Through the work of Michael Tsin, Kristin Stapleton, Madeleine Yue Dong and others, we know that social reforms and political revolution spread across early twentieth-century Chinese cities and transformed the organization, meaning, and function of urban space. Building her book on the pioneering scholarship of these authors, Shuk-wah Poon studies how early twentieth-century reform and revolution reshaped urban religious space, how religious professionals and believers interpreted and reacted to the momentous change, and how such transformation redefined the organizational structure and cultural implication of religious congregations, pilgrimage, and religious festivals. Her case in point is Guangzhou over the course of four decades from the late Qing to 1937. Political upheavals and radical cultural reforms engulfed the city and transformed it into the cradle of Chinese nationalism and the stronghold of the Nationalist Party. Against this backdrop, Poon presents an intriguing local history that examines the confrontation and negotiation between state-sanctioned religious institutions and “popular religion,” between the culture of scientism and the purported “superstitious” mentality and practice, and between the modernist state and the local community.
The book is structured chronologically. It begins with the late Qing reforms of the 1900s. Imperial officials converted temples into schools to promote a new type of education. Social reforms also intensified that derided religious worship as a disturbing sign of perverse tradition and backward mentality. The book then shifts its focus to the Republican municipal administration in the 1920s under Sun Yat-sen and Sun Ke. The father-and-son team and their comrades put all temples in Guangzhou up for sale. By imposing a property tax on religious premises and claiming a part of each temple's earnings from commercial activities conducted on site, the government expanded its sources of revenue but strained its relationship with the local community. The last three chapters of the book focus on the Nanjing decade. Due to divisions between the central and local governments and between pragmatic administrators and dogmatic party ideologists, the focus of the anti-religion campaign was constantly changing. Some leaders supported an all-out assault—to stigmatize religious service providers, to regulate worshippers’ behaviors, and to secularize religious celebrations—while others sought to strike a balance between safeguarding religious freedom and eradicating superstition. It seems that the state often aimed high but accomplished little. By contrast, the people, though they rarely resorted to outright confrontation with the invasive state, were quite adept in circumventing the government's demands and keeping “their religious faith and space alive by adapting their religious practices to the changing political and urban environments” (p. 90).
Poon's book is the latest installment in the study of the relationship between China's modern state and society. To distinguish her Guangzhou case from studies of other major cities in China in the same period, Poon claims that her book “discards the conventional rejection-acceptance dichotomy in explaining the reaction of the populace to the political and cultural endeavors of the state” (p. 2). She argues that “the state-society relationship was never a zero-sum game; there was no clear winner and no clear loser, as state control and urban autonomy were always intertwined” (p. 153). Yet, the argument that Poon emphasizes in both her introduction and conclusion is familiar to researchers and readers of modern Chinese history. Since William T. Rowe's classic study of late imperial Hankou's vibrant business community in 1984 (Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796–1889 [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press]), historians have been reminding readers that state control in modern China was never a unidirectional process; instead, the public participated and to a certain extent manipulated the outcome. The formulation of “control vs. negotiation” has lost analytical vigor and needs to be replaced by new compelling questions.
Readers may wish that the author had done more to engage existing scholarship. Rebecca Nedostup's recent book Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Asia Center, 2009), for example, studies the Nationalist-led anti-superstition campaign in Jiangsu during the Nanjing decade. A dialogue between Nedostup and Poon over the shifting definition of “superstition” in modern China and the role of secularism in building the modern Chinese nation-state would have been intriguing and intellectually rewarding. It would help us better understand how the term became a rallying point that united a diverse and divided group of political and social leaders and how secularism affected the people who were supposed to benefit from it. Space is another analytical focus of Poon's book. On this topic, Peter Carroll's book Between Heaven and Modernity: Reconstructing Suzhou, 1895–1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), in particular the fascinating chapters about the intense cultural debate revolving around the city's Confucius Temple, would have been a useful work of reference. Even so, Poon's book is a concise case study that will be of interest to anyone who studies the complex relationship between religion, the people, and the modern Chinese state.
