Governance in the global

Diagnoses of untempered globalization and calls for global governance abound. This short article tries to make sense of the discipline of International Relations’ handling of these issues. It is centred on the theoretical and typological contribution of James Rosenau, but embeds his account in a broader disciplinary story.

James Rosenau is without any doubt one of the central figures of the governance debate in International Relations (IR). In 1992, Rosenau co-edited (with Otto Czempiel) a volume significantly entitled Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics.Reference Czempiel and Rosenau¹ Although the ideas he expressed in this volume were not wholly emancipated from traditional inter-national thinking, as we will demonstrate below, the book is rightfully considered a milestone. The early 1990s were a period of change, and of studying it. In this respect it may be noted that 1992 witnessed the publication of Alexander Wendt’s famous article ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’.Reference Wendt² This article heralded the definite breakthrough of IR constructivism, i.e. the idea of the fundamental and ‘inevitable’ contingency of the social world and of the knowledge thereof. This meta-theoretical stance was to have a direct effect on our understanding of international politics. From a constructivist perspective, there is no logic to anarchy, hence there need not be a Hobbesian state of war of all against all. Sovereignty becomes a social construct, the meaning of which changes over time and in different places.Reference Biersteker and Weber³

Both currents, global governance and constructivism, reacted to all kinds of new dynamics that surfaced in international politics, even though their conception of time and thus their interpretation of change differed widely. Hegelian history drives Wendt’s constructivism, while a non-linear conception of time appears to structure Rosenau’s thought. In 1995, Rosenau listed five major changes in world politics: (1) the end of the Cold War; (2) the development of space-shrinking communication and transport technologies; (3) the skills revolution, emancipating and empowering people; (4) economic globalization; and (5) related trans-national problems such as economic inequality and environmental degradation.Reference Rosenau⁴

As a matter of fact, globalization (in all its guises and meanings) seems to be the encompassing phenomenon to which global governance reacts as a theory and practice. Driven by progressive processes of technological innovation,Reference Gilpin⁵ different (economic, social, cultural, and political) processes that used to operate on a local scale, become globally connected. Boundaries fade, markets open up. The result is not only a rosy picture of increasing economic prosperity and concomitant individual emancipation and freedom. There is also a dark side: fast-paced, global financial crises; rapidly spreading epidemics; international terrorism; transnational environmental problems; growing socio-economic inequality within and between states. The state necessarily, albeit perhaps unfortunately, fails to live up to its duties, so it is argued. Its authority is questioned and becomes dispersed among a range of sub-national, supra-national, international, and transnational entities.

Interpreting this changing world-political landscape, global governance (as a new paradigm) highlights the spontaneous appearance of a multiplicity of spheres of authority or control mechanisms, adding up to a complex hodgepodge: together they govern – sometimes complementarily, sometimes at cross purposes – the world. There is little coherence or hierarchy. Within a global governance perspective, there is no a priori reason to attribute more power or authority to a state than to a non-governmental organization (NGO). Analytically, organized crime is on an equal footing with international organizations.Reference Rosenau⁶ Fascinated by governance ‘Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier’, Rosenau perceives a gradual reduction of surveyability and a fading of past certainties. His view of present-day international politics is programmatically summarized in the following quotation:

Whereas globalization is often associated with international integration and mounting uniformity, Rosenau stresses fragmentation and complexity. As a result, he appears to be less concerned with ‘global governance’ as a unifying practice than with the increasingly complex ontology of ‘governance in the global’. Importantly, this implies that the practice of global governance cannot be reduced to the activities and rules of international organizations such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organisation. If so, which forms of governance – that is, what kinds of spheres of authority – does Rosenau distinguish?

In drawing up a typology of world-political control mechanisms, as he also sometimes calls them, Rosenau focuses on two parameters: trusteeship and the degree of institutionalization.Reference Rosenau⁸ With regard to the former, he discerns three different instances: state, non-state (transnational and subnational), and shared (i.e. both state and non-state) trusteeship. With regard to the latter, that is, the degree of institutionalization of control mechanisms, Rosenau observes that they can be either strongly (e.g., the state) or weakly (e.g., epistemic communities) institutionalized. Examples include: international organizations, NGO’s, macro-regions (such as the European Union), micro-regions (such as Scotland and Flanders), cities, states, multinational corporations, social movements, organized crime cartels, international regimes, epistemic communities, ethnic minorities, and so on. The list of possible spheres of authority is seemingly without end, and there is little coherence to structure it. Meanwhile, the central argument that global governance cannot be reduced to world government, or to international governance, transpires clearly again.

