When the United Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaFootnote 1 (UNCLOS) (which is the only framework convention established for the purpose of covering world ocean affairs) was negotiated in the 1970s, participants expected that new ocean uses would emerge. The UNCLOS requests parties to cover new uses, either through establishing new international legal instruments or through existing treaties. Regulation of marine geo-engineering is one of the new issues that have recently been significantly dealt with within existing international legal frameworks for the management of ocean affairs.
Ocean fertilization, which is a geo-engineering activity, was first introduced as a carbon dioxide mitigation technique in the 1980s. However, its effectiveness to slow down climate change is uncertain, and it is expected to have an impact on the marine ecosystem. Although no specific international rules to regulate the activity have been completely developed as yet, as a short-term measure, a number of international treaties (such as the London Convention/Protocol (LP) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)) have limited this activity to scientific research purposes only.Footnote 2 The applicability and scope of the LP for regulating this activity has been examined for the purposes of the development of binding rules to govern marine geo-engineering activities under the Protocol. In addition to these attempts to restrict ocean fertilization temporarily, and to develop binding rules for the regulation of geo-engineering activities, the establishment of a liability regime with respect to these activities was raised during a discussion on the regulation of ocean fertilization under the Protocol.
Many international environmental protection treaties, including the LP and the CBD, contain a provision that recommends State Parties to develop rules to impose international liability for environmental damage, which in many cases is transboundary. This implies that the international community has recognized the need for establishing a liability regime for damage to the global environment. One of the main purposes of the liability regime is to make ocean users more cautious when exploring and exploiting the ocean by charging for clean-up costs or by imposing compensation for damage. This paper aims to identify the preventative effect of international liability, and the implications of such an effect for the protection and conservation of the marine environment from marine geo-engineering activities. Part I introduces geo-engineering activities, including ocean fertilization, and the most recent attempts to regulate ocean fertilization under existing international treaties. Part II reviews the principles of the responsibility and liability of states in general, and the liability provisions and obligations of due diligence, whose breach entails state liability, in relevant international marine environment protection treaties. Part III then identifies the preventative effect of the liability regime with particular reference to a case experienced in relation to the exploration of international seabed resources, and the implications of the effects for the practice of marine geo-engineering activities under the Protocol.
I. EMERGING NEW OCEAN USES
A. New Ocean Uses
The anthropogenic addition of greenhouse gases (most significantly, carbon dioxide) into the atmosphere has been shown to cause more heat energy from the sun to be trapped below the lower atmosphere, which causes global warming. The technical responses to the issue of climate change are currently divided into three categories: the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the mitigation of emitted CO2, and the reflection of heat energy into space. The second and third responses are classified as geo-engineering, which is defined as “deliberate interventions in the Earth's climate system that might moderate global warming”.Footnote 3 The second category of responses to climate change, the mitigation of emitted CO2, includes CO2 Capture and Storage (CCS) and ocean fertilization. These activities can be conducted in the ocean, so are categorized as marine geo-engineering, which is a deliberate intervention in the marine environment for the purpose of climate change mitigation.Footnote 4 These more directly manipulate natural process of the marine environment than other categories, therefore they may have a more significant impact on the marine environment.
CCS is an activity that is conducted for the purpose of the mitigation of CO2 from industrial sectors. This was first practised by a Norwegian oil company in 1996.Footnote 5 Several international legal instruments have recently adopted measures for regulating this activity. For example, the London Protocol now includes an amended provision and annex as well as new guidelines for controlling this activity. In accordance with these, CO2 sequestration is conditionally allowed to be stored under the seabed and exported to other states for storage under geological formations.Footnote 6 While CCS and its potential negative impact on the marine environment are internationally regulated, another geo-engineering activity, ocean fertilization, has not yet been fully regulated under any international legal instrument.
Ocean fertilization is technically defined as an action that “deliberately increase[s] planktonic production in the open ocean … by directly adding nutrients, or nutrients supply from deep water, or potentially by other means”.Footnote 7 The definition of this activity adopted within the London Protocol does not classify “conventional aquaculture, or mariculture, and the creation of artificial reefs” as ocean fertilization.Footnote 8 The nutrients that are to be added for the purpose of fertilization are mainly iron, nitrogen, and phosphorus. These can be added artificially from ships or by placing a device that then pumps nutrients accumulated on the seabed into the surface water. Increasing light provision into the open ocean, where light is limited, through the use of certain devices could be another way of providing ocean fertilization.Footnote 9 Phytoplankton and bacteria need both nutrients and light for photosynthesis, which then results in the consumption of CO2 that is absolved into the seawater.Footnote 10 The artificial addition of nutrients and light into the ocean can facilitate photosynthesis, which can speed CO2 consumption.Footnote 11 This would result in more CO2 being absorbed into the seawater and it would, therefore, reduce the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere.Footnote 12 The effect of ocean fertilization on the reduction of CO2 in the atmosphere first came to attention in the 1980s.Footnote 13 To date, predominantly small-scale fertilization activities have been conducted for the purposes of scientific research.Footnote 14 At least thirteen scientific experiments have been conducted so far in offshore regions and on the high seas.Footnote 15 The results of these experiments vary; however, some small-scale fertilizations have been shown to positively increase the levels of biomass of e.g. phytoplankton and bacteria, which results in higher levels of CO2 being absorbed into the seawater.Footnote 16
If a suitable location is selected, then ocean fertilization can be effectively used to reduce CO2 levels in the atmosphere.Footnote 17 Ocean fertilization needs to be large in scale and conducted for a long period of time to effectively mitigate the anthropogenic induction of global warming.Footnote 18 Otherwise, the effectiveness of the fertilization cannot be guaranteed. A large amount of the CO2 consumed by plankton is highly likely to be released back into the atmosphere instead of sinking down into the deep ocean where it can be stored.Footnote 19 The CO2 mitigation effect by artificial upwelling is also reported as being of limited value.Footnote 20 While the climate mitigation effect of ocean fertilization is uncertain, it can cause harmful algal blooms as a result of eutrophication, the redistribution of fish stocks, a reduction of the number of fish, an increasing mortality rate in marine living organisms by the depletion of oxygen, the production of other greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxide and methane as a result of anoxia, and ocean acidification, which would have a significant impact on shellfish and deep sea corals.Footnote 21 With regard to ocean acidification, some scientists argue that ocean fertilization rather mitigates ocean acidification.Footnote 22 Cao and Caldeira came to the different conclusion that ocean fertilization “can at best play a minor role in mitigating surface ocean acidification” and “would lead to greater acidification of the deep ocean”.Footnote 23 Ocean acidification would negatively impact on the growth, respiration, and reproduction of marine living organisms, and alter the structure of ecological communities and the biogeochemistry of marine ecosystems.Footnote 24 These side effects would impact on a wide area and result in damage to the marine environment. They would also cause the loss of natural resources. Scientists mostly agree that components of marine ecosystems can be modified by ocean fertilization, but the degree and contents of such modification as suggested by them are varied. For example, scientists who are in favour of ocean fertilization argue that it results in an increase in the fish population, while others have suggested a decrease of its population.Footnote 25 This is because a lack of sufficient data prevents the accurate prediction of the negative impact of ocean fertilization.Footnote 26 This implies that the scale of the impact of ocean fertilization could be larger than expected and that as yet unknown side effects could also occur. The cost of taking measures to reduce our impact on the global environment, and to restore it, as well as the costs of monitoring and assessing the damage, will be high.
