In April 2005, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published its Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research.1
Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, National Research Council. Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 2005. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences; 2005. Available at: http://newton.nap.edu/books/0309096537/html/.
Robert JS, Baylis F. Stem cell politics: The NAS prohibitions pack more bark than bite. Hastings Center Report 2005;35:15–6.
White House. Fact sheet: embryonic stem cell research. 2001 Aug 9. Homepage available at: http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-1.html (accessed 2005 Dec 1).
Grafting human or nonhuman stem cells into human or nonhuman hosts at various stages of development.
In the NAS guidelines, research involving the transfer of hES cells or their derivatives into nonhuman primate blastocysts is prohibited, as is the transfer of human and nonhuman ES cells into human blastocysts.4
See note 1, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, National Research Council 2005:8, 57, and 124.
See note 1, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, National Research Council 2005:7, 57, and 124.
See note 1, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, National Research Council 2005:8, 58, and 125.
In this paper, we critically examine the NAS position on research involving the transfer of hES cells or their derivatives into nonhuman primates. We argue that the moral reason given for the NAS prohibition on grafting hES cells into nonhuman primate blastocysts, namely that this may undermine human dignity, is flawed. We next review alternate proposals for pursuing such research subject to strict research design criteria and conclude that they too are flawed. These conclusions leave us calling for a richer discourse on the ethics of creating novel beings likely to be of a controversial moral status.7
Robert JS, Baylis F. Crossing species boundaries. American Journal of Bioethics 2003;3:1–13.
Reasons for Creating Part-Human Chimeras
The promise of stem cell research for the treatment of degenerative brain diseases like Parkinson's and Alzheimer's is great, as are the scientific and ethical hurdles. One of those hurdles, according to some stem cell scientists, is research involving the creation of part-human chimeras. These scientists maintain that such research is a necessary step on the path to clinical trials—a step that, according to the NAS, “will inevitably be required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).”8
See note 1, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, National Research Council 2005:39.
Hall SS. Stem cells: A status report. Hastings Center Report 2006;36:16–22.
The anticipated benefits of research involving the grafting of human neural stem cells into nonhuman embryos (blastocysts stage and beyond) and human fetuses are twofold. First, this research will permit “the study of human neural development in a live environment paving the way for the generation of new models of human neurodegenerative and psychiatric diseases” (p. 18644).10
Muotri AR, Nakashima K, Toni N, Sandler VM, Gage FH. Development of functional embryonic stem cell-derived neurons in mouse brains. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 2005;102:18644–18648.
See note 10, Muotri et al. 2005:18648.
In further explaining the need for and value of research involving the creation of part-human chimeras, the NAS guidelines underscore the following benefits associated with the introduction of hES cells or their derivatives into nonhuman blastocysts and nonhuman postgastrulation and postnatal animals: “[S]uch experiments will be essential to test the potential of hES cells or their derivatives to differentiate into the desired cells and tissues and to ensure that hES cells or their derivatives do not give rise to inappropriate cell types or to tumors or have any other deleterious consequences.”12
See note 1, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, National Research Council 2005:39.
Concerns with Creating Part-Human Chimeras
The scientific community is divided with respect to the value of interspecies chimera research.13
Robert JS. Model systems in stem cell biology. BioEssays 2004;26:1010.
Grafting hES Cells into Postgrastrulation and Postnatal Nonhuman Animals
The NAS guidelines permit the grafting of hES cells into postgrastrulation and postnatal nonhuman animals, including primates, in the belief that there is no serious risk that hES cells would contribute to the germline of the engrafted animal. Erring on the side of caution, however, the guidelines stipulate that this unlikely risk will be managed by prohibiting the breeding of part-human chimeras.14
See note 1, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, National Research Council 2005:39–40.
The risk of human cells infiltrating the brains of postgrastrulation or postnatal nonhuman animals is also deemed unlikely, but is not identified as a risk to be avoided. Indeed, according to the NAS guidelines, this possible outcome would be worthy of further study:
[T]he idea that human neuronal cells might participate in “higher-order” brain functions in a nonhuman animal, however unlikely that may be, raises concerns that need to be considered. Indeed, if such cells are to be used in human therapeutic interventions, one needs to know whether they could participate in that way in the context of a treatment. Thus there are good reasons to explore this sort of issue through animal experiments.15
See note 1, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, National Research Council 2005:39–40.
