1. The quote attributed to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa
In an article published in 2002 in the Journal of Indian Philosophy, and subsequently in 2009 in Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, the late Ramkrishna Bhattacharya presented a valuable collection of existing passages and quotations taken from Cārvāka/Lokāyata texts (Bhattacharya Reference Bhattacharya2002, Reference Bhattacharya2009). These passages have been preserved within writings authored by adversaries who adhered to diverse philosophical traditions and constitute our sole available direct resources for reconstructing the teachings of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata school.Footnote 1 Although the material may be limited in quantity, it is fortunately sufficient to outline the foundational principles of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophical stance. However, precisely because the sources are limited, there is a heightened necessity for thorough scrutiny of their attribution. This is essential to prevent the inadvertent inclusion of theories and concepts dubiously associated with these philosophers, which could potentially distort the original message of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata tradition.Footnote 2
Amongst the citations collected by Bhattacharya, a notable instance is found in Vādidevasūri's (twelfth century) Syādvādaratnākara (SVR), a commentary on the author's own work, the Pramāṇanayatattvāloka. Vādidevasūri, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara school of Jainism, ascribes the quotation to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata thinker Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa (ninth century?), also known as Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa or Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa.Footnote 3 The original Sanskrit passage runs as follows in Motilāla Lādhājī's edition:Footnote 4
yatra tu bhaṭṭodbhaṭaḥ prācīkaṭat |
na hy atra kāraṇam eva kāryātmatām upaiti yata ekasyākāraṇātmana ekakāryarūpatopagame tadanyarūpābhāvāt tadanyakāryātmanopagatir na syāt | kiṃ tv apūrvam eva kasyacid bhāve prāgavidyamānaṃ bhavat tatkāryam | tatra viṣayendriyamanaskārāṇām itaretaropādānahitarūpabhedānāṃ sannidhau viśiṣṭasvetarakṣaṇabhāve pratyekaṃ tadbhāvābhāvānuvidhānād anekakriyopayogo na virudhyate | yata ekakriyāyām api tasya tadbhāvābhāvitaiva nibandhanaṃ sā cānekakriyāyām api samānā iti |
Bhattacharya comments thus: “[Literal translation of this passage is beyond my power. I give below only a summary of what Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa is alleged to have said]: It cannot be said that the cause attains the nature of the effect, but the effect is something new which appears in the presence of the cause”.Footnote 5
2. The section of the SVR in which the quote occurs
Although the principal objective of the present study does not primarily entail an exhaustive examination of the conceptual and philosophical contents of the aforementioned passage, it is nevertheless useful, for the correct attribution – and therefore correct understanding – of the quotation under concern here, to consider the entire section of the SVR in which it is contained:Footnote 6
anekakāryam upādānasahakārisvabhāvenaikasyotpādayato viruddhadharmādhyāsenaikatvānupapatteḥ | ekatve tu tasyopādānasahakāritvayor anyataratvāpattyā’nyatarasyaiva kāryasyotpādaprasaṅgaḥ |
yatra tu bhaṭṭodbhaṭaḥ prācīkaṭat | na hy atra kāraṇam eva kāryātmatām upaiti yata ekasya kāraṇātmanaFootnote 7 ekakāryarūpatopagame tadanyarūpābhāvāt tadanyakāryātmatopagatirFootnote 8 na syāt | kiṃ tv apūrvam eva kasya cid bhāve prāgavidyamānaṃ bhavat tatkāryam | tatra viṣayendriyamanaskārāṇām itaretaropādānāhitarūpabhedānāṃ sannidhau viśiṣṭasvetarakṣaṇabhāve pratyekaṃ tadbhāvābhāvānuvidhānād anekakriyopayogo na virudhyate | yata ekakriyāyām api tasya tadbhāvabhāvitaivaFootnote 9 nibandhanaṃ sā cānekakriyāyām api samānetiFootnote 10 |
tatrocyate | mopagāt kāraṇaṃ kāryātmatām | te tāvaj jananasvabhāvā iṣṭā eva | tataś ca tatsannidhauFootnote 11 vijñānalakṣaṇakāryasaṃbhavāt tajjananasvabhāvataiṣām avadhriyate | kāryasvabhāvāpekṣayā kāraṇasya janakarūpatāvasthāpanāt | tato vijñānajananasvabhāvebhya pratyekaṃFootnote 12 kathaṃ tadanyakāryasambhavaḥFootnote 13 | tadbhāve vā teṣāṃFootnote 14 tadanyajananasvabhāvatā syāt |