Currently, our knowledge of marine ecosystems and the interconnectivity between components of the marine environment is limited. Hence, the impact of ocean fertilization on the marine environment is difficult to fully comprehend and is subject to continuous speculation. Therefore, commercial fertilization has been temporarily prevented under the CBD and the LP, based on the precautionary principle, until such time as the scientific evidence indicates that there is no serious harm to the marine environment.Footnote 27 In addition to CCS and ocean fertilization, other marine geo-engineering activities have not been identified for the purposes of regulation under international legal instruments; however, some states have attempted to manage these activities as a whole under the London Protocol. The next section will review the recent progress on enacting rules on the regulation of ocean fertilization and other marine geo-engineering activities under the relevant treaties.
B. A New Ocean Order
The side effects caused by geo-engineering activities, either conducted within national jurisdiction or on the high seas, are mostly likely transboundary. Therefore, they must be regulated co-operatively by all states that may potentially be affected. As noted earlier, CO2 sequestration and storage under the seabed has been commercially practised and is regulated by the London Protocol and other legal instruments. Among other geo-engineering activities, ocean fertilization has also been considered as a practical option for the mitigation of climate change. The development of international rules to govern ocean fertilization and other geo-engineering activities is currently an ongoing process under a few international legal instruments. Any rules adopted in the future with regard to these activities could significantly influence the development of additional rules for governing these issues under other legal instruments. This section will first attempt to classify ocean fertilization among marine geo-engineering activities as one of the traditional categories of ocean uses that have been managed by existing treaties. It will then briefly review the applicable provisions on the management of ocean fertilization and other marine geo-engineering activities under existing international law, in particular, the UNCLOS. It will then review the current legal development of the regulation of ocean fertilization and other marine geo-engineering activities, especially under the CBD and the LP.
1. Categorization of ocean fertilization under existing international law
In advance of reviewing international law applicable for the management of ocean fertilization activities, it is essential to attempt to categorize the activity into one of the traditional ocean uses such as mining, fishing, other types of exploration and exploitation of natural resources, laying cables or pipelines, drilling, scientific research, or dumping. Since there are international rules to govern these activities, ocean fertilization can be managed by existing rules if it can be classified into one of these categories.
Ocean fertilization basically adds nutrients through pumping nutrients dissolved in water into the ocean behind a moving vessel.Footnote 28 Meanwhile, artificial upwelling moves nutrients from the deep water to the surface water by means of a huge floating pipe.Footnote 29 These methods of fertilization may not be changed when they are commercialized, but commercial artificial fertilization may use more chemicals.Footnote 30
Currently, fertilization is conducted mostly for the purposes of scientific research; therefore, it should be categorized as a research activity. However, commercial fertilization, which is not conducted for scientific research, does not easily fit into the traditional types of ocean activity. For example, artificial fertilization seems to be similar to dumping, which is defined in the UNCLOS as the deliberate disposal of waste or other matters at sea. However, the definition of dumping in the UNCLOS does not include disposal activities that have a specific purpose other than mere disposal.Footnote 31 Ocean fertilization is conducted for the purposes of mitigating climate change, so it has another purpose beyond mere disposal; hence, it cannot be considered to be dumping in accordance with the Convention.Footnote 32
It can be argued that artificial upwelling is the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, since it uses nutrients from the deep sea. In the context of the UNCLOS, the term “exploration and exploitation” is used in connection with the commercial utilization of natural resources, which include both living and non-living resources.Footnote 33 In this case, the “natural resources” are used as exploited (or potentially exploitable) natural components of the marine environment within the UNCLOS.Footnote 34 The nutrients pumped from the deep sea are natural components of the marine environment, therefore they may be classified as “natural resources”. Then, it seems, this activity fits to the definition of “exploitation and exploration” under the UNCLOS. It is distinctive from traditional ocean uses that result in the direct consumption of resources by humans. An example of an existing ocean use that does not result in the direct consumption of resources by humans is energy production (e.g. using wind, waves, or seawater). Humans do not consume wind or waves directly but transform them into energy that is then commercially consumed. Article 56 of the Convention states that exploitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) includes “production of energy from the water, currents and winds”.Footnote 35 If ocean fertilization becomes a clean development mechanism that can be traded in a future carbon market, the activity would result in the creation of a right to emit carbon, which is a good in a carbon market. Humans do not consume deep sea nutrients directly, but only when they are transformed into a good that is then commercially traded. Considering that energy production is a type of exploitation of natural resources under the UNCLOS, the utilization of deep sea nutrients for the purposes of climate change mitigation should also be considered as a type of exploitation. The categorization of this activity under another convention will be reviewed in the following section.