Rosenau’s approach is sober, and analytically honest. He attempts to draw an objective analytical sketch of the sociology of world politics. His discourse is not triumphant. The reduction in authority suffered by the state is not celebrated at all, perhaps even regretted. While it is true that the national state is no longer the sole locus of authority in international politics, the old international system did procure a modicum of order and surveyability. The old system’s anarchy was formal, not substantive.Reference Rosenau⁹ This means that there was no overarching vertical authority indeed (i.e. it was a formal anarchy), but that it wasn’t an arena of rampant chaos and bloody competition either (i.e. it wasn’t a substantive anarchy). These days, on the contrary, there are few elements of cohesion. Fragmentation prevails. In Rosenau’s opinion, then, the international has become more substantively anarchic than it was before. Note, though, that this cannot unambiguously be assessed as a negative trend. While anarchic, it also offers more space for creativity, flexibility, and initiative, contends Rosenau.Reference Rosenau¹⁰ His opinion, as is the world he perceives, is marked by ambivalence.

Political realism and global governance

Global governance, as Rosenau conceives of it, puts into doubt the premises of political realism: the state loses importance, international morality is no longer precluded a priori. However, realism soon articulated a sceptical response.

First, realists question the revolutionary character of globalization, which they moreover define in narrow economic terms. Globalization is geographically biased: mainly Western countries are participating in the process. Moreover, globalization is supposedly not new. Before the First World War, there was as much international economic activity as there is these days. In addition, economic globalization is mostly limited to the financial sector. All other economic activity remains largely nationally focused. Finally, the idea that globalization causes national political economies to converge, has been proven to be blatantly wrong.¹¹ Major institutional differences remain between the Japanese, German, French, and American economies. Relying on these arguments, realists intend to refute the basic premise of their opponents, that is: they do not accept the idea that globalization entails a qualitative change for the workings of international politics. It is not surprising, then, that they fail to be convinced by those arguing that the state’s authority is being hollowed out. Quite the contrary. States push, and steer, globalization, realists argue. They are much more active participants in the world economy than they ever used to be. The more the international economy becomes integrated, the more there will be need for well-functioning states, that can assure (through regulation) the smooth operation of the market and the continuing welfare of its citizens. In no way does globalization add up to a ‘Requiem for the State.’Reference Delwaide and Geeraerts¹²

To the realists, globalization is merely old wine in new bottles. Realism becomes increasingly conservative – even reactionary – when it comes to the issue of cooperation in the face of new global challenges. Realists consider cooperation unlikely. Robert Gilpin, the foremost realist in international political economy, wrote a contribution to Held & McGrew’s edited volume on Governing Globalization that was meaningfully entitled ‘A realist perspective on international governance’.Reference Gilpin¹³ Gilpin’s perspective on globalization can be described as sceptic, if not outright dismissive. Gilpin stubbornly speaks of international, not of global, governance. In the process, the whole theme of global governance is reduced to the traditional debate on international cooperation and the importance of relative versus absolute gains. Global governance is narrowly defined as international cooperation, and considered improbable because of states’ self-interested concern for security (and thus for relative gains).

Meanwhile Gilpin does discuss three pure types of global governance: new medievalism, traditional inter-state cooperation, and trans-governmentalism. He is outright dismissive of the first and the last, and still considerably so of the second.

‘New medievalism’ portrays a picture of the international world that is a reminder of the shared and fragmented authority structure supposedly characteristic of medieval Europe (although lacking, in its modern guise, the cohesive glue of Christianity). Gilpin portrays it as a worldview that values horizontal policy networks and multiple identifications. NGOs and global civil society would play an increasingly important role. As such, Gilpin’s account of new medievalism strikingly resembles Rosenau’s interpretation of global governance. However, Gilpin is sceptical of this new world, for several reasons.