tataś ca vijñānam eva na kuryuḥ | tadanyajananasvabhāvatvād iti |
ya punar ayam atra vyājahāra parihāram | naiṣa doṣaḥ, teṣām anekakāryakriyāsvabhāvatvāt | tathā hi te tadavasthāyāṃFootnote 15 pratyekaṃ viśiṣṭasajātīyetarakṣaṇajananātmakās teṣāṃFootnote 16 tatsattānantaryadarśanāt | tatra vijñānajananasvabhāvataiveti tasyā jananasvabhāvatā vyavacchidyate | tasyā eva pratiyogitvāt nānyajananasvabhāvatā | na cātas teṣām anekātmatā syāt | ekasyaivātmātiśayasyānekakāryahetutvāt ity ādi |
tatrāyaṃFootnote 17 jaraddvijanmā mahānubhāvo'bhinavam etam uttaramārgam asmān prati prakāśayati |
3. Comparison between the SVR and the Hetubinduṭīkā HBṬ
Even though, in Lādhājī's Sanskrit edition of the SVR, Vādidevasūri attributes this quotation to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, a closer examination shows that the excerpt comprises three passages extracted from Arcaṭa's (730–790) Hetubinduṭīkā (HBṬ), a commentary on Dharmakīrti's (sixth or seventh c.) Hetubindu (HB). Arcaṭa is also known as Arcaṭabhaṭṭa or Bhaṭṭārcaṭa.
This becomes clear when we compare the SVR with the corresponding parts of the HBṬ text edited by Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji (textual differences are underlined):
A summary analysis of the SVR's broader textual context, in which these quotes are inserted, is provided in section 7 below.
4. Dharmakīrti's HB on co-operating causes (sahakārikāraṇa)
Before attempting a translation of the SVR passage, we note that these three excerpts occur in the HBṬ section (numbered 26 in the Sanghavi-Jinavijayaji edition), commenting upon the following portion of the HB:Footnote 18
bhinnasvabhāvebhyaś cakṣurādibhyaḥ sahakāribhya ekakāryotpattau na kāraṇabhedāt kāryabhedaḥ syād iti cet |
na | yathāsvaṃ svabhāvabhedena tadviśeṣopayogaḥ tadupayogakāryasvabhāvaviśeṣāsaṅkarāt | yathā mṛtpiṇḍakulālasūtrādibhyo bhavato ghaṭasya mṛtpiṇḍād amṛtsvabhāvebhyo vṛkṣādibhyo bhinnaḥ svabhāvaḥ kulālāt tasyaiva mṛdātmanaḥ sataḥ saṃsthāviśeṣātmatayā tadanyebhyo bhinnaḥ sūtrāt tasyaiva mṛtsaṃsthānaviśeṣātmanaś cakrāder vibhaktaḥ svabhāvo bhavati | tad evaṃ na kulālān mṛtsvabhāvatā na mṛdaḥ saṃsthānaviśeṣaḥ | na ca tayoḥ śāktiviśeṣaviṣayabhede'pi tajjanitaviśeṣabhedasya kāryasya svabhāvabhedaḥ mṛtsaṃsthānayor aparasparātmatayā saṃsthānamṛtsvabhāvaviśeṣābhyāṃ tayor apratibhāsanaprasaṅgāt |
[Objection:] If the production of a single effect is attributable to co-operating causes, such as the eye, etc., which have distinct natures, [then] there would not be [any] difference in the effect due to the difference in the cause.
[Reply:] No! The acquisition of the specific aspects of that [effect depend on] each [co-operating cause] by virtue of their [individual] difference in nature, because of the non-mingling of the specific aspects of the nature of the effect by means of those acquisitions. For instance, of a pot, which is [produced] by a lump of clay, a potter, a string, etc., [we observe that, firstly,] because of [its being made of] a lump of clay, [its] nature is distinct from the natures of [things] not [made] of clay, such as trees, etc. [Secondly,] of that very [pot] which has the nature of clay, because of the [intervention of the] potter, there is a [nature] distinct from other [things made of clay], due to [its] specific shape. [Thirdly,] of that very [pot,] which has the nature of [being made of] clay and has a specific shape, because of the string there is [still another] distinct (vibhakta) nature due to the [potter's] wheel, etc. Thus, the nature of clay is not caused by the potter and the specific shape is not caused by the clay. And even if there are different objects for the specific capacities of the two [i.e. the potter and clay, yet] there is no difference by virtue of the nature of the effect, whose different specific aspects are produced by them. [If the effect had many different natures, there would be an impasse] out of the [undesirable] consequence of the non-appearance [together] of those [clay and shape] because of the peculiarity of the shape and clay [respectively], which is due to the peculiar nature of clay and shape.
