Topically, this book offers a conceptual history of atomism from the pre-Socratics to the end of the nineteenth century. The story falls into three roughly equal parts: the first covers ancient Greek and medieval atomic and matter theories; the second deals with the scientific and chemical revolutions; and the third takes the story from Dalton through to the experimental discovery of the electron, via studies of statistical mechanics and Perrin's work on Brownian motion. Analytically, Chalmers puts forward four interwoven, historicist, arguments. The first, and broadest, is essentially negative: although one may perceive certain basic similarities between ancient atomic theories and our current conceptions, there is no productive connection between the two. One can, however – and this is the second argument – trace important and constitutive connections between classical ideas and the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century. Drawing on work by William Newman, Chalmers suggests that Greek atomists were not the only source for early modern thinking about the granular structure of matter. Granular theories were kept alive through the medieval period via engagements with and elaborations of Aristotelian, rather than Democritean, ideas. Chalmers's third argument is almost certainly his most provocative. He claims that it is legitimate to distinguish between the mechanical philosophy and the new experimentalism of the seventeenth century, that the latter owed much less to the former than is commonly assumed, and that only the experimental philosophy proved productive in the long run. In essence, the mechanical philosophy, like earlier matter theories, was concerned with questions of ultimate causes – well beyond the realms of testing and observation – and hence should be regarded as philosophical metaphysics. The new experimentalism, on the other hand – concerned with what Robert Boyle termed ‘intermediate causes’ – produced new and testable questions. Such questions, unlike philosophical claims, could be confirmed by new data, rather than merely accommodated to it. Hence the subtitle of Chalmers's book, which makes both a historical and a philosophical claim: not only did philosophy fail to gain knowledge of atoms, it essentially had to fail, since philosophy, by Chalmers's definition, can never possess the explanatory or predictive power of science. The fourth argument, then, is that the advances in our understanding of the atomic world which ushered in the twentieth century were due not to philosophical claims about the fundamental nature of the world, but (drawing on the work of Ursula Klein) to the more mundane levels of theorizing of those engaged in artisanal, metallurgical and pharmaceutical practice, as well as those engaged in experimentalist pursuits.
As one may note from the description above, the questions that drive The Scientist's Atom are fundamentally teleological, even Whiggish. Indeed, early on Chalmers points out that, were one to write the history of modern conceptions of atomism backward, attempting only to identify the preconditions for later notions, one would not only arrive at a story different from one written forwards from the work of ancient Greek atomists, but at one in which such ancient theories would play very little role. Few historians of science would be surprised by this fact, of course, but I suspect that most would take away a different point than does Chalmers, who sees the result of his thought experiment in writing history backwards as an argument in favour of the narrative offered in his book. His aim is, unabashedly, to identify those concepts that enabled progress towards ideas like our own – rather than to situate or contextualize such ideas more broadly and synchronically. This is a very conscious choice, since Chalmers signals his awareness of the fact that his questions and assumptions are not necessarily those of his actors and that figures involved in the scientific revolution did not regard the new experimentalism as the acme of their intellectual productions:
Seventeenth-century intellects were intent on articulating world-views that would underpin and help comprehend the new social order and also to recast Christian theology in light of the undermining of the Aristotelian philosophy with which it had become entwined. Empirically confirmed knowledge that conformed to my characterization of science … was not up to such tasks (p. 12).
More generally, the book eschews engagements beyond the bounds of an internalist history of ideas, distancing itself ‘from contemporary sociologists of science and social constructivists who see the need to bring wide-ranging social elements involving consent into the evaluation of scientific knowledge …’ (p. 122 n. 25).
This last point tends to weaken even Chalmers's historicist defences against charges of presentism. Well aware that his distinction between philosophy and science was not generally made for much of the period that he examines, Chalmers nonetheless argues that, for Boyle at least, an awareness of this distinction ‘was there in practice … and sometimes made explicit by him’ (p. 99). More specifically, Chalmers argues that Boyle understood there to be important differences between the new experimental science and the mechanical philosophy, despite Boyle's repeated efforts to show that these two aspects of his work form a coherent whole. To make this somewhat counterintuitive argument work, Chalmers claims that one must distinguish between uses of the word ‘mechanical’ in what he terms the ‘strong’ and the ‘common’ sense. While common uses of the term might be used to describe familiar mechanisms and even the action of intermediate causes in Boyle's experimental studies, strict uses can only make reference to the ‘shapes, sizes, arrangements, and motions of particles of impenetrable matter’ (p. 117). Common uses, therefore, which might deploy terms like ‘elasticity’ or ‘weight’, are incompatible with strict uses, which can only be concerned with fundamental rather than intermediate explanations. Chalmers claims that, while Boyle did not himself make the distinction explicit, in practice he did distinguish between common and strict uses of the word ‘mechanical’. In particular, when defending the mechanical philosophy against Aristotelian and scholastic critics, Boyle systematically deployed the strict understanding of the term ‘mechanical’ – and his arguments would have been unintelligible had he not.
Chalmers makes his arguments clearly, powerfully and well. Nonetheless, there does seem to be something fundamental missing in this analysis. For, if one imagines, as Boyle himself appears to have, that the mechanical philosophy encompassed both the ‘strict’ and the ‘common’ understandings of the word ‘mechanical’, it does not seem surprising that Boyle would emphasize certain aspects when arguing with scholastics and others when describing his experimental studies. One need merely acknowledge that different texts serve different ends and are written for different audiences. That is, one need pay attention to the social and rhetorical purpose of texts, not merely their intellectual content, narrowly construed.
The history of atomism is a rather familiar topic and it is to Chalmers's considerable credit that the subject matter comes alive in his hands. Writing with a verve and grace that will be familiar to readers of his now-classic What Is This Thing Called Science?, he is able to parse complex historiographical debates and to pull out fresh new questions of interpretation. More history deployed to answer a philosopher's questions than history itself, The Scientist's Atom will nonetheless inspire debates not only in those fields, but also in related fields within science studies.