First, NGOs are not powerful enough to effectively govern world politics. They can only have an impact when they are backed by mighty states. The argument has it that states and non-state actors are not engaged in a zero-sum game (where one loses what the other wins). Indeed, NGOs are often financed by states, who push them to participate in processes of global governance. Hence states are pulling the strings. Second, Gilpin notes a marked ‘civilizational bias’: most NGOs are of Western origin, more specifically from the United States, which can undermine their legitimacy in an increasingly post-Western world. What’s more, it often concerns self-selected and often non-representative elites, lacking basic democratic legitimacy. More radically still, civil society is not always all that civil; it contains obviously un-civil elements, it suffices to think of international drugs cartels or human trafficking.

Faced with ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’, which defines a more traditional form of inter-national governance, Gilpin might be more hopeful. ‘Neo-liberal institutionalism’ is a theoretical current that accepts the continuing relevance of the state and the state-system, but that simultaneously highlights states’ ability to establish rules of the game as well as concrete, material international organizations in order to structure international interaction, at least in the economic realm (such as WTO, IMF, World Bank). Within these international organizations, states cooperate to solve international problems. It is not easy for states to found and maintain durable international cooperative endeavours. This much realists and neo-liberal institutionalists agree upon. However, liberals do hold out somewhat more hope. Whereas realists would argue that cooperation is only possible under the leadership and authority of a hegemonic power (i.e. hegemonic stability theory), liberals believe in the feasibility of effective and more or less egalitarian ‘international regimes’, also After Hegemony.Reference Keohane¹⁴ International regimes are (issue-specific) systems of principles (e.g. free trade), rules and procedures that states voluntarily accept in order to deal with a problem of global governance. Notice that global governance is quite effectively reduced here to the tenuous provision of global public goods. Global governance, in casu: international regimes, is a public good, and as such a positive thing if accomplished. It is, then, a mere policy question. Nonetheless, Gilpin detects a set of problems.

First, rules and policies are often agreed upon, but compliance is rather less forthcoming. An important explanatory factor would be that there is actually no consensus regarding the principles that structure the international economic order. Not everyone is convinced of the value of minimal state intervention. In addition, international organizations do have a legitimacy problem: their decision making procedures are often not democratic. Another possible legitimacy problem is that their organizational structure no longer corresponds to the shifting distribution of power in the international system – as witnessed by the debate on UN Security Council reform to include more permanent members with veto capacity. The call for reforms is loud, but in order for them to be successful, they have to be supported by the great powers, realists argue. Unfortunately, the greatest power, the United States, is not very enthusiastic. Neither China nor Russia, two of the other great powers, are fierce advocates of Security Council reform. They are suspicious of international interference, and are, in important ways, even more conservative than the United States with respect to existing world order principles. If anything, the powers that matter (except perhaps for the European Union) seem inclined to less, rather than more, international governance.Reference Delwaide¹⁵

To the extent that realists believe in the existence of global governance, they condition it on the toleration and/or active support of the most powerful countries in the international system. The current system of governance is shouldered by the United States, argues Waltz: ‘More than any other state, the United States makes the rules and maintains the institutions that shape the international political economy.’Reference Waltz¹⁶ (Notice that governance is located firmly in the economic sphere, not in the security domain.) Taking into account the endurance of anarchy (and thus of the concern for security and for relative gains), it is to be expected that this situation will not last. Other states will work to improve their position by undermining or adjusting the American-built institutions. They will seek to balance, argues Waltz. From this perspective, global governance, being dependent on power, becomes inherently unstable.

Finally, as a third form of global governance, Gilpin discusses ‘trans-governmentalism’, by which is meant the technocratic cooperation among different national government agencies and epistemic communities. This approach is explicitly a-political and presupposes that technical issues can be addressed outside the realm of politics. Not only is transgovernmentalism essentially undemocratic, it also supposes that this kind of non-political problem actually exists. Gilpin, by contrast, argues that politics is omnipresent and that one encounters it where one least expects it. He gives the example of the Basle accord, which organizes the minimal money reserve a bank should have at its disposal in order to prevent financial crises. This seemingly technical question gave rise to a great deal of disagreement and could eventually only be resolved as a result of substantive political pressure from the United States. The more a question is politically charged, the smaller the chance of finding a satisfying transgovernmental solution. Clearly this will also hold for the highly charged domain of international security, so crucial for realists.

