1. Introduction
Paul Rohrbach (1869–1956) hailed from Irgen in Latvia. He was a theologian, traveller, political commentator, and journalist. He published travelogues, treatises on national and colonial economy, and nationalist propaganda. Rohrbach was also German Government Settlement Commissioner to South-West Africa between 1903 and 1906. From 1907 until the end of the First World War he taught colonial economics at the Handelshochschule in Berlin. During this time Rohrbach wrote prolifically, and a large amount of nationalist propaganda flowed from his pen during the time leading up to the First World War and during its early stages. His broader aim was, as stated in his monograph of 1912, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt, to propagate German religious, moral, and cultural ideals in the world. Here he professed to oppose political and material domination of colonies and to promote a type of cultural patronage that some scholars have termed “ethical imperialism” (Mogk Reference Mogk1972).
In this paper I analyze five short essays which were reprinted with only minor stylistic amendments in the collection Zum Weltvolk hindurch! in 1915 (= Rohrbach Reference Rohrbach1915a). These essays are prime examples of German nationalist discourse at the start of the First World War. They and many more like them were printed in cheap editions and widely read;Footnote 1 it is therefore highly likely that Adolf Hitler would have encountered them, although he does not mention Rohrbach in Mein Kampf as a specific influence.Footnote 2 The influence of these and similar essays, most notably those of Houston Stewart Chamberlain (Reference Chamberlain1914, Reference Chamberlain1915), would have extended into the National Socialist era.Footnote 3
2. Method of Analysis
This paper will adopt a method devised by Martin Wengeler, who has, in turn, been influenced by Fritz Hermanns's (Reference Hermanns, Link, Ortner and Portmann-Tselikas2003) ideas on the development of a “linguistic hermeneutics” (Sprachhermeneutik). The ambition of both Wengeler and Hermanns is that linguistics should become a cultural science, something which, in their eyes, it has hitherto failed to be. Their aim is that, through knowledge of the connection between linguistic and social behaviours, linguistics may enable a broad understanding of human actions, their causes and effects, and the motives and reasoning behind them (Hermanns Reference Hermanns, Link, Ortner and Portmann-Tselikas2003:136). To this end, Wengeler has devised a system of analysis according to which the presence of certain elements of discourse are indicative of an archetypal Kriegsbotschaft [justification of war], a text type to which the essays under scrutiny clearly belong (Wengeler Reference Wengeler, Busse, Niehr and Wengeler2005:216–217). In Wengeler Reference Wengeler, Busse, Niehr and Wengeler2005, he looked for eight characteristic Merkmale (“features”) when analysing the rhetorical figures and topoi used in political speeches delivered in Germany between 1900 and 2001, while making it clear that he did not expect all features to be present in each Kriegsbotschaft:
1. Die Narratio, in der der Redner erzählt, wie es zu der aktuellen Situation gekommen ist, in der „leider“ ein militärischer Einsatz, ein Krieg oder eine Aufrüstungsmaβnahme erforderlich sind. [The narratio in which the narrator explains how the present situation has come about and why military measures, a war or armament are “unfortunately” necessary.]
2. Die Selbstdarstellung bzw. Selbstinszenierung des Redners (resp. der Gruppe, die er repräsentiert) als verantwortungsvoller und friedliebender Mensch, der alles versucht hat, um die militärische Maβnahme zu ver-meiden … [The self-presentation or self-invention of the narrator (or the group he represents) as a responsible and peace-loving person who has tried everything possible to avert military measures]
3. Die Rechtfertigung/Legitimation der begonnenen oder zu beginnenden Maβnahme durch die Darstellung der Handlungen des Gegners (Notwendig-keitstopos) und der Gefahren, die drohen, wenn nun nicht militärisch reagiert wird. Zu beiden gehört die Ausmalung eines Feindbildes. [The justification and legitimation of the action which has started or is due to start by means of a portrayal of the opponent and the danger of not taking military action (topos of necessity). The depiction of an “image of the enemy” is frequently involved.]
4. Die Darstellung der Ziele, die nur durch einen Krieg/einen militärischen Einsatz oder eine Aufrüstungsmaβnahme zu erreichen sind; … „Heile Welt“-Topos (Stichwort neue Weltordnung, dauerhafter Frieden). [The portrayal of the goals which will only be achieved by a war, military deployment or armament; … the topos of an ideal world (key phrases: “new world order,” “lasting peace”).]
