The rise of modern American conservatism from apparent irrelevance in the postwar years to a dominant force in US politics by the 1980s has lately received increasing attention from historians and other scholars. This is a welcome development. For too long, George Nash’s book, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945, was treated as the first and last word on this subject. Nash’s scholarship is important and remains indispensable; yet, his flattering description of conservatism’s history, which exaggerates the importance of William F. Buckley Jr. and the National Review, leaves out much of the story.

John S. Huntington’s book, Far-Right Vanguard, helps fill important gaps in our understanding of conservatism’s history. He joins other contemporary historians such as Nicole Hemmer and Paul Matzko in highlighting the importance of mostly forgotten right-wing activists, broadcasters, and publishers. He also argues that there were often few substantive differences between right-wing radicals and the more mainstream conservative movement.

The birth of modern conservatism in the United States is often traced to the 1950s, the period when Russell Kirk published The Conservative Mind and Buckley launched the National Review. It was during this period that conservative journalists and intellectuals combined the principles of free-market economics, cultural traditionalism, and belligerent anticommunism into a coherent political philosophy—an ideological amalgamation often called “fusionism.” By beginning his story earlier, in the first decades of the twentieth century, Huntington demonstrates that the principles developed and espoused by the conservative movement were less novel than today’s conservatives often acknowledge.

The book’s first substantive chapter, which covers this early period, is its most useful contribution precisely because it canvasses material often ignored in studies of US conservatism. Huntington notes that the political ideals of cultural conservatism and free-market economics were being championed by important political leaders well before the birth of the modern conservative movement as we understand it; Senator James A. Reed (D-MO) was one such example. A difference, however, was that Reed and similar politicians of that era were overt white supremacists, whereas the later conservatives sought to avoid such a label (although it was sometimes warranted) and added many elements to the cultural conservative agenda.

Chapter 2 examines the effect on the Right of World War II, noting that it effectively marginalized explicit fascists in the United States. Figures such as William Pelley (leader of the Silver Shirts) and the openly anti-Semitic Charles Coughlin became irrelevant after Pearl Harbor. Huntington notes that the war changed the US far-right in significant ways. This was a period when a substantial number of right-wing Democrats began seriously considering abandoning their party. They were divided, however, on whether they should align with the Republicans or create a third party. This would be a perpetual question for the far right for the next several decades.

Chapters 3 and 4 cover more familiar ground, examining topics such as the rise of the National Review, Robert Welch and the John Birch Society, and McCarthyism. The National Review, and Buckley more specifically, would eventually become important gatekeepers on the Right, determining which views would be incorporated into mainstream conservatism and which would be relegated to the political fringes. Welch was one of the first victims of such a purge. However, Huntington reminds readers that, at the time, the difference between the more respectable conservatives and the paranoid Birchers was more stylistic than substantive. This is not a novel argument. Buckley’s coauthored book defending McCarthyism is not exactly a secret, nor is his infamous article, “Why the South Must Prevail,” which argued that Southerners were right to restrict the franchise to whites. Huntington is nonetheless correct to remind readers of this history.

These chapters also document how anticommunism became a tool for fighting against civil rights for African Americans. Rather than directly arguing against civil rights activists on the question of racial equality, conservatives often found it easier to simply declare the civil rights movement a communist plot and therefore illegitimate.

In chapter 5, Huntington focuses on Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign. This was a pivotal moment for the Republican Party, when the party’s right-wing finally managed to secure one of their own at the top of the Republican ticket. This was also the period when conservatives, inching closer to real political power, began to take the “respectability” question more seriously. Chapter 6 ends with Nixon’s triumph and the end of serious efforts to create a right-wing third party. For the radicals, Nixon was far from perfect, but by that point they mostly concluded that pushing the Republican Party further to the right was their most likely road to success.

Huntington describes people and events well, and readers will have no trouble following the narrative despite the massive number of characters and organizations he introduces throughout this relatively short work. I noticed no factual errors in his analysis. This book offers a fantastic summary of important figures and organizations. Even the most knowledgeable reader will learn fascinating new details from Huntington’s efforts.

His interpretation of the record can be challenged, however. Far-Right Vanguard argues that the Radical Right was the driving force on the American Right, pulling the mainstream conservative movement and eventually the Republican Party into its ideological orbit. If this is true, why has there been so little crowing from the radicals? If the mainstream conservatives always end up giving in to the ultraconservatives, why do the latter have so much genuine contempt for the former? If they have won so many battles, why do the leading voices on the Radical Right perennially and sincerely view themselves as beleaguered underdogs, defending the last ditch? There are many possible explanations for this, but I would have liked to learn how Huntington explains this phenomenon.

Huntington also seems to take it for granted that readers share his ideological leanings and that it goes without saying that today’s conservative movement and the Republican Party are both totally captured by the Far Right. Many learned observers have also reached this conclusion, but it is not incontrovertible. The claim, for example, that the Tea Party movement “viewed nonwhites and immigrant groups as latent threats” (p. 217) will have many defenders, but it is also a point that, in my view, remains debatable. Such a claim, at the very least, requires citations. It would have been helpful if Huntington had defined his terms more explicitly. He argues that conservatives were often indistinguishable from ultraconservatives and the far right. But there must be some distinction; otherwise, why would he even use these separate terms?

The historical period that concludes Far-Right Vanguard also seems somewhat arbitrary and early. The book would be even more useful if Huntington had extended his narrative forward a few additional years. I would have especially appreciated it if Huntington had applied his talents to examining Paul Weyrich and the rise of the “New Right” in the late 1970s. That era deserves additional scholarly analysis, and I hope it will be the focus of Huntington’s research in the future. In the meantime, readers will find much to learn in the present volume.