As already suggested, scepticism abounds among the realists: about globalization, about the decreased authority of the state, about the emancipatory capacity of NGOs, about the existence and scope of global governance. Realists are not impressed by the putative changes in the international system. Conservatism and pessimism continue to prevail.

The English school: an attempt at synthesis

Although sharing realism’s conservative ontology of world politics as inter-state relations, the English School infuses it with a healthy and salutary dose of optimism. In spite – and in full recognition of – international anarchy, the English School believes order and cooperation to be possible. The English School’s theoretical tradition focuses on informal norms (say, sovereignty and non-intervention) and institutions (say, balance of power and international law) which states have concertedly extended. States do not operate in a social vacuum, but interact in an ‘international society’ premised on shared interests and shared values, thus ensuring a modicum of order.

Not only does the English School offer a middle way between Rosenau’s conception of global governance as utter complexity and realism’s quick rejection of it; the English School has also been a major source of inspiration for Rosenau. Indeed, a comparison of both approaches allows one to detect an evolution in Rosenau’s thinking. While they agree on the basic existence of something like global governance, their conception of it has become widely diverging.

Keeping our comparative purposes in mind, it should be noted that the English School remains highly state-centric. As emphasized, the English School operates on a conservative ontology of international politics. Traditionally it has indeed shown little regard for the world political role of various private and non-state actors, like multinational companies or NGOs. However, recent contributions to the British research tradition have called for explicit attention for the economic sector and for the activities of ‘world society’, consisting of transnational and interhuman interaction (beyond a mere focus on interaction among states in the inter-national society). This does not at all imply that states are now considered irrelevant. It does mean, however, that the increasing salience of other non-state actors has to be recognized and theorized as shapers of the international economic order. This thematic restriction is probably regrettable given the increasing salience of non-state actors in international security governance.Reference Dunne¹⁷

Rosenau’s conception of global governance and that of the English School differ not only with respect to their appreciation of the state, but also with regard to the question of coherence. The English School posits a high degree of coherence in global governance; a conviction that flows naturally from its belief that international society, and thus global governance, is premised on ‘common interests’ and ‘shared values’.Reference Dunne¹⁸ Rosenau, on the other hand, diagnoses complexity, turbulence, and obscurity. Here we can see a remarkable shift in Rosenau’s theoretical thinking. At least from 1995 onwards, he stresses fragmentation, and thus seems to have become unequivocally interested in governance in the global, rather than in global governance. Back in 1992, the year he co-edited the milestone-volume on Governance Without Government, Rosenau was still much less radical; at that time, he still argued that governance as ‘governing without government’ was native to all non-hierarchical political systems, and thus is a universal feature of all international politics. Governance, Rosenau then contended, always consists of three mutually reinforcing components: an ideal, a behavioural, and a political component. He applied the conceptual framework to the Cold War. Mutual enemy images, the arms race, and institutions like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were all essential elements of the Cold War. While being the expression of an all too real antagonism, together they did constitute a form of international governance, and thus provided for order and stability. In 1992, governance for Rosenau remained:

The difference with Rosenau’s later opinions could hardly be bigger; in his later work, he indefatigably stressed the fragmented nature of world politics; definitely when one takes into account his 1992 definition of governance as ‘order plus intentionality,’ a definition which is not free of a degree of conservatism. For the younger Rosenau, disorder and fragmentation could be no part of order, thus of governance (Ref. Reference Rosenau9, pp. 2, 6). As pointed out above, Rosenau’s earlier definition not only clashes with his later equation of global governance with fragmentation, but also with his later insistence on the spontaneity (versus intentionality) of the development of global governance processes.

The ideas of the early Rosenau are quite compatible with those of the English School. In large measure, Rosenau shared a language and substantive concerns with the British research tradition. Moreover, Rosenau emphasized continuity rather than change: changes might occur, but this does not mean that governance will disappear, it will only take a different form. We don’t know yet exactly which form governance will take, but eventually it will crystallize and show coherence. That was Rosenau’s 1992 argument, it appears to be the English School’s present argument, but it is no longer the argument of the later Rosenau, who is at once more careful and bolder. He is more careful because he does not presuppose coherence anymore. At the same time, he has become bolder because he interprets this (possible) lack of coherence as a source of creativity and emancipation, and because he dares to emancipate himself from his earlier opinions. Rosenau shows the lead in embracing ambivalence.