Mark Fabian's A Theory of Subjective Wellbeing (OUP, 2022) begins by acknowledging the significant contributions of subjective well-being scholarship over the past four decades; among them are its empirical orientation and the distinction between evaluative and experienced well-being. However, Fabian identifies several shortcomings in the field. Most notably, he argues persuasively that there has been a lack of serious attempts to develop a robust theory of subjective well-being grounded in both philosophy and positive psychology. Fabian highlights methodological flaws, particularly in the conceptualization and measurement of subjective well-being, which are hindered by issues like adaptation and scale norming. Finally, Fabian critiques the normative foundations of well-being policies, which often adopt a social planner perspective. Such policies frequently fail to engage with people's own understandings of well-being or their preferences for such policies, leaving them open to critiques of expertocracy and paternalism.
Fabian contends that existing accounts of subjective well-being must move beyond their narrow operationalist epistemology and adopt a more realist and philosophically defensible framework. To distinguish his account from more conventional approaches, Fabian introduces the term SWB as opposed to SW-B. SW-B refers to the literatures in hedonic psychology and happiness economics that measure happiness mainly via affect and life satisfaction. In contrast, SWB is broader than SW-B: SWB aims to be an explanatory theory of people's lived experience of their own wellbeing. Fabian's theory of SWB integrates existing accounts of well-being while drawing on several rich philosophical traditions, particularly existentialism. It aligns with nature-fulfilment accounts, eudaimonic psychology and Valerie Tiberius’ value-fulfilment theory. While this mix of approaches might seem eclectic, I believe the juxtaposition is one of the real strengths of the book. Fabian's theory centres on ‘wellbeing as wholeness’, that is, on life coming together in a coherent and integrated way. For such a theory, it seems plausible that elements from various accounts are necessary; the rigid, categorical theories often favoured in philosophy may offer limited explanatory value when it comes to understanding wellbeing in a more comprehensive and nuanced way.
In Fabian's theory, the outcome of SWB is captured by the Subjective Wellbeing Production function (SWBPF), while the process of achieving SWB is articulated through the concept of the coalescence of being. The SWBPF consists of three dimensions: hedonia (pleasant life), eudaimonia (a fulfilling life) and conscience (a valuable life). Hedonia is conceptualized as a function of positive affect, negative affect and hedonic life satisfaction. Eudaimonia is defined as a state in which an individual's basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness are satisfied. Conscience pertains to meaning and purpose, identity and the sense of oneself as a virtuous person. At the heart of the idea of the coalescence of being is the idea of self-actualization in which individuals aim to harmonize the relationship of their various selves, namely their actual self (current values and behaviours), ideal self (aspirational values and behaviours) and ought self (ethical values and behaviours). Coalescence is the process of aligning these different facets of identity by calibrating the elements of the SWBPF to fit one's unique circumstances.
I found Fabian's discussion of existentialist philosophy particularly intriguing. Fabian highlights a critical challenge many individuals face in achieving SWB: despair. Despair manifests as the feeling that the universe is devoid of intrinsic value (nausea), lacks a moral order (seriousness) and that we are perpetually in a state of becoming, leaving us disconnected from a fixed sense of self (anguish). Fabian's exploration of conscience through the lens of existentialist thought adds a vital and original dimension to the study of SWB. It creates a level of philosophical depth that has been largely absent in the more empirically oriented SW-B literature.
While Fabian's juxtaposition of existentialism with wellbeing research is highly insightful and original, I have two minor quibbles with this part of the book. First, existentialism is a psychologically demanding philosophy, as it requires individuals to embrace their radical freedom and take responsibility for creating meaning in their lives. It remains an open question whether people generally view this as a suitable response to the growing sense of despair within contemporary society. Recent trends suggest that religion and collectivism in the form of doubling down on in-group affiliations have experienced something of a resurgence, offering alternative pathways to address the meaning vacuum many people sense today. These alternatives may provide simpler and more accessible solutions compared to the philosophical demands of existentialist thought.
My second quibble concerns Fabian's discussion of seriousness. Drawing on Kierkegaard, Fabian suggests that seriousness can be seen as a productive factor for SWB because it motivates individuals to uphold crucial values and prevents them from falling into nihilism. However, it is worth noting that existentialists after Kierkegaard, notably Sartre and de Beauvoir, viewed seriousness not as a virtue but as an impediment to an authentic life. For instance, one of the main goals of Sartre's Being and Nothingness is to critique the ‘spirit of seriousness’ inherent in traditional philosophy and bourgeois culture. In all fairness, Fabian does not aim to provide an exegesis of existentialist philosophy but rather seeks to apply its insights productively to SWB research. His observation that people often feel distressed by ambiguity and respond by doubling down on existing values, particularly group norms, is astute and seems highly relevant to the study of SWB.