Grafting hES Cells into Nonhuman Blastocysts
The NAS guidelines permit the grafting of hES cells into all nonhuman blastocysts except those of primates. The explicit prohibition on grafting hES cells into nonhuman primate blastocysts is introduced because of the risk of both germline and brain infiltration. This risk is identified as a threat to human dignity, though human dignity is nowhere defined in the guidelines:
Research in which hES cells are introduced into nonhuman primate blastocysts … should … not be conducted at this time. These kinds of studies could produce creatures in which the lines between human and nonhuman primates are blurred, a development that could threaten to undermine human dignity.16
See note 1, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, National Research Council 2005:55.
Human Dignity and Moral Status
Concerns about violating human dignity are shared by Karpowicz and colleagues according to whom “chimeras, by combining the appearance and functional capacities of humans and animals, seem to risk denying human dignity” (p. 333).17
Karpowicz P, Cohen CB, van der Kooy D. It is ethical to transplant human stem cells into nonhuman embryos. Nature Medicine 2004;10:331–335.
Human dignity is a widely shared concept that refers to being worthy or respected because one is human…. Human dignity is based on the recognition that human beings possess, will possess, or have possessed functional and emergent psychological capacities that indicate they are worthy of respect. Humans have the capacity to make moral choices and their actions can be imputed to them because they possess a conscience and a sense of responsibility. Recognition of such human characteristics informs us of our common humanity and reminds us of our reasons to respect and support humanity.18
See note 17, Karpowicz et al. 2004:333.
Interestingly, despite a shared concern about possible threats to human dignity, Karpowicz and colleagues reach a different conclusion than that found in the NAS guidelines. In their view, grafting hES cells into nonhuman primate embryos need not “threaten the belief at the core of our social ethic that human beings have a certain distinctive dignity” (p. 129).19
Karpowicz P, Cohen CB, van der Kooy D. Developing human–nonhuman chimeras in human stem cell research: Ethical issues and boundaries. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2005;15:107–134.
See note 17, Karpowicz et al. 2004:333.
See note 17, Karpowicz et al. 2004:334.
See note 17, Karpowicz et al. 2004:334.
See note 17, Karpowicz et al. 2004:334.
See note 19, Karpowicz et al. 2005:128.
See note 17, Karpowicz et al. 2004:334; see also note 19, Karpowicz et al. 2005:129.
Related to concerns about human dignity are concerns about moral status. Shortly after the NAS guidelines were released, Greene and colleagues published their views on the moral issues associated with grafting human stem cells into nonhuman primates, starting with the worry that such research might change the morally relevant mental capacities of engrafted nonhuman primates.26
Greene M, Schill K, Takahashi S, Bateman-House A, Beauchamp T, Bok H, et al. Moral issues of human–nonhuman primate neural grafting. Science 2005;309:385–6.
See note 26, Greene et al. 2005:385.
Greene and colleagues do not present a consensus view on the moral acceptability of grafting hES cells into nonhuman primate embryos: “[S]ome of us believe that engraftment of human neural cells into great apes should not be permitted, particularly early in neural development. Others argue against outright prohibition.”28
See note 26, Greene et al. 2005:386.
See note 26, Greene et al. 2005:386.
Flawed arguments
A first problem with arguments in support of limited research involving the grafting of human stem cells into nonhuman primates is that such arguments appear to accept unchallenged the claim that creating interspecies chimeras is a necessary step in the development of safe and effective stem cell therapies for human disease. But what about the problem of inference from cross-species research to human research given known differences between the biology of nonhumans and humans? Biological differences such as the possible absence of the rostral migratory stream in the human brain after infancy may well limit the ability to extrapolate research findings from part-human chimeras to humans.30
Sanai N, Tamontin AD, Quinones-Hinojosa A, Barbaro NM, Gupta N, Kunwar S, et al. Unique astrocyte ribbon in adult human brain contains neural stem cells but lacks chain migration. Nature 2004;427:740–4.
Those who advocate part-human chimeric stem cell research as a means to the end of regenerative medicine suggest that this research is imperative in part because the human-to-human chimera research would be unethical. But this statement may be far too sweeping. For example, following current guidelines in Canada, the United Kingdom, and many other countries, human embryo research, though morally controversial, is permitted up until 14 days. Why preclude human-to-human chimera research within the 14 day time limit?31
Robert JS. The science and ethics of making part-human animals in stem cell biology. Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology 2006;20:838–845.
