I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines one of the first attempts, made by Ferdinando Galiani (1728–1787), to apply Newtonian methodology to represent theories and analyze political, social, and economic problems, proposing an original approach to social mathematics. This interesting effort, started in the early works, was completed in his maturity, mainly in the Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds (1770) and in the political treatise on neutrality (De’ Doveri dei principi neutrali verso i principi guerreggianti e di questi verso i neutrali, 1782). This evolution of Galiani’s thought toward an original form of social mathematics, fully integrated in the Enlightenment intellectual movement, has not been evidenced by the considerable critical literature, and his attempt to establish political and economic arguments on an analytical basis remains largely unexplored. In particular, the Neapolitan abbé has been considered “rather alien to the spirit of the Enlightenment” (Diaz and Guerci Reference Diaz, Guerci and Galiani1975, p. xxii), stressing his ambiguous, cynical, and Machiavellian nature (Venturi Reference Venturi, Venturi and Woolf1960; Robertson Reference Robertson2000, p. 34) and his aptitude for the logic of paradox (typical of the Baroque period) (Ravix Reference Ravix, Tiran and Carnino2018), or highlighting his connection with the philosophy of Giambattista Vico (Nicolini Reference Nicolini1918; Tagliacozzo Reference Tagliacozzo1968; Tiran Reference Tiran, Tiran and Carnino2018; Soliani and Clément Reference Soliani, Clément, Tiran and Carnino2018), or emphasizing his eclectic attitude poised between libertinism and the Enlightenment (Amodio Reference Amodio1997). An attempt to frame Galiani’s thought in the context of the Enlightenment has recently been made by Koen Stapelbroek, following Vincenzo Ferrone (Reference Ferrone1995, pp. 220–247), but the outcome is ambiguous, since “in attempting to step outside of the ideological categories of eighteenth century political thought, Galiani also turned himself into an outsider to the Enlightenment” (Stapelbroek Reference Stapelbroek2008, p. 224).
The non-systematic nature of Galiani’s intuitions, due to his laziness, largely justifies this underestimation of his scientific program. Instead, despite the fragmentariness and the dispersion of his thought, this paper intends to show that Galiani has a coherent and unitary methodological project largely influenced by Newtonianism, which is known to have been an essential component of the Enlightenment debate. The abbé Galiani follows an intellectual itinerary, shared by other Newtonians in the same years, asserting the necessity of a general science of society in an intellectual context, the Neapolitan one, in which the application of a rigorous analytical methodology is considered an indispensable tool to understand and describe the complex structure of society, while at the same time highlighting the limits and dangers deriving from the extreme abstraction of social phenomena (see Vico Reference Vico, Bergin and Max1744).
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Neapolitan intellectual context was dominated by the so-called veteres who opposed the Cartesian philosophy. In particular, Paolo Mattia Doria (1667–1746) and Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) disapprove of the generalization of René Descartes’s abstract geometrical method, though they do not reject all forms of mathematical knowledge, and, following the Renaissance tradition and Galileo Galilei’s legacy, they propose a model of mathematical empiricism in which theoretical laws are determined by induction, not in contrast with empirical observations.
This empirical approach is also incorporated in the Neapolitan Enlightenment movement, initiated by Celestino Galiani (1681–1753), Ferdinando’s uncle, and by Bartolemeo Intieri (1678–1757), who remains extraneous to any form of abstract methodology, maintaining close contact with the Galileian heritage (see Galasso Reference Galasso1989) and proposing a social science rigorously based on empirical foundations. For this research program, Isaac Newton’s inductive approach, contrasting with Descartes’s deductive methodology, offers a new paradigm for scientific analysis compatible with the Galileian tradition. In the Neapolitan intellectual context, therefore, the empirical component of the complex movement of the Enlightenment prevails.
In this perspective, Galiani’s exclusion from the Enlightenment intellectual movement must be reviewed in light of this overlooked methodological approach. In fact, Galiani shares the Enlightenment call for a social science based on a rigorous method, but his approach is strongly realistic and remains immune from abstraction, connecting with the empirical versions of the Enlightenment movement. Galiani’s approach manages to combine analytical rigor with the need for empirical evidence, represented, in the field of social science, by historical and institutional contextualization. The interpretation proposed in this paper attributes to Galiani a consistent adherence to Newtonianism as a methodological model in order to construct a conception of social science as a complex discourse that has both a descriptive and normative value.
Galiani’s methodological maturation was completed with the anti-Physiocratic querelle: in contrast with Physiocratic economic doctrine, based on the primacy of deductive methodology, the Neapolitan abbé claims for economic science the realism of circumstance against aprioristic axiomatic hypotheses and rationalist generalizations.
The Physiocratic movement is part of the Rationalist strand of the French Enlightenment, strongly influenced by the mediation of Nicolas Malebranche, above all in the ethical view and deistic optimism of the natural order. From the Rationalist tradition, the Physiocratic School derived the idea of an ideal order (ordre naturel), which is understood with Reason, defined by general and immutable laws, described by simple arithmetical formulas (Tableau), and, finally, used to make resolute political decisions (see Hoselitz Reference Hoselitz1968; Perrot Reference Perrot1992, p. 369; Cremaschi Reference Cremaschi2000, pp. 713–718). Physiocratic economic analysis based on aprioristic assumptions (such as the natural order or the exclusive productivity of agriculture) can be called Cartesian social mathematics, inasmuch as “the Cartesian method was consciously and purposely cultivated by the Physiocrats” (Neill Reference Neill1948, p. 168).Footnote 1 This dominant Rationalist influence is evident in Physiocratic policy proposals, particularly on the issue of liberalization and deregulation of the grain trade, and Newtonian methodology, based on the experimental approach, remains extraneous to the Physiocratic movement.