Reviewing applicable provisions on the management of ocean fertilization under the framework conventions such as the UNCLOS in detail has already been attempted by international law scholars and will be published in due course. Consequently, the remaining part of this section will only briefly review the applicable rules that govern ocean fertilization as “scientific research” or “exploration and exploitation” under the UNCLOS in general.
At present, iron is the predominant nutrient used for ocean fertilization. The area where iron is used is mostly the high seas.Footnote 36 However, the area where fertilization can be effective includes some areas that are under national jurisdiction.Footnote 37 Within the EEZ and the continental shelf, coastal states have sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting natural resources (on the continental shelf, natural resources refers to sedentary species and minerals), and jurisdiction for scientific research, and preserving and protecting the marine environment (within the EEZ, not just on the continental shelf).Footnote 38 Since the nutrients from the deep sea are natural resources and could also be minerals, their exploitation (i.e. artificial upwelling) within national jurisdiction shall be managed exclusively by coastal states. When it becomes commercialized, artificial fertilization cannot specifically be managed under the UNCLOS. However, considering that any activity which inhibits coastal states from exercising their rights within a national jurisdiction is to be exclusively controlled by coastal states in accordance with Articles 60, 79, 80, and 81 of the UNCLOS, coastal states may be able to regulate commercial fertilization activities (which have the potential to impact on the exploitation of fisheries resources by coastal states), based on their exclusive rights within the EEZ and the continental shelf. Ocean fertilization, both artificial fertilization and upwelling, as marine scientific research, can also be rejected by coastal states on the basis that it has “direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources”, such as fisheries resources.Footnote 39
While coastal states can have rights to control fertilization within their national jurisdiction, on the high seas flag states have the freedom to conduct marine scientific research, and to explore and exploit marine living resources subject to the duty to protect the marine environment and to preserve the rights of other states to use the ocean. In particular, the duty to protect the marine environment is to be implemented through the formulation of international rules and standards.Footnote 40 There are currently two international conventions under which parties have attempted to regulate and are developing rules and standards to control the fertilization of the ocean for the purposes of the protection of the marine environment; these are: the CBD and the LC. The following section will review the current development of the management of the activity under these conventions.
2. The current development of new rules
The international institutions that have discussed the management of geo-engineering, and in particular ocean fertilization, are the Conference of Parties (COP) to the CBD, the Meeting of the Contracting Parties (MOP) to the London Protocol, and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
The COP 9 to the CBD adopted Decision IX/16, which postponed all ocean fertilization activities on the basis of the precautionary approach, except for “small scale scientific research studies within coastal waters” until “there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities”.Footnote 41 Such an adequate scientific basis includes “assessing associated risks, and a global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanism”.Footnote 42 Small-scale scientific research shall be properly regulated in order to not induce economic gain directly from the activity and to not cause an impact on the marine environment.Footnote 43 The scientific justification of the activities was thoroughly researched by the CBD Secretariat and UNESCO-IOC based on existing publications. Their studies were reviewed by a working group on ocean fertilization that was established under the LP to evaluate whether it could be used for the needs of the LP to determine what level of impact by ocean fertilization is acceptable and whether ocean fertilization is not contrary to the aims of the LP.Footnote 44 This review was one of the two initial tasks conducted in the course of developing rules governing ocean fertilization under the LP.
Parties to the LP have considered this issue since 2007. They have reviewed the applicability of the Protocol to this activity through establishing working groups that studied the legal and scientific issues of the management of ocean fertilization. The main task of the working group on scientific issues was to review the studies by UNESCO-IOC and the CBD secretariat, which were mentioned above. This task was completed in 2011. Legal discussions on this issue started during the scientific groups’ meetings of the LP in 2008. The governing bodies’ meetings that were held in the same year adopted a resolution reaching an agreement that the LP has jurisdiction to deal with ocean fertilization activities.Footnote 45
For the purposes of management under the London Protocol, ocean fertilization activities, in accordance with the resolution, can be divided into two categories: legitimate scientific research and ocean fertilization activities other than legitimate scientific research.Footnote 46 Activities that are classified as legitimate scientific research are not subject to the jurisdiction of the London Protocol because they cannot be classified as dumping; it is instead “placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof” (the purpose is to mitigate climate change).Footnote 47 According to the Protocol, such placement must not be “contrary to the aims of this Protocol”, which are to “protect and preserve the marine environment from all sources of pollution and take effective measures … to prevent, reduce and where applicable eliminate pollution caused by dumping or incineration at sea of wastes or other matter”.Footnote 48 For the determination of whether a particular fertilization for research purposes is contrary to the aims of the Protocol, or whether it is within the scope of the Protocol, a research proposal for fertilization should be thoroughly assessed based on an assessment framework that was adopted by the governing bodies’ meeting in October 2010.Footnote 49 “Ocean fertilization other than legitimate scientific research” is also “placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof”, but it can cause environmental harm which is contrary to the aims of the Convention and Protocol.Footnote 50 Therefore, such fertilization shall be considered as dumping rather than placement, and must be prohibited under the Protocol since the nutrients disposed of for fertilization are not included in Annex I of the Protocol, which provides a list of materials that are allowed to be disposed of at sea, subject to certain conditions.Footnote 51
Since ocean fertilization as legitimate scientific research is classified as placement rather than dumping, it cannot be regulated under the LP. In addition, parties to the Protocol have not fully agreed that non-legitimate ocean fertilization is within the scope of the LP. Although the 2008 Resolution declared that the management of ocean fertilization is within the scope of the London Protocol, since the resolution is non-binding, parties to the Protocol do not have a legal obligation to prohibit such activity conducted by their nationals.Footnote 52 The categorization of the activities as dumping, and the interpretation of the Protocol as covering ocean fertilization, fits into the scope of the legal definition of dumping adopted under the Protocol. The Protocol exceptionally allows for the regulation of some placement activities that are not generally conceived of as dumping but which do cause pollution. However, this interpretation does not fit into the traditional perspective of ocean dumping. Therefore, some parties to the Protocol, based on the 2008 Resolution, interpret it to mean that non-legitimate ocean fertilization is dumping and must be prohibited, while other states interpret the Protocol as not imposing a legal obligation for the regulation of ocean fertilization. Due to this disagreement, successful implementation of the 2008 Resolution and the 2010 Assessment Framework, that is also non-binding, depends entirely on the voluntary participation of the parties to both treaties.
