Morality Tales is an invigorating attempt to unravel two court registers of 16th century Aintab in relation to contemporary legal and administrative texts (i.e., books of jurisprudence popular at the time, relevant kanunames, tax surveys, etc.), important events of the period, as well as social, political, and religious dynamics of the local society. The result of this exercise is a stimulating account of legal practice that recognizes and brings into discussion many factors (legal and nonlegal) that influenced the court's operations.
The two registers that this book relies upon are the earliest ones available to researchers. They were compiled between 1540 and 1541, soon after Aintab, a significant urban center located approximately fifty miles north of Aleppo in southeast Anatolia, was captured by Ottoman forces. In these sources, Peirce recognizes Ottoman attempts to incorporate Aintab into the Ottoman legal and administrative system. One of the most important and frequently iterated suggestions in the book is that the arrival of a new qadi, Hüsameddin Efendi, in 1541 signaled the intention of Ottoman authorities to better control the financial resources of Aintab as well as keep an eye on the political and religious currents in the region. Peirce also claims that the ability of the “new” court to satisfy local expectations was instrumental in legitimizing Ottoman rule in Aintab. In fact, Peirce interprets the increasing workload of the court after the arrival of Hüsameddin Efendi, as well as the greater number of those cases in sicils that relate to social order and security, as evidence that after 1541 the court began to play a greater role in local society.
Peirce makes important observations with regard to the court's operations. One such observation is that the court was popular in general and attracted individuals from both sexes and all segments of the community. Admittedly, women had certain disadvantages in court. Their testimony was not regarded as valuable as that of men, they were not allowed to introduce female witnesses to corroborate their claims, and, unlike men, they were not allowed to take oaths to prove their allegations. At the same time, all individuals were given opportunities to voice their opinions in court, present their sides of the story, and justify their actions. Thus, the court functioned as more than a legal forum. According to Peirce, many people, including women and the marginalized, approached the court not necessarily to win their legal disputes but primarily to proclaim their honor, demonstrate their morality, or defend their good names (more on this later).
Also interesting in this discussion is the revelation that, particularly in those cases that involved sexual assault or the ones in which one's reputation was questioned, it was common for male and female litigants to adopt different discursive strategies. Peirce calls the angry, aggressive attitude toward one's opponents in court the “male idiom,” whereas the “female idiom” aimed to explain, justify, and, occasionally, demonstrate regret. Although the adoption of either of these discursive strategies was not always a direct result of one's biological sex, their very existence displays the highly gendered nature of the court process.
Morality Tales brings together not only different kinds of historical sources but also attempts to synthesize a variety of different disciplines. Hence, readers from different fields might react to this book differently. For example, there are statements that might make specialists of Islamic law feel uneasy. It is simply not true that in court “the burden of proof lay with the plaintiff” (p. 102), nor would the phrase “hul divorce” receive much favor by legal experts (p. 132). Moreover, at times Peirce seems to use the term shari

a in place of fiqh or jurisprudence (p. 114).
From a historian's perspective, it is surprising that Morality Tales has not created much debate, given its ambitious approach to sources and history writing. In this book, the author attempts to construct a “thick description” that relates the court of Aintab to its people and its cultural, political, and religious world. As exciting as the end result is, Peirce's narrative is susceptible to similar kinds of doubts that Geertz and his followers generated in the past. Indeed, one might justifiably argue that in her boldness to “contextualize” her sources, to selectively “connect” different sicil entries to one another, and to make assumptions and speculations regarding the real intentions of her subjects, Peirce imposes her own thoughts, expectations, and, perhaps, desires upon her sources a bit daringly. For example, a woman's calling a male opponent a “pimp” in the heat of an argument does not necessarily amount to “intentionally casting that person's wife an adulteress” or portraying him as being “complicit in his own wife's sexual immorality” (p. 173). This cannot be considered, if not supported by other sources, as “a calculated move to have herself [the woman who does the cursing] written into the court record, to create a legal space alongside that reserved for the males involved in the case” (p. 173).
Furthermore, any unrestrained interpretive attempt comes with the danger of blindness to what we do not expect to see in our sources. One case in point is Ine's story, in which a young woman accused her father-in-law of raping her. Peirce's objective in presenting this story is to demonstrate that, although the court did not legally recognize the validity of Ine's claim against her father-in-law, it favored her by granting her the chance to be heard by the community and to explain her reasoning for seeking a divorce from her husband. As original as the idea of “separate justices for individuals in conflict” (p. 130 and passim) may sound in evaluating the court's motives, the author's reading of Ine's sicil seems rather charitable to this reviewer. Peirce's own translation of the entry indicates that Ine appeared in court as the plaintiff and her father-in-law as the defendant. Because the latter denied Ine's allegation, according to established procedures, the “burden of proof” was supposed to be placed on Ine's shoulders. Instead, and contrary to “normal” procedures, we notice in the document that Ine was not given a chance to substantiate her allegation by possibly introducing her witnesses. Subsequently, her father-in-law exonerated himself with the help of those who proclaimed his good reputation. Of interest, Peirce does not comment on this procedural irregularity, nor does she indicate whether or not the “principal of separate justices” may have involved the court's willingness to discriminate against a party to this extent, that is, at a level that exceeded even what the law called for. Perhaps, the author would have been less generous toward the court had she noticed this irregularity; or, arguably, it is her discursive construction of the court's benevolent motives that is responsible for this lack of recognition.
Other such examples of “overinterpretation” also exist in the text. Yet, it should be also emphasized that, with Morality Tales, Leslie Peirce has made an important methodological intervention to sicil studies. Although one may take issue with many points in this book, Peirce's work represents a fresh attempt to reconsider the relationship between the text and its context. It is an effort to demonstrate the possibilities and limitations of a microhistorical orientation in Ottoman studies at a level that has not been attempted thus far. It seems certain that Morality Tales will lead us Ottomanists to rethink and question many of the methodological choices that we advertently or inadvertently make in our attempts to decipher our sources.