In contrast with this vision of social science, Galiani’s approach, particularly attentive to the realism of hypotheses, can be named Newtonian social mathematics as opposed to the Cartesian social mathematics characterizing the Physiocratic School and other rationalist components of the Enlightenment.
The analysis presented will demonstrate a substantial continuity of Galiani’s thought between the positions expressed in his early works, under the influence of the Neapolitan Newtonian school, and those adopted in maturity, in the midst of the intellectual controversy triggered by the publication of the Dialogues. Footnote 2
This paper is organized as follows: section II describes the criticism of Cartesianism and the diffusion of Newtonian methodology in Neapolitan culture, focusing on the epistemological debate on the role of mathematical knowledge; section III presents the young Galiani’s first attempts to build an economic discourse based on certain, general, and constant principles; section IV describes Galiani’s anti-Physiocratic querelle; section V describes the final stage of Galiani’s new paradigm for social science focusing on other contemporary Newtonian approaches to social science; section VI concludes.
II. NEAPOLITAN MATHEMATICAL SCHOOLS AND NEWTONIANISM IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
In the last decade of the seventeenth century in the Kingdom of Naples, as in other regions of Europe, mathematical science was considered an essential part of human knowledge, and its applications went beyond the narrow field of mathematicians. This interest in mathematics became common among intellectual élites, favoring the general adoption of Descartes’s algebraic geometry and the rapid algebraization of mathematical language (Garin Reference Garin, Pompa and Pinton2008, vol. I, ch. 24). In Naples, the Cartesian supremacy was broken in the early eighteenth century, when Paolo Mattia Doria, a nobleman of Genoese extraction who had settled in Naples, and Giambattista Vico, professor of rhetoric at the University of Naples, began to attack Descartes’s rational methodology and, in particular, analytical geometry.Footnote 3 More specifically, Doria, following the Neoplatonic tradition, assigned a central role to the rehabilitation of Euclidean geometry in his controversy with modern mathematical methodology, supporting the merits of the ancient authors versus the moderns. He rejected all developments accomplished in mathematics after Descartes’s revolution, and in particular opposed differential calculus, considering it a deviation from the logical foundations of Greek geometry (Doria Reference Doria1722–1726; Amodeo Reference Amodeo1924, ch. I; Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, pp. 525–540; Stapelbroek Reference Stapelbroek2008).
Despite this opposition to modern mathematics, in the first decade of the eighteenth century, the new tools of differential and infinitesimal calculus were widespread among Italian scholars and were reputed to be useful instruments for much scientific research (Mazzone and Roero Reference Mazzone and Roero1997). This diffusion was facilitated by Celestino Galiani’s academic reform. Galiani was appointed cappellano maggiore of the Kingdom of Naples (a sort of secretary of state for education) in 1732 and immediately started a reform program in order to modernize institutions and to create the conditions for integrating the Neapolitan education system into the intellectual development of the eighteenth century. This project was elaborated under the influence of Newtonian natural philosophy and Lockean rationalism, definitely rejecting the Cartesian epistemological approach. In Naples, as in other parts of Italy, Isaac Newton’s scientific program is associated with the great heritage of Galileo Galilei’s experimentalism and this explains its rapid spread (Casini Reference Casini1983; Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, p. 129; Bruni and Porta Reference Bruni, Porta, Schabas and de Marchi2003).
The reform of the mathematics teaching method, based on a Newtonian approach, was an essential element of this project of modernization. Galiani established chairs of mathematics and of theoretical and experimental physics; advanced mathematics was taught also in several religious and military colleges with practical applications; and Celestino Galiani himself was a brilliant mathematician and profound expert of differential calculus (Palladino Reference Palladino1987). The establishment of the Accademia delle Science (1732), designed to spread rationalist philosophy, completed the modernization of the education system in the Kingdom of Naples (Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, pp. 201–202). Important support for Galiani’s reforms came from the Tuscan Bartolomeo Intieri, a self-educated mathematician, interested in the economic development of the kingdom (Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, pp. 43–45, 223–238).
The nascent group of Neapolitan Newtonians (called novatores) therefore gave additional support to the fight against the Cartesian school, decreeing its decline once and for all. Newton’s inductive approach contrasted with Descartes’s deductivistic and aprioristic methodology and offered a new paradigm for scientific analysis (Cohen Reference Cohen1971, pp. 227–251). The Newtonian paradigm provided a solution to the Neapolitan epistemological debate on the role of mathematical knowledge, with the new experimental method embodying the greater realism advocated by Doria and Vico. Moreover, the Neoplatonic deism followed by Newtonians, compatible with Catholic orthodoxy, and a clear distinction between religion and science are two features consistent with a general reaction against Cartesian aprioristic rationalism in early eighteenth-century Naples.
Celestino Galiani accepted a particular interpretation of Newton’s thought proposed by Dutch Newtonian scientists Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande (1688–1742) and Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692–1762) (’s Gravesande Reference ’s Gravesande1723; Musschenbroek Reference Musschenbroek, Orlandi and Genovesi1745). This Newtonian experimentalism was prevalent within the Accademia delle Scienze and promoted the shifting of interests from natural to social disciplines, encouraged by Bartolomeo Intieri (Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, p. 230).Footnote 4
The extension of Newtonian methodology favored the application of mathematical tools to social phenomena, which were considered measurable and could therefore be represented with formal algorithms. Euclidean geometrical nomenclature, with axioms, reasonable postulates, and clear definitions in order to present the basic principles, had been used by Vico himself in his Principles of New Science (1744), and Euclidean geometry was applied to economic matters by Troiano Spinelli (1712–1777) in his works on monetary theory and policy (Spinelli Reference Spinelli1749; Patalano Reference Patalano2017).