5. Die Berufung auf die Geschichte, die lehrt, dass die unpopuläre Maβnahme nötig sei und/oder dass man Erfolg haben wird (Geschichts-Topos) sowie die Anrufung eines höheren Wesens als Berufung auf die Religion. [Appeals to history (topos of history), which teaches us that un-popular measures may be necessary or that the measure will be successful, as well as the invocation of a higher being as an appeal to religion.]
6. Die Berufung auf Instanzen wie grundlegende (zu verteidigende) Werte, kodifizierte Normen (Prinzipien-Topos), und/oder Verpflichtungen gegen-über Partnern, Verträgen etc. (Autoritäts-Topos). [An appeal to things such as values (which should be defended), codified norms (the topos of principles), and/or duties towards partners, treaties, etc. (the topos of authority).]
7. Der Ausdruck der Siegesgewissheit … z.T. auch verbunden mit Drohungen an den Gegner. [The expression of confidence in a future victory … often accompanied by threats towards the opponent.]
8. Der Solidaritätsappell nach innen, bei Hitler charakteristischerweise verbunden mit Drohungen an die, die sich verweigern, ansonsten oft verknüpft mit der Darstellung der Ernsthaftigkeit der Lage und der zu erwartenden. [Appeals for internal solidarity, in the case of Hitler characteristically accompanied by threats towards those who refuse to act and otherwise frequently linked to a depiction of the seriousness of the situation and reference to the numbers of expected victims.]
My aim in this paper is to explore the usefulness of measuring five of Rohrbach's political essays against these criteria. The chief difference between Rohrbach's texts and those analyzed by Wengeler in his Reference Wengeler, Busse, Niehr and Wengeler2005 essays is that the former are written propaganda and the latter are speeches. Furthermore, the latter are nominally the words of rulers or political leaders, while Rohrbach is writing as an expert advisor to those in political authority. He is, however, writing with a voice of a “rhetorischer Ratgeber” [rhetorical advisor] or godfather similar to that identified by Wengeler in the speeches of men with greater political power, most notably Wilhelm II and Hitler (Wengeler Reference Wengeler, Busse, Niehr and Wengeler2005:218). I hope to demonstrate that an identification and elucidation of Wengeler's Merkmale is a valuable analytical tool very much in line with those used by critical discourse analysts to examine the construction of national identity (see Wodak et al. Reference Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia and Karin1999:33–42). Indeed it will show that the Kriegsbotschaft is an ideal locus for the construction of a national identity, for, as Wodak puts it: “even the ‘good’ nation of citizens needs its image of an enemy in order to conceive itself as a nation” (Wodak et al. Reference Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia and Karin1999:20).
In his essays, Rohrbach is addressing the “politisch urteilsfähige(n) Leser(n)” [politically competent reader(s)] (Rohrbach Reference Rohrbach1915a:45). The narrative voice is a wir [we]. We cannot be certain who this wir is, but in general it appears to be a wir that includes the audience, as in “wir aber wissen, worum es für uns geht” [but we know what is at stake for us] (1915a:42). Occasionally the wir is clearly the voice of authority speaking to the audience and advising them, as in “wir wuβten, was kommen würde, und bald kommen würde” [we knew what would happen, and happen soon] (45). This authoritative voice presents “objektive Tatsachen” [objective facts] (1915a:55) and reassures the reader: “Nur keine Angst!” [Don't be afraid!] (1915a:60). In the main, however, Rohrbach's wir appears to be one of the types of we defined by Wodak et al. as seeming to be addressee-inclusive while not being so, or only partially so, for example the “author's plural” and the “pluralis modestiæ” (Wodak et al. Reference Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia and Karin1999:45).
The five texts below are analyzed in chronological order so as to trace the development of the author's message during the early stage of the First World War. In the conclusion, an attempt will be made to assess the value of Wengeler's methodology as a tool for a “linguistic hermeneutics” that may elucidate broader social and cultural factors underlying propaganda texts.
3. Textual Analyses
3.1. Warum es sein muβ.Footnote 4
This text was originally published on the day after Germany's invasion of France. The justification for war is explicit in the title. This “muβ” [“must”] is echoed in the final line of the essay: “Darum muβ es sein: Mit Gott in den Krieg” [That is why it must be so: to war with God at our side] (1915a:45). The causes of the present situation (Merkmal 1) and the legitimization of measures just undertaken by Germany through reference to enemy actions (Merkmal 3) make up much of this text. The “Bluttat von Sarajewo” [act of bloodshed in Sarajevo]Footnote 5 and Russia's perceived pan-Serbianism and pan-Slavism are claimed to have forced Germany to support Austro-Hungary. War is justified in this essay as a matter of life and death for Austria and therefore Germany (“Sein oder Nichtsein” [To be or not to be], 1915a:44).
