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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2004
From the title one might expect a sequel of sorts to the author's highly regarded On Nationality (1995). The volume is both less and more than that, although mostly more. David Miller has long been critical of the Anglo-American liberal approach to political theory and has advanced his criticism along a number of fronts. To oversimplify, Miller is not a liberal, he is a civic republican; he is not a universalist liberal, he is a nationalist; he is not a liberal democratic, he is a deliberative democrat; he is not an economic liberal, he is a social democrat.
Some North American critics of liberalism eventually become concerned to show that, really, they are liberals, too, and they are only concerned to debunk certain metaphysical or rhetorical moves made by certain liberal theorists. Miller does not go in for that sort of backsliding. (The now common references to the theory of On Nationality as a species of the genus “liberal nationalism” therefore does him something of an injustice.) He advances serious, careful, civil criticisms of what he takes to be the standard liberal approaches to fundamental questions of political order. He does not blur the distinctions between liberalism and his own views. Liberalism seems to him too individualistic and too universalistic, insufficiently attuned to the collective political, economic, and social projects that take place and ought to take place at the level of the nation-state. In this book he draws those themes together. This makes for a work that, instead of developing much farther the nationalist argument in On Nationality, shows the links between that work and the theories Miller has elsewhere (e.g. Market, State, and Community, 1989; Principles of Social Justice, 2000) developed regarding social justice and citizenship.
Eight of the ten chapters have been previously and separately published, but they hang together quite well. The oldest, written nine years ago, is a piece on deliberative democracy and social choice theory that does feel somewhat dated. It advances what has become the standard view: Deliberation about the common good diminishes the force of social choice theory concerns regarding the coherence of democratic outcomes. But it sets the stage for subsequent chapters in which Miller argues for the close tie between an ideal of deliberative democracy and his understandings of republicanism and nationalism. The balance of the book is largely concerned with demonstrating the value of citizenship in a democratic-republican nation-state and defending it against both more local and more global claims.
Miller argues that “nationality answers one of the most pressing needs of the modern world, namely, how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states that are large and anonymous, such that their citizens cannot possibly enjoy the kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face interaction” (pp. 31–2). His is a nationalism stripped of much of the pretense that national sentiment is somehow an extension of the desire for a homogeneous, local, immediate community. Indeed, Miller is acutely concerned to defend the extended community of the nation-state against the claims of ethnic and cultural communities that might more closely approximate a face-to-face ideal. Roughly half the book consists of arguments against various forms of multiculturalism, the politics of difference, and pluralism that might shift citizens' primary loyalties downward from the nation-state.
Miller suggests that liberal and libertarian understandings of citizenship and pluralism are too fragmentary, and a robust republican conception of citizenship is necessary to overcome the centrifugal forces of modern pluralism. He thinks there are genuine national identities attached to the British, Spanish, and Canadian states, and not only to the Scottish, Catalan, and Quebecois subunits; and where nationality takes this nested form, secession by the national minority is not only imprudent but also unfair and actually contrary to the principle of national self-determination. (The British nation has to have a voice; the decision cannot be made by the Scottish nation alone.) He defends the shared project of deliberative democracy against those who say that it disadvantages minorities.
Some parts of this argument are more persuasive than others. In the chapter on liberal, libertarian, and republican responses to pluralism, Miller makes the familiar point that Rawlsian liberal citizenship is supposed to be justified in terms of respect for pluralism, but it excludes those whose religious or other primary identities are incompatible with the liberal polity. He argues that republicanism is more inclusive because it “places no limits on what sort of demand may be put forward in the political forum,” and the success of any particular claim depends only on “how far it can be expressed in terms that are close to, or distant from, the general political ethos of the community” (p. 57). But the apparently greater inclusiveness at the level of political argument is bought at the very high price of a shared commitment to a unified political project, regardless of its outcomes. The (in Rawls's terms) unreasonable believers may be brought into common political life, but they must agree to make the common political project more important than their private religious lives. Miller thinks liberal and republican citizenship will converge in practice, for instance, because the republican polity will adopt the usual liberal rights. But it is by no means clear that the subordination in principle of private rights to public outcomes ought to be more preferable to religious or other minorities than the exclusions in principle of liberal public reason.
In addition to arguing against giving priority to subnational groups and identities, Miller engages with partisans of supranational politics. Pieties about cosmopolitan citizenship may jeopardize the reality and real importance of “bounded” citizenship within a finite state; we should not interpret the demands of global justice so broadly as to forget that social justice is primarily an attribute of political communities with shared histories and social understandings. “Global justice” sometimes seems to be one of those topics that attracts writers only after they have a fairly expansive understanding of it. Miller's intervention in this literature is welcome, and I hope he will develop his arguments on this front further.
In so few pages Miller cannot and does not try to restate the separate positive cases for his theories of nationality, social justice, and republicanism. Instead, the book makes the case that those theories mesh, and the combined whole is able to respond to a variety of criticisms. The reader looking for refinements to Miller's previously stated views may be frustrated; other than the (quite important) chapters on secession and nested nationalities, there is little that decisively adds to On Nationality or Principles of Social Justice. To those unfamiliar with Miller's earlier works, this volume may seem like a collection of skeptical review essays on multiculturalism, social choice theory, global justice, communitarianism, and so on, with not much argument for Miller's own preferred alternatives. Moreover, the author's ethical position in general is founded on a Humean deference to received sentiment that, even when fully developed and laid out, can be difficult to engage with. Critical argumentative steps are filled by the appeal to sentiment. Liberal citizenship provides insufficient unity for the pursuit of social justice in the nation-state. Multiculturalism undermines that pursuit; appeals to cosmopolitanism weaken it; and so forth. But the defenses of both nationality and social democracy depends on the existence of sentiments in their favor. Those whose sentiments, or principles, do not incline them toward the social democratic nation-state will sometimes find no point of intellectual entry.
All of that said, this is a valuable addition to Miller's valuable corpus. His complex but generally unified theory of politics has genuine differences with most others on the academic scene. In Citizenship and National Identity Miller makes the case for the theory's unity and politely but vigorously engages with its rivals. Both aspects of the collection help clarify the shape and scope of his intellectual project.
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