In order to overcome the current weaknesses (a lack of jurisdiction to regulate legitimate scientific research and controversy on the scope of the Protocol to cover ocean fertilization) and to provide a legal basis for the regulation of other geo-engineering activities, it was suggested that a legally binding rule for the regulation of placement activities is to be adopted under the Protocol.Footnote 53 Parties to the Protocol have developed several options to include a binding rule to govern ocean fertilization and/or other geo-engineering activities. Although there were originally four options, there are currently two options.Footnote 54 Option 1 suggests the inclusion of a new article and two new annexes for the regulation of marine geo-engineering that is conducted by “placement activities”.Footnote 55 Meanwhile, Option 2 proposes the regulation of only ocean fertilization through the addition of a new article and/or a new annex.Footnote 56 Option 1, now supported by Australia, Nigeria, and South Korea, was submitted without a substantial amendment of its original text as a proposed amendment of the Protocol on 11 April 2013 for communication to parties to the Protocol.Footnote 57 The adoption of the proposal was to be considered at the next governing bodies meetings, held in October 2013.
II. STATE LIABILITY REGIME FOR THE DAMAGE OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
Part I has reviewed potential damage to the marine environment by ocean fertilization. It has also confirmed that not enough information has been gathered to come to a conclusion that ocean fertilization is effective in mitigating climate change, and its effectiveness in combating global warming is still quite contentious. Because of the potential harm and uncertainty of ocean fertilization, some international legal instruments (as reviewed in the CBD and the LP) have attempted to prohibit these activities, on the basis of the precautionary principle, until a fuller understanding of their impact is available. During the development of the assessment framework for the purposes of providing standards of determining allowable research under the LP, there was a reference made to the issue of liability and compensation for damage caused by ocean fertilization.Footnote 58 A draft of the framework included a sentence with regard to liability, which said that “liability should be considered as appropriate”.Footnote 59 The final version of the framework deleted the reference to liability; it instead included a footnote that does not specifically refer to liability but implies Article 235 of the UNCLOS, which is about state responsibility and liability,Footnote 60 as follows:
This Framework is to be interpreted and applied in conformity with the relevant rules of international law, including as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). Nothing in this Framework prejudices the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under international law including as reflected in UNCLOS.Footnote 61
Although the current draft amendment proposal and the proposal submitted for amendment of the LP do not include a rule on state responsibility or liability, there is the possibility of resuming the discussion with regard to potential damage caused by marine geo-engineering activities since the issue has been raised occasionally in recent meetings of their contracting parties. In advance of reviewing the potential preventative effect of the international liability regime in terms of the management of marine geo-engineering under the LP in Part III, the following subsections will briefly explain state responsibility and liability. They will then review the liability regimes under marine environmental protection treaties.
A. State Responsibility and Liability in General
The general obligation of states to not pollute the marine environment of other states, as well as the high seas, by ships under “their jurisdiction or control”, is stipulated in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration: states have a “responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”.Footnote 62 The importance of this principle was confirmed in several pronouncements by the International Court of Justice.Footnote 63 For instance, the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons confirms that, “[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment”.Footnote 64 This paragraph is quoted in the 1997 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project case.Footnote 65 This principle is also reiterated in Articles 192 and 194 of the 1982 UNCLOSFootnote 66 and Article 3 of the CBD. The general obligation does not require absolute conservation of the environment but it does require conservation through taking all necessary measures, which is an obligation of due diligence. This general obligation has not evolved in a more specific way to include the conservation of specific elements of ecosystems or for taking specific measures. However, although it has not been further specified itself, it has been broadly accepted as a rule or general principle of international law.Footnote 67 It has also provided a legal basis for detailed measures for marine environmental protection.
This general obligation closely relates to the law of state responsibility and liabilityFootnote 68 because it can be a legal basis for the imposition of such responsibility and liability. The obligation reflects the “common concern” of the international community, which consists of states.Footnote 69 The issue of common concern relates to the responsibility of all states, so that any state can invoke a common responsibility against other states.Footnote 70 Marine environment protection treaties mostly impose similar obligations of due diligence whose breach entails the responsibility or liability of operators as well as states. Among fields that have been covered by international liability regime under treaties so far—oil pollution, nuclear energy, hazardous wastes, and marine scientific research in the Polar regions—can result in transboundary marine pollution which is the common concern of the international community.Footnote 71
State liability is distinct from civil liability in the way that a state itself requests compensation or is requested to pay for damage caused by its nation or itself, while civil liability is imposed on the individuals who are the actual polluters. In practice, civil and state liability are difficult to distinguish because international organizations adopt rules on state liability to oblige states to pay for environmental damage caused by polluters, which they cannot themselves afford.Footnote 72
Responsibility, or liability, based on the general obligation cannot be imposed if the damage occurs after exercising “due diligence”, i.e. taking all necessary measures to prevent all kinds of pollution. Exercising due diligence involves:
due care in taking measures … foreseeability of the injurious acts and the possibility of preventing their commission with the resources available in the States, necessary exercise of authority in apprehending the individuals who committed injurious acts and giving the alien the opportunity to bring a claim against such individuals, exercising vigilance, enacting and enforcing relevant legislation.Footnote 73
Exceptionally, liability (not responsibility) arises even if states exercise all due diligence.Footnote 74 This is called strict liability. The damages for which strict liability applies are normally caused by “ultra-hazardous activities”. For example, pollution from a nuclear power plant is considered to be ultra-hazardous.Footnote 75 However, except for this example, international environmental law has not yet identified other activities as ultra-hazardous.Footnote 76 Damage from ultra-hazardous activities is normally irreversible and enormous. An activity, therefore, is not supposed to be classified as ultra-hazardous after that damage is actually experienced; however, it should be able to be classified as ultra-hazardous based on the anticipated degree of damage.Footnote 77 Besides the exception of ultra-hazardous activities, strict liability can also be imposed on states in relation to the crash of a space object on the surface of the earth and on scientific research that is conducted under the Antarctic Treaty, both of which are normally led by states rather than the private sector. Although strict liability is imposed on damage caused after observation of all international obligations, it does not mean that such liability can be imposed without explicit agreement among states, since there is no evidence of the existence of a customary rule of strict liability.Footnote 78 Strict liability is reviewed in this paper because it can be argued that a liability may need to be imposed on damage caused by marine geo-engineering activities after all measures to prevent pollution are taken.