Rohrbach has taken inspiration for this essay from a church sermon, a “Kriegspredigt” [war sermon], in which patriotic songs were sung (Ernst Moritz Arndt's poem Heimat und Vaterland of 1813 and Ein' feste Burg, the “Lutherlied” [“Luther's hymn”]) in order to unite the congregation in “vaterländische(r) Ernst” [patriotic seriousness] (1915a:41) and an “überwältigende(n) Gefühl der tiefen und vollen Aufrichtigkeit” [overpowering feeling of deep and total honesty] (1915a:41). Rohrbach's evocation of German virtues which are to be defended (Merkmal 6) is enhanced with a description of the ancient church in which the sermon is held, its “mächtige(m) Wehrturm” [mighty tower] and “schmucklose Mauern” [plain walls], and an evocation of the more ancient Scandinavian glaciers which transported the granite from which the church was built to North Germany. The German Selbstbild [image of the self] brims with rectitude (“Tüchtigkeit” [efficiency], “Aufrichtigkeit” [honesty], “Friedensliebe” [love of peace], “Fortschritt” [progress] all 1915a:42); the Serbian Feindbild [image of the enemy] is one of “revolutionierende(n) und meuchelmörderische(n) Politik” [revolutionary and treacherous politics] (1915a:43) and “allserbische, auf Zertrüm-merung Österreich-Ungarns gerichtete Agitation” [pan-Serbian agitation, aimed at ruining Austro-Hungary] (1915a:43). The Russian enemy, portrayed as a dangerous animal (1915a:45), and peace-loving Germany are contrasted, with the war deemed to be a Russian trap for the peace-loving Germans: “eine(r) hinterlistige(n) Falle für die Friedensliebe des deutschen Volkes und seines Kaisers” [a treacherous trap for the love of peace of the German people and their Kaiser] (1915a:42).
The message of this particular sermon is that, while all nations involved in wars believe God to be on their side, in this war Germany is God's side (Merkmal 5, 42). It is German virtues that will benefit the rest of the world if they are allowed to spread (Merkmal 4). Rohrbach, as a theologian and in his role as a benevolent coloniser, sees Germany's influence in the world as indispensable and as God's will, believing:
… daβ unser Volk die ihm von Gott gewiesene Aufgabe hat, seine Kräfte zu erhalten und zu entfalten, um an seinem Teil etwas Tüchtiges für den Fortschritt der Menschheit zum Guten und Wahren zu leisten (Merkmale 3, 4 and 6; 42). [that our people have the God-given duty to preserve and display their strengths, and to achieve on his behalf something substantial for the progress of mankind towards goodness and truth.]
An enemy which aims to destroy Germany or one of her allies, in this case Austro-Hungary, thus jeopardizes Gods plan for mankind. This is why God will help Germans defend themselves “wenn wir um unser Dasein, um unsere ganze Zukunft zu kämpfen gezwungen werden. Gezwungen!” [if we are forced to fight for our existence, for our entire future. Forced, I say!] (1915a:42). Rohrbach writes that the sermon justified war in two ways: Germany's honour must be preserved and her duty to her allies upheld (both Merkmal 6). For him, however, there is a third, more decisive reason to fight: “das Entscheidende, das eigentliche, zwingende Muβ!” [the decisive, the actual, imperative must!] (1915a:42). To explain this third reason, he uses Bismarck's essay Gedanken und Erinnerungen as his authority, praising its author, “der mit einer festen Religiosität von altem Schrot und Korn die rücksichtslose realpolitische Erkenntnis der Tatsachen vereinte” [whose firm, old-school religiousness helped him recognise the facts with a ruthless mind and a clear understanding of practical politics], for his insight that a nation must help its allies for its own sake: if Austro-Hungary is defeated, Germany is next in line (“daβ nach Österreich ohne Zweifel wir an die Reihe kämen” [that, after Austria, it would no doubt be our turn], 1915a:44)
In the final paragraph of this essay, Rohrbach invokes history to prove that war is necessary (Merkmal 5). He claims that the current situation is identical to that of 1805 (“eine Wiederholung der Schicksalsfrage an Preuβen” [a repetition of Prussia's fate]) when Napoleon attacked Austria and Russia, and King Friedrich Wilhelm chose to remain neutral; the following statement is thus an example of Merkmal 1:
So wie Napoleon sich nur ein Jahr nach dem Siege über die Österreicher und Russen auf Preuβen warf …, so würden wir die russischen Tatzen zu spüren bekommen (1915a:45). [Just as Napoleon pounced on Prussia only one year after his victory over the Austrians and Russians …, we would get to feel the Russian claws.]