Also, what about nonhuman-primate-to-nonhuman-primate research (with appropriate stringent restrictions on the care of nonhuman primates in research facilities)? Admittedly there are fewer available nonhuman primate stem cell lines and nonhuman primate hosts are an expensive animal model for preclinical research, but if this research could successfully sidestep certain moral and scientific problems, why not pursue this alternative and plan to move directly from nonhuman-primate-to-nonhuman-primate studies into human clinical trials? At this time, there is no reason to think that the inferential problems will be greater with grafting nonhuman primate stem cells into nonhuman primates as contrasted with grafting human stem cells into nonhuman primates, though admittedly different research strategies may be needed for efficacy than for safety.
With respect to safety, there is the claim that interspecies research is necessary to test for tumorigenicity. Recent research, however, suggests that ES cells may be more likely to generate tumors when grafted into a host that is of the same species as that from which the cells were derived.32
Erdo F, Buhrle C, Blunk J, Hoehn M, Xia Y, Fleischmann B, et al. Host-dependent tumorigenesis of embryonic stem cell transplantation in experimental stroke. Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow & Metabolism 2003;23:780–5.
Lindvall O, Kokaia Z, Martinez-Serrano A. Stem cell therapy for human neurodegenerative disorders—How to make it work. Nature Medicine 2004;10(Suppl):S42–50.
With respect to efficacy, there is the apparent assumption that nonhuman primates are the ideal animal model for diseases affecting the human brain, so that we are right to have more confidence in the relevance of preclinical data from human–nonhuman primate chimeras than from human–rodent chimeras. Evidence in support of the view that nonhuman primates are the better animal model for research relevant to the human brain is lacking, however. Here, it is perhaps instructive to consider the development of the related field of fetal neural transplantation for the treatment of Parkinsonism. The first published clinical trial of this approach34
Madrazo I, Leon V, Torres C, Aguilera MC, Varela G, Alvarez F, et al. Transplantation of fetal substantia nigra and adrenal medulla to the caudate nucleus in two patients with Parkinson's disease. New England Journal of Medicine 1988;318:51.
Sladek JR Jr, Redmond DE Jr, Collier TJ, Blount JP, Elsworth JD, Taylor JR, et al. Fetal dopamine neural grafts: Extended reversal of methylphenyltetrahydropyridine-induced parkinsonism in monkeys. Progress in Brain Research 1988;78:497–506; Fine A, Hunt SP, Oertel WH, Nomoto M, Chong PN, Bond A, et al. Transplantation of embryonic marmoset dopaminergic neurons to the corpus striatum of marmosets rendered parkinsonian by 1-methyl-4-phenyl-1,2,3,6-tetrahydropyridine. Progress in Brain Research 1988;78:479–89.
Olanow CW, Goetz CG, Kordower JH, Stoessl AJ, Sossi V, Brin MF, et al. A double-blind controlled trial of bilateral fetal nigral transplantation in Parkinson's disease. Annals of Neurology 2003;54:403–14.
A further problem with arguments limiting research involving the grafting of human stem cells into nonhuman primates is the failure to address head-on the moral quandary, namely that the primary scientific reason for wanting to pursue research involving the creation of human–nonhuman primate embryonic chimeras and the primary ethical reason for limiting such research are one and the same—nonhuman primates most closely approximate humans. Instead of squarely confronting this quandary, considerable intellectual energy is expended insisting on the potential scientific benefits of biological humanization while seeking to minimize the risk of moral humanization.
The Argument from Human Dignity
It is difficult to assess the NAS claim that grafting human cells into nonhuman primate blastocysts “could threaten to undermine human dignity” without first understanding the meaning of the term human dignity. This is no easy task, as there are a number of candidate definitions.37
See Macklin R. Dignity is a useless concept. British Medical Journal 2003;327:1419.
Human dignity is often used as a stand-in for autonomy,38
See note 17, Karpowicz et al. 2004; see also note 19, Karpowicz et al. 2005; Kant I. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Ellington JW, trans. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, Inc.; 1981:40–1.