This Neapolitan tradition of geometrical presentation of arguments was easily replaced by new tools of infinitesimal calculus. Celestino Galiani, in his unpublished essay “Della Scienza Morale” (Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, pp. 168–176), written probably between 1720 and 1730, makes an initial attempt to define measurable arguments in the ethical doctrine.Footnote 5
This project was mainly based on the philosophical doctrine of pleasure and pain, following the hedonistic doctrine of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, p. 173). Pleasure and pain (taken from the second book of Locke’s Essay) are considered two prime principles of human life and were immediately interpreted in terms of mathematical calculus (Galiani, “Della Scienza Morale,” f. 61).
According to Galiani, pleasure and pain are relative concepts, subordinated to quantity and duration, and for this reason can be calculated (Galiani, “Della Scienza Morale,” ff. 303r–304v), as Pierre Louis Maupertuis’s Essay de philosophie morale (1749), which theorizes, for the first time systematically, the possibility of a mathematical calculus of pleasure and pain. Moreover, in his essay, Galiani attempts to apply not only differential calculus but also some notions of probability calculus, although he does not achieve any significant results (Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, p. 331n31).
At the end of the 1740s Newtonian experimentalism was definitely consolidated in Naples (Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, p. 248) and started to be applied to social sciences, particularly to economic analysis, which was called science of commerce and already considered an autonomous discipline. Neapolitan Newtonians were interested to establish a close connection between the physical order and social and economic order, establishing a Newtonian approach to social science, which can be regarded as a Newtonian version of social mathematics. This approach to social science was related to the idea of civic progress and to programs of political reforms.
The first attempt in this direction was systematically developed by Ferdinando Galiani, Celestino’s nephew, in his well-known treatise on money.
III. FIRST ATTEMPT AT NEWTONIAN SOCIAL MATHEMATICS IN GALIANI’S DELLA MONETA (1751)
Educated by his uncle Celestino and oriented to social science by Intieri, Ferdinando Galiani in his essay on money provided an early rigorous application of Newtonian methodology to economic matters.
This aim is made explicit in his work:
The laws of commerce correspond with no less exactness to the laws of gravity and the laws of fluids. The desire for gain, or the desire to live happily, is to man what gravity is to physics. Once this is accepted, all the physical laws of matter can be verified perfectly, by one who knows how, in the ethical principles of our lives.
(Galiani Reference Galiani1751, p. 52; Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 37)Footnote 6The young Galiani attempts to build an economic discourse based on certain, general, and constant principles represented by laws regulating economic phenomena. Following Newtonian methodology, Galiani proposes an original approach in which the experimental proof of natural science is replaced in social science by an accurate analysis of historical events.Footnote 7 According to Galiani, just as the system of planets is built on astronomical observations, made constantly over a long period, so the investigation of the historical development of society and its institutions provides convincing support for economic laws (Galiani Reference Galiani1751, prologue).
The first application of Galiani’s approach is the definition of the complex law of value.Footnote 8 This law, defined as a ratio composed of two other ratios, combines naturalistic elements (utility based on physiological needs, and scarcity subject to availability of natural resources) with historical and social elements (utility can be based on psychological and cultural elements, like fashion; scarcity is also based on historical conditions of production). So, Galiani delimits natural law by using historical and social considerations as a limit to abstraction and generalization. In this sense Galiani applies Newton’s advice (Hypotheses non fingo) that the hypotheses must be close to the facts.
The analysis of price determination follows the same approach. Initially Galiani defines a logical sequence: value—exchange—price. The first two steps have an abstract character, they are based on value theory and the general principles governing exchanges; the third step, the definition of the mechanism that determines actual prices, involves an empirical perspective that strongly limits the prediction of hypotheses. For this reason it is very difficult, often impossible, to define the price a priori, because scarcity and value depend on consumption, and consumption likewise corresponds to, and varies with, value. The problem is therefore made indeterminate, as always happens when two quantities that have some relationship between them are set against each other (Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 34; Galiani Reference Galiani1751, pp. 47–48).
And “such feats of arithmetic must be what sets the price” (Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 39; Galiani Reference Galiani1751, p. 48) because this achievement requires a perfect knowledge of thousands and thousands of variables that set the final price. Moreover, “the calculation of political arithmetic is a risky matter. They are the source of serious errors, for they must all be made without any confirmation or endorsement by the principles; and only principles devoted to such studies could verify such facts and events” (Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 43; Galiani Reference Galiani1751, p. 58).
The calculation of price a priori is impossible, but this impotence of human reason is corrected by a providential Supreme Hand (or Providence) that creates an equilibrium.Footnote 9 This tendency to equilibrium derives “not from human prudence and virtue but from the lowest stimuli of all private gain,” transforming selfish instincts into social wealth (Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 36; Galiani Reference Galiani1751, p. 50).Footnote 10 This Supreme Hand works similarly to Newtonian gravitational theory, and the different individual interests, like different bodies in physics, become interdependent and reciprocally influenced, directed toward a harmonious systematic order by an invisible force of attraction (a sort of moral gravity). The equilibrium is based upon two principles: first, the initial variations should not be taken into account but only the permanent and stationary states, since in these last ones the equilibrium is always found, as happens in a vessel, when the water, after the irregular movement, returns to its original level; second, there is always a moral or physical gravity that prevents extreme movements (see Galiani Reference Galiani1751, pp. 51–52; Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 37; see also Cesarano Reference Cesarano1976, p. 382).