What Dharmakīrti is trying to argue here is that numerous causal factors can co-operate to yield a single outcome (ekārthakriyā). Nonetheless, this does not suggest that one of the associated factors assumes the primary role while the others merely serve as supplementary or superfluous. Instead, each collaborating factor is accountable for a distinct facet of the resultant effect.
5. Arcaṭa on difference (bheda)
Arcaṭa discusses the concept of difference (bheda) implied in the HB passage referred to above by introducing four distinct categories of differentiation advocated by some “shameless people” and others, as outlined below:Footnote 19
nanu ca mṛtsaṃsthānaviśeṣayor ekasvabhāvatve'py ahrīkādibhiḥ saṅkhyādibhedād bheda iṣyate tatkatham anekapratyayajanitasyaikatve etad udāharaṇam syāt | sarvatraiva hi dravyaparyāyayoḥ saṅkhyāsaṃjñālakṣaṇakāryabhedād bhedo deśakālasvabhāvābhedāc cābheda iṣyate yathā ghaṭasya rūpādīnāṃ ca | tathā hi eko ghaṭaḥ rūpādayo bahava iti saṅkhyābhedaḥ | ghaṭaḥ rūpādayaḥ iti saṃjñābhedaḥ | anuvṛttilakṣaṇaṃ dravyan nityaṃ ca vyāvṛttilakṣaṇā bhedāḥ kṣaṇikāś ca jaiminīyasya tu ke cit kālāntarasthāyino'pīti lakṣaṇabhedaḥ | ghaṭenodakāharaṇaṃ kriyate rūpādībhiḥ punar vasturāga iti kāryabhedaḥ |
But surely a difference is admitted by the shameless ones (ahrīka) etc., because of the difference in number and so on, even if there is one single nature of the clay and the specific shape [of a pot]. How would that be [applicable to] this example of [a pot, which is] produced by many conditions, if there is oneness [of nature]? Always, indeed, of the [material] substance and [its specific] modes a difference is admitted [by Jainas] because of the difference of number, name, characteristic and function,Footnote 20 and non-difference [is admitted] because of the non-difference of place, time and nature, for instance [as in the case] of a pot and of [its] colours, etc. Therefore, one pot, many colours, etc., is difference of number. Pot and [the name of] colours, etc., is difference of name. The permanent substance is the characteristic of continuity, and the different momentary [states] are the characteristics of cessation, but [the characteristics of cessation concern] also some [ceasing elements] that last for a longer [lit.: other] time (kālāntarasthāyin) [according to the ideas] of the follower[s] of Jaimini's school [namely, the Mīmāṃsā;Footnote 21 all this] is the difference of characteristic. The collection of water is done through the pot, and the desire for an object [develops] again because of [its] colours, etc., [this] is the difference of function.
The term ahrīka (literally meaning “shameless one”) was perhaps originally reserved for the Digambaras because of their habit of roaming and living naked, which was considered offensive to the usual social norms. However, the practice of nudity seems to have been abandoned after the Gupta period (fourth–sixth century ce), or even earlier, and reintroduced only recently.Footnote 22 In the present context, therefore, it is highly probable that the term ahrīka designates adherents of Jainism in general. To substantiate this perspective, we observe that Dharmakīrti himself, in his critique of the Jaina anekāntavāda (theory of multiplexity), employs the term ahrīka (in Pramāṇavārttika, Svarthānumāna 181, and Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti on Svarthānumāna 181 and 184) to refer to all Jainas, without distinguishing between Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras. Furthermore, Haribhadrasūri (seventh century), a Śvetāmbara, in his Anekāntajayapatākā, seemingly identifies himself with the group criticized by Dharmakīrti and, while reproducing Dharmakīrti's arguments, he replaces the pejorative ahrīka with the more neutral anekāntavādin.Footnote 23
The term ahrīka occurs twice also in Kamalaśīla's (740–795) Pañjikā (a commentary) on Śāntarakṣita's (725–788) Tattvasaṃgraha 1708, which opens the chapter devoted to the analysis of the Jaina theory of epistemological conditionality or syādvāda.Footnote 24 In this instance, too, ahrīka appears to refer to the Jainas in general, as it is not mentioned in the section dedicated to the refutation of the Digambara conception of self (Digambaraparikalpitātmaparīkṣā; Tattvasaṃgraha 311–27 and the accompanying Pañjikā), suggesting that ahrīka and Digambara were likely not considered strictly synonymous.