Besides the breach of due diligence (observation of international law), the foundations of state responsibility and liability can include fault (intent) and actual damage. Depending on the case, these foundations either need to be combined to create liability or they can each create a responsibility or liability on its own. State responsibility, or international liability, occurs where duties under international law are breached, or the rights of other states are infringed.Footnote 79 In particular, a breach of international law is the key factor for state responsibility to be created in relation to environmental damage. On the other hand, international liability, including state liability, can be imposed if the damage is caused without breach of international law.Footnote 80 This characteristic has been used to distinguish state liability from state responsibility,Footnote 81 but it can make the concept of state liability confused with the strict liability which can also arise in relation to damage caused by lawful activity. State liability imposed on damage caused by activities that are not in breach of international law is called sine delicto liability. This liability arises from “lawful activities on the basis of the mere causal link between these activities and the damage done”; that is, not necessarily caused after taking obligations of due diligence.Footnote 82 Thus, sine delicto liability is not always a form of strict liability, while strict liability is applicable “as a form of sine delicto”.Footnote 83 Another foundation, fault (or intent) to cause pollution, is not always coupled with the creation of state responsibility and liability.Footnote 84 Because international responsibility or liability is imposed on the result of an activity, rather than on the activity itself, if actual damage occurs, then responsibility or liability can be imposed regardless of the existence of intention. In addition to the breach of law and fault, then, the third foundation of state responsibility or liability is actual damage or potential for such damage.Footnote 85
Considering that the general obligation is a fundamental principle upon which state responsibility and liability to damage on marine environment is based, and the legal status of the obligation is a general principle of international law, and allegedly customary international law,Footnote 86 it can be argued that international liability based on the obligation can be imposed without a treaty basis. However, if anyone wants to justify imposing international liability based on this general principle of international law without a treaty basis they will encounter the fundamental limitation of the generally accepted applicability of customary international law; that is, a general principle of customary international law of itself does not produce a universal legal obligation of specific practice relating to it.Footnote 87 As argued in the Gulf of Maine case, it is axiomatic that general customary international law, which by its nature provides “guidelines” or “principles”, does not generate universal legal obligations to observe the technical matters which are related to it.Footnote 88 It is a matter of course that if there is a customary rule to protect the marine environment then there must surely be some kind of conduct that could be caught by it, otherwise it can hardly be said to be an obligation. What that conduct is can possibly be identified by investigating the decisions and provisions adopted under an international legal instrument. It can therefore be said that the general obligation has provided certain legal obligations to the conduct. In addition, these decisions and rules would identify some of the content of the pre-existing obligation not to damage the environment of the high seas or the area within other states’ jurisdictions. However, this conduct based on the general principle cannot have its own binding force without having a basis in a treaty. Consequently, state responsibility or liability also needs a treaty basis to be imposed on environmental damage in a binding way.
The International Law Commission (ILC) attempted to stipulate general rules on state responsibility and liability separately. They are: Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in 2001; and Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities in 2006.Footnote 89 Although many provisions in the Draft Articles on state responsibility were allegedly stipulated based on existing customs, the rules in the Draft Principles on state liability were not.Footnote 90 At the time of drafting the principles, the ILC did not see that state liability is a developing norm,Footnote 91 because polluters and victims of environment damage are mostly likely to be individuals rather than states,Footnote 92 and in practice many states prefer to impose liability on individual polluters rather than on themselves.Footnote 93 Both drafts have not yet been adopted as treaties. Many international environment treaties contain a provision that requires the development of procedures for imposing responsibility or liability for environmental damage, although an actual provision for responsibility or liability (either of operators or of states) has rarely been adopted under these treaties. The following subsection will review rules requiring the development of procedures for, and imposing responsibility and liability in, marine environment protection treaties.
B. State Responsibility and Liability to Marine Environmental Degradation
Taking all necessary measures is a key element of the duties of due diligence in international environment treaties.Footnote 94 Each environmental protection treaty sets up different degrees and contents of duties of due diligence. Such obligations are obligations of conduct rather than obligations of result, which will be confirmed in this section.