Despite Galiani’s acceptance of the “hydrostatic analogy” (Waterman Reference Waterman1988, p. 94), this equilibrium is not a simple product of natural laws but is historically determined.Footnote 11 For this reason, the Neapolitan abbè Galiani is more interested in the forces that restore the equilibrium than in the static analysis of equilibrium, as is shown by the well-known example of the sudden conversion of a Muslim population that modifies the structure of demand and supply in a certain market (Galiani Reference Galiani1751, p. 51; Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 37). This is an extremely modern program as it is centered on the study of the mechanisms that lead to market equilibrium. Moreover, the adjustment process towards an equilibrium is not conceived as instantaneous or a-temporal but is slow and irregular, always able to cause real effects (Giocoli Reference Giocoli2001, p. 120). This is the well-known analysis of the “augmentation,” or devaluation, of money (Galiani Reference Galiani1751, bk. III, ch. 3), in which Galiani claims that the adjustment process triggers the redistributive effects of the transition phase towards post-devaluation equilibrium. In this analysis Galiani outlines a model of behavior in a context of asymmetric information and strategic interdependence, offering an example of empirical observation that delimits theoretical laws.Footnote 12
Another example of this “historical experimentalism” is offered by the model of the “tickets” (“bullettini”) presented in Book 2 of Della Moneta, in which the abstraction of the “analytical method” (Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 71; Galiani Reference Galiani1751, p. 96), used to illustrate the logical nature of money, is immediately reversed in a synthetic approach, closely following Newton’s 31st Query (Newton Reference Newton1730, pp. 80–381) to reveal the actual characteristics of money as it appears in historical reality (“coins are the tickets”) (Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 70; Galiani Reference Galiani1751, p. 94).Footnote 13 In the same way, Galiani rejects rationalist (or Lockean) conjectural history about the conventional origin of money (Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 48; Galiani Reference Galiani1751, p. 66).Footnote 14 In Galiani’s methodology, “historical experimentalism” (historical and institutional contextualization) thus has the same function as the empirical proof in Newton’s methodology. According to Galiani, the domain of economic laws depends on particular historical and institutional circumstances and cannot be defined in abstract terms, true sub specie aeternitatis, but only within the limits of the premises that have been established.
Even if Della Moneta is not mathematically formalized, it is evident that many “measurable” concepts are expressed by mathematical logic. It is the case of value law, defined as a ratio composed of two other ratios, or the case of the law of diminishing marginal utility (Einaudi [1945] Reference Einaudi and Einaudi1953, p. 287; Kauder Reference Kauder1965, ch. 3; for a critical view, see Niehans Reference Niehans1990, p. 120), or the hedonistic comparison between alternative pleasures and the consideration of opportunity costs (Galiani Reference Galiani1977, p. 21; Galiani Reference Galiani1751, p. 28; see Einaudi [1945] Reference Einaudi and Einaudi1953, p. 287). However, the most interesting example of Galiani’s mathematical logic is offered by the pioneering analysis of choice under conditions of uncertainty, at the beginning of the chapter on interest, which undoubtedly contains one of the first applications of probability calculus to the economic domain (in terms of the expected value rule).
Over many centuries of ignorance men have been so terrorized of chance events and by sheer luck that they have fled from them in fear, as from an untamed, kicking horse from whom they would flee with fright, seeking refuge out of reach. The light of true science has led them, finally, to the discovery that nothing is less fortuitous than chance events. Such events have a constant order and a controlled rule, such that it is possible to find a proportional relationship between the certainty of the present and the uncertainty of the future. Thus, as he quieted his fear, little by little, man began to familiarize himself with the idea of luck, to manage and manipulate it. For the first time, one hears discussions concerning justice in games of pure chance. Though previously scorned, in the hands of Bernoulli, the art of forecasting becomes a branch of mathematics and of truth. From games, men proceeded to more serious matters such as navigation, human longevity, and the harvests of the fields, all for so long the butt of chance. These were measured, valued, and insured, against the wiles of fortune, placing human prudence in reins and in chains.… Thus, [thanks] to mathematic[s], many conventions were put straight again, and the justice which the darkness of false science had expelled was recalled. In the face of chance, human daring was calculated and restricted between stable limits.
(Galiani Reference Galiani1751, pp. 349–350; Galiani Reference Galiani1977, pp. 260–261; amended in Giocoli Reference Giocoli2001, pp. 127–128)Galiani was amongst the first social scientists to realize that the structure of natural sciences, based upon a probabilistic model, is perfectly adaptable to social and economic analysis.Footnote 15
Beyond his analytical contribution in this domain, Galiani in this chapter enunciates de facto a program of social mathematics. Indeed, the Neapolitan abbé attempts to find, in the complexity of natural events, a constant order based on provable laws.Footnote 16 This revealed regularity provides a guide for human actions and constitutes the true social science, opposed to the darkness of false science, not based on calculus and controlled arguments. The mathematical representation of events is extremely useful for practical decisions, as is demonstrated by its application to the art of navigation. The analogy between politics and the art of navigation, as we will see, becomes a central topic in Galiani’s thought in his maturity.
IV. GALIANI’S DIALOGUES: THE REACTION AGAINST CARTESIAN SOCIAL MATHEMATICS (1770)
The enthusiasm for the ideal model of Newton’s science, common in eighteenth-century culture, took on a special meaning in France, acquiring an original feature in its synthesis with the previous Cartesian tradition (Brunet Reference Brunet1931; Shank Reference Shank2008). Although Voltaire, in his Philosophie de Newton (Reference Voltaire1738), stressed the Newtonian empirical approach in contrast with Descartes, there remained a considerable legacy of Cartesian deductive methodology in authors like Charles-Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu ([1748] Reference Montesquieu, Cohler, Miller and Stone1989, pp. 3–4) and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (Reference d’Alembert1743, pp. ii–iii) (see Israel and Ingrao Reference Ingrao and Israel1990, ch. 1; Oliveira Reference Oliveira2017).
According to d’Alembert, the true model of science, distinct from metaphysics, is based on mathematical and geometrical deductive methodology and every scientific discipline is composed of logical chains, originating in fundamental principles (Cane and Hankins Reference Cane and Hankins1976).