Germany must learn from the disastrous consequences of past neutrality and take to heart the sentiment expressed in the final line of the essay: “Mit Gott in den Krieg!” [To war with God at our side!] (1915a:45).
3.2. Hie Schuld—Hie Schickung!Footnote 6
This essay is straightforward in content, doing little more than legitimize the war by juxtaposing the enemy, Russia and France, and the innocent parties, Austria and Germany (Merkmal 3). Russia is shown as having unleashed war: “Wenn je ein Staat eine furchtbare und schuldvolle Verantwortung mit dem Entfesseln der Kriegsfurie auf sich genommen hat, so jetzt Ruβland” [If ever a state has taken on the terrible and guilty responsibility for unleashing the fury of war, then it is Russia] (1915a:46–47). Austria is once more shown as fighting for her life and in need of Germany's support (Merkmal 6): “weil es sich seines Lebens wehrt, wird es von Ruβland am Dasein bedroht” [because she is fighting for her life, Russia is threatening her very existence] (1915a:46). The essay's simplicity seems appropriate for a text published during the first week of war, when the necessity for combat and issues of guilt and innocence must have been widely debated. The “Schuld” [guilt] of the title is laid primarily at the door of the Russian Tsar, Nicholas II, and his people; the “Schickung” [stroke of fate] is a benevolent fate which has absolved Germany of guilt for the war:
… wir haben dafür unser Gewissen unversehrt gehalten. Wir gehen in den Krieg mit dem Bewuβtsein: er ist nicht unsere Schuld, sondern eine uns aufgezwungene Schicksalsentscheidung (Merkmal 2; 1915a:47). [in this we have maintained an unscathed conscience. We are entering the war in the knowledge that it is not our fault, but something which fate has forced upon us.]
The ruler of each nation is endowed with significant responsibilities and attributes: Nicholas II is shown as a leader with “eine klägliche, schwächliche Natur” [a pitiful, weak nature] (1915a:46) and as guilty of “Hinterhältigkeit” [underhandedness] (1915a:46); a “Bösewicht” [villain] (1915a:46) who has spoken words that give the appearance of “Dringlichkeit und Aufrichtigkeit” [urgency and sincerity] while sharpening a knife with which to murder his opponent (“gleichzeitig aber das Messer für die Kehle des anderen zu schleifen” [simultaneously sharpening the knife to cut his enemy's throat], 1915a:46). The Selbstbild of the innocent party is strengthened by the portrayal of Franz Ferdinand as a martyr who has unmasked Germany's enemies (“die verbündeten Neider Deutschlands” [the allies who envy Germany], 1915a:45) and who will change the fate of Austro-Hungary for the better, likening his “sacrifice” to that of Christian martyrs who died for their beliefs (“das Blut der Märtyrer kitte den Bau der Kirche” [the blood of martyrs cements the stones that build the Church], 1915a:45). Russia, on the other hand, is metonymized as a “Raufbold” [ruffian] and “Bankrottierer” [bankrupt] who is happy to rob a third party to pay his debts; it is a country drifting on a sea of hatred and greed (“es treibt auf dem Meere des nationalen Hasses und der Eroberungssucht” [it is drifting on the sea of national hate and thirst for conquest], 1915a:46). In contrast, the German Kaiser's “Friedensliebe” is shared with his people: “Wir haben das Äuβerste getan, um Frieden zu erhalten” [We have done our utmost to keep the peace] (Merkmal 2, 1915a:47).
This essay also develops Rohrbach's views on expansionism, which he sees as a good thing if practised for the right reasons. He contrasts the German notion of a beneficial expansion “um der inneren Notwendigkeit der nationalen Idee” [for the intrinsic necessity of the national idea] with Russia's pan-Slavic “Machtpolitik [“power politics”].” Rohrbach's conception of colonialism was, we are led to believe, far from one in which pure power was the goal (Mogk Reference Mogk1972:82). His claim for Germany's future is modest in this essay and a future victory is not a forgone conclusion: “Jetzt kommt die groβe Prüfung: ob wir fähig sind, unsere Zukunft als Weltvolk zu verteidigen?” [Now comes the great test: will we be able to defend our future as a world power?] Germany is to be tested, and if she passes the test her role in the world will be preserved. The readers of this essay may have been familiar with earlier publications (for example, Rohrbach Reference Rohrbach1903 and Reference Rohrbach1912) which presented the colonialist view of Germany's duty to bring the “German idea” to the world, in other words to spread German culture and civilisation, a duty which, in 1914, he still believes she must fulfil (Merkmal 4).