Notably, Tattvasaṃgraha 313–5 and the Pañjikā thereupon reiterate the arguments posited by Arcaṭa. In the Tattvasaṃgraha these arguments constitute the primary rationales put forth by the Jainas in support of their doctrine concerning the double characteristic of the self (Tattvasaṃgraha 311b: naram). According to this doctrine, the self is conceived both as a substantive entity and as possessing modes (Tattvasaṃgraha 311c: dravyaparyāyarūpeṇa). It is by virtue of its simultaneously modal and substantive nature that the self can exhibit characteristics of both differentiation and continuity respectively (Tattvasaṃgraha 311d: vyāvṛttyanugamātmakam). Such a perspective is deemed incompatible with the Buddhist framework, as emphasized by Tattvasaṃgraha 312, which advances the following counter-argument: if a substance (dravya) that is held to be immutable (avikṛta) were to be conjoined (saṅgata) with its modes (paryāya), it would not undergo modification (viśeṣa), and as a consequence it would not be susceptible to transformation (pariṇāmi na) either.Footnote 25
Like Śāntarakṣita, Arcaṭa also disagrees with the Jaina views, although from a different angle.Footnote 26 In fact, after his introduction translated above, Arcaṭa proceeds to examine and refute each of the four categories of differentiation, culminating in the fourth and final type, the difference of function (kāryabheda). In this regard, it should be noted that the Sanskrit term kārya has a multifaceted semantics, encompassing meanings such as “function”, “action”, and “effect”, thereby introducing a layer of intricacy in the interpretation of Arcaṭa's discourse.Footnote 27 Presented below is the initial part of Arcaṭa's analysis concerning the concept of kāryabheda:Footnote 28
kāryabhedas tv asmān prati asiddha eva | rūpādīnām eva keṣāñ cit tatkāryakartṛtvāt | tathāpy abhyupagamyocyate kāryaṃ hi dvividham | bhinnakālam abhinnakālaṃ ca | tatra pūrvaṃ bhavati bhedanibandhanam yadīha sambhavet | tat tu na sambhavati dharmadharmiṇos tulyakālatvāt | abhinnakālas tu kāryabhede'naikāntikaḥ vibhaktapariṇāmeṣu paṭādiṣu sambhavāt | paṭādayo'pi hi vibhaktapariṇāmā anekaṃ kāryaṃ kurvanto dṛṣṭāḥ | na ca dharmirūpeṇa bhidyante ekasyānekakriyāvirodhābhāvāc ca |
Now the difference in function [between the substance and its modes] is for us just unestablished because [you argue that] only some [aspects, such as] colors etc., have the condition of being the agent of that function. Nevertheless, if we accept [that there is a difference,] it is said [that] the function is twofold, diachronic and synchronic. There, the former is based on (nibandhana) difference [in time], if [only] that were possible here, but that does not happen because of the [necessary] contemporaneity of property [such as color,] and property-possessor [such as substance]. Yet, the synchronic is indecisive (anaikāntika) if there is difference in function [between substance and its modes], because it comes together (sambhava) in distinct transformations (vibhaktapariṇāma) [like] in the case of cloths and so on. Cloths, etc., are indeed [the result of] distinct transformations [over time of pieces of fabric], which are [altogether] observed to produce a function that is manifold, as they do not differ by means of the nature of the[ir respective] property-possessor, and because of the absence of contradiction for a manifold function of one [compound entity].