This particular approach, deeply influenced by the Cartesian legacy, which establishes a methodological monism in scientific research, finds a systematic application in the field of economic analysis with the Physiocratic School.Footnote 17 For the Économistes, economic laws, like natural laws, are immutable, based on simple, constant principles, deducible from the natural order. They are the manifestation of the mechanical natural order, based upon the force of human self-interest and readable through the epistemological concept of “evidence” (Quesnay Reference Quesnay1751; see also Luftalla Reference Luftalla1963; Fischman Reference Fischman1998). As typical rationalists, the Physiocrats (who called themselves philosophes économistes) subscribed to the idea that economic concepts are written in the code of nature and can be read with the aid of reason (Le Mercier Reference Le Mercier de La Rivière1767, vol. II, pp. 120–121, 434; Dupont de de Nemours Reference Du Pont de Nemours1768b) as intuitive and evident geometrical concepts. Consequently, economic analysis is an exact science, based on simple, constant principles, subject to invariable rules of natural laws, as indicated by the word Physiocratie (Du Pont de Nemours Reference Du Pont de Nemours1768a), and subject to rational demonstration like the most certain physical sciences (Le Trosne Reference Le Trosne1766, p. 9; Le Trosne Reference Le Trosne1777, p. 320). Economic science constitutes a system, an “ensemble so united by a series of necessary and coherent deductions, that when the chain is broken one can present nothing more than scattered parts, isolated and disordered truths, parts of principles that are as obscure as the language is inexact” (Le Trosne Reference Le Trosne1777, vol. I, pp. 492–493; see Neill Reference Neill1949, p. 541).Footnote 18 Operating on measurable objects, economic science “is apt to be subject to calculus” (Le Trosne Reference Le Trosne1777, vol. I, p. 320),Footnote 19 and the laws of this science are clearly discerned “by reflection, by judgment, by physical and moral arithmetic, by certain calculation” (Dupont de Nemours Reference Du Pont de Nemours1768a, vols. I, III; see Neill Reference Neill1949, p. 543). Mathematical evidence is described by simple arithmetical and mechanical formulae (as Tableau) used to make intelligible political decisions (see Hoselitz Reference Hoselitz1968; Perrot Reference Perrot1992, p. 369).Footnote 20 Finally, civil and political laws must be dictated by the natural laws and must not interfere with them (laissez-passer and free trade).Footnote 21
In contrast with some recent interpretations, this paper, confirming a consolidated view, considers the Physiocratic movement as part of the Rationalist current of the French Enlightenment, influenced by Nicolas Malebranche.Footnote 22 Although François Quesnay, the recognized founder of the school, followed an eclectic methodological approach (Neill Reference Neill1948, p. 169) and was often called the “Newton of new economic science,” Newtonian methodology and experimental approach remain extraneous to philosophes économistes. Footnote 23
The mechanical logic of Descartes was adapted to the political project of the Physiocracy, characterizing economic science as a machine of wealth, of which the driving force is constituted by landowners and land rent (Diemer and Guillemin Reference Diemer and Guillemin2013, p. 38).Footnote 24
Around the time of the Seven Years’ War (1756 to 1763), the Physiocratic movement gained great influence in France, winning followers also among rulers in Europe and beyond. Several journals, publications (like the Encyclopédie), and political pamphlets appeared, signaling an increasing audience in France and in Europe for the new economic doctrine.Footnote 25 By the early 1760s, the Physiocrats’ arguments for liberalization and deregulation of the grain trade had a huge impact in intellectual and court circles, dominating discussions of concrete economic policy issues (Steiner Reference Steiner1994; Faccarello Reference Faccarello1994). Then, two laws enacted in 1762 and 1764 abolished virtually all restrictions on trade in grain and marked the political success of the school. The years 1769 and 1770 saw a severe subsistence crisis: supplies contracted, prices rose, and grain and bread riots swept large parts of the country. This crisis caused controversy on the implementation of economic liberalization policies, which were judged too abstract and inadequate for the French socio-economic state.
In this political climate, the most determined attack on the Physiocratic School’s methodology and its theories of economic policy was made by Galiani, in his Dialogues sur le commerces des bleds (1770).Footnote 26
Galiani’s opposition to all kinds of hypostatization of concepts and apriorism, already clear in Della Moneta, Footnote 27 becomes the central nucleus of Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds. Footnote 28 For this reason this work by Galiani represents an original methodological perspective, not a belated proposal of seventeenth-century mercantilist policies (like Forbonnais’s criticism; see Forbonnais Reference Forbonnais1767) and not even an anticipation of nineteenth-century protectionist theories.
According to Giorgio Tagliacozzo, a striking parallelism exists between Vico’s attack on Cartesianism and Galiani’s polemic against the Physiocrats, the representatives, in the field of economics, of the basic viewpoint of rationalism. As Vico was one of the first and most authoritative critics of Cartesianism, so Galiani was the first and the most forceful critic of abstract economic principles and metaphysical preconceptions (Tagliacozzo Reference Tagliacozzo1968, pp. 109–110). This Methodenstreit is clearly expressed by Galiani in his well-known declaration of intents: “I’m for nothing. I’m for people not to reason falsely. The export of common sense is the only one which exasperates me” (Galiani Reference Galiani1770, p. 12; translated in Tagliacozzo Reference Tagliacozzo1968, p. 108). This statement echoes the Newtonian methodological maxim: Hypotheses non fingo. Galiani, in his criticism of Physiocracy, contrasts Newton to Descartes, claiming for economic science the realism of circumstance and aims as opposed to axiomatic hypotheses and metaphysical generalizations.
Physiocratic deductive determinism is the methodology of metaphysicians:
Their work is a true mosaic job. It consists of bringing together many small detached pieces, which they must not have made and changed, but that are existent, true, just as nature procures them. From such artistically glued, placed, veiled pieces, a great picture and a new view appears, although entirely made of scattered pieces.
(Galiani Reference Galiani1770, pp. 99–100; my translation)Footnote 29The thesis on trade liberalization or the main principle that agriculture is the only source of wealth is the result of an abstract determinism in which historical-institutional circumstances and socio-political implications are not even considered. Physiocratic economic principles, not verified by experience, are merely axioms easily refutable by their opponents.