3.3. Unsere Gegner.Footnote 7
A large portion of this longer text is devoted to an explanation of the political and economic reasons for Russian and French aggression, for England entering the war, for the German invasion of Belgium, and for Italy remaining neutral (Merkmal 1). Russia is seen as particularly treacherous and as having made it necessary for Germany to defend herself (Merkmal 3):
… daβ die Hinterlist des amtlichen Ruβlands, des Kaisers an der Spitze, Deutschland zwang, die Fäden des Netzes, das über uns geworfen werden sollte, zu zerschneiden, ehe es zu spät war (1915a:49–50). [that the guile of Russian officialdom, with the Emperor at its head, forced Germany to cut the threads of the net which was to be thrown over us, before it was too late.]
Germany's virtues are emphasized through the contrastive portrayal of Russian faults: what the Tsar and his people lack is implied as present in Germans. Unlike Germany, Russia has no “politische und nationale Sittlichkeit” [political and national morality] (1915a:56); Russia needs to overcome a number of physical, technical and moral obstacles if she is to succeed in the war, for example, (to name only the moral ones): “Stumpfsinn und Widerstand der Eingezogenen, Gewissenlosigkeit, Brutalität, Korruption der ordnenden und leitenden Stellen, mangelnde Fähigkeit zum Disponieren” [apathy and resistance of those who have gone to war, unscrupulousness, brutality, corruption among those who command and lead, inability to plan ahead] (1915a:56). The Russian people no longer have strong authority figures (“Zarenglaube” [faith in the Tsar], “Kirchenglaube” [faith in the Church], “Herrenglaube” [faith in masters], 1915a:57); they have no-one to obey—Germany, we assume, still has authority figures and a desire to obey them. France, on the other hand, has only been hypnotized into wanting war, due to her desire for revenge against Germany for past defeats (1915a:55).
The “Feindschaft Englands” [England's enmity] is mentioned for the first time in this series of essays, and from now on Rohrbach gives equal weight to the “„Suprematie“ Englands auf den Meeren und jenseits der Meere” [England's supremacy at sea and overseas] (1915a:53) as a reason for Germany having to defend herself and her allies (Merkmal 3). This is, furthermore, the first of the series of essays under examination in which there is a clear expression of “Siegesgewissheit” [certainty of victory] (Merkmal 7):
Wir werden Frankreich schlagen, wir werden mit Ruβland fertig werden … Es wäre klüger von England gewesen, sich von vornherein auf unseren Sieg einzurichten und sich mit uns über die Zukunft gütlich zu verständigen (1915a:52). [We will defeat France, we will finish off Russia … England would have been wiser to prepare herself for our victory from the beginning and negotiate with us amicably about the future.]
Germany is also declared, for the first time unequivocally, as a future “Weltvolk” (Merkmal 4): “… wir werden auch gegen England unsere Zukunft als Weltvolk nicht nur zu behaupten, sondern auch zu verbessern imstande sein” [we will be in a position not only to maintain but also to improve our future as a world power vis-à-vis England] (1915a:53). Rohrbach reassures his readers of a triumphant future for their nation and promises that the test to which they have been subjected will have been worthwhile. German virtues will have been defended (Merkmal 6) and the possibility of misfortune will have been reversed:
Darum dürfen wir überzeugt sein, daβ dieser Krieg uns nicht zum Unheil, sondern durch die Prüfung unseres nationalen, sittlichen Wollens und Könnens und durch den Triumph, den er uns bringen wird, zum Heile ausschlägt (1915a:57). [Therefore we can be certain that this war will not end in disaster for us but, through the testing of our national moral intentions and abilities and through the triumph that the war will bring us, it will end in success for us.]
The notion of “Siegesgewissheit” [certainty of victory] reappears later in the essay, when Rohrbach claims that it is impossible for other powers to bring down the united force of Germany and Austro-Hungary. He states Germany's superiority in four areas as the reasons for her invincibility: “politische(r) Einheitlichkeit” [political unity], “nationale(r) Begeisterung” [national enthusiasm], “äuβere(r) und innere(r) Höhe der krieger-ischen Einrichtungen” [external and internal superiority of military installations], and “sittliche(r) Stärke des Kriegsgrundes” [strength of the moral basis for war] (all 1915a:54). Such virtues are obviously lacking in enemies who could interpret the passage as a threat if they were in a position to read it (Merkmal 7). This positive German Selbstbild is contrasted with a picture of Russia, France and England who are not, like Germany, fighting for survival: “Keiner von ihnen verteidigt seine Existenz” [None of them are fighting for their existence] (1915a:54).