The UNCLOS provides several legal bases for responsibility and liability to be imposed on damage to the marine environment. Article 235 of the UNCLOS stipulates a general duty of states to be liable for damage caused by pollution by their nationals.Footnote 95 It also requires for parties to implement existing international law relating to liability and compensation, and to further develop relevant rules under relevant treaties if needed.Footnote 96 In addition to this general obligation, Part XI on international seabed mining and Part XIII on scientific research contain provisions that oblige states to be liable for damage caused by seabed mining and scientific research. Article 139 obliges States Parties “to ensure” that their mining activities on the seabed area are conducted in conformity with Part XI.Footnote 97 Damage caused by the failure of such obligation entails liability.Footnote 98 However, if a party takes “all necessary and appropriate measures to secure compliance” of its sponsoring individuals, it can be exempted from liability.Footnote 99 The measures that parties take to avoid liability under Article 139 include laws, regulations, and administrative measures “to ensure compliance by the contractor with its obligations”, which shall be no less effective than international rules, regulations, and procedures, and should be in force while a contract is effective.Footnote 100
Article 263 of the UNCLOS imposes state liability with respect to pollution damage caused in relation to scientific research conducted by their nationals.Footnote 101 This article obliges states to ensure compliance of relevant provisions in the UNCLOS (Article 263(1)), international law (Article 263(2)), and Article 235 of the UNCLOS (Article 263(3)) by their scientists. The relevant provisions in the UNCLOS would be Article 94(4)(c), which requires flag states to take measures to ensure that the master, the officers, and the crew on board a ship (including a research vessel) observe relevant international rules on the prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollution.Footnote 102 Coastal states also have a responsibility to inform researchers from other states about any potential hazards in an area where the research will be performed.Footnote 103
Article 5 of the London Protocol requires parties to develop procedures for imposing liability on damage caused by dumping or incineration at sea.Footnote 104 Contents of due diligence with respect to the liability can be sought in Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 of the Protocol. Parties to the Protocol shall take all necessary measures to protect the marine environment from pollution by dumping, or incineration of wastes or other matter.Footnote 105 Damage caused by activities covered by the Protocol shall not be transferred to the sea area under other states’ jurisdiction or the high seas.Footnote 106 The protective measures shall be taken based on the precautionary approach and the polluter pays principle.Footnote 107 Dumping or incineration of wastes or other matter at sea shall be prohibited.Footnote 108 Exception of the rule is stipulated in Annex 1, which includes wastes or other matter allowable for dumping; however, this dumping is better avoided if at all possible.Footnote 109 Except for carbon dioxide streams, wastes or other matter shall not be transported to other countries for dumping or incineration.Footnote 110 Dumping of any wastes or other matter requires permits, and details of wastes or other matter dumped at sea shall be recorded and reported to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).Footnote 111 Parties to the Protocol shall apply rules in this Protocol, including reporting of dumping and incineration, for high seas conservation.Footnote 112
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (hereafter, the Barcelona Convention) includes Article 16, which requests parties to establish procedures for imposing liability and compensation on damage caused by the pollution of the marine environment.Footnote 113 State Parties shall take all necessary measures to avoid, reduce, and, if possible, eliminate such pollution, particularly caused by dumping or incineration at sea, shipping, mining on the continental shelf and beyond, land-based sources, transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and their disposal, and to protect and improve the marine environment. A working group has been convened since 2006 to develop a procedure as Article 16 requests.Footnote 114 This working group has developed an implementation of guidelines for the determination of liability and compensation for damage resulting from pollution of the marine environment in the Mediterranean area, and has reviewed the guidelines.
Article 16 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty requires its parties to establish rules and procedures for liability for damage caused by activities conducted in an area covered by the Treaty.Footnote 115 These rules and procedures shall be consistent with the purposes of the Protocol, which are “comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems”.Footnote 116 The obligation of environment protection under the Protocol in particular, breach of which entails liability, is an obligation of conduct rather than result. Article 6 of Annex VI, which is titled as liability and adopted in 1999 by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, specifies that a state operator or a non-state operator that does not take a proper response to an environmental emergency shall be liable.Footnote 117 Article 3 of the Annex imposes an obligation on parties to the Protocol to “require” its operators to take appropriate preventative measures.Footnote 118 Article 8 of the Annex, exemptions from liability, implies that liability can be imposed if operators do not take “all reasonable preventative measures”.Footnote 119 However, even if operators take all reasonable measures, liability shall be able to be imposed on damage caused by them since Article 6(3) of the Annex specifies that “liability shall be strict”.Footnote 120 Liability under the Protocol can be imposed on individual operators as well as on states, and shall be imposed on the basis of a breach of international law in accordance with Article 10 of the Annex.Footnote 121
Rules on liability in the treaties referred to in this section do not specify who could invoke liability, given that the activities can occur on the high seas and that damage by the activities may pollute the global environment. Article 4 of the Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities implies that states injured or likely to be injured can invoke liability for transboundary damage caused by lawful activities.Footnote 122 A state other than the injured ones can invoke responsibility for damage caused by a breach of an obligation “owed to a group of States including that State or is established for the Protection of a collective interest of the group”.Footnote 123 The right of states other than injured ones to invoke “liability for damage caused by a lawful activity”, however, is not guaranteed to be conferred under current international law.Footnote 124 It seems then that third states other than injured states do not have the same right as injured states to invoke liability on damage to the global environment caused by ocean fertilization and other geo-engineering activities.
With respect to ocean fertilization, it is particularly important that liability is imposed on sponsoring states as well as on the operators, who have failed to take all appropriate measures. Damage by ocean fertilization is likely to be slowly accumulated and spread widely. As a result, when the actual damage appears, liability for the damage can be potentially significant, so that the liability could far exceed the financial capacity of the operators. For more liability to be covered, sponsoring states shall be liable for damage caused by not taking all necessary measures to ensure compliance of their operators. In addition, states will be involved in several stages of the development and commercialization of marine geo-engineering activities. For example, marine geo-engineering is usually initiated by research projects at government level. When it becomes commercialized and is traded, it may be done so not in a traditional market but in a carbon market that is to be created to implement the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.Footnote 125 Governments must be involved in the establishment of the carbon market, at least at its beginning. Therefore, it is right for states to be liable for damage caused by the activities initiated and sponsored by them.
The above review of obligations of due diligence whose breach entails liability under several environment treaties proves that the obligations are mostly obligations of conduct rather than of result. On the other hand, as noted in Part II.A, liability shall be imposed where there is an actual result, damage, or potential for such damage. This gap between the attribute of obligations whose breach entails liability and the key condition of liability to be imposed results in a fulfilment of the obligations that can result in the imposition of liability if actual or potential damage exists, while a breach of the obligations sometimes may not result in the imposition of liability if no damage occurs or is expected to occur. The former case is a strict liability (e.g. liability under the Antarctic Treaty). This strict liability applies to limited subjects, as noted.