The idea of the supremacy of agriculture is analyzed, ignoring the fact that agricultural activities are conducted under conditions of uncertainty, under the absolute power of nature. The farmer is comparable to a gambler who takes rolls of coins, the price of seeds, and labor, to throw them over the field against the natural elements and the seasons, which hold the stage (see Galiani Reference Galiani1770, p. 110).
Most economic actions, both by individual agents and governments, take place in a situation of uncertainty, and in this perspective the analysis of circumstances becomes the basic element of decisions. In expressing this opinion, Galiani reaffirms the probabilistic model of science, adapted to social and economic analysis.Footnote 30 According to this complex methodology, the indicators of a suitable policy are not those deduced from abstract axioms but those that are more useful and coherent to the prudence and wisdom of a particular society.
Therefore, economic policy is reduced to being part of political science, as the art of government, in which the focus is not individual interest but the more complex context of raison d’État, or national interest. This view of economic policy as art is confirmed by Galiani through the analogy with the art of navigation (Galiani Reference Galiani1770, pp. 233–234). The general principle that must regulate the art of government is expressed in the Latin motto “Nil repente!” (nothing suddenly) (Galiani Reference Galiani1770, p. 257).
Economic problems, Galiani argues, are complex because
when in a problem there are a lot of variables, the equation becomes indeterminate, or it belongs to the class of problems we call de maximis et minimis, and such are in fact all political problems. It is a matter of obtaining the most possible good with the least possible evil. It is an approximation. Nothing in politics can be pushed to extreme limits. There is a point up to which the good is greater than the bad; if you overstep it, the bad prevails over the good.
(Galiani Reference Galiani1770, p. 229; see also Faccarello Reference Faccarello and Faccarello1998, p. 128)Galiani’s Dialogues offers one of the first applications of calculus (or differential calculus) to economic problems in defining a situation of social equilibrium. The notion of de maximis et minimis, referring to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Nova Methodus pro Maximis et Minimis (1684), can be applied to every political and economic problem in terms of maximization/minimization under constraints (Faccarello Reference Faccarello and Faccarello1998, p. 128). However, mathematical formalization of economic and political problems, even though useful, has a limited domain of application and produces partial results, in the end leaving a degree of indeterminateness. This is a general principle that would be better defined later, in the writings of Galiani’s maturity.
Galiani himself regarded his attack as a bombshell (Galiani to Epinay, 18 November 1769, Galiani Reference Galiani1959, p. 350) against the monolithic rationalism of Physiocracy. Galiani’s criticisms were rejected with equal vehemence by André Morellet and Pierre Le Mercier de la Rivière (Morellet Reference Morellet1774; Le Mercier de la Rivière Reference Le Mercier de La Rivière1770). In these replies, the Physiocrats systematically defend the supremacy of deductive methodology, rejecting the idea that a theory must be based on solid and verified facts (Morellet Reference Morellet1774, pp. 28–29) because empirical data are misleading if not connected with a theoretical principle and with natural laws valid everywhere (Morellet Reference Morellet1774, p. 35).Footnote 31
Galiani, forced to return to Naples after ten years in Paris, followed the controversy through his correspondence with French friends Madame d’Epinay, Denis Diderot, and Friedrich Melchior von Grimm, and outlined a reply in a satirical form (La Bagarre), which remains unpublished (Galiani [Reference Galiani1770] 1979).Footnote 32
After his return to Naples, Galiani was occupied in political office and in other intellectual interests, far removed from economic analysis. But Galiani occasionally returned to his methodological approach to social science. The correspondence with Madame d’Epinay is an important source in following the evolution of Galiani’s thought after the publication of Dialogues. In a letter of November 1773, the Neapolitan abbé mentions his controversy with Physiocracy, outlining a formal definition of political science.
Politics is the science that promotes the greatest possible good for men with the least possible pain, according to circumstances. This is a solution of the De Maximis et Minimis problem. Politics is a curve (a parabola) to delineate. The abscissas will be the good, the ordinates will be the bad. The point will be found where the least possible pain meets the greatest good. This point solves the problem, and these are all human problems, because everything is a mixture of good and bad. You can see that in the beginning all political problems are represented by an indeterminate equation which will be fixed when you apply it to particular cases. Politics is therefore the geometry of curves, the sublime geometry of governments, like the administration (police), it is plain and simple geometry: Euclid’s six books.
(Galiani to Madame Epinay, 6 November 1773, Galiani Reference Galiani and Pérey1881, vol. II, pp. 274–275, 276; translated partially in Faccarello Reference Faccarello and Faccarello1998, p. 16)In a dissertation dedicated to the economic problem of grain storage in Genoa, Galiani again resumes his attack against Physiocratic Cartesianism, defining its exponents as “economists of evidence” (Galiani [1773] Reference Cesarano and Galiani1999, p. 69), or the “true sect of the illuminated” (Galiani Reference Galiani1959, p. 436).
This science that modern Frenchmen out of highest ignorance have called economic, when they should have called it politic, is much more difficult than it appears. It is reduced to applying very simple general theories to very complicated specific cases. He who believes he knows it through only having understood is a fool, because its theoretical truths are so simple and clear that every child guesses them. It is as if he believes himself a sublime geometer, because he knows that the whole is greater than the parts…. But an immense, deep, complex science is required to apply them to a particular country. This science includes ethics, traditions, laws, commerce, agriculture and finance. Every variation makes different cases, and different applications of theories.
(Galiani [1773] 1999, p. 69; my translation, italics added)And in the preface to the second edition of Della Moneta, Galiani stresses that, thanks to the Physiocrats, economic science “before reaching maturity has come to the corruption of an obscure metaphysical jargon in the mouths of those who France wanted to call economists” (Galiani Reference Galiani1780, p. [3]; my translation).