See Thomas A. Mappes and David DeGrazia's discussion of human dignity in the general introduction of their anthology Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill; 1996:17–8. See also SC Crawford's discussion of the physician–patient relationship in Hindu Bioethics for the Twenty-first Century. Albany: State University of New York Press; 2003:103.
Something like this seems to be informing Crawford's discussion on this issue in Hindu Bioethics for the Twenty-first Century. See note 39, Crawford 2003:29.
See Wilson JSJ. Proposed definitions of dignity. British Medical Journal (A Rapid Response found on the Internet to Ruth Macklin's article “Dignity Is a Useless Concept”) 2004 Feb 26 (accessed 2005 Dec 1). Available at: http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/eletters/327/7429/1419#51703. See also Ingle RF. Nuts and bolts of dignity? (A Rapid Response found on the Internet to Ruth Macklin's article “Dignity Is a Useless Concept”) 2004 Mar 1 (accessed 2005 Dec 1). Available at: http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/eletters/327/7429/1419#51703.
But what of the definition of human dignity offered by Karpowicz and colleagues, who, like the NAS, worry that grafting human stem cells into nonhuman primates may violate human dignity? In their view,
[h]uman dignity is a widely shared notion that signifies that humans typically display certain sorts of functional and emergent capacities that render them uniquely valuable and worthy of respect. It is not only the capacities for reasoning, choosing freely, and acting for moral reasons, as Kant argues, or for entertaining and acting on the basis of self-chosen purposes, as Gewirth holds, that are at the core of what we mean by human dignity. The notion also encompasses such capacities as those for engaging in sophisticated forms of communication and language, participating in interweaving social relations, developing a secular or religious world view, and displaying sympathy and empathy in emotionally complex ways.42
See note 19, Karpowicz et al. 2005:120.
The problem with this definition when it is used to clarify what types of chimera research would or would not violate human dignity is that it implicitly relies on the species integrity argument (disclaimers to the contrary notwithstanding). Indeed, there is an inherent tension in Karpowicz and colleagues' criticism of the use of the species concept and their own use of their concept of human dignity. It appears to us that they want to both (a) value certain human functions and capacities for their own sake and not because they are human43
“[H]umans are not considered to have dignity because they are Homo sapiens, but because they possess a cluster of capacities that matter ethically and that members of that species generally exhibit.” See note 19, Karpowicz et al. 2005:121.
“The family of capacities associated with human dignity seems to belong uniquely to human beings … [A]nimals, including those with capacities that resemble those of humans in several respects, have a different sort of worth from that of humans.” See note 19, Karpowicz et al. 2005:122.
The problem with implicitly opting for, while at the same time denying the value of, species integrity is that this introduces a significant logical problem. If Karpowicz and colleagues believe that human capacities are to be valued for their own sake and not because they are human, then they can't conclude that creating human–nonhuman primate chimeras with these capacities in any way threatens human dignity. Alternatively, if their position is that human capacities are to be valued because they are human and not for their own sake, then they can conclude that creating human–nonhuman chimeras risks violating human dignity but, per force, must acknowledge that their argument relies on presuppositions about species integrity.
Karpowicz et al. are resistant to relying on a species integrity argument, but this comes at a price. If the species classification/demarcation truly plays no role in the analysis of human dignity and if nonhuman primates have dignity-associated capacities “that resemble those of humans in several respects,”45
See note 19, Karpowicz et al. 2005:122.
In sum, we agree with Karpowicz et al. that human capacities “for carrying out discursive and moral reasoning, engaging in complex communication, and forming multifaceted social relations”46
See note 19, Karpowicz et al. 2005:123.
See note 19, Karpowicz et al. 2005:124.
From another perspective, it is difficult for us to understand how the use of nonhuman primate hosts for the creation of part-human chimeras represents an objectionable affront to “human dignity” (and for this reason should be prohibited or strictly regulated), whereas the use of other nonhuman hosts seemingly does not constitute such an affront (and therefore does not need to be prohibited or strictly regulated). Surely the threat to human dignity, if there is such a threat, would be all the more significant with efforts to “humanize” our more distant nonhuman relatives? Would not a “thinking, talking” mouse à la Stuart Little be more of a threat to human dignity (such as it is) than a “thinking, talking” Cornelius from Planet of the Apes?48
Having said this, it is worth noting that although the claim above is logical, it may not always be true to human psychology. In many ways “proximity” is relevant to the perception of “threat.” The fact that nonhuman primates (unlike rodents) are similar to us in so many ways makes their cognitive and emotional enhancement more threatening than it might be with other species that appear more distant from humans. This point was drawn to our attention by T. Krahn.
