Robert MacDougall makes an important contribution to the historiography of telephony and populism in his history of the American and Canadian telephone systems in the Gilded Age. During this era, the United States telephone market went through a period of patent monopoly, which was followed by competition between AT&T and its rivals, known collectively as the Independents. This was supplanted by federal government control, and finally an era of state regulated monopoly. During each phase, there was tremendous variation across geographic regions in telephone use, marketing, build-out, technological innovation, and market structure. The Canadian telephony experience was less volatile.
MacDougell provides a rich, readable description of how market structure influenced the performance and conduct of the industry, and the economic and political factors that created variations in structure across the two countries. He argues that the variation in market structure, and performance, can be explained, in large part, by political decisions.
While many authors have focused on the difference in developments across the United States, no other writer has so successfully incorporated a comparison between Canada and the United States. The cross-national comparison is illuminating. Canada and the United States provide a natural experiment for telephony developments because Alexander Graham Bell's patents were not sustained in Canada. Hence, unlike in the United States, the patent laws were not effectively used to block entry. Nevertheless, across the time period addressed in the book, the degree of rivalry was higher in the United States. MacDougall writes that this paradox is explained in large part by Bell Canada's federal charter granting it the authority to install poles in cities without needing to seek approval from local authorities. The Bell Canada charter provided the firm with bargaining power, which it used to obtain exclusive city franchises in exchange for its willingness to make financial commitments to a city or town. MacDougall makes a compelling case for the proposition that it is these types of political decisions, such as a municipality issuing an exclusive franchise in exchange for Bell Canada's commitment to increase its investment in the city, rather than the underlying economics of the telephone network, that best explains why the market in the United States returned to a monopoly structure, despite the initial success of AT&T's competitors.
The US/Canada comparison illuminates how monopolies operate. Once faced with competition in the United States, AT&T realized how its failure to promote use of the telephone for social purposes, as well as by lower- and middle-income households, immigrants, and rural citizens, reduced its profits. There was a latent demand for telephone service that it had not exploited when it was the sole supplier of service. AT&T's competitors in the United States showed that by developing rural service, an externality was created that increased consumers’ willingness to pay in urban markets. Surprisingly, Bell Canada, which faced little competition, did not adjust its operations in response to this information, but chose instead largely to serve well-to-do, English speaking, urban subscribers. Bell Canada had to be aware of the opportunity to increase its profits through an expansion of its market because its primary stockholder was AT&T. That it chose not to serve neglected, profitable markets illustrates the point of Sir John Hicks (“Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly.” Econometrica 3 [1935]: 8) that “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”
MacDougall makes a compelling case that both AT&T and the Independents failed to optimize their operations in other areas. During the period of rivalry, there were significant technological developments initiated by both AT&T and the Independents. According to MacDougall, some of these advancements were not adopted because each camp's political philosophy interfered with a rational appraisal of the technology.
Despite the intensive and extensive development of the market that resulted from rivalry, competition diminished after 1907. MacDougall contends that the business community's dissatisfaction with competition played a crucial role in the demise of competition. Business customers were not pleased with having to rent two telephones, one from AT&T and a second from the competing, independent operator. Two telephones were needed because the networks did not interconnect and businesses needed to be able to connect with all potential customers. MacDougall notes that reports issued around 1906 and 1907 by business leaders in New York City and Boston characterized competition as an inferior option to a regulated monopoly. These reports represent, according to MacDougall, a clear barometer of the declining support for AT&T's competitors. While it is true that influential business groups in these two cities did not support the construction of competing networks in 1907, they hardly represented the majority view of the population. During this same time period, public referendums were held in Denver, Omaha, Portland (Oregon), and San Francisco that resulted in an overwhelming majority of people voting to grant the Independents franchises. The granting of a franchise was dependent on the outcome of these referendums. If we are to accept MacDougall's proposition that market outcomes were largely determined by political processes, we need to need to know more about why, despite the continued strong public support for the Independents in 1907, their market power quickly dissipated.
MacDougall shows that the market structure of an industry is not technologically determined. Economies of scale are important, but not determinative for communications technologies. Firms may survive by being at the forefront of developing new markets, technologies, and pricing structures and levels, as well as by having key political connections. This lesson is important to keep in mind as we observe consolidation today in electronic communications markets.