5.1. Excursus: Durvekamiśra's explanation of distinct transformation (vibhaktapariṇāma) in the synchronic function
The concept of distinct transformation (vibhaktapariṇāma) is explained in Durvekamiśra's (970–1030) Hetubinduṭīkāloka, the sub-commentary on the HBṬ, by wittily exploiting a play on words between vibhaktapariṇāma and vibhaktaparimāṇa:Footnote 29
vibhaktapariṇāmeṣv iti pāṭhe vibhaktaḥ pariṇāmo yeṣām iti vigrahaḥ | vibhakto viśiṣtakāryakāritvena niyukta iti cārtha iti pūrve nibandhakṛto vyācakhyuḥ | […] vibhaktaparimāṇeṣv iti tu pāṭho yuktarūpaḥ | tatra parimāṇaṃ mānavyavahārakāraṇaṃ guṇaviśeṣaḥ | paraprasiddhyā cedam ucyate tac ca dīrghatvākhyam utpādyam atra vivakṣitam | tatra vibhaktaṃ vibhāgena vyavasthāpitam parimāṇam yeṣāṃ paṭādīnāṃ teṣu vistāriteṣu dīrghīkṛteṣv iti yāvat | vibhaktāyāmādikarpaṭādayaḥ kiñcid āvṛṇvate kiñcic ca dhārayanti kiñcid upabadhnantīti |
[The expression] “in distinct transformations” (vibhaktapariṇāma) in the text is analysed as their [i.e. of the functions] transformation that is distinct. The meaning is that distinct [elements are] bound [together] by means of specific functionality (kāryakāritva), as the treatise (nibandhakṛta) [i.e. the HBṬ] explained earlier. […] But the appropriate [interpretation of the] text is “in distinct measurements” (vibhaktaparimāṇa). There, measurement is the reason for conventional expressions regarding length (māna),Footnote 30 [which is] a peculiar quality. This is said through the consensus of others, and that [term] is intended here as a product (utpādya) denoting lengthiness. There, distinct is to be established as [having the meaning of] part, that is to say the measurement of these cloths etc. through those unfolded (vistārita) and lengthened [parts]. Some patches, etc., which have distinct lengths (āyāma) etc., cover, some hold, and some fasten.
In other words, considering clothing as an assemblage of distinct components and textiles, it becomes implausible to assign all the functions carried out by its individual parts (such as covering, holding, fastening, etc.) to the clothes simultaneously. This justifies why Arcaṭa refers to the fallacy of indecisiveness (anaikāntika), as each function represents an effect that can only be attributed to the specific component that performs or causes it, not to the clothes as a whole. However, Arcaṭa argues, it is not contradictory to acknowledge that a composite entity like an item of clothing can indeed fulfil a multifaceted function, which here seems to be understood as the juxtaposition of the diverse functions of its constituent parts.
6. The translation of the SVR passage
After his introductory lines on the difference of function (quoted and translated at the end of section 5 above), Arcaṭa develops the discussion through the three passages quoted in the SVR, the translation of which I provide here:
[The idea] of one [cause] producing a multiple effect by means of the nature of co-operating substrata is non-applicable towards oneness because of the superimposition of contradictory properties. Or, when [there is] oneness, the connection (prasaṅga) with the production of the effect is only of one or the other (anyatara), because, of that [effect], the substratum and the state of being co-operating (sahakāritva) enter (āpatti) the condition of eitherness (anyataratva).Footnote 31
On which case Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa clarified (prācīkaṭat):Footnote 32
[Quote 1] “In this case the very cause does not perform the nature of the effect, for if the nature of one effect were the result of the nature of one cause, in the case of the absence of a nature [of a cause] other than that, there would not be acquisition of the nature of an effect other than that. However, in the presence of something [i.e. the cause] just a new [aspect] happens as its effect[, which was] previously absent. In this case, if there is the individual presence of one (sva) and the other (itara) specific moment[ary entities], in the proximity (sannidhi) of the different natures effected by the mutual substrata (itaretaropādāna) of object (viṣaya), sense-organs (indriya) and mental engagement (manaskāra), the acquisition (upagama) of a manifold function is not contradictory out of conformity to their presence and absence. Wherefore, even in [the case of] a single function, only its coming about when that [cause] is present (tadbhāvabhāvitā) is the support (nibandhana) of that [effect], and that [coming about when the cause is present] is the same [support] also in [the case of] a manifold function”.
In this case it is said that the cause is not furnished with (mopagāt) the nature of the effect. Indeed only those natures able to produce [the effect as something new] are approved. Moreover, [Quote 2] “their [i.e. of object, sense-organs and mental engagement] producing nature (jananasvabhāva) is ascertained because of the appearance, when there is their proximity, of the effect that has the characteristic of being a cognition. Because the cause firmly rests in the condition of having the nature of producer with reference to the nature of the effect, then, in which way from the natures able to produce a cognition, [taken] individually (pratyekam), would there be the appearance of an effect other than it [i.e. other than a cognition]?Footnote 33 Or, they being present, how would there be a producing nature other than it?
[Objection:] Then, they would not produce just cognition because of the state of having a producing nature other than it[, therefore object, sense-organs and mental engagement have many producing natures]”.
