Timothy Mooney’s Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception: On the Body Informed is an excellent work that profitably adds to the scholarship on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s thought. The book is billed as ‘an advanced introduction to and original interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s work’. For the most part, the book fits this description well. It should be generally accessible to someone with some background in philosophy (e.g., an advanced undergraduate student and above) and it presents some interesting interpretive insights. There are some problems with the book that arise, though, when the two aims (introduction v. original interpretation) clash. Still, despite these problems, the book presents a cohesive and lucid account of Merleau-Ponty’s thought.

Mooney’s book straddles the line between a general overview of Merleau-Ponty’s thought that focuses on concepts or themes and a reading of Phenomenology of Perception that runs through the book chapter by chapter. The book loosely follows the latter structure by running through themes in roughly the order they are presented in Merleau-Ponty’s text. The reader of Phenomenology of Perception will be familiar with the fact, though, that the book is not laid out in a linear fashion and moves back and forth between topics. Because of this Mooney helpfully does not stick to a purely linear discussion of the text. For example, Mooney’s second and third chapters (‘Sensations, Associations and Explanations’ and ‘Attention, Judgement and Other Work’) initially map directly onto the first four chapters of Merleau-Ponty’s book. But in presenting Merleau-Ponty’s ideas in these chapters Mooney draws on passages that occur much later in Phenomenology of Perception where Merleau-Ponty amplifies and extends earlier points. A good example of this is Section 4 of Chapter 2 (‘On Intersensory Perception’) where Mooney considers issues that are primarily discussed in Part Two of Phenomenology of Perception. This does not come across as Mooney jumping around or skipping material, however; it fits with the general themes that he draws out of earlier parts of Merleau-Ponty’s book and is thematically coherent. One might say that to a degree Mooney chooses an order of presentation that is more coherent than Merleau-Ponty’s. At the very least, the way he combines a linear summary of Merleau-Ponty’s book with a coherent overview of Merleau-Ponty’s themes simplifies the order of presentation in a manner that is appropriate for this type of work.

Another strength (at least in most instances) of Mooney’s book is the way he brings in references to other texts and viewpoints in order to contextualize, and sometimes critique, Merleau-Ponty’s views. Along these lines, the book actually begins with an overview of Husserl’s phenomenology, which Mooney uses to situate Merleau-Ponty’s own use of the phenomenological method. The first few sections of Chapter 1 (‘Phenomenology and Objective Thought’) are very successful in this regard. Mooney presents an excellent overview of Husserl’s thought in this context, providing enough detail to reasonably present Husserl’s views without getting so bogged down in a discussion of Husserl that the link to Merleau-Ponty is obscured. The later portions of this chapter then do a very good job of linking the two philosophers’ views, elucidating the way in which Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of objective thought and pre-objectivity link up with Husserl’s views on the natural attitude and phenomenological reduction. In general, Mooney does an excellent job of showing how, despite some of his critical views on Husserl’s thought, Merleau-Ponty’s work stands clearly within the orbit of Husserlian phenomenology.

One other instance that we will highlight (note that there are others we do not mention) where Mooney does an excellent job of providing context is in Chapter 6 (‘Motor Intentionality and Our Landscapes’) where Mooney discusses Merleau-Ponty’s use of the Schneider case. Mooney’s presentation on Schneider (a patient who suffered from visual agnosia due to an injury suffered in WWI) is somewhat more effective than Merleau-Ponty’s original work. By drawing more information from the original studies on Schneider along with recent commentaries, Mooney situates and explains the conclusions Merleau-Ponty draws from the case. Clearly, Mooney has the advantage of writing from a more contemporary perspective, but his explanations are also often clearer and more accessible than Merleau-Ponty’s own. Perhaps more significantly, though, Mooney references other similar cases (involving the subjects D.F. and Ian Waterman; see pp. 134–43) which provide helpful points of comparison and contrast with the Schneider case and help draw out the significance of Merleau-Ponty’s points. Again, Mooney’s introduction of material from outside Merleau-Ponty’s text is spot on here; it is enough to enrich the discussion of Merleau-Ponty without distracting from it.

