Scholars continue to debate the origins of West Germany's astonishing recovery after 1948. Competing analyses of the “economic miracle” have highlighted the complex relationship between the inevitable results of postwar reconstruction and the specific policies advocated by Ludwig Erhard, first as economic director of the Bizone and then as economics minister, without being able to resolve the issue of which was decisive. Perhaps it is just as well that the question cannot be resolved to everyone's satisfaction; a true miracle, after all, requires an element of mystery.

All cynicism about terminology aside, the economic miracle and Erhard as its architect have assumed a historical significance that is in many ways impervious to criticism. Erhard's vision of a “social market economy,” with a largely free market balanced by social spending, became and remains one of the main touchstones of (West) German political life, with every major political party now claiming to be best equipped to maintain it. The contemporary ubiquity of the term, however, threatens to obscure its history. For the triumph of the social market economy was not the inevitable product of history with a capital H, but rather the result of the careful cultivation and manipulation of images in West German political discourse. Erhard and the social market economy became central elements of the policy and propaganda of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer. Although Adenauer was not necessarily interested in economics and often clashed with Erhard on policy questions, he recognized early on Erhard's value to the CDU/CSU's image, and Erhard became the “electoral locomotive” [Wahllokomotive] pulling the CDU/CSU to victory.

The use of the social market economy as political symbol and its implications for West German political development are the focus of Mark Spicka's book. Spicka is not interested in abstract economic debates, but rather in how the CDU/CSU adapted Erhard's economic ideas and rode him to electoral success. According to Spicka, this adaptation began with the first Bundestag elections in 1949, which CDU/CSU speakers proclaimed to be a choice between the social market economy and the planned economy espoused by the Social Democrats (SPD). With each successive campaign in 1949, 1953, and 1957 bringing ever larger majorities and the economy growing at an impressive rate, the CDU/CSU's emphasis on Erhard's economic policies grew to crowd out “cultural and ideological” issues, such as religion and education, which had originally been central to Christian Democratic politics (p. 211). The CDU/CSU's political dominance in the Federal Republic eventually forced the SPD to abandon its preference for economic planning and embrace the social market economy at its Bad Godesberg convention in 1959. Just as economic recovery kept the CDU/CSU in power, so the aggressive marketing of the social market economy made it into the national consensus we know today.

Spicka outlines how the use of the social market economy as a symbol both required and encouraged the CDU/CSU to adopt the newest techniques of polling and public relations (PR) based on American models. Surprisingly for a conservative party, the CDU/CSU was quick to see the advantages these practices brought. Spicka also describes the semi-private pressure groups that emerged to advocate for the social market economy, most famously Die Waage (the Scale), an officially non-partisan group funded by industry that kept up a steady drumbeat in favor of the social market economy's alleged balancing of private profit and the public good. Spicka argues that such tactics accelerated the “Americanization” of West German politics.

Spicka tells his story well, basing his arguments on detailed research in the relevant German archives and including in his text many examples of posters and flyers from the CDU/CSU and Die Waage that reveal the techniques used to appeal to West German voters. The most famous of these are the flyers dedicated to conversations between “Fritz and Otto,” two West German everymen whose friendly debates always led to the social market economy coming out on top (pp. 180–186). He also describes the origins of the German polling community, highlighting the significance of pioneers such as Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann and others in developing targeted public opinion polling.

There is a lot to admire in this solid and very readable analysis. Its weaknesses are few. One is the relatively uncritical use of the term “Americanization” to describe the development of West German politics and the use of modern PR techniques. Although the influence of the United States is undeniable, the term remains under-theorized in this book. Spicka does not engage the ongoing lively debate, represented by the recent works, for example, of Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and others, over whether such developments should be considered Americanization or westernization. He also did not take advantage of important recent works on the CDU by authors such as Frank Bösch to put his arguments into the broader scholarship on the party.

Nevertheless, this book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the origins of the Bonn Republic and the history of German political discourse. It will be a valuable resource for students and researchers, and should be included in any discussion of the social market economy as policy and as symbol.