I appreciate the critical engagement by Bruce Cronin. My response focuses on the questions he has raised.

On his observation that not all adversaries since 1945 have engaged in the types of tactics I point out in my book and his question of whether this, therefore, can be considered as endemic to all asymmetric conflicts or just to specific adversaries: I think his observation that all conflicts involving the United States since the end of World War II have been asymmetric in one form of another is correct. My point, however, is that the U.S. norms of casualty aversion and civilian protection only started emerging in their current form in the post-Vietnam era, from the 1980s onwards. This helps explain why U.S. adversaries prior to that era have placed less emphasis on exploiting these norms than they do today. Having said this, exceptions still exist even today. Take, for instance, the strategy chosen by Saddam Hussein during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This might indicate that such asymmetric behavior is about specific adversaries. But the overall evidence shows that most U.S. adversaries since the 1980s have opted to choose such strategies, which is an indication that they see the U.S. norms of casualty aversion and civilian protection as offering them areas of U.S. vulnerabilities they seek to exploit (albeit to different degrees and to different ends).

Cronin is also right in pointing out that the United States itself has exploited this type of enemy behavior by engaging in more ambitious targeting practices and engagements, which by definition will increase civilian risks, in order to then put the blame for collateral damage on the behavior of their asymmetric adversaries. In fact, Cronin’s book offers a very strong analysis of how U.S. rhetoric in these cases has shifted over time.

In terms of my analysis of both the laws of war and the moral principle of “due care,” I slightly disagree with the point he raises. International humanitarian law—as my book shows in great detail—remains extremely vague. In fact, it fails to specify anywhere that soldiers need to accept higher levels of risks to themselves if this leads to a reduction of risks to enemy civilians. Yes, IHL points to “feasible precaution”; for instance, it explicitly requires soldiers to gather sufficient intelligence about a target before launching an attack. But nowhere does it state that this also requires higher levels of risk taking for the soldiers themselves, which is the key issue with a casualty-averse military like that of the United States. So, I maintain that this is indeed an issue not just of U.S. practice but also of the lack of provisions set by IHL.

Finally, on Cronin’s question concerning risk transfer and civilian protection as not being new phenomena: My point is that civilian protection itself only became a real legal requirement with the Geneva Conventions in 1949 and—in the case of the U.S. military—only started to really affect the latter’s strategy and tactics in the post-Vietnam era. As a result, the issue of civilian protection (while having been a key moral concern in the Just War tradition for a long time) only really became one for U.S. forces since the 1980s.