V. THE FINAL POINT OF ARRIVAL OF GALIANI’S METHODOLOGICAL PATH AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY NEWTONIAN APPROACHES TO SOCIAL SCIENCE (1782)
When the anti-Physiocratic controversy was closed, another occasion to reiterate his approach to social mathematics was offered in the treatise De’ Doveri De’ Principi Neutrali verso i Principi Guereggianti, e di questi verso i Neutrali, published in 1782 and written to justify the Neapolitan adhesion to the League of Armed Neutrality, led by Catherine the Great. In this case Galiani’s arguments become more systematic (Stapelbroek Reference Stapelbroek and Stapelbroek2011). According to the Neapolitan abbé, to avoid mistakes and uncertainties, the science of law must be represented geometrically—that is, rigorously—by axioms and first principles, from which it is possible to infer all truths and solutions, as in geometry, in which innumerable truths originate in a few definitions (Galiani Reference Galiani1782, pp. xi–xii). The moral sciences can acquire geometrical rigor in the clarity of expressions and proofs because their object, like geometry, consists of comparable relations of quantities, which can be expressed by means of calculus (Galiani Reference Galiani1782, pp. 16n, 20n).
In conformity with the geometrical method, Galiani, at the beginning of his treatise, defines the limits of matter, using primitive definitions and axioms, self-evident and true, as the basis of every other statement (Galiani Reference Galiani1782, pp. 6–13). Beyond specific analysis of the political neutrality problem, in this treatise Galiani offers several elements of his idea of social mathematics. The starting point is human nature. Man is divided between two forces: an instinct of conservation (self-interest), and the need for relations with other men, whether conflicting or friendly.
Every moral question is not a simple search amounting to how, in a given case, one can do the greatest good for oneself, or how one can give the greatest benefit to other men; but it is a composite problem always amounting to how, in a given case, one can obtain the greatest good for oneself at the cost of the smallest possible injury to others, or again how one can obtain the greatest good for other men at the cost of the least trouble to oneself. These are the problems that geometers call De Maximis et Minimis, theories of which are adaptable, so perfectly, to the study of morals.
(Galiani Reference Galiani1782, pp. 16–18; see also Faccarello Reference Faccarello and Faccarello1998, p. 16)Footnote 33In a footnote to the text, Galiani drafts an example of geometrical formalization, using a coordinate system, in which the two contrasting human forces give rise to a circular curve whose tangent represents the perfection of virtues (Galiani Reference Galiani1782, p. 18n1).Footnote 34 In another passage of his work, Galiani defines the human will as “a hyperbole between its asymptotes, freedom and coercion” (Galiani Reference Galiani1782,p. 412; my translation).
In this attempt at formalization, Galiani follows Gottfried Leibniz’s argument on the relation between geometrical quantities and the shape of a curve, and Newtonian terminology (explicitly using the term fluent; Galiani Reference Galiani1782, p. 267), but he ignores the concept of functional relation as the expression of the relationship between variables by means of equations, outlined in Leonhard Euler’s classic Introductio in Analys in Infinitorum of 1748 (Euler Reference Euler1748). Galiani’s method is completely influenced by the concept of calculus developed by Newton and Leibniz and strictly linked to seventeenth-century analysis. In fact, the principal object of study in seventeenth-century mathematics was the analysis of geometric curves, formulated in different methods for solving problems regarding curves, tangents to curves, areas under curves, lengths of curves, and velocities of points moving along curves (Kleiner Reference Kleiner1989).
Galiani’s attempt is not isolated in the complex context of the European Enlightenment, and it is useful to make a brief comparison with other contemporary Newtonian approaches.
The reaction against an imprudent use of mathematical notation in economic analysis is the nucleus of the Marquis de Condorcet’s Tableau général de la science qui a pour objet l’application du calcul aux sciences politiques et morales (Condorcet [1793] Reference Condorcet, McLean and Ewitt1994), which can be considered the Social Mathematics Manifesto (Ingrao and Israel Reference Ingrao and Israel1990; Feldman Reference Feldman2005). Condorcet distinguishes this science from William Petty’s “Political Arithmetic” and Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon’s “Moral Arithmetic” (Condorcet [1793] Reference Condorcet, McLean and Ewitt1994, pp. 93–94), limiting the application of calculus to moral and political sciences.Footnote 35 Using the French word calcul, Condorcet refers, above all, to calculus of probabilities as the main instrument for the development of the social sciences (Williams Reference Williams2004, p. 104). The application of mathematical logic to social science requires a methodological elaboration to avoid abstract and naive algebraic formalization. In the Tableau, Condorcet outlines a complex structure of new social mathematics, based on five preliminary theories: probability theory, theory of quantity (which includes the theory of money interest), theory of combination (algebraic basis for the calculus of probabilities), deductive theory (the method for deducing from observed facts either general facts or even more general laws), and the theory of mean values (Condorcet [1793] Reference Condorcet, McLean and Ewitt1994, p. 97). Among these preliminary theories, Condorcet does not mention differential and integral calculus because he does not believe that they could be systematically applied to the political and moral sciences (Crépel and Rieucau Reference Crépel and Rieucau2005, p. 255).
Condorcet’s reaction against an extended use of mathematical language follows the polemical arguments used by Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon and Denis Diderot against the mathematical radicalism advocated by D’Alembert (see Buffon Reference Buffon1749, Premiere Discourse; Diderot [1761] Reference Diderot, Assézat and Tourneux1875; see also Krakeur and Krueger Reference Krakeur and Krueger1941; Casini Reference Casini1988; Richards Reference Richards2006; Hamel Reference Hamel2019).
