I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: STATE OF RESEARCH
Many scholars and scientists have dealt with Ordoliberalism and von Hayek at great length, and compared in particular the socio-economic theories of Walter Eucken and Friedrich August von Hayek.Footnote 1 Watrin (Reference Watrin, Külp and Vanberg2000) analyzes the varying concepts of the state and government tasks. According to him, Eucken, as a member of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, favors—more or less—a deliberately designed and ‘made’ (constructivist) order, while von Hayek, on the other hand, is highly in favor of an evolutionary, ‘grown’ (spontaneous) order (i.e., constructivist rationalism vs. evolutionary/critical rationalism; see Hayek Reference Hayek1973). Streit and Wohlgemuth (Reference Streit, Wohlgemuth, Külp and Vanberg2000a and Reference Streit, Wohlgemuth and Koslowski2000b), in turn, point at the diverging leitmotifs underlying the conceptions of von Hayek and Eucken: in the center of Ordoliberalism is the topic of private power, or, to put it differently, the question of how to avoid, eliminate, or at least reduce the concentration of power in the economic and political sphere. To the contrary, von Hayek is not so much concerned with the problem of power as with the epistemological topic of knowledge. His major concern is the division or fragmentation of widely dispersed knowledge, which can be utilized via competitive market processes operating as a discovery procedure. A similar approach as in Streit and Wohlgemuth, and Watrin, is presented by Kolev (Reference Kolev2008). Kolev not only discusses the distinct roles of the state; additionally, he analyzes Eucken’s and von Hayek’s concepts of monetary competition and social policy, as well. According to Pies (2001, p. 123), the differences between Eucken and von Hayek are, in fact, merely of minor importance. The only true difference is that Eucken presents a theory of power, while von Hayek presents a theory of knowledge. Finally, Bönker and Wagener (Reference Bönker, Wagener, Labrousse and Weisz2001) again emphasize the differences between a self-generating, spontaneous formation of order and a political artifact-order. In addition to referring to the role of the state and the agenda of economic policy, they refer to the philosophy of science aspects resulting from the diverging, underlying leitmotifs already mentioned in the two essays by Streit and Wohlgemuth.
In retrospect, it is striking that most of these subsequent interpretations highlight the parallels, while the differences are either of minor importance, as in the work of Pies, or they are one-sided. Von Hayek is often regarded as an Ordoliberal, and the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, Ordoliberalism in the wider sense, and von Hayek are often talked about in the same breath (Kolev Reference Kolev2010). The major differences are traced back to the diverging leitmotifs (power vs. knowledge) and/or the two concepts of order—made or grown order—or, in the Hayekian terminology—taxis and kosmos. These disparities are, no doubt, of eminent significance, and they must not be underestimated or neglected. However, and this is essential to note, considerable differences can be found on other, different, topics.
Variations and disparities between von Hayek and Ordoliberalism in the wider sense can be detected on diverse levelsFootnote 2: 1. philosophy of science: von Hayek’s recognition of incomplete information, limits of reason, and bounded rationality, and his warning against pretence of knowledge vs. the ordoliberal quest for absolute truth and inherent epistemic optimism and malleability due to pure human reason; 2. setting dissimilar priorities: von Hayek’s focus on the problem of knowledge and his reinterpretation of competition as a discovery procedure vs. the ordoliberal focus on the problem of power and its reinterpretation of competition as an instrument of disempowermentFootnote 3; 3. social philosophy: von Hayek’s focus on regulatory ethics vs. the ordoliberal combination of regulatory and individual/virtue ethics pegged to the topics of Gesellschaftskrisis (societal crisis of the present) and Vital Policy as one major peculiarity of German Ordoliberalism; 4. genesis of norms: von Hayek’s cultural-evolutionary vs. the ordoliberal constructivist-elitist approachFootnote 4; and 5. notion of freedom: von Hayek’s negative concept of liberty vs. the ordoliberal combination of negative and positive (Kantian) liberty.
Therefore, it should be possible to make an important distinction within neoliberalism itself that contains at least two factions: von Hayek’s evolutionary liberalism, and German Ordoliberalism. This paper builds on the work of Renner (2000), Quaas (Reference Quaas2000), Hennecke (Reference Hennecke2008), and others evaluating the different varieties inside neoliberalism.
