propaganda (The Prime Minister's Office 2015a).
Over the past few years, there have been calls for a systematic and comprehensive policy toward the IMNF rather than reactive or piecemeal actions (Nachman Reference Nachman2000, 14). Several prominent Israeli policymakers justified the need to outlaw the organization on the basis that it poses a strategic danger to the state. Other analysts opined that the time was ripe for Netanyahu to get rid of the IMNF and reap the political benefits (Barak Reference Barak2015). However, other political commentators and analysts had different opinions; some considered these statements against the IMNF to be empty threats intended solely to “scare” the group, who would simply move underground if it were banned outright (Barak Reference Barak2015). Israel's security agencies had different recommendations for dealing with the IMNF. Israel Police supported the outlawing of the branch while the Shabak's assessment of the issue stated that the IMNF was innocent of involvement in violence or illegal actions, thus opposing Netanyahu's proposal to outlaw the movement. The main reason for the disagreement between the two agencies’ intelligence assessments was the projected effect outlawing the Northern Faction would have on the Arab community. The Shin Bet postulated that the move could lead to unrest, strengthen the status of the Northern faction and Salah, and lead the IMNF to work underground. Israel Police's assessment, on the other hand, did not find that banning the movement would lead to an escalation in violence.
Nevertheless, the move to outlaw the IMNF was adopted in spite of split public opinion by the Israeli Narrow Security Cabinet, headed by the right-wing Netanyahu and signed by Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon (Rubin Reference Rubin2015, 3–5). As for Netanyahu himself, he explains his decision:
Those who incite violence and subvert the state in order to establish an Islamic caliphate in its stead cannot refuse to accept responsibility. A democracy must protect itself from those who wish to subsume it. We will not allow extremist parties to undermine our sovereignty and subvert our state (The Prime Minister's Office 2015b).
However, Ighbariyyeh of the IMNF believes that this is all a stunt. He comments, “In my opinion, these differences are not real but a political game to show that Israel is a democracy. I think the Shabak was part of the decision or recommended this move.”Footnote 25 The real motivation, according to Ighbariyyeh, was mainly political but also personal:
We believe the motive is political. In our view, there is what is being called an international cooperation against the IMs, whom world leaders claim support terrorism. Netanyahu wanted to show that he is part of the fight against it, especially after IMNF’s role in Jerusalem and against occupation increased. While the outlaw was a dramatic policy change, it was a planned move, and there were many statements in the media discussing this option. There is also something personal in this decision: Netanyahu is accused of serious corruption. He wants to associate his name with big events, so he incites against Palestinian citizens to gain attention.Footnote 26
Netanyahu's political motives are also discussed by Lawrence Rubin, who argues that the inability of Netanyahu to provide security to the “terrorized Israel polity” and rising dissatisfaction with his performance motivated his decision (Rubin Reference Rubin2015, 5).
Retreating from political liberalization while continuing the economic liberal policies that marked the 1980s, Raef Zuraik argues that, especially since the Second Intifada, Israel has demanded from its Palestinian citizens complete loyalty and complete identification. The outlawing of the IMNF and removal of several Arab members from the Israeli Knesset are good examples of this retreat (Zuraik Reference Zuraik2016, 11–21). Ghanayem of the IMSF asserts also that the IMSF continues to face state hostility and persecution itself, leading people to believe that even the more moderate reincarnation of the IM may not be safe from Israeli control.
However, Elias Abu Oksa, a member of the Israeli Communist party, has a different assessment:
A year and a half ago, Israel outlawed the IMNF led by Raed Salah and Kamal Khatib under the claim that it supports terrorism and incitements to violence and that Palestine is Islamic “Waqf.” However, the general assumption is that this is just a “nail trimming” and nothing further. The two names mentioned above have a very suspicious relationship cooperating with the Shabak. Salah was arrested in London and was confined to a home arrest in the residence of Zuhair Salem, a supporter of “Syria's revolution.” The IMNF, with Shabak knowledge, transferred ZakahFootnote 27 money to Syria's “rebels.” However, the straw that broke the foalFootnote 28 was when Salah refused to give up his organization: Mourabitun in al-Aqsa and his campaign “al-Aqsa is in danger” in addition to support for Jewish rights there. That would have been a scandal for him. He refused, and they punished him for that by outlawing his movement, although he works with them and acts with their knowledge.Footnote 29
Despite criticism against the IMNF, all Arab parties expressed solidarity and viewed the move as one taken against the Palestinian minority as a whole.Footnote 30
IMPLICATIONS OF BEING OUTLAWED
The outlaw resulted in the closing of the IMNF's 17 welfare and charity organizations and confiscation of their assets. How has the outlaw affected IMNF members and what options do they have in light of that decision?