Condorcet is interested in the distinction between mathematics and economic analysis, underlining that “these two sciences must not be confused” (Condorcet [1793] Reference Condorcet, McLean and Ewitt1994, pp. 109–110). Political economy provides theory and observation of facts, without calculus, while social mathematics offers solutions based on calculus, allowing policy makers to calculate the effects of the measures adopted. Social mathematics is only a tool and involves facts and ideas only as a foundation for the calculus of the solid basis (Laboulle Reference Laboulle1939, p. 53; Crépel and Rieucau Reference Crépel and Rieucau2005, p. 266). Condorcet’s approach preserves the Newtonian methodological paradigm, based on observation of facts and on a limited application of mathematical tools.
Despite the differences, Galiani and Condorcet attempted to delineate a Newtonian solution to the epistemological debate on the role of mathematical knowledge in the social sciences, but this approach did not develop further.Footnote 36
In Scottish moral philosophy, Francis Hutcheson reproposed the analogy between egoistic motives and the functioning of gravity in the physical laws, applying mathematical concepts to his analysis, arriving at a rigorous formulation of the utilitarian principle (Hutcheson Reference Hutcheson1725; Brooks and Aalto Reference Brooks and Aalto1981; Pribram Reference Pribram1983, p. 121). However, Hutcheson’s position remained isolated because neither David Hume nor Adam Smith made attempts to apply mathematical concepts to social science, proposing a skeptical Newtonianism.Footnote 37 According to Hume, mathematics is not a useful tool in the field of moral philosophy and all attempts to extend this instrument beyond the bounds of abstract science “are mere sophistry and illusion” (Hume Reference Hume1748, p. 252, see also Demeter Reference Demeter, Biener and Schliesser2014, pp. 171–180). Even Smith, while proposing abstract concepts and generalizations, does not use mathematical formalizations, showing a diffidence towards symbols and long chains of reasoning (Redman Reference Redman1997, pp. 215–218).
During the decade of the French Revolution, economic analysis reacquired an abstract character and was defined in terms of formalized axioms, with empirical analysis being confined to an auxiliary role, neglecting Condorcet’s methodological line. This approach, mainly due to the ideologues of the Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques at the Institut de France, is deeply influenced by the Cartesian legacy.Footnote 38 An example is Nicolas-François Canard, who won the Institut de France prize with his essay (subsequently published in book form) Principes d’économie politique, proposing an effective merger between algebraic formalization and the economic concepts embodied in Adam Smith’s work.Footnote 39
In Italy, Antonio Genovesi (1713–1769), at the end of the 1740s, started his collaboration with Intieri and Celestino Galiani, showing growing interest in social science and particularly in the new economic discipline. But the role of Genovesi, the first holder (since 1754) of a chair in political economy (called Commercio e Meccanica),Footnote 40 was ambiguous: his conception of economia civile (civil economy, Genovesi Reference Genovesi1765, 1767; see Porta Reference Porta2018) privileged an ethical and political perspective, completely neglecting the methodological connection between economics and mathematical tools, drawing criticism from Pietro Verri for the lack of scientific rigor (Verri [1766] Reference Verri, Greppi and Giulini1923, p. 32; Ferrone Reference Ferrone1995, p. 260).Footnote 41 Nevertheless, Genovesi was still interested in the Newtonian approach in the field of moral philosophy: in the Diceosina (Genovesi Reference Genovesi1766) he proposed an ethical system based on Newton’s Principia, establishing a connection between the law of gravitation and human behavior. Genovesi’s underestimation of social mathematics in favor of the primacy of the political and ethical dimension in economic analysis brought to a close the program of research started by Celestino Galiani’s circle.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Newton’s approach offers a new paradigm for scientific analysis, opposing mathematical empiricism to Cartesian mathematical metaphysics (Cohen Reference Cohen1971, pp. 227–251). In this approach, mathematical knowledge, although necessary for analytical rigor, is never complete, and, since there is a part of reality that escapes it, the application of mathematical tools is limited to measurable concepts. Theoretical laws, elaborated in algebraic forms, must not contradict the empirical observations.
Under the influence of the Newtonian approach to scientific analysis, Galiani proposes a new paradigm for economic methodology, which can be called Newtonian social mathematics. Despite the absence of systematic reasoning, Galiani’s approach is an original contribution to the emerging connection between the evolution of economic knowledge and the rise of the scientific method. While supporting the need to establish a social science on certain principles and general laws based on the utilitarian approach—defined by the principle of “the greatest good for oneself at the cost of the smallest possible injury to others” (Galiani Reference Galiani1782, pp. 16–18; see also Faccarello Reference Faccarello and Faccarello1998, p. 16)—Galiani rejects a mechanistic application of deductive methodology to the social and economic system, drawing an appropriate epistemic distinction between natural science and the social and political sciences. In line with Newtonian mathematical empiricism, Galiani proposes a limited mathematical formalization of economic laws, claiming the supremacy of historical and institutional contextualization over abstract theory (Einaudi [1945] Reference Einaudi and Einaudi1953, pp. 281–282; Tagliacozzo Reference Tagliacozzo1968, pp. 109–110; Demaria Reference Demaria1972, p. 675).Footnote 42 Galiani’s Newtonian social mathematics proposes a synthesis between general and abstract aspects of an economic phenomenon and the particular historical characteristics that this phenomenon assumes in different historical contexts. Moreover, rejecting the deterministic approach, the Neapolitan abbé elaborates a probabilistic model, in a condition of uncertainty (an analogy with the art of navigation), highlighting the interdependence of individual choices and analysis of behavior in a strategic context (Demaria Reference Demaria1972, p. 630).Footnote 43
In the field of economic analysis, Galiani, as a conscious follower of the Newtonian methodological lesson, proposes arguments based on real contents inserted in the historical context and rejects the apodictic truths of deductive methodology. According to this complex method, the appropriate measures of policy are not those resulting from abstract axioms but those that are more useful and more consistent with prudence and common sense. Galiani proposes a gradualist approach to policy making, rejecting the “shock therapy” proposed by the Physiocratic School and defining a conception of economic policy as a general art of government and as a component of political science.Footnote 44