From our perspective, it seems logically possible to engage in human-to-nonhuman primate neural grafting without adversely affecting the dignity of humans. Nothing about this process entails that human persons or even human beings (if we wish to make this distinction) will lose their status as autonomous individuals, persons, or equal moral citizens (of the global moral community). Nor is there any reason to suppose that this will undermine their self-respect. As such, while there may be sound ethical concerns with grafting hES cells into nonhuman primates, it would seem that these concerns have little or nothing to do with human dignity (at least relative to the definitions of human dignity that we have canvassed).
In the end, discussions of whether human dignity is adversely affected seem focused on the wrong beings. Though no human beings are adversely affected by human-to-nonhuman primate neural grafting at early developmental stages, and so human dignity (whatever it might mean) remains unthreatened, nonhuman primate beings may be adversely affected by such research. The possibility of harm to nonhuman primates is difficult to assess at this juncture in the debate, however.49
Streiffer R. At the edge of humanity: Human stem cells, chimeras, and moral status. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2005;15:347–70.
The Argument for Protected Human Moral Standing
Greene and colleagues appear to believe that grafting hES cells into nonhuman primates may alter those primates' cognitive and emotional capacities in ways that might change their current moral status.50
See note 26, Greene et al. 2005:385.
See note 26, Greene et al. 2005:386.
There are several problems with the article by Greene and colleagues, not the least of which is the contradiction between the claim that there is no scientific or philosophical ground for maintaining a strict theoretical division of the species,52
See note 26, Greene et al. 2005:385.
Ereshefsky M. Eliminative pluralism. In: Hull D, Ruse M, eds. The Philosophy of Biology. New York: Oxford University Press; 1998:353–4; Rachels J. Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1991; Dunbar RIM. What's in a classification? In: Cavalieri P, Singer P, eds. The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity. London: Fourth Estate; 1993:110–1.
This point informs Jane Goodall's musings on the similarities and differences between chimpanzees and humans in her book Through a Window: My Thirty Years with the Chimpanzees of Gombe. Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1990:174; Dawkins R. Gaps in the mind. In: Cavalieri P, Singer P, eds. The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity. London: Fourth Estate; 1993:82–5.
In our estimation, talk of nonhuman primates who might acquire humanlike characteristics as a result of hES cell grafting, and so become worthy of a moral status akin to that accorded such humans as young children or the mentally challenged, is deeply problematic. There simply is no good reason to think that there is a class of mental states, or a set of classes related through family resemblance each containing a set of mental states, properly described as human that are unique to all humans. Arguably, to think otherwise is to fail to appreciate the remarkable diversity of cognitive capacities found throughout the human species. What we see among humans is a broad spectrum of cognitive capacity from the very simple (e.g., infants and toddlers) to the complex (e.g., human adults who enjoy a degree of cognitive health that falls within what is considered to be statistically normal, possess linguistic skills, and have a to-be-specified level of education). When we include various pathological or degenerative conditions in this analysis, the diversity of cognitive capacities among humans only increases. The “simpler” the cognitive capacity exhibited by humans, the less likely it is that this capacity is unique to humans. Indeed, considerations of evolutionary parsimony lead us to expect that similar behaviors in closely related species are to be explained by similar proximate causes, and this is no less true for the human and chimpanzee than it is for wolves and domestic dogs.55
De Waal FBM. Foreword. In: Mitchell RW, Thompson NS, Miles HL, eds. Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. Albany: State University of New York Press; 1997:xiv–xv.
Greene et al. suggest some characteristics they believe confer on humans a unique moral worth, including linguistic capacity, rationality, and a capacity for sufficiently rich social relationships.56
See note 26, Greene et al. 2005:385.
See Gómez's comment to this effect in his own footnote in Gómez JC. Apes, Monkeys, Children, and the Growth of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2004:282.
See Greenfield PM, Savage-Rumbaugh S. Grammatical combination in Pan paniscus: Processes of learning and invention in the evolution and development of language. In: Parker ST, Gibson KR, eds. “Language” and Intelligence in Monkeys and Apes: Comparative Developmental Perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1990:540–78; Savage-Rumbaugh S, Shankar SG, Taylor TJ. Apes, Language and the Human Mind. New York: Oxford University Press; 1998.
