This is not a scholarly book. Nor does it appear so intended, e.g., there are only six footnotes for 185 pages of text. While I will not hold it to scholarly standards, it is unclear to what standards a nonscholarly book should be held in a scholarly academic review. This should be kept in mind regarding what follows.
The book consists of nine short biographies, in order: Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804), Tench Coxe (1755–1824), William Duer (1743–1799), Albert Gallatin (1761–1849), Thomas Willing (1731–1821), Robert Morris (1735–1806), Stephen Girard (1750–1831), Andrew Jackson (1767–1845), and Nicholas Biddle (1786–1844). The basic facts of each man's life are taken from a few secondary sources. The stories selected make for a crisp and enjoyable read. But these bios are not what the book is really about. They serve primarily as a backdrop for preaching a message. Even the book's title is misleading as the book is not about the financial founder fathers as much as about perpetuating and enlarging the Hamiltonian myth. Namely, Hamilton as the first Secretary of the Treasury created modern national public financial institutions—the U.S. financial revolution—including a market in funded national debt and a national central bank. These institutions caused U.S. economic growth. Other people (the other bios) either aided Hamilton's creations or put obstacles in the way that were overcome. The success of these institutions fostered the rise of private and state sector financial markets to the point where they could survive on their own when Jackson “killed” Hamilton's creations in 1832.
After Hamilton, the bios selected have less to do with contributions to the founding of financial institutions than as mirrors to reflect on Hamilton and the creations attributed to Hamilton. The book is narrowly about national public financial institutions. Other financial institutions and their founders, e.g., insurance markets, state banks, state public finance, foreign currency markets, securities exchanges, futures markets, the U.S. Constitution, and so on, are for the most part absent. With regard to just national public financial institutions at the birth of the republic, Hamilton, Robert Morris, and perhaps Willing are obvious bio candidates, though Robert Morris is sold short here. James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, the two people most responsible for shaping the financial clauses in the U.S. Constitution, do not appear, nor do Benjamin Franklin, Joseph Nourse (Registrar of the Treasury from 1781 to 1829), and important Congressmen who shaped and passed the relevant financial legislation. By comparison, it is hard to justify Coxe, Duer, Girard, Jackson, and perhaps Biddle as financial founding fathers. That said—the bios offered are used to present an understandable story of the Hamiltonian creation myth, which is coherent in its structure and forceful in its vision.
The presentation style is highly partisan—imbued with personal ideology and idolatry. There are gods and devils, saints and sinners, heroes and villains, good and evil, us and them. Rather than using substantive demonstrations of fact and sound argumentations, the prose is laced with pejorative and superlative adjectives to describe the motives and actions of people. And hardly a page goes by without some exaggerated, questionable, or downright erroneous assertion of fact, inference of motive, or deductive judgment. For example, we are told that life insurance caused the modern demographic transition to smaller families (p. 135) and that the American victories at Trenton and Princeton were due to soldiers having “coins clicking in their purses” (p. 121). Finally, simplistic metaphors are often relied on, almost on the level of a children's fairytale, as a substitute for analysis. We are constantly told about geese and golden eggs, tortoises and hares, and so on. But the most constant metaphor is religious. Hamilton is the god-like creator surrounded by angels, sinners, saints, etc. There is even a Judas (Coxe). The explicit use of religious metaphors by the authors is perhaps fitting as the book has a strong cast of religious zealotry in presentations and interpretation. The authors come across more as ideologues and Hamiltonian acolytes than as scholars. To what extent they intended to so appear is unclear.
The economic and financial market analysis is more often sound than erroneous. The sound portions, however, are simplistic and naïve. There is also a lot of “retro” history—the reading of modern economic and financial understandings into the actions and motives of historic actors. For example, we are told that the First and Second Bank of the United States (1791–1811 and 1816–1836, respectively) operated throughout as an effective central bank, pumping in liquidity when needed to avert crises, keeping inflation in check by controlling state banks, causing recessions when it screwed up, and so on, much as what Greenspan and the modern Fed could do. Yet, at the very end (p. 184) we are also told that the United States was on a specie standard in this period, which obviated discretionary monetary policy. The authors also seem a bit naïve on issues where insider-trading, rational maximization, and opportunity cost are concerned.
Other than as a bedtime fairytale for bankers to read their children at night, it is unclear to what audience this book can be recommended. I would not recommend its use in undergraduate courses—it is too shallow and partisan. But what about casual reading for high school students or for Aunt Sally the lawyer and Uncle Dirk the plumber? I have mixed feelings here. On one hand I want them to read about early American history, about the important financial developments that occurred, and about the personalities involved. But much of the core of this story can be found elsewhere in more tempered forms, such as in freshman college history texts.