The discussion of existentialism brings me to a broader point: the potential tension between the perspective of becoming and the perspective of integrity in SWB. Embracing the becoming view of SWB entails the acknowledgement that one's beliefs and values are open to question and, therefore, never entirely secure. Yet, at the same time, stressing the perspective of integrity one might also recognize people's need to uphold certain internally coherent beliefs and values. My sense from reading the book is that Fabian emphasizes the importance of integrity, particularly in his discussions of the development of a latent self with goals that are harmonious, intrinsically motivating and satisfy one's basic psychological needs. However, both existentialist philosophy and the pursuit of self-congruent goals require a degree of openness to playful experimentation and the potential to hold conflicting views at times. The book acknowledges the dual dimensions of well-being, integrity and becoming, but I found myself wondering if more could be said about how individuals might navigate this process.
The book concludes with a thought-provoking chapter on the politics of well-being. While Fabian acknowledges strong reasons to believe that SWB is beneficial for individuals, he argues that governments should generally avoid directly promoting SWB. The argument of this chapter may initially surprise readers who have immersed themselves in the earlier chapters, which carefully develop a unique account of SWB. However, the transition feels more natural when considered alongside the preceding chapter on measurement issues. Fabian's critique of the use of SWB-based cost-benefit analysis is a forceful warning that it could lead to perverse distributional outcomes, shift state behaviour towards neuro-governance and open the door to technocratic rule. Instead, government efforts should focus on the objective conditions of life by expanding individuals’ range of life options and, in doing so, empower individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good life. Such a welfare-focused approach would direct resources to those with the fewest opportunities rather than those who merely report the lowest levels of SWB.
Importantly, even within this welfare-as-opportunities approach, Fabian highlights a potential, indirect role for governments to promote SWB by fostering practical wisdom (‘means to reason’) of citizens through education. Several skills are not only helpful but arguably essential for living and being well when faced with a range of opportunities. These include mood management, mindfulness, willpower and the ability to reason critically about one's actual, ideal and ought selves. Training programmes could be integrated into existing educational curricula, equipping students not only for work but also for different meanings attached to alternative life paths. Fabian acknowledges, however, that the government's role in providing programmes that foster such skills depends on assessing whether market failure or cognitive biases exist that prevent individuals from accessing them independently.
Personally, I would have loved for Fabian to delve deeper into the potential of public programmes that foster skills of living and being well. Governments are already deeply involved in education through kindergartens, schools and universities. At every level, curricular reforms informed by SWB research could bring about meaningful change and lasting impact. Both casual observation and empirical data on rising levels of depression and anxiety suggest that critical thinking skills and effective goal-setting abilities are significantly underprovided. Many individuals in midlife, for instance, feel dissatisfied with their personal and professional choices. A key reason for this dissatisfaction might be that they are not trained to listen to affective feedback but often simply follow societal norms at crucial life junctures, be it in decisions about marriage, children or career paths. Although difficult to quantify, the personal and societal costs of poor goal-setting and decision-making are likely substantial, perhaps even contributing to the sense of meaninglessness that drives many to reject the principles of liberal, open societies. In this context, more active curricular reforms informed by SWB research could serve as a valuable remedy, helping individuals lead more fulfilling lives while strengthening the fabric of society.
Overall, Fabian offers a timely and ambitious book that makes a substantial contribution to the well-being and happiness literature. It is timely in its effort to take stock of the field, disentangle key debates and propose a path forward. It is ambitious in its scope, skilfully combining deep philosophical and theoretical insights with discussions of empirical social science research and practical policy implications. This bold and programmatic approach is a strength, as books – unlike journal articles – have the space to explore creative and forward-looking ideas in ways that foster new perspectives. The book's target audience includes academics, policy analysts and advanced students, making it a valuable resource across disciplines. I plan to assign it in my Ethics and Economics class when we explore SWB as an alternative benchmark for policy assessment. I will also recommend it to friends as a highly sophisticated self-help guide, advocating for the importance of both critical thinking and affective feedback for living a better life.