This essay also contains a “Solidaritätsappell nach innen” [call for internal solidarity] (Merkmal 8) in that Rohrbach warns Germany against complacency and the uncritical condemnation of others. While it is true that France suffers more than other nations from “sittliche Zerfressen-heit” [moral corrosion], Germany is also guilty of a particular type of “Fäulnis und Volksschande” [degeneracy and national disgrace], that of failing to sustain a healthy birth-rate and widespread “Kinderscheu” [fear of having children] (1915a:55). Rohrbach's confident tone is tempered with a warning at the end of his essay that German victory may be jeopardized by elemental catastrophes, over which no-one has control, and by a “schmähliche Eigensucht unter uns selber” [a shameful selfishness among ourselves], which is preventable. His final sentence calls for “nationale(n) Opferwilligkeit” [national willingness to make sacrifices] (Merkmal 8), a call which will be continued in the next essay to be examined.
3.4. Drei Grundsätze vom Kriege.Footnote 8
Rohrbach's three principles of war are as follows:
i. Man soll den Krieg nicht führen, bevor er sich von selber als nationale Notwendigkeit offenbart. [A war should not be waged until it becomes obvious that it is a national imperative] (Wengelers “Notwendigkeits-topos” [topos of necessity]) (1915a:57–59).
ii. Man soll im gerechten Kriege alles an alles setzen (1915a:59–60). [In a just war no effort should be spared]
iii. Organisiert die innere Kriegshilfe vernünftig! (1915a:61–63). [A sensible organisation of humanitarian aid on home ground]
It is the third of these principles which introduces a new dimension to Rohrbach's propaganda, as it is based on the premise that war is a moral test (“noch mehr eine moralische, als eine militärische Kraftprobe” [more a moral than a military test of strenght], 1915a:61). While this part of his message contains a call for solidarity (Merkmal 8), it diverges from Wengeler's template of the Kriegsbotschaft and presents us with an aspect of Rohrbach's individual and highly ethical ideology.
In Rohrbach's eyes, both the State and private individuals have a duty willingly to give aid to those in need and to make some personal sacrifice for the common good. In Germany there is a “Riesenmaβ von Kraft und Willen im Volke selbst” [huge amount of strength and will within the people] (1915a:60) and the positive German Selbstbild painted by Rohrbach also includes the virtues of “Selbstzucht und Verantwort-ungsgefühl” [self-discipline and sense of responsibility] and “Opfer-willen” [willingness to make sacrifices] (1915a:62). Germans should feel “Hilfsbegeisterung” [a desire to help] and see things from a “vater-ländische(n) und menschliche(n) Standpunkt aus” [patriotic and human point of view] (1915a:61). Germans can help those less fortunate than themselves without drawing attention to themselves “nicht nur mit Begeisterung und gutem Willen, sondern auch mit Verstand und nüchternem Nachdenken” [not only with enthusiasm and good will, but also with common sense and clear thinking] (1915a:61). As an experienced economist, Rohrbach offers concrete advice on how, for example, the better-off citizen can choose to continue employing a music teacher whose low wage keeps him alive, how businesses can act “verständig und volkssittlich” [sensibly and ethically] by employing more people than they need, and how morally educated workers (“die Gebildeten des moralischen Urteils” [those educated in moral judgement]) can willingly accept lower pay in order for colleagues to keep their jobs: “dem Volksgenossen ein Stück seiner Arbeit erhalten, ist noch mehr wert, als patriotische Gaben spenden!” [it is of more value to our national comrades to keep them in their jobs than to make patriotic donations!] (1915a:62, final sentence).
