In times where the European Commission's “more economic approach” to competition policy often is accepted as the new and only standard for competition policy without any questions asked about other, non-economic objectives, Christopher Townley's book refreshingly goes against this trend as it examines the relevance of non-economic goals in contemporary EC competition policy. This task is very much to be lauded as his work fills in a gap in the English speaking academic literature which, up to this point, does not appear to have attempted an in-depth analysis of this important topic in a comprehensive manner. Until now, the works which are probably closest to Townley's book insofar that they might be considered as having (at least partially) examined similar points are D. Schmidtchen, M. Albert and S. Voigt (eds.), The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law (Tübingen 2007), and A. Künzler, Effizienz oder Wettbewerbsfreiheit? (Tübingen 2008). However, neither of these books deals exclusively with the question of the importance of public policy considerations in competition policy concerning Article 81 EC. In other words, Townley has written a much needed book.

Townley's work (which is based upon his PhD thesis) is divided into three parts – entitled “Part A: Considering Public Policy Objectives in Competition Law”, “Part B: How and Where is Public Policy Balancing Performed in Article 81 EC?” and, “Part C: How and Where Should Public Policy Balancing be Performed in Article 81 EC?” – a conclusion and an annex which contains two tables detailing the number of Article 81 EC cases which involved public policy considerations in the period from 1993 up to 2004. Part A examines the theoretical framework of “why” and “when” it might be appropriate (or even necessary) to consider public policy in competition analysis: first in what Townley calls a “legal vaccum” (passim, Chapter 1) and then in the context of Article 81 EC (Chapter 2). In this part, he advocates a balanced (and balancing) approach to the interaction of and/or conflict between different policy considerations. Maybe unsurprisingly, he concludes that the Commission's recent policy change has regrettably created more ambiguity than clarity as it implies that public policy concerns are irrelevant in Article 81 EC decision-making. In this context, he also raises the interesting question if the Commission alone is able to change competition policy. Part B logically builds upon Part A's conclusion that the EC Treaty demands the inclusion of public policy in Article 81 EC and examines the different mechanisms by which public policy is considered within the said Article. Townley divides these assessment mechanisms into what he calls “mere-balancing” and “market-balancing”. According to Townley, “mere-balancing” denotes that an agreement is first assessed in relation to its effects on “consumer welfare”; subsequently, the result of this assessment is balanced against the impact it has upon relevant public policy considerations. The term “market-balancing” is used to refer to an assessment which takes place within what Townley calls the “consumer welfare test” and which places, depending on the context, a different emphasis on the importance of the components of economic efficiency analysis. As Townley himself points out in Part B, it is hard to come up with concrete conclusions in this respect (passim); however, for the purpose of this review it suffices to say that he concludes that, although both mechanisms appear more or less possible within Article 81 EC, more clarity is needed as to when, where and which of these mechanisms should and can be applied. Concluding the examination, Part C suggests how the current system, which Townley considers to be “too unclear” (p. 201), could be changed to make it more coherent and transparent. Amongst the propositions which are made by Townley in this part, maybe the most important are that consumer welfare should become the sole goal of Article 81(1) EC and that public policy should be considered in the context of Article 81(3) EC by means of “mere-balancing”. In doing so, the book also reinforces the statement (and overall conclusion) that public policy must be taken into account when dealing with an Article 81 EC scenario.

With regard to the scope of the book, Townley wisely restricts his analysis to Article 81 EC but suggests that his “conclusions equally apply to Article 82 [EC] because these two provisions' objectives are the same” (pp. 8 and 46) and hints that something similar is the case for the EC Merger Regulation as it appears to adopt the framework he suggests for analysing Article 81 EC (pp. 8 and 46). In particular, he analyses in great detail the public policy considerations of economic efficiency, market integration, environmental protection, consumer protection, culture, industrial policy and security of energy supply. Although it is probably debatable whether or not “economic efficiency” can easily qualify as a public policy, Townley nonetheless makes a strong case for the need of the (continuing) recognition of public policy in EC competition analysis. However, by building upon both older and more recent cases such as LC Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v. Commission [1982] (Case 258/78) and GlaxoSmithKline Services UnLtd v. Commission (both [2006] T-168/01 and C-501/06), he neither suggests that public policy should be the only guiding principle for competition analysis nor that such considerations, despite their documented importance in EC case law, have been (or indeed, should be) accepted without any restrictions as to their applicability and appropriateness. His emphasis is on “balance”.

Whilst one does not necessarily have to agree with all of Townley's conclusions and his arguments could, at times, be made both a bit clearer and more forcefully, it is very much hoped that this book is not the end of a much needed discussion. As Townley observes himself in his overall conclusion, “[t]here is much (difficult) work to do” (p. 319). In the meantime, this book provides a good starting point for the further examination of the important question “Why, how and when might public policy have a part to play in contemporary EC competition analysis?”. This is even (and especially) the case at the advent of the Treaty of Lisbon.