To date, no liability regime has been set up for the damage caused by marine geo-engineering (including ocean fertilization). Damage by these activities is hardly likely to be “ultra-hazardous”, consequently, strict liability will not apply to damage caused by these activities. This means that if damage occurs by the activities after states take all necessary measures to prevent, reduce, or eliminate pollution they are not liable for the damage. Although liability cannot absolutely cover all damage caused by the activities, the adoption of a liability regime, in particular with regard to ocean fertilization and other marine geo-engineering activities, is desirable since it has a certain preventative effect. This effect was recently experienced where liability was imposed on states. The following section will attempt to identify the potential preventative effect of state liability under the London Protocol for the management of marine geo-engineering activities.
III. AN INCENTIVE OF A STATE LIABILITY REGIME FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE GEO-ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES
Marine geo-engineering activities, including ocean fertilization, have the potential for a negative impact on marine ecosystems. However, the actual amount of damage caused to the marine environment is difficult to measure, and polluters and victims are not easy to identify. Therefore, even if a rule on liability with regard to the activities is adopted, it may not be applicable, at least immediately. Even so, the adoption of a provision on responsibility and liability of states may have some preventative effect, as demonstrated in a recent advisory case by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). This section will review the case and examine whether a responsibility or liability regime under the London Protocol can have the same effect if established.
A. State Liability as a Preventive Measure
In many cases, a hazardous activity does not result in immediate environmental damage. It causes instead an accumulated impact, which could result in irreversible damage.Footnote 126 In this case, the prevention of the repetition of the same kind of incident is more important than guaranteeing compensation after irreversible damage has occurred. The precautionary principle is important in terms of the prevention of environmental harm in advance. The precautionary principle is laid down in Principle 15 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration), which states that “the lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”.Footnote 127 However, this principle is guidance rather than a mandate, so it must be implemented through the adoption of effective measures. An environmental impact assessment is one of the significant preventative measures for implementing the precautionary principle. A state liability regime can include preventative measures in its regulatory rules as well as being adopted as an implementing measure of the precautionary principle. It is expected for the regime to prevent unknown environmental impact caused by ocean fertilization activities before serious harm by the activities is scientifically proven. This effect was recently experienced in the International Seabed Authority.
Nauru and Tonga submitted applications for the exploration of polymetallic nodules in the area to the Legal and Technical Commission of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) in April 2008. The review of these applications was requested to be delayed in May 2009.Footnote 128 The reason for this delay was to clarify the contents and the degree of responsibility and liability of sponsoring states stipulated in Part XI of the UNCLOS.Footnote 129 In 2010, Nauru submitted the “Proposal to Seek an Advisory Opinion from the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on Matters Regarding Sponsoring State Responsibility and Liability”.Footnote 130
Along with other questions included in the proposal, Nauru questioned in its original submission the extent of state responsibility and liability, in particular, under Article 139 of the UNCLOS, which is read as “damage caused by the failure of a State Party or international organization to carry out its responsibilities under this Part shall entail liability”.Footnote 131 Nauru argued that “developing States are unlikely to sponsor activities in the Area if they face potential significant liabilities that cannot be effectively mitigated with a high degree of certainty”.Footnote 132 The Council of the ISA summarized the request by Nauru and adopted a decision to forward the summarized request for advisory opinions to the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on 6 May 2010.Footnote 133 The submitted request by the Council includes the following key questions:
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1. What are the legal responsibilities and obligations of States Parties to the Convention with respect to the sponsorship of activities in the Area in accordance with the Convention, in particular Part XI, and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982?
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2. What is the extent of liability of a State Party for any failure to comply with the provisions of the Convention, in particular Part XI, and the 1994 Agreement, by an entity whom it has sponsored under Article 153, paragraph 2(b), of the Convention?
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3. What are the necessary and appropriate measures that a sponsoring State must take in order to fulfil its responsibility under the Convention, in particular Article 139 and Annex III, and the 1994 Agreement?Footnote 134
The Chamber concluded that Part XI and Annex III of the UNCLOS, the Implementing Agreement of Part XI, and the mining codes adopted by the ISA, did not specify responsibility as defined under the ILC's Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.Footnote 135 The Chamber instead interpreted the responsibility used in the provisions as “obligations”.Footnote 136 It noted that the obligations of due diligence under Article 139 (“to ensure that activities in the Area … shall be carried out in conformity with this Part”), whose violation entails liability, are obligations of conduct.Footnote 137 The contents of the obligations of a sponsoring state under the UNCLOS, breach of which entails liability, are to adopt laws and regulations, and to take administrative measures for “ensuring compliance by operators with its obligations under the Convention and related instruments as well as under the relevant contract”.Footnote 138 Conditions for the imposition of liability with respect to activities in the Area are: first, breach of the obligations; and second, existence of damage.Footnote 139 These apply to operators as well as sponsoring states. Sponsoring states are liable for damage when they fail to take all necessary and appropriate measures.Footnote 140 If damage occurs after the sponsoring states have fully carried out their own obligations, and the operators cannot afford the full compensation for the actual amount of damage incurred by activities in the Area, the sponsoring states are not liable for the residual amount of actual damage and the actual amount of damage may not be fully compensated.Footnote 141 A trust fund then can cover the gap.Footnote 142
With respect to consideration of the different abilities of states to afford liability, the Chamber has noted that the responsibility and liability of sponsoring states with regard to environmental damage shall apply equally to all sponsoring states, including developing states.Footnote 143 Therefore, Nauru, as a developing state, is not exempt from environmental liability arising from the exploration and exploitation of seabed mining. The Chamber pointed out that two existing mining regulations impose liability on mining operators as well as on sponsoring states even after the exploration phase is completed.Footnote 144 Considering the statement by Nauru enquiring about the content and degree of state liability under the UNCLOS, and the decision by the Chamber, there are several elements that may be required for a liability regime to have a preventative effect in terms of pollution on the high seas, as follows:
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1. Sponsoring states shall be liable for damage caused by the activities of their sponsored operators.
