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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 April 2005
This insightful book asks why capitalists and workers have been reluctant to press for democratization in late-developing countries, given that many of the classic works in political economy characterize one or both of these social forces as having been the champions of democracy in the West. Eva Bellin's answer is that, while both capital and labor had a material interest in challenging dictatorship in early-industrializing countries, in late-developing states often it is decidedly not in these classes' interest to “rock the authoritarian boat.” State policies typically have favored the interests of private entrepreneurial classes, and the private sector tends to depend on state assistance (e.g., market protection and technical help) to survive in a globalizing world. Capitalists do not challenge authoritarian states, therefore, because they are relatively well treated and because falling out of the state's good graces could spell material disaster. They also worry that the existence of radical movements, fueled by the widespread poverty that often characterizes late-developing countries, might mean that democracy would destabilize economies and threaten capitalists' interests. While capital's lot is considerably better than that of organized labor, many states have granted unions important policy concessions in return for their political support. As a result, union members are far better off than workers in the informal and agricultural sectors, and they, too, back the authoritarian state. Both groups are reluctant to see democratization render states obliged to respond to a wider array of societal interests, a development that would undermine their own comparatively privileged access to decision makers.
Bellin's book has two audiences. The author derives her overarching theoretical argument from the Tunisian experience. Her contribution to the field of Middle East studies is her painstakingly researched survey of the relationship between the Tunisian state and its private capital and labor classes, respectively, over time. Since independence, the state has been a sort of midwife to private industrialists. State support for this class took a variety of forms: rhetoric in the early years; joint ventures and infrastructural support during the 1960s; a broad array of more aggressive policy interventions in the liberalizing 1970s; and market-oriented reforms from the mid-1980s onward. The state–labor relationship is more complex. Until 1970, the state sponsored the labor movement but kept it politically subordinate; in the 1970s, a more confident state granted legal and policymaking concessions to labor, which had become increasingly militant; from 1978 to 1987, the state harshly repressed labor; and President Ben Ali has rehabilitated labor in carefully controlled fashion. Bellin arrives at these findings based on appropriate secondary sources and extensive primary sources. The latter include both documentary data and numerous interviews with businesspeople and labor activists. The former are particularly helpful to the author as she attempts to quantify the growth and power of these social classes—a difficult task. The latter are as invaluable for grasping contemporary state–labor and state–business relations as they are difficult to procure, given the oppressive research environment Ben Ali's regime has created.
The second audience for the book comprises those in the field of comparative political science. Here Bellin's text is attractive in two primary respects. The first is her general argument regarding how the political dispositions of social classes are likely to vary, depending on the world-historical context. Notably, while the author developed the argument from the Tunisian case, the book's final chapter extends the analysis to several additional cases. In so doing, it offers additional evidence for the validity of her propositions. Bellin shows that in Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, and Mexico, capitalists were diffident about democracy when their development and well-being depended on state sponsorship or they feared that democracy would empower anticapitalist extremists or otherwise result in destabilization. Tellingly, in South Korea, Brazil, and Mexico, capitalists became democrats when they lost state sponsorship, no longer needed such sponsorship, or no longer feared what democracy might bring. The author uses the Mexican, South Korean, Egyptian, and Zambian cases to show that labor's enthusiasm for democracy varied inversely with the degree to which labor's status depended on state largesse. These additional cases not only help establish the plausibility of Bellin's arguments; they also allow her to undercut rival explanations for class dispositions toward democracy—including levels of economic prosperity and cultural endowments.
Comparativists should also value the illuminating manner in which Bellin draws on broader literature to disaggregate and define the concepts of “power” and “autonomy” when assessing classes' ability to press states into adopting their policy preferences. Capital's power potentially derives from three sources: the pivotal role it plays in the economy (structural power); the influence it exerts over the media and educational institutions (ideological power); and through financing political actors, lobbying, and serving in public office (instrumental power). Labor's power derives from its capacity to mobilize support for politicians and its ability to disrupt economic operations via strikes; the latter in turn depends on structural factors (e.g., levels of worker concentration and labor scarcity); the state-defined legal context in which workers operate; and the leadership, culture, and organization of labor unions. “Autonomy” refers to classes' ability to “conduct themselves independently in the political arena” (p. 49), something that turns on “the degree to which [their] well-being is beholden to the goodwill of the state” (p. 127). Importantly, Bellin shows that “power” and “autonomy” do not always go together; the two phenomena can be quite independent of each other.
This is a smart, elegantly written book rich in empirical detail and theoretical argument. In just one place does the book lose its impressive clarity: in the Tunisian case study, Bellin dissects and attempts to measure the power and autonomy of both capital and labor, arguing that both will affect their capacity to influence state policy. By the final, comparative chapter, outcomes appear to turn on autonomy alone—earlier discussions of power seem to drop out of the equation with no comment from the author. Also, the study is not without lacunae that are a byproduct of its ambition. Bellin treats the private capitalist class essentially as a unitary actor, a defensible analytic move but one that nonetheless obscures differences in the preferences and stature of various segments of that class—for example, inefficient versus competitive businesses with ostensibly diverging views vis-à-vis globalization—that are potentially important. Her exploration of the relationship between class and democracy focuses exclusively on urban groups when the literature she is in dialogue with often models regime outcomes as dependent on the disposition of capital and labor, taking into account as well their relationships to rural elites and mass forces. None of these three observations, however, take much at all away from what remains a well-researched, well-written, thoughtful, and convincing text.