In this response, I plan to answer two questions raised by Abrams. The first concerns how instances of calculated and uncalculated unbounding might appear across other contentious processes. I argued in Revolution Squared that unlike revolutionary actors, social movement activists do not undertake big existential decisions that separate themselves from everyday obligations when they take part in collective action. Thus, their actions in movements are more thought-out as they do not go through an extreme unleashing nature for their collective action. I would suggest that it is almost impossible to conclude with certainty how lived contingency, as well as calculated and uncalculated unbounding, work within the spectrum of contentious politics. We ought to study many more cases before settling on an answer. But one could argue that some episodes of contention are closer to revolutions in their intensity; intensity here refers to instances when the battle for sovereignty—people’s and state—are at their highest stake. Not only that, but these instances of high intensity happen with a sense of hope and strong presence of collective power. Perhaps there is a comparable dynamic to revolutions in wars of independence, uprisings, and postrevolutionary transformations, as these episodes have similar degrees of intensity. Again, we need more work on the social psychology of collective action in contentious politics.
Abrams’ second question is ingenious. He asks, given that the square was integral to the dynamics of the revolution, could have we imagined a revolution in 2011 Egypt without Tahrir? We know that nothing is predictable in revolutions; these complex events involve so many actors, and they cut through many levels. Yet I would maintain that the square would likely still be a main site for action, given the state of Egypt in 2011, and the history of the square as a colonial and postcolonial site of resistance. The initial mobilizers called for congregation in the square on January 25, 2011 through their “We are All Khaled Said” Facebook page, and a classified document by the Egyptian security agencies listed the square as a main location for expected action (see Chapter 2 of Revolution Squared). What I aim to explain in the book is that while Tahrir Square was a likely site for action, the revolution was not doomed to “being squared.” That is to say, the revolution was not limited to the square, and did not construct itself as taking place mainly or solely in Tahrir. There were many possible locations for action, and several specific important modes of actions, like working-class strikes and popular committees. These possibilities that could have allowed the revolution to avoid being squared were undermined by the ambivalences of revolutionaries in Tahrir toward these other modes of action.
I thank Benjamin Abrams for this fruitful exchange and his thorough reading of my book, and I hope we find ways to continue this conversation. I am especially interested in investigating the tension and relation between the individual and the collective in our respective approaches (lived contingency and affinity convergence theory).