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2. Conservation standards must be equally applied to all states, including developing states. Although developing states have a different capacity for conservation, it shall not be used as an excuse for not adopting the same standard of conservation as other states. They must seek technical assistance in accordance with the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS to adopt an equal standard of conservation domestically. Such standards shall be no less effective than international rules, standards, and recommended practices and procedures.
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3. Although states cannot be liable for all damage, they shall at least be liable for the damage caused by not ensuring the compliance of their operators through taking all necessary legal, technical, and administrative measures.
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4. Liability shall be imposed even after the activities are completed.
A responsibility or liability regime has not yet been developed under the London Protocol. The relevant provision in the Protocol, Article 15, contains a legal basis for liability to be imposed on states “[i]n accordance with the principles of international law regarding State responsibility”.Footnote 145 Therefore, it can be assumed that State Parties are liable for the damage caused by dumping or incineration at sea conducted by their nationals. With regard to the second element on the equal application of conservation standards, the LP does not render an exemption of application of environmental protection standards to developing countries. It instead has a provision that obliges parties to assist developing countries to be familiar with “environmentally sound technologies and corresponding know-how” so that they are able to properly implement the Protocol.Footnote 146 This meets the second element of the liability regime to have a preventative effect.
As reviewed in Part II.A, the LP obliges parties to take all necessary measures to prevent, reduce, or eliminate pollution from dumping or incineration. Article 11 and Annex 2 (assessment of wastes or other matter that may be considered for dumping) to the Protocol require parties to establish “procedures and mechanisms” of compliance, and to “assure compliance with any resulting waste reduction and prevention requirements” by permitting process.Footnote 147 Consequently, states shall be liable under the LP if damage occurs from not taking all necessary measures to ensure the compliance of their operators.
With respect to the fourth element, the London Protocol does not specify that states shall be liable for damage caused by activities after these have ceased. A liability regime under the Protocol must be established in accordance with “principles of international law regarding State responsibility for damage to the environment of other States or to any area of the environment”.Footnote 148 The provisions on state responsibility or liability arising out of transboundary pollution drafted by the ILC do not specify liability after the completion of polluting activities. International treaties rarely include a clause on continued liability after completion of activities. As noted in Part II.A, international law imposes responsibility or liability based on results or potential results rather than on the activity itself. If damage occurs, or potential damage is expected by an activity after its completion, the operators or sponsoring states shall be liable for such damage. This is confirmed in several judicial decisions, including the Trail Smelter Arbitral Award, which ordered that subsequent damage discovered after the activities have ceased shall be compensated.Footnote 149 This shall also apply to a liability regime adopted under the London Protocol, so that parties to the Protocol shall be liable for damage caused after dumping or incineration is completed.
As implied in the argument by Nauru and based on the experience of the preventative effect of state liability in this case, it can be argued that the preventative effect may be high with respect to activities conducted by underdeveloped or developing countries, but this may not be true for developed countries. Even if states with large political and economic powers may have less influence by adoption of a liability regime, the regime, if established, can still effectively discourage all initiations of marine geo-engineering activities. This can be inferred from the fact that objections to the liability regime which so far have appeared, have mainly depending on the possibility of engagement in the activities subject to liability. During negotiation on a liability provision under the CBD and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, the State Parties with the potential of practising transboundary movement of living modified organisms, and hazardous wastes and other wastes, did not agree with the establishment of a liability regime.Footnote 150 The states that raised and supported the adoption of a liability provision on damage caused by ocean fertilization during the governing bodies meetings of the London Protocol held in 2012 were developing countries. The reason of their support was that they are less likely to actually practise ocean fertilization in the near future, but any activity is highly likely to have an impact on marine ecosystems within their national jurisdiction.
States which do not support the adoption of a liability regime may wish to instead strengthen existing measures for implementing the precautionary principles, such as environmental impact assessment or monitoring. Then, regardless of the actual adoption of the liability regime, an attempt to adopt it can have the indirect incentive of preventing detrimental impact of the activities subject to the regime strengthening implementation of the precautionary principle. Reviewing this indirect incentive is beyond the scope of this paper, of which a key purpose is to examine the potential of a direct preventative effect of state liability itself, but could be a good subject for future study.
IV. CONCLUSION
Liability of states in terms of environmental damage is not imposed solely for the purposes of reparation. In many cases, environmental damage does not occur immediately after an incident; and repetition of such incidents must be more carefully prevented. Implementing an important principle in terms of the prevention of environmental harm in advance, the precautionary principle could be another main reason to establish rules and procedures for international liability on environmental damage.
Ocean fertilization is mostly likely to be conducted on the high seas, where no universal jurisdiction exists. Pollutants from ocean fertilization could slowly spread into the far distance and become accumulated; its damage could be significant and long-lasting. If liability should be imposed on any damage that has been proven to be caused by ocean fertilization, then it will be easier to impose it on states rather than operators, who are not normally capable of affording significant amounts of compensation. Since liability could be significant, states would prefer to oblige all operators to take preventative measures in advance of the occurrence of an incident rather than to oblige an operator to take response measures after an incident occurs. Potentially significant liability for damage caused by ocean fertilization, and other marine geo-engineering activities, can thus trigger implementation of the precautionary principle. It also has a direct preventative effect, making states cautious about initiating these activities, as experienced recently by the ISA. This paper confirms that liability on damage caused by ocean fertilization and other marine geo-engineering activities, if it can be imposed under the LP, could have the potential of a preventative effect.
Since this paper aims to initiate a discussion on the conservation of global marine environment in a more responsible manner through the imposition of a liability which is currently largely disregarded under international environment treaties, how the principles of international liability actually apply to ocean fertilization and other marine geo-engineering activities and why the liability regime can have the preventative impact would remain as future subjects for separate study.
