A quarter of a century ago, in Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (1994), Larry Wolff brilliantly illuminated how intellectuals in eighteenth-century Western Europe conceived of Russia as both different from and potentially similar to the West, utilizing categories such as civilization and barbarism while repositioning Russia as in the east rather than in the north. In his new book, Wolff, a professor of history at New York University, deploys a similar approach to shine light on the influence of the geographic imagination on President Woodrow Wilson and his advisers during and after the First World War. This approach is particularly appropriate for an era when the president crafted foreign policies in consultation with a few close advisers (there being no large national security bureaucracy) and when their decisions were shaped more by emotions, “irrational fantasy,” stereotypes, and prejudices than by studious examination of facts (9).
Wolff’s beautifully written and engaging book is organized in four long chapters, each of which highlights a particular theme. Chapter I focuses on how a Christian moral vision, influenced by British Prime Minister William Gladstone’s abhorrence of Turkish barbarism in the 1870s, guided Wilson’s approach to the Ottoman Empire and his determination that the Turks should be expelled from Europe. Chapter II examines how Wilson’s evolving ideas about national “emancipation” influenced his gradual embrace of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Chapter III centers on how Wilson’s personal friendships with leading figures, especially the Czech intellectual Tomas Masaryk and Polish pianist Ignacy Paderewski, influenced his attitudes and decisions in relationship to Eastern European countries. Chapter IV concentrates on Wilson’s efforts to protect national minorities, particularly Jews, in Eastern Europe.
Born in Virginia in 1856 and raised in the South during the Civil War and Reconstruction, Wilson had strongly felt racial prejudices that have provoked a recent decision to remove his name from a school of public and international affairs at Princeton University. Wolff tends to underplay the importance of those racial attitudes. With deliberate understatement, he writes that Wilson’s administration “did not advance the cause of racial equality in the United States” (151). According to Wolff, on Wilson’s cross-country speaking tour to promote the League of Nations in September 1919, the president described the partitions of Poland “in the spirit of Uncle Tom’s Cabin” (112). That formulation disregards Wilson’s distance from anti-slavery agitation, his great sympathy for Thomas Dixon’s novel The Clansman (1905), and his enthusiastic approval of D.W. Griffiths’ film The Birth of a Nation (1915). Considering the background of such views, it seems odd to read, in relation to Wilson’s rhetoric about “enslaved peoples” in 1919, that “the struggle against slavery, for Wilson, was an ongoing campaign, reaching back to Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation” (114).
A more significant weakness of the book is its treatment—or lack of treatment—of Russia. Although Wolff recognizes the “undeniable significance” of Russia for defining Eastern Europe, he chose to place it “largely outside the central arena” of his book (6), and he concludes that “Russia was largely excluded from Wilson’s reimagining of Eastern Europe” (238). To the extent that Russia does appear in the book, it is mainly in the form of the menace of Bolshevism sweeping out from Soviet Russia into other Slavic lands or “the danger of a Slavic bloc dominated by Russia” (190). As a result, Wolff neglects how deeply Wilson was committed to a vision of a large, democratic Russia uniting most of the lands controlled by Imperial Russia. On April 2, 1917, when Wilson called upon Congress to declare war against Germany, he hailed the “wonderful” revolution in Russia against the tsarist autocracy and proclaimed that “Russia was … always in fact democratic at heart,” a strained vision that made it possible to summon Americans to a crusade to make the world “safe for democracy.” If Wolff had discussed Wilson’s rapturous enthusiasm about the revolution, it would have enhanced his analysis of the development of Wilson’s broader messianic vision of America’s relationship to Eastern Europe.
After Boris Bakhmeteff, the ambassador for Russia’s new liberal provisional government, arrived in Washington, he affirmed to Wilson and others that Russia and America were now guided by the same democratic principles. Despite the fall of the provisional government in November 1917, Wilson continued to recognize Bakhmeteff as the representative of a democratic Russia he wished to see replace the Bolshevik usurpers, whose power he viewed as temporary. That diplomatic standing allowed Bakhmeteff to lobby the Wilson administration for support of anti-Bolshevik armies and against recognition of the independence of the Baltic states. Recognizing the persistence of Wilson’s faith in a democratic Russia and addressing the influence of Bakhmeteff would have helped Wolff explain Wilson’s unwillingness to recognize the Baltic states, despite the urging from intellectuals in the advisory group known as the Inquiry. Wolff attributes Wilson’s aversion to “a strategy of national destabilization of Russia” to fears that it would benefit Germany (66), but Wilson maintained his position in favor of a large, united Russia long after the end of the war against Germany in November 1918.
There are a few errors in this fine book. Alexander Kerensky was not the head of the provisional government when the United States rushed to recognize it after the fall of the autocracy in March 1917 (6). It is not true that “the only ‘independent’ Armenia was Soviet Armenia” (54): Armenia had a brief period of independence from 1918 to 1920. More importantly, U.S. intervention in the Russian Civil War was not “particularly aimed at extricating the Czechoslovak Legion,” which was strung out along the Trans-Siberian Railway in the spring of 1918 (128). Instead, Wilson arranged with Masaryk for the legion to stay in Siberia to assist in the stabilization of a non-Bolshevik region and the liberation of Russia from Bolshevism. (The legion did not leave until early 1920.) Wolff’s neglect of the legion’s role is surprising because Czech leaders believed that the service the legion rendered in Russia assisted the realization of their desire for recognition of an independent Czechoslovakia.
Finally, although Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe unfortunately does not have a bibliography, it does present some valuable maps, posters, and photographs.
