Alice D. Ba begins her interpretation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and regionalism in that geographic area by emphasizing the paradox in how the association is viewed. From the perspective of most conventional theories, ASEAN would appear to be a fairly inconsequential “talk shop”: Its actual institutions were rather slow to develop and remain limited; there is substantial diversity among the nations and cultures of Southeast Asia; the ASEAN nations are lesser powers who should be disadvantaged in an increasingly globalized world; and the applicability of international relations realist theory, with its focus on the national pursuit of material interest and on power balancing in international relations, appears to be decidedly circumscribed. To the contrary, Southeast Asia has improved markedly, if not dramatically, over the four decades since ASEAN's founding in 1967, strongly implying successful regional development. Conflict among the original members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) has declined considerably. In the mid-to-late 1990s, four countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) were added to ASEAN without major problems (Brunei joined in the 1980s), and many of these countries have had significant periods of economic dynamism. Over the last two decades, ASEAN has played a key role in broader attempts to promote Asian regionalism.

Ba resolves this paradox convincingly by applying constructivist theory to explain ASEAN's evolution and major accomplishment of becoming “a group of diverse states that has managed to create a stable and prosperous region that is the envy of many in the developing world” (p. 223). While material challenges and changes (e.g., conflicts among Southeast Asian countries and the Vietnam War in the late 1960s or the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98) have generally provided the trigger for ASEAN attempts at regionalism, the response of the Southeast Asian nations has rarely followed the postulates of realist or institutionalist theory. Rather, Ba argues, the evolution of ASEAN is much more congruent with the constructivist logic that ideas set off discourses and dialogues, which, in turn, lead to the social construction of new relationships and identities.

Thus, ASEAN's founding ideas reflected the insecurities of its original members stemming from their colonial heritage and divisions among them. Their basic values focused on nationalism, nation building, self-determination, and national resilience. These values produced a paradoxical view of regionalism as a potential supporter, not negater, of nationalism. On the one hand, the founders came to believe that regional unity could be used to overcome their individual vulnerabilities. On the other, they also realized that too much unity would destroy national diversity and self-determination. This produced a regionalism that was centered on a process of ongoing dialogue that was inclusive, consensual, and noncontroversial but cumulative over time, with an emphasis on informal institutions and rituals for social reinforcement. The central concern of ASEAN, then, is building and maintaining relationships, resulting in many declarations of regional solidarity but few treaties. To some scholarly traditions, this would just be a “talk shop,” but the undeniable progress that the Southeast Asian nations have made over the last 40 years supports Ba's conclusion that the exchange of ideas can transform the relations among nations.

The development of ASEAN has gone through two overlapping stages: 1) the gradually expanding organization of and relations among the Southeast Asian nations themselves, and 2) ASEAN participation in broader regional organizations in the Asia Pacific and East Asia. ASEAN was founded in 1967 as the successor to two narrower regional organizations in response to the founders' fears about their fragmentation and weakness and their hopes that regional unity could help them, as lesser powers, regain their futures. Because of this paradoxical linking of regionalism to nationalism, its formal organizational development was gradual and slow. For example, security issues were generally ignored as too controversial, and trade liberalization was fairly limited (in part because of the competitive nature of these economies). Rather, Ba contends, ASEAN is better conceptualized as going through an ongoing negotiation and renegotiation about its founding ideas for its first 25 years.

Then, more drastic change occurred in the 1990s in response to international challenges. In 1992, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was created in the hope of restoring economic dynamism after a sharp recession. An important feature of AFTA is that it was based on a more flexible idea of consensus in that ASEAN members had the choice of participating or not participating in specific agreements. Even more dramatically, ASEAN added Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia as members between 1995 and 1999. Integrating these countries into the organization certainly raised considerable challenges, which the members were willing to face in order to live up to ASEAN ideas and ideals, such as “One Southeast Asia” as a culmination of regional struggle against larger powers (e.g., Western pressure against admitting Myanmar).

The greatly different international environment of the post–Cold War era brought growing security concerns and pressures for wider regionalism in the Pacific area. This should have been quite threatening to the lesser powers in ASEAN. Yet, in direct contrast to what realist theory would predict, ASEAN actually has played a leading role in the broader regional initiatives in Asia over the last two decades. This is especially striking in the security realm. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the security debate within ASEAN became much more intense over how to deal with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from military bases in the Philippines. This dialogue over security issues, which were previously considered too controversial for specific agreements, ultimately resulted in the 1993 decision to launch the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), comprised of a large number of other countries including all the major powers (the United States, China, Japan, the European Union, and India). Despite such Great Power participation, ARF is an ASEAN institution that follows ASEAN norms of inclusive and consensual dialogue.

In the economic realm, there were two different approaches to broader regionalism. One focused on the entire Asia Pacific region in APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation); and the other involved several proposals for East Asian cooperation. Even within APEC, ASEAN exercised a surprising amount of influence, retaining its institutional identity and keeping the organization fairly informal, consistent with ASEAN norms and practices, despite Western pressure for more formal organization and agreements. The growing East–West tensions following the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 undercut APEC and led to the creation of ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea), or APT, with ASEAN again forming the core of this organization.

[Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia provides an innovative interpretation of ASEAN that provides a convincing explanation for the paradox of the greatly contrasting evaluations of its operations and efficacy. Indeed, Ba demonstrates that regional progress in Southeast Asia occurred because of, not in spite of, the “talk shop” characteristics of ASEAN. In so doing, she also shows the value of constructivist theory since no other approach can really encompass ASEAN reality. The book and its argument could have been strengthened, though, if she had given a more extensive treatment to what happened after Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam joined ASEAN and how well the APT has functioned. She does note that both of these issues have presented significant challenges to ASEAN. Thus, they would seemingly constitute a critical test of the “ASEAN way.” One hopes that Ba will explore these issues in future work. At the same time, this book is a significant accomplishment that speaks to many important concerns regarding Asian regionalism and international politics.