He then answered this objection here: [Quote 3] “This is not a fault, because they [i.e. the causes of a cognition] have a [single] nature [capable] of yielding many effects. Therefore, they [i.e. sense-organs etc.] have the nature of producing specific similar (sajātīya) and other (itara) moment[ary effects while remaining] in their states individually, because we observe that there is no interval between them [i.e. their activity] and the existence of those [effects]. In this regard, it is said ‘only the nature able to produce a cognition’, [since] the producing nature of that [cognition] is separated [from the natures of causes that are incapable of yielding cognitions]; because of the correlation only of that [nature that is able to produce a cognition with the corresponding cognition], there is not another producing nature [involved]. And, from this, there cannot be a manifold nature of them [i.e. of the causes of a cognition] because of the state of being a cause in many effects only of one special aspect (ātmātiśaya) [of their nature, namely, the aspect capable of producing cognition]”, and so on.
Here this respectable old twice-born illuminates to us this new better way [of addressing the subject under discussion].
Without undertaking a comprehensive analysis of this passage, a task that exceeds the scope of the present article, I restrict my focus to the ensuing observations. The discourse centres around the connection between cognition and its underlying causes. The causal factors of cognition are sequences of momentary states (kṣaṇa, kṣaṇika) capable of eliciting an outcome only when they are in close proximity. It is this proximity that facilitates the interaction of their distinct generative natures, which is needed to yield the effect. Each momentary state possesses a generative nature able to perform different activities. On the one hand, this nature bears the capacity to engender the subsequent momentary state, which is akin to its preceding state. For instance, a sense-organ (indriya) such as the eye (cakṣus) at time T1 possesses a generative nature that gives rise to the eye at time T2 and so forth. On the other hand, it also holds the potential to collaborate with other natures to generate effects that are dissimilar to it. For example, at time Tx, when the eye is in close proximity to the object (viṣaya) and mental engagement (manaskāra), its generative nature, together with the generative natures of the object and mental engagement, contributes to the emergence of cognition, an outcome that is dissimilar to the eye, the object, and mental engagement. The core of the argument can be encapsulated within a form of circular reasoning: a cognition possesses the inherent nature of being the outcome of a cognitive process because it originates from entities (such as sense-faculties, etc.) endowed with the inherent capability to generate cognitive processes that cause cognitions.
7. A look at the broader context
Before concluding our analysis, it is pertinent to consider the broader contextual framework within which these quotations are inserted. We note that the passage under scrutiny marks the commencement of a new discourse within the SVR, which follows the comprehensive analysis and dismissal of three out of four causal theories, as explicitly delineated in the sentence preceding the excerpt discussed here:Footnote 34 etena tṛtīyapakṣo'pi pratikṣiptaḥ (“In this way the third thesis is rejected”). The four causal theories are enunciated as follows:Footnote 35 ekasmāt kāraṇād ekakāryam utpadyate | anekasmād ekam | ekasmād anekam anekasmād anekaṃ Footnote 36 vā | (“[1] One effect originates from one cause, [2] one [effect originates] from many [causes], [3] many [effects] from one [cause], or [4] many [effects] from many [causes]”). Vādidevasūri initiates hence the analysis of the fourth and final causal alternative by introducing the quotations he attributes to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa.
The part subsequent to the quotations proceeds to engage with the Nyāya perspective, as the following statement makes clear:Footnote 37 anenaiva naiyāyikataskaraḥ sarvasvāpahārāya pravekṣyati kṣaṇād iti tu nāvekṣate iti (“But he [i.e. the twice-born] does not consider that the thief Naiyāyika will immediately attend to stealing everything by means of this very [reasoning]”). A few lines later, the Naiyāyikas are characterized as contentious (naiyāyikakaṇṭaka),Footnote 38 and their doctrine is identified as an inopportune instruction (naiyāyikaśikṣākṣaṇa).Footnote 39 In summary, the objection raised by the Naiyāyikas revolves around the contention that the unique (eka) nature (svabhāva) of an entity (bhāva), characterized by a stable unitary condition (atisthiraikasvarūpa), persists across various corporeal synchronic and diachronic functions (bhinnakālābhinnakālānekakāyakavṛtya). However, if it is posited that this stable entity possesses the nature of effect production (kāryajananātmaka), contingent upon the presence of co-operating functions (sahakārisannidhānāvasthā), then it necessarily entails acknowledging that, since a pot (ghaṭa) is generated (utpadyate) within space (vyoman), considered as a co-operating function, the production of a pot is also conditioned by space (taddhetuka), which is nonsense. Moreover, considering the nature of water collection (jalāharaṇasvabhāvatā) inherent in the pot, at the moment of its activation (tatkāla), the pot must be distinct (vyavacchidyate) from the nature incapable of effecting water collection (tadajananasvabhāvatā), as there exists a correlation (pratiyogitva) solely between the nature of water collection during the specific moment of actual water collection, and not across other temporal instances (kālāntara). Consequently, the activation of the nature that gives rise to an effect (tajjananasvabhāvatā) can be substantiated based on the occurrence of the effect (tajjanana) out of temporal difference (kālabheda), thereby implying that differences in property (dharmabheda) do not entail differences in the property-possessor (dharmin), as illustrated by the difference between the production of cognition and the production of delight (vijñānajananarasajananabheda) as effects resulting from perceiving one and the same colour (rūpa).Footnote 40 In other words, against the position drawn in the SVR quotes under discussion, the Naiyāyikas argue that the occurrence of multiple functions stemming from a single cause at the same time, each yielding distinct effects, is untenable.
