Written from an evangelical perspective, this book re-examines the Christian tradition of ‘Just War’ reflection with two objectives in mind. One aim is to reintroduce Just War thinking to American evangelicalism, which the author charges is largely disengaged from serious political theology (a result, he says, of the eschatological escapism that characterises evangelicalism). Charles commends Just War thinking to evangelicals as part of an ‘incarnational humanism’ (John Courtney Murray), a Christian theology that moves beyond simply saving souls to participate in the transformation of culture.
The book's second aim is to correct what Charles sees as a misunderstanding of the underpinnings of Just War theory. Charles rejects the interpretation that Just War theory depends upon a prior presumption against violence and killing: ‘A presumption against war is not part of the classic Just War tradition’ (p. 159). Instead its principled foundation is the state's responsibility to ensure justice, and to illustrate he surveys the history of Christian reflection on war, noting (against stereotype) that even the early church was not predominantly pacifist and that Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and the Reformers all acknowledged the magistrate's obligation to preserve justice as the starting point for justifying violence in the name of the state. Having established the importance of justice to classical Just War theorists, Charles brings his analysis to the modern day with an examination of figures like Reinhold Niebuhr and Jean Elshtain and with an application to the particular problems raised by the war on terrorism.
At first glance, this book offers a nice (though quick) introduction to Christian Just War theory. Charles serves us well with his reminder of the importance of justice as a foundational principle for this tradition, as he does by his inclusion of thinkers who often get overlooked in this history – Vitoria, Suarez, and Grotius. Likewise, his review of contemporary thinkers is unusually broad, and his specific message to evangelicals to re-engage deep reflection in political theology stands as the book's greatest strength.
One problem with the book, however, is the author's erroneous claim that a presumption against violence plays no role in classic Just War theory. With due respect to the value of reasserting justice as a foundational principle for Just War theory, it is clear from a deep reading of the tradition that a presumption against killing is also a logical premise. In fact, the moral considerations of Just War theory are necessary because Christian theology begins with the presumption that killing is normally unjustified, a presumption most explicitly displayed in the principle of last resort. Charles resists acknowledging this presumption against killing, both because he thinks it displaces justice as a foundational principle and because he assumes such a presumption would imply that state force is inherently wrong, a stronger moral judgement than the presumption against violence actually requires. Historically and logically, it is more accurate to observe that both the presumption against force and a principle of justice serve to ground Christian Just War theory, as prima facie norms that in certain circumstances conflict with one another. The Just War tradition developed from the conflict between these two principles, and in cases where the pursuit of justice permits the suspension of the principle against violence, Just War criteria maintain the ‘moral traces’ (Nozick) of the pacifist principle as a guard against insufficiently critical appeals to justice alone. By insisting that only justice, and not a presumption against violence, informs Just War thinking, Charles ignores the balance between the two principles that actually characterises the historical tradition.
Another problem with the book concerns the title, or more accurately the assumptions the title betrays. Why ‘Jihad’? Clearly Jihad is not a Christian term, so use of it cannot mean to reference an extreme in Christian theology against which Just War thinking should be positioned. More likely, the title is meant to encourage the comparison of Christianity itself to Islam, and to imply that the Christian Just War tradition discussed in these pages improves upon militaristic tendencies in Islam. The caricature of Islam as prone to militarism, encouraged by the title but also by the discussion of terrorism in chapter 7, is misleading and dangerous, for it ignores the moral complexity of a religious tradition capable of elevating peace as a moral objective and of articulating limits on armed conflict with sophistication equal to historical Christianity. The juxtaposition of Christian Just War theory with Islamic Jihad also deflects attention from the crusading tendencies in Christianity, a theological possibility that the use of the word ‘crusade’ in the title would have acknowledged.
While I believe these points represent significant shortcomings, nonetheless this book helpfully contributes to study of the Christian Just War tradition and its relevance to contemporary debate, especially for members of an evangelical tradition looking toward deeper engagement with political responsibility.