See Fouts RS, Fouts DH. Chimpanzee sign language research. In: Dolhinow P, Fuentes A, eds. The Nonhuman Primates. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company; 1999:252–6; Fouts RS, Jensvold MLA, Fouts DH. Chimpanzee signing: Darwinian realities and Cartesian delusions. In: Bekoff M, Allen C, Burghardt GM, eds. The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 2002:285–91.
Miles HLW. The cognitive foundations for reference in a signing orangutan. In: Parker ST, Gibson KR, eds. “Language” and Intelligence in Monkeys and Apes: Comparative Developmental Perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1990:511–39.
See Patterson F, Linden E. The Education of Koko. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston; 1981.
Some of Savage-Rumbaugh's retelling of her experiences with Kanzi are most suggestive in this regard. See her brief account of her research with Kanzi in (see note 58), Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998:3–74.
See some insightful comments on this matter in (see note 57) Gómez 2004:281–9. Do note, Kanzi does not use sign language, or elements of sign language, in communicating with Savage-Rumbaugh. Rather, Kanzi uses a keyboard containing symbols when communicating with his human “interlocutors.” A picture of some of these symbols can be seen in (see note 58) Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998.
See some cautious comments on this matter in (see note 57) Gómez 2004:109–12.
Tanaka I, Eishi T, Haruo T, Toshio H. Tube test in free-ranging Japanese macaques: Use of sticks and stones to obtain fruit from a transparent pipe. In: Matsuzawa T, ed. Primate Origins of Human Cognition and Behavior. Tokyo: Springer-Verlag; 2001:509–18.
Matsuzawa T. Field experiments on use of stone tools by chimpanzees in the wild. In: Wrangham RW, McGrew WC, de Waal FBM, Heltne PG, eds. Chimpanzee Cultures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1994:351–70; Matsuzawa T, Yamakoshi G. Comparison of chimpanzee material culture between Bossou and Nimba, West Africa. In: Russon AE, Bard KA, Parker ST, eds. Reaching into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 1996:211–32.
Ingmanson EJ. Tool-using behavior in wild Pan paniscus: Social and ecological considerations. In: Russon AE, Bard KA, Parker ST, eds. Reaching into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 1996:190–210.
For an excellent discussion of this tool use, see note 66, Matsuzawa T. 1994:351–70.
See FBM de Waal's extended discussion of the social interactions of macaques, chimpanzees, and bonobos in his book Peacemaking among Primates. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1989.
See de Waal FBM. Conflict as negotiation. In: McGrew WC, Marchant LF, Nishida T, eds. Great Ape Societies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 1996:161–2.
See note 69, de Waal 1989.
These facts suggest to us that the worry with grafting hES cells into nonhuman primate blastocysts, in relation to concerns about moral standing, is not so much a worry about nonhuman primates acquiring human-like characteristics, as they already have these. Rather, it would appear that the worry is more about nonhuman primates becoming human.
Conclusion
In the face of repeated claims about the need for human–nonhuman primate chimera research as a necessary step along the way from bench to bedside in the treatment of neurodegenerative diseases, it is important to identify and carefully assess the arguments for and against such research. As we have shown, the moral reason given for the NAS prohibition on grafting hES cells into nonhuman primate blastocysts—the argument from human dignity—is flawed. So too, however, are the arguments given by Karpowicz and Greene and their respective colleagues for permitting such research.
Beyond this, we have identified the need to critically examine the following beliefs (some of which appear to undergird arguments about the ethics of creating human–nonhuman primate chimeras): that the natures of species are fixed; that human beings have a certain distinctive dignity; that moral standing is a function of genetics, higher cognitive capacities, or both; that enhancing the psychological and cognitive capacities of nonhumans is a priori a bad thing; that preclinical research in the human embryo is de facto unethical or unlikely to yield answers to interesting and important scientific questions and potential stem cell therapies; that the scientific and economic challenges with nonhuman-primate-to-nonhuman-primate research are not worth exploring; or that the nonhuman primate (or part nonhuman primate) model is the preferred model for Parkinson's and Alzheimer's research. The time has come for us to question these beliefs and, in so doing, to squarely address the moral status of novel part-human beings.