At this juncture, in opposition to the Naiyāyikas’ objections, Vādidevasūri resorts to the following quote (let us call it quote 4), which he does not attribute explicitly to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa and yet is again taken from the HBṬ:
The translation is:
And if there is non-accordance of many functions of one [cause, in consequence of] this restriction of coming together somewhere [i.e. in the entity] of a specific colour, taste, smell, tangibility, [the effect] would not be perceived through the means of knowledge, because [the perception of an effect in its complexity] is impossible in the restriction of coming together of different characteristics.
Following this citation, Vādidevasūri emphasizes that this approach does not align with how he himself would refute the objection:Footnote 41 tad api nāsmākaṃ dūṣaṇam | ekāntena bhinnanimittajanyatvasya vivakṣitarūpādiṣv asmābhir anabhyupagamāt | (“Even that is not our refutation, because we do not admit in the intended colours etc. that different characteristics [possess] the state of being produced by means of oneness [of cause]”). Then the discussion moves to further subjects.
8. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion shows that the passage attributed to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa in the SVR (referred to as quote 1) is sourced from Arcaṭa's HBṬ. Furthermore, it becomes evident that the SVR includes two additional excerpts (referred to as quotes 2 and 3) from the HBṬ, which immediately follow the first passage in Arcaṭa's commentary. Finally, a concluding passage (quote 4) is presented to close the discussion with the Naiyāyikas, also drawn from the HBṬ.
The attribution of the first three quotations to the same author by Vādidevasūri himself can be inferred from the conclusive statement in the SVR passage, translated above, wherein the entirety of the discourse is credited to a single individual designated as “twice-born” (dvijanman). The designation “twice-born”, we observe, is a traditional appellation indicative of brāhmaṇa status, and can be applied with equal validity to both Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa and Arcaṭa, as they both hailed from brāhmaṇical lineages.Footnote 42
From the examination of the quotations and of the broader textual context, a recurring reference to a substantial portion of the HBṬ emerges (encompassing a segment spanning from at least quote 1 to quote 4). It is particularly noteworthy, in this regard, that the criticism raised by the Naiyāyikas and summarized in section 7 above, appears directed towards a Buddhist interlocutor, as evidenced by two key considerations. Firstly, the Naiyāyikas’ argument emphasizes the untenability of positing a co-operating cause/function (sahakāri) within a causal framework, wherein a stable cause already possesses the inherent capacity to produce an effect. Secondly, if a cause is qualified by the nature of producing an effect, this determines a distinction between property/qualifier and property-possessor/qualified in the cause itself, which implies both a chronological precedence of the qualifier over the qualified and the possibility that the property-possessor remains the same through changes of properties, a notion that cannot be accepted by a partisan of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇavāda).Footnote 43
These last considerations prompt further reflection, which leads us to the following four main hypotheses.
