Many key statistical series in economics and public opinion do not date back farther than the Second World War. For instance, Congressional Quarterly was launched in 1945, and not until later did it begin publishing its familiar data on such things as party unity and presidential support. Accordingly, students of American elections and political institutions sometimes act as if the world started in 1946. With some exceptions (e.g., polarization studies using the DW-NOMINATE scores), the scholarly focus is on the postwar era because that is where the information is most easily accessible. The situation recalls the old joke about the drunk looking for his keys under the lamppost because the light is so much better there.
The problem with this postwar focus is that we might regard the past as an alien planet, inhabited by political figures with radically different goals and strategies. In Ambition, Competition, and Electoral Reform, Jamie L. Carson and Jason M. Roberts present a most valuable corrective. Taking the perspective of contemporary political science, they analyze congressional elections and electoral processes in the 74 years before 1946. To a large extent, they find that elections during this period look much more like contemporary ones than most scholars have realized.
Studies of electoral behavior often emphasize the tendency of voters to respond to the records and qualities of individual candidates. Some accounts assume that this tendency is a relatively recent development and that voters from earlier times passively followed the will of political machines. “After sifting through archival sources, election results, newspaper stories, and various other historical documents,” Carson and Roberts write, “we have come to the conclusion that voters from this era were attentive, informed, and quite active in politics” (p. 26). One example is particularly telling: Before the adoption of the Australian ballot, ticket-splitting was hard because voters had to mark out or paste over a name on a party ballot and replace it with another candidate. Since ballot secrecy was not yet the norm, they had to do so in full view of party workers who would know which voters had broken ranks. Yet as the authors point out, a substantial number of voters did take the trouble to split their tickets, meaning that they were taking candidates into account. Aware of this phenomenon, party leaders knew that they could not simply foist hacks and puppets on the electorate. Accordingly, they went out of their way to recruit what we today call “quality candidates,” people who had already held elective office. Their control over patronage and electoral nominations was a major asset in the recruitment process, since they could assure quality candidates that a job or a shot at another office would await them in case of defeat.
Carson and Roberts break new ground in explaining the old politics of candidate quality. Until the past couple of decades, it was hard to learn about candidate characteristics in elections of yesteryear, but technological advances have made such research much more feasible. Taking advantage of newly-available tools and sources, the authors gathered candidate-specific data for some 13,000 House races from 1872–1944. In addition to official biographies and other standard references, they made ingenious use of sources such as The Political Graveyard and Ancestry.com.
They find that quality candidates fared better during this period than political novices. Incumbents seeking reelection were not as successful as those of the modern era, mostly because opposition parties got experienced candidates to run against the incumbents. Over time, however, Progressive-era reforms weakened the ability of party leaders to provide quality candidates with a safety net. Electoral innovations such as the direct primary and the Australian ballot meant that it was harder to make an ironclad promise of a future nomination, just as civil service reform limited their ability to offer patronage plums. Challenging an incumbent thus became riskier for quality candidates. If they gave up their current office for what turned out to be a losing race, they would be jobless in the short run and have only iffy prospects of election in the future. Quality candidates thus became more selective about picking their races. Carson and Roberts conclude that reform reduced “the overall levels of electoral competition by stripping the once-powerful party organizations of their ability to coordinate entry decisions and encourage risk-averse candidates to run in marginally-competitive races” (p. 148).
This excellent book is essential reading for anyone with an interest in congressional elections. The authors do not purport to answer every question about the history of House races, so graduate students and young scholars should use it as an inspiration for future research. One possible topic could be the relationship of district size, representation, and electoral outcomes. An average district today has about 700,000 people, more than four times as many as in the 1870s. Although House members of that era lacked modern means of travel and communication, it seems reasonable to suppose that smaller constituencies and shorter sessions enabled them to maintain strong local ties. So how did members keep in touch with their voters? What was their “home style” like? Such queries could be the stuff of intriguing dissertations.
Ambition, Competition, and Electoral Reform should prompt some nuanced reconsideration of the role of machine politicians. If one’s knowledge of the subject begins and ends with George Washington Plunkitt, one might think that the bosses were hardcore opponents of reform, concerned mostly with graft, “honest” and otherwise. While acknowledging the existence of corruption, Carson and Roberts point out the party organizations actually had a complicated relationship to reform. For instance, state party leaders did not oppose the adoption of uniform ballots. By the late 19th century, local party leaders had frequently thwarted state parties by putting out ballots with different candidates for certain offices. Uniform party column ballots actually preserved some influence for the state leaders.
As suggested earlier, voter attentiveness also prompted the leaders to think about the quality of the people they put on the ballot. To use the currently fashionable language, they were concerned about the party brand. Electoral victory may have been their main motivation, but the invisible hand of the political market nudged them in the general direction of competent governance. In more recent times, Joseph M. Bessette recalls that Richard M. Daley used his job as State’s Attorney of Cook County as a stepping stone to the Chicago mayoralty. But Daley first had to show that he was worthy, and public relations alone would not do the trick. “The most effective way to convince the citizenry of Chicago that he was doing a good job was, most simply, by doing a good job” (The Mild Voice of Reason, 1994).
One could also read Ambition, Competition, and Electoral Reform as a companion to Lara Brown’s equally excellent Jockeying for the American Presidency (2010). Like Carson and Roberts, Brown finds a strong strand of continuity in American politics: Just like today’s presidential candidates, those of older times spent years positioning themselves for the chance at the big prize. In presidential politics, as in congressional elections, the fundamental things apply as time goes by.