3.5. Der Vater der Dinge.Footnote 9
In this essay, Rohrbach calls upon authority figures such as Moltke, who, he claims, wrote that peace is a dream and not a good one, and Herakleitos of Ephesos, the proclaimed author of the statement “Der Krieg ist der Vater aller Dinge” [War is the father of all things]. He interprets Herakleitos aphorism as a primitive version of Hegel's assertion that progress consists of “Aktion, Reaktion und Synthese” [action reaction and synthesis], which he further interprets as “Stoβ, Gegenstoβ und Ausgleich” [attack, counter-attack and settlement], i.e., war (1915a:67). For Rohrbach, war has made possible nearly all of human progress: “Es hat selten einen groβen Aufschwung menschlichen Wesens gegeben, dessen Vater nicht auf irgendwelche Weise der Krieg gewesen ist” [There has seldom been a major positive development for humankind which has not in some way been the progeny of war] (1915a:67), and he gives historical examples from the fourth century BCE to nineteenth-century Prussia (Merkmal 5). He presents Bismarck, “der Schmied unserer Einheit” [the one who forged our unity], as the man who adapted Herkleitos’ aphorism to modern circumstances and to the problems of German unity, which would only be solved “durch Blut und Eisen” [by blood and iron] (1915a:68). And now Germans will show solidarity in the face of war: “keinem wird es in den Sinn kommen, dem anderen geringeren Opferwillen fürs Vaterland vorzuwerfen” [it will enter no-one's head to accuse another person of being less willing to make sacrifices for the fatherland] (Merkmal 8). They will be grateful for the creative force which emanates from war: “Ist das nicht etwas Ungeheures? Hat da nicht eine Erzeugergewalt gewirkt, wie sie in Wahrheit einem Vater der Dinge zukommt?” [Is it not tremendous? Wasn't that the effect of powerful creative force as really befits a father of things?] (1915a:69). According to Rohrbach, war will even cure Social Democrats of a lack of patriotism (1915a:69) and invigorate a German “Nationalgefühl” [national feeling] which he had diagnosed as ailing in his 1912 monograph (Rohrbach Reference Rohrbach1912:20, 37, 56, 98–99, 226). Footnote 10 The notion of war as creative force and a cure for present internal problems fits in well with Rohrbach's personal vision and his hopes for Germany as a world power. It is a characteristic not listed by Wengeler as belonging to the common features of the Kriegsbotschaft from the Kaiserzeit onwards.
In Der Vater der Dinge, Rohrbach relativizes the horror of war for his readers: war may be “furchtbar” [terrible], “grausig” [gruesome], and “zerschmetternd” [destructive], but the modern age has experienced more deaths as a result of illness and suicide than from wars (1915a:69). Such individual tragedies do not benefit the nation as a whole; however, a war does: “Und wie nutzlos zerstörend sind jene Einzelfälle, wie groβer Dinge Vater aber ist der Krieg!” [And how uselessly destructive are those isolated cases, yet what a father of great things is war!] (1915a:69). Past wars have even led to scientific progress, particularly in the field of medicine (1915a:70). Rohrbach stresses that Germany will win the war because the necessary solidarity, norms and values are already sound (Merkmale 6, 7 and 8; 1915a:70). Even the weak war-time economy is portrayed in a positive light, as something which has led the nation away from “Geschäftsmaterialismus” [business materialism] (1915a:70) and towards “nationale(n) Opfermut” [national readiness to make sacrifices] and “ein Bad sittlicher Wiedergeburt” [a bath of moral rebirth] (1915a:71).
History is used once more in the second half of this essay to illustrate the benefits of war, this time with England, for whom the Napoleonic War was the “Vater der englischen Gröβe auf ein Jahrhundert hinaus” [father of English greatness for a century to come] (1915a:71). Now it is Germany's turn to take to the world stage: “Da erhob sich Deutschland!” [Then Germany rose up!] (1915a:71). Germany's desire is to become a “Weltvolk” [world power] and England's mistake is to try to deny Germany this right (Merkmal 3): “England aber will uns in seinem Herzen die Lebenslust weigern, die wir brauchen, um ein Weltvolk zu werden” [In its heart England wants to deny us the zest for life that we need if we are to become a world power] (1915a:72). It is this denial that has made war necessary (Merkmal 3). Rohrbach quotes from a letter in which England is accused of sin, “Sünde gegen den heiligen Geist” [sin against the Holy Spirit] (1915a:72), namely her unjust and immoral insistence upon war: “England hat den Kampf gewollt, ohne ein sittliches Recht zum Kampfe zu haben” [England wanted combat without having any moral right to it] (1915a:72). Germany will, according to Rohrbach, win the war (Merkmal 7) and bring a new world order (Merkmal 4), because she is in the right and because, as a “Weltvolk,” she will protect all of mankind:
In unserem Lager aber ist das Recht, nicht nur das Recht des deutschen Volkes, sondern das Recht der Menschheit. Im Kriege haben wir es zu verteidigen, im Kriege wird England stürzen, werden wir steigen. Indem wir aber steigen und uns ausbreiten, beginnt ein neues Geschichtsalter (1915a:72). [But we have right on our side, not only the right of the German people, but the right of mankind. In the war we have to defend it, in the war England will fall, and we will rise. But as we rise and spread out, a new historical era will begin.]