1. Scattered throughout the SVR are additional quotes taken from Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa's works, including mention of one of his writings entitled Tattvavṛtti,Footnote 44 now lost, presumed to be a commentary either on a Cārvāka/Lokāyata foundational text or a Nyāya treatise.Footnote 45 While definitive evidence is lacking, these indications suggest that Vādidevasūri may have had access to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa's writings, where he found the three (and the fourth) quotations under consideration, which he extracted, potentially without realizing that they were originally part of the HBṬ. This hypothesis, in turn, prompts inquiries – deemed unanswered until new material on Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa emerges – regarding whether Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa really copied verbatim from the HBṬ and, if so, for what reason. On the one hand, we can speculate that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa may have utilized Arcaṭa's text as, for instance, a pūrvapakṣa, a preliminary standpoint, employing it as a premise for discussion and subsequent rejection. This option suggests, however, that the three quotations in the SVR do not reflect at all Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa's genuine stance. On the other hand, it can be supposed that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa indeed agreed with Arcaṭa, although this proposition introduces more complexities than resolutions, since accepting such a possibility would entail acknowledging that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa endorsed, among other tenets, also the characteristic Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇavāda), which is strongly implied in the cited passages. However, substantiating and rationalizing such a conclusion from a philosophical standpoint becomes a challenging (if not impossible) endeavour, considering Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa's primary association with the Cārvāka/Lokāyata – albeit with a “revisionist” imprint – and his apparent affinity towards Nyāya epistemology.Footnote 46
2. Despite the SVR demonstrating a certain familiarity with Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa's works, it remains possible that Vādidevasūri did not have direct access to these texts. Instead, he may have copied the quotations attributed to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa from an intermediary manuscript authored by someone other than Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, within which they were included. This intermediary author may have erroneously attributed to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa the passages from Arcaṭa, and Vādidevasūri may have accepted this attribution without further scrutiny.
3. Alternatively, the assignment to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa of Arcaṭa's excerpt may be an incorrect attribution by Vādidevasūri himself.
4. Or, the attribution may also be the fruit either of a textual corruption in the SVR, or of a misinterpretation by the editor Motilāla Lādhājī. However, without direct access to the manuscript(s) that served as the basis for compiling the published edition of the SVR, I am presently unable to verify this possibility.
While absolute certainty regarding which, among these, is the correct hypothesis remains unattainable, and the possibility of additional alternatives beyond the four presented cannot be dismissed, it appears to me that hypotheses 1 and 2 are considerably more robust than hypotheses 3 and 4. Having said that, the present study reveals that the SVR excerpt under discussion indicates Vādidevasūri's intention to address arguments pertaining to the distinct functions/effects (kāryabheda) of the nature capable of engendering cognition (vijñānajananasvabhāvatā) of the sense-organs, etc., and as previously emphasized, these arguments clearly stem from a Buddhist framework and exhibit pronounced Buddhist philosophical elements, such as the doctrine of momentariness. Furthermore, the reference to Buddhism appears to be indirectly corroborated also by the Naiyāyikas’ critique, summarized in section 7 above. Consequently, the question of whether and for what reasons these arguments were integrated into one of Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa's works remains too ambiguous to assert confidently that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa truly espoused their content. Based on these considerations, the following conclusions can be proposed: firstly, it appears reasonably clear that the quotations in question lack an authentic Cārvāka/Lokāyata perspective, given that their original author was a follower of Dharmakīrti; and, secondly, it is consequently suggested that these quotations (particularly our quote 1) be removed from the fragments attributed to Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa in Ramkrishna Bhattacharya's collection of Cārvāka/Lokāyata passages.
To conclude, the significance of emphasizing Vādidevasūri's assignment of a Buddhist argument to a Cārvāka/Lokāyata thinker should not be underestimated, especially in light of the previously mentioned scarcity of available source material for the reconstruction of the authentic Cārvāka/Lokāyata thought. This scarcity, combined with the preservation of source material within writings authored by adherents of diverse, non-Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophical traditions, highlights how contemporary scholars engaged in the study of Cārvāka/Lokāyata are consistently confronted with hermeneutical uncertainties and intricacies, which preclude the assumption of anything as established with absolute certainty. It is therefore reasonable to assert that, particularly in this context, any textual doubts not completely resolved carry the potential to result in substantial deviations from a precise interpretation and understanding of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy.
The suggestion to remove the quoted passage from the Cārvāka/Lokāyata source material, as discussed in the present paper, represents a modest yet decisive step towards a more accurate assessment of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata tradition. Moreover, it implicitly contributes to a more meticulous evaluation of Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa's ideas and their influence, not only within the confines of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata school, but also within the broader philosophical discourse developed from the ninth century onwards.
Acknowledgements
I express my heartfelt gratitude to Stanisław Jan Kania, Gianni Pellegrini, and Antonio Rigopoulos for their generous assistance in reviewing the initial draft of this article and to Piotr Balcerowicz for providing valuable feedback and suggestions. A special acknowledgement is extended to the two reviewers for their precise and helpful comments. It goes without saying that any remaining inaccuracies or shortcomings in this work are solely my responsibility.