Philosophical texts ought to be challenging, but philosophical texts can be overly difficult. Mooney has produced robust prose that demands effort from the reader, but he is also keen to clarify passages that are confusing beyond merit. He walks the line between challenge and clarity in a way that benefits the development of readers who want an introductory text. When Mooney’s writing is accessible to those looking for an introductory text (which it is most of the time), it is because of the many tools he has employed to create that accessibility. For one, Mooney understands that nuance does not inhibit the process of introductory understanding, but in fact accelerates it. In most instances, even when Mooney chooses more complicated additions of context, contrast, and careful distinctions, he is able to synthesize numerous viewpoints for a cohesive and lucid result.

While Mooney generally does a good job of adding context by referencing or expanding upon sources beyond Phenomenology of Perception, there are some instances we find problematic. For example, the overview of Husserl in the early sections of Chapter 4 is much more technical, and thus more difficult to follow, than the basic discussion of Husserl in the early sections of Chapter 1. This is particularly the case for the summary of Husserl’s analysis of the relation between kinesthesis and our sense of space in Thing and Space (see especially pp. 82–88). Husserl’s analysis there is highly complex and raises a number of interpretive questions. Mooney’s discussion of it is of such length that it distracts from the discussion of Merleau-Ponty, but too short to adequately discuss the Husserl text. We are also unsure of the degree to which these specific analyses actually influenced or are important for Merleau-Ponty’s thought; thus we believe Mooney’s book would be better off without the discussion of Thing and Space. It is worth noting that no introductory work can truly please all. Readers invariably emerge from different backgrounds, therefore possessing different viewpoints on philosophers and their claims. Nevertheless, we think that some parts of the book, such as the one referenced above, do not properly fit with the aim to be an ‘advanced introduction’.

We have similar problems with Mooney’s discussion of Kant in the later sections of Chapter 3. It is certainly fitting that Kant is discussed in Chapter 3; the general topic of the chapter is Merleau-Ponty’s critique of intellectualism and Kant stands as a major figure in that area. We also strongly agree with one of Mooney’s main interpretive points, namely that Merleau-Ponty is greatly influenced by Kant while also being critical of his thought. The problem, however, is that the discussion of the similarities between Merleau-Ponty’s and Kant’s views end up going into too much depth for a book that is billed as an ‘advanced introduction’. There is in particular too much depth regarding Kant; someone coming to this book with little prior knowledge of Kant’s work is likely to find these sections more confusing than illuminating. This is particularly the case for the discussion of the role that the body might play in Kant’s conception of synthesis and the application of concepts (pp. 68–71) and the discussion of the productive imagination (all of section 3.5). The former discussion seems a bit out of place because it is more about an interpretation of Kant rather than Merleau-Ponty, while the latter section is important for Mooney’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty but takes on a higher level of technical discussion than much of the rest of the text.

The discussion in the last section of Chapter 3 of the relation between Kant’s conception of the productive imagination and Merleau-Ponty’s thought is probably the starkest example of a point where the book’s two stated aims – to provide an advanced introduction and to provide an original interpretation – come into conflict. On the one hand, this section is clearly quite important for Mooney’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty. And in that regard we feel a bit bad for being critical of it. The points Mooney makes are quite interesting and should make an important contribution to the growing body of scholarship that draws positive links between Kant’s thought and Merleau-Ponty’s. To that end, though, these ideas likely should be developed further in another publication that can be dedicated to a full discussion of the issue. In the context of this book the discussion might be too technical for those readers looking for an introduction to Phenomenology of Perception but not quite developed enough (though quite suggestive and interesting) for those doing deeper research on the Kantian aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s work.

Mooney ends his book with an appeal for the future of phenomenological study. The reader is offered a sentimental conclusion that is not just moving, but in fact necessary. Phenomenology produces alongside its complex theories a sense of emotion that is brilliant, arresting – and ultimately cause to be humbled by the legitimacy of its inquiry. Mooney’s recognition of this idea is one of many implemented tools that make his book such an invigorating, layered – and accessible – read.