Bryan Shelly’s book takes on an important and controversial topic in public education—the centralization of both funding and authority over Kindergarten through Grade12 schools in the United States. The trends toward growing federal and state involvement in both financing and overseeing K–12 education are widely recognized. Yet few studies assess the possibility that these two trends are linked. Does an increasing state and federal role in school funding lead to greater state and federal authority over school policy and diminished local control? Shelly uses the term “Piper Link” to describe this hypothesized causal relationship, a reference to the proverb “He who pays the piper calls the tune.” Money, Mandates, and Local Control in American Public Education is a creatively constructed multimethod analysis of the relationship between school funding and control of schools.

In order to test the Piper Link relationship, Shelly first distinguishes between two forms of local-level autonomy for school districts. He refers to the absence of commands from higher levels of government as “negative autonomy.” The opposite, “positive autonomy,” is based on the power to act independently at the local level. The author assesses how funding centralization might affect each form of autonomy using a 50-state cross-sectional analysis and comparative case studies of two states.

Shelly’s examination of negative autonomy looks at five state policies—standardized testing, teacher certification, high-stakes testing, safety requirements, and state takeovers to determine whether the share of school funding provided by the state is significantly related to state government involvement in each policy. His findings are remarkably consistent—state funding share is not a significant factor for any policy. Other independent variables, such as partisanship and the share of the state’s population that is African American, are significantly related to many of these policies. Yet his null result for state funding share is significant in its own right. First, it is refreshing to see a null result prominently featured and published as a key finding. Second, the finding is a substantively significant demonstration that the Piper Link should not be assumed—at least not in the form of increasing state constraints on local districts. Shelly concludes this chapter by emphasizing the range of variation in state funding share: approximately 20% to 90%. In other words, his test of state funding centralization provides little information about the impact of growth in state funding at the low end of the spectrum—for example, an increase in state funding share from 5% to 10%—and he suggests that changes at the low end could offer stronger evidence of the Piper Link.

Shelly uses comparative case studies of Vermont and Michigan to assess the impact of state funding centralization on positive autonomy—the power of local districts to act independently. He begins each case with an explanation of the political context behind school finance reform in each state. Vermont’s reform began with a lawsuit and a state supreme court ruling that ordered the legislature to reform education funding. The legislature and Governor Howard Dean acted swiftly, enacting reform to establish a statewide property tax and provide a block grant to every district. The result was a dramatic redistribution of state funding to benefit poor districts. Michigan’s school finance reform was driven by discontent over rising property taxes. Governor John Engler led the adoption of a reform that both reduced property taxes and increased school funding by raising state revenue for education by means of sales, income, and property taxes, as well as the state lottery. Michigan’s school finance reform provided more protection for affluent districts to maintain higher levels of spending than Vermont’s, but funding equity increased substantially in Michigan as well.

The breadth of evidence that Shelly uses to assess positive autonomy in each case study is heavily tilted toward Vermont. The Vermont case includes interviews with local officials and detailed analysis of budget data and school board policy. In contrast, the Michigan case study relies largely on secondary source materials. Although the author reaches similar conclusions from both cases, the Vermont case study is considerably more persuasive. Overall, he concludes that funding centralization did not reduce the independent action of local districts in either state. The policymaking activities of school boards in Vermont did not decline, and public participation in district politics was not affected; neither state experienced significant consolidation of local districts.

Yet Shelly’s more limited analysis of Michigan does not fully explore some key developments that suggest a more complex relationship between state funding centralization and local control, such as the growth in charter schools. He acknowledges that “[n]o other state has paired finance reform with major school choice measures” (p. 84); however, he does not account for the combined impact of these policies in the specific places where charter schools grew most rapidly. Although only 6.4% of the state’s public schools were charter schools in 2011, charter schools enrolled 41% of students in Detroit and 33% in Flint. With state funds tied closely to student enrollment, state revenues to districts like Detroit have declined rapidly. Charter schools alone do not account for declining enrollment in urban districts; many families were eager to seek other options to escape low-performing schools, including surrounding suburban districts. Nonetheless, the interaction between state funding centralization and school choice policies may have hastened acute financial crises in some urban districts in Michigan. By 2013, three Michigan school districts were under the control of emergency managers appointed by the governor, including Detroit. In these extreme cases, local autonomy has been almost entirely removed. The Michigan case suggests that a further investigation of the Piper Link may require closer attention to the relationship between funding centralization and school choice policies.

Following the case studies, Shelly turns to an analysis of the impact of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) law on local autonomy. By examining the federal level, he is able to assess whether “the changes in centralized-level funding that truly compromise local autonomy are those where it moves from no contribution to even a small percentage of the total funding for a program” (p. 132). As Shelly notes, federal officials have threatened to remove Title I funding from states and districts that refuse to comply with NCLB, but Title I provides a very small share of funds to states and districts. Given that only eight districts nationwide have opted out of NCLB, the small share of the education purse strings held by the federal government appears to have a disproportionate impact on local compliance with major policy intervention.

Based on the contrasting state and federal stories, Shelly’s conclusion drives home two key points about funding centralization and autonomy. First, he highlights his evidence that states can improve funding equity without substantial consequences for local autonomy. Second, federal officials could take greater care to recognize and ameliorate the onerous consequences of federal regulations and mandates, which are rarely fully funded. Money, Mandates, and Local Control in American Public Education makes a significant empirical contribution to ongoing debates over federalism, local control, and funding equity.