According to Sheykh Khatib, the outlaw was “unfair,” and it constituted a “shock” to hundreds of families, especially because the decision does not allow any formation of an institution that may serve IMNF's goals: “The range of employment opportunities was dramatically reduced, and services to our people were largely severed. Employment was reduced to personal initiatives and individual work. Some got lucky and found an alternative, but others remained jobless.”Footnote 31
Aisha, an IMNF member, also expressed her frustration over the decision and explained the state of devastation she and other members felt after the outlaw:
I personally feel that I lost my home and that the future is unknown and cannot be predictable. This decision affected the lives of so many people in the movement in two main areas. First, financially: many people and families who depended on IMNF's institutions lost their source of income. Second, politically: many youths lost the place and the framework they belonged to. The world of female activists in college who could have an influence on society and politics was shattered and totally devastated.Footnote 32
One question forces itself here: would violence be an option for the frustrated IMNF members as a reaction to the outlaw of their movement and as an action of their protest? This option of using violence by the IMNF was negated by Igbariyyeh, who occupied several positions in the IMNF, most recently the position of head of al-Aqsa Foundation (one of 17 organizations outlawed by the state) until 2014. Igbariyveh remarked,
I do not think IM members would use violence or go underground. Most are educated intellectuals who can find work in their area of specialization. We are very cautious and know where we live. We know that we have other legitimate legal tools to use. We were not raised in the movement to use violence. Besides, IMNF members know that using violence would harm the movement, something they would not do. It is true that the movement is finished legally, but we will continue to contribute socially until our last day.Footnote 33
Echoing some critiques of the IMNF by its opponents and Arab rivals that IM “has become corporatized and too business like” (Rubin Reference Rubin2014, 13), Adv. Rabee Jahshan also expresses doubt about the possibility of tumult:
I do not believe they will turn to violence. Most of them are opportunists who made a fortune from this business that is called “the Islamic Movement.” They fear the security arms and that they would lose the wealth they accumulated. Those young people who could act violently already left and found their places in ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. (Daoud Reference Daoud2017a, Reference Daoudb).
Interestingly, Aisha, an IMNF member who expressed her concern about such a scenario, commented: “This is what we fear; the movement was a frame that contained the youth and many times prevented them from violence” (Daoud Reference Daoud2017a, Reference Daoudb). Her fears were realized on May 17, 2017, when the Shabak arrested three Palestinian citizens linked to the IMNF who were planning to kill Israeli soldiers in the Negev area in the south (Haaretz 2017) However, this was one act, and the future will tell more about this possibility.
Can the alternative to violence be a new party? The answer is not as simple as one may expect. A few months before IMNF was formally banned, several leaders from the movement announced the establishment of a new Islamist party, al-Wafaa wal-Islah, the Loyalty and Reform Party, in a press conference in Nazareth. The leader of the new party was not Sheykh Salah but rather Hussam Abu Lail, one of the former senior leaders of the IMNF. Salah, for his part, dismissed any connection of this party to the IMNF, emphasizing that he is still the leader of what does not exist anymore: “I am still the head of the IM and will remain the leader of a movement that strives to serve the Arab people, the Palestinians and al-Aqsa Mosque” (Almsadir 2016). Ighbariyyeh also commented that the new party is very different from the IMNF: “it is not Islamist but secular and has even Christians in it,” he said.Footnote 34
Meanwhile, Salah himself is still there. Unlike an IMNF member who suggested that Salah is “finished” and “barely leaves his home,” Ighbariyyeh said the opposite is true: “Raed Salah today is still very active. He is present in all activities supporting Palestinians when their houses are demolished by the state, and he mediates between rival families. I am surprised somebody would say that he is finished.”Footnote 35
CONCLUSIONS
Alienated from both its host state (Israel) and from other internal Palestinian political parties in Israel, the IMNF and its leader Sheykh Raed Salah continued to radicalize and to provoke the Israeli establishment, especially after the IM split in 1996. Accused by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of seeking to “subvert the state in order to establish an Islamic caliphate in its place,” (The Prime Minister's Office 2015a) the IMNF was outlawed after a long period of inconsistent Israeli policy regarding the movement. Internal, regional and global development created an opportunity for troubled Netanyahu to take a dramatic shift in policy toward the IMNF.
While the many efforts for the IMNF to reunite with the Northern faction failed, the March 2015 national elections in Israel witnessed the creation of the Joint Arab List: the unification of four major Arab parties for the first time in their history. This unprecedented alliance among Arab parties proves that limitation of the trapped minority model who failed to project such unity. Interestingly, while the Joint Arab List provides some counterevidence to the model, for now, this model seems to work fairly well to explain the sub-religious/ethnic group of IMNF. The group was not part of the alliance and continued its doubled isolation—from the state and from the other Arab parties—while seeking recognition and alliances with movements outside of the borders of Israel.
While Palestinians viewed the decision to outlaw the IMNF as a declaration of war by the Netanyahu government on Palestinians in Israel, the implications of this decision are yet to be determined on all sides: IMNF's frustrated outlawed members, the state and the Israeli Jewish public, and the relationship between the state and the Palestinian minority. The economic hardship of many Palestinian families, who depended on and benefited from the IMNF and its many activities and organizations, will increase. Economic hardship accompanied by regional and global developments can increase frustration and alienation and lead to the next clash between the Palestinian marginalized minority and the state in Israel as a whole not only by the IMNF supporters. Israeli policy toward the IMNF does not necessarily indicate that other groups will be outlawed, but it does create challenges for the Palestinian people in Israel.
APPENDIX: INTERVIEWS
For this paper, I interviewed seven policymakers and activists from the Islamic Movement and activists from outside of the movement. I conducted interviews in Arabic via phone, Whats App and Messenger and translated them into English. In most cases, I followed up with participants to clarify information and to ensure the accuracy of my translation. Having become familiar with almost all the interviewees through interviews conducted for previous research, I believe I have been able to accurately convey the exact meaning of their sentiments.
The following information provides details about these interviews.
• Email exchange with former IMNF member Aisha Hajjar, January 18, 2015, and follow up an interview in January 2017.
• Interview with former IMNF member Zaki Ighbariyyeh, May 18, 2017, via Whats App.
• Interview with DFPE member Elias Abu Oksa, May 23, 2017, via Messenger.
• Interview with former IMNF vice-president Kamal Khatib, January 16, 2017, via Messenger (answers received via Messenger from Khatib's supporter who operates his Facebook page).
• Phone interview with DFPE MK Afo Ighbaria, July 2, 2013.
• Interview with DFPE activist Adv. Rabee Jahshan, May 1, 2016.
• Interview with IMSF member MK Masoud Ghanayem, January 2017.