This is why war is the father of all things. It is the foundation of Rohrbach's philosophy and the reason for his writing his Kriegsbotschaften. It forms the kernel of his politics: Germany has a right and a duty to bring her culture to the world for the benefit of the world. This essay is followed by one first published a week later, “Die Furcht vor dem Frieden,” which warns of the dangers to Germany of a premature peace and is the obvious next step from an explication of the notion that war brings about progress. Space does not permit a full analysis of that essay, but its most significant sentence, written entirely in italics, makes a fitting end to the analyses presented above:
Es gibt überhaupt nur ein einziges Mittel, den Völkern Glauben an den deutschen Gedanken beizubringen und damit der deutschen Zukunft freie Bahn zu machen, Dies einzige Mittel heiβt: Sieg über England! (1915a:75; italics omitted). [There is only one way to teach other peoples to believe in the German idea and thus free the way for a German future. This one way is victory over England!]
4. Conclusion
All five essays under scrutiny contain several of Wengeler's eight features of a Kriegsbotschaft and all eight features have been identified in the sequence as a whole, but can we say that using his methods has contributed to a linguistic hermeneutics in which human actions, their causes and effects, and the motives and reasoning behind them are elucidated? Has the application of Wengeler's methods to the five essays analyzed above gone any way towards helping linguistics become a cultural science?
I think the answer is “yes.” In Rohrbach's essays we have become acquainted with the German Selbstbild, as he saw it, at the beginning of the First World War. As with all nations, a positive Selbstbild was important for Germans. At the outbreak of war it was vital that German national identity was clearly stated and that the German people should be familiar with it. In particular, Germans wanted to be reminded of their moral virtues; they did not want to feel guilty for the outbreak of war and needed to think of themselves and their leaders as innocent victims and as “friedliebend.” Rohrbach deemed it appropriate to justify the war in Christian terms and, presumably with Christian virtues in mind, and he evidently assumed that his readers would be willing for self-sacrifice. We also see the German need for authority figures, such as Moltke, Hegel, Bismarck, and Kaiser Wilhelm; we are told that Russia had none. We also see the German need for a Feindbild in her construction of national identity and become familiar Germany's view of her enemy, as mediated by Rohrbach, at the beginning of the First World War. Finally, we gain an understanding of Rohrbach's mission to spread the “German idea” to the world, a mission that was abandoned for a short while at the end of the First World War, but reappeared with National Socialism.
Highlighting Wengeler's Merkmale has helped us follow the development of Rohrbach's expressed attitude to Germany's involvement in the First World War. I say “expressed” because it is likely that he was personally in favour of aggression from the outset, but wanted to lead his readers more gently in the “right” direction. Rohrbach adopts the stance of a responsible advisor in all five essays, and he portrays the German people and their Kaiser as peace loving (Merkmal 2). In the first two essay of the sequence, Russia is seen as the primary aggressor. It is in the third essay that England and her supremacy on the sea appear as an obstacle to Germany's future fortune. In the final two essays, Germany has evolved from a victim to a strong primary actor who is likely to become stronger as a result of war. Rohrbach still does not accept that Germany is responsible for the war, but she must now be grateful that it has been forced upon her.
Wengeler's eight characteristic features of war justification serve as a steady framework within which to place elements of political propaganda. He regards these features as “obligatorische Bestandteile der Textsorte „Kriegsbotschaft““ [compulsory components of the text-type of “Kriegsbotschaft”] (Wengeler Reference Wengeler, Busse, Niehr and Wengeler2005:216). While the presence of these “Bestandteile” [components] or Merkmale can serve as an indication that a text belongs to the category of Kriegsbotschaft, each political author will add his own distinctive features. In Rohrbach's case, ideological issues connected with his personal brand of “ethical imperialism” are given contemporary relevance at the outbreak of the First World War (see especially section 2.4 above). His personal admiration for Bismarck shines through as his rhetoric becomes more aggressive in the final essay (section 2.5). A future detailed comparison with similar propagandistic texts, pre-dating, contemporary to and post-dating the five essays analyzed in this article, will determine the extent to which Rohrbach was influenced by and in his turn influenced other political authors, and will highlight the features of his discourse that were purely personal.