Coming back once again to the literature review on the current state of research, what becomes clear is the fact that theories of justice are more or less neglected. Only a few paragraphs are dedicated to this topic (see Bönker and Wagener Reference Bönker, Wagener, Labrousse and Weisz2001, pp. 190–191; Streit and Wohlgemuth Reference Streit, Wohlgemuth, Külp and Vanberg2000a, pp. 486–489; and Streit and Wohlgemuth Reference Streit, Wohlgemuth and Koslowski2000b, pp. 249–251). The only exception in this regard is Kolev. The following essay not only takes the neoliberal separation of different varieties stated by Renner et al. as granted; it focuses on the topic of justice and elaborates the (slightly) differing conceptions of justice within neoliberalism. Thus, the specific contributions of the paper are that it fills the gap and that it adds a sixth dimension of differences (which is highly interconnected with the already mentioned differing conceptions of genesis of norms). To put it differently: in this paper I try to analyze the (often neglected) subtle differences between von Hayek, Eucken, Röpke, and Rüstow with special emphasis on their theories of justice, and I approach von Hayek’s evolutionary liberalism and German Ordoliberalism from a theoretical-historical and economic-ethical justice perspective. As stated above, I focus not only on Eucken and von Hayek. I include the concepts of justice developed by Rüstow and Röpke as well, and, consequently, broaden the perspective incorporating Eucken as a member of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, and Rüstow and Röpke as representatives of Ordoliberalism in the wider sense.
This paper tackles these topics in three steps: After a brief discussion of the existing literature and a literature overview of the decade-long debate on von Hayek and Ordoliberalism in the first part, the second part describes von Hayek’s conception of commutative justice—justice of rules and procedures (rather than end-state justice). The third part examines Eucken’s, Rüstow’s, and Röpke’s theories of justice, which consist of a mixture of commutative and distributive justice. In the fourth part, I draw a comparison between the ideas of justice developed by Eucken, Röpke, and Rüstow, on the one hand, and von Hayek, on the other. The essay ends with a summary of my main findings.
II. SOCIAL JUSTICE AS A ‘WEASEL-WORD’? VON HAYEK ON JUSTICE
It is now necessary clearly to distinguish between two wholly different problems which the demand for ‘social justice’ raises in a market order. The first is whether within an economic order based on the market the concept of ‘social justice’ has any meaning or content whatever. The second is whether it is possible to preserve a market order while imposing upon it (in the name of ‘social justice’ or any other pretext) some pattern of remuneration based on the assessment of the performance or the needs of different individuals or groups by an authority possessing the power to enforce it. The answer to each of these questions is a clear no. (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, pp. 67)
[T]he addition of the adjective ‘social’ makes them capable of meaning almost anything one likes. The word has indeed become one of the chief sources of confusion of political discourse and can probably no longer be reclaimed for a useful purpose. (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, pp. 79)
Von Hayek’s trilogy Law Legislation and Liberty is often considered as his opus magnum; the second volume is entitled The Mirage of Social Justice—so this trilogy is of particular importance in the field of justice, and deserves a detailed analysis.
What becomes clear right from the start is the interconnectedness of von Hayek’s theory of impersonal justice based on formal (abstract and end-independent) rulesFootnote 5 with the twin concepts of cultural evolution and spontaneous order. At the center of his negative theory of justice (Hayek Reference Hayek1979, p. 130) are the legal rules of just conduct and the constitutional ‘design’ of political institutions (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 100). It is not a positive conception of justice that makes it an obligation of administration and government to distribute and reallocate wealth equally among citizens (p. 103). Rather, what is important is to evade injustice and, thus, approach the (unattainable) ideal state of absence of injustice (p. 54). As claimed by von Hayek, a positive (i.e., agreeable and consensual) criterion of justice simply does not exist (p. 42)Footnote 6; only negative ones are obtainable, indicating what is unjust. Merely an objective, and that means an interpersonally valid (negative), test of injustice enables us gradually to remove these kinds of rules that prove to be unjust and that are, therefore, not universalizable.Footnote 7
Instead of granting non-achievable and non-enforceable positive rights, the socio-political order should rest on negative rights and commutative justice. Such an ideal of impersonal justice, rather than sectional justice, is based on formal rules. It is based on spontaneously grown rules, not on deliberately planned/made rules brought about by deliberate human design (i.e., “the result of human action but not of human design”—Hayek [following Ferguson] 1973, p. 20). This evolutionary approach to law involves the rejection of the interpretation of law as a deliberate construct of super-natural forces (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 60). According to von Hayek, it is difficult in a Great Society to agree on ends. Agreement is more likely to be reached on means, or, to put it differently, on rules of just conductFootnote 8: “rules of just conduct serve not (concrete or particular) ends but (abstract and generic) values” (p. 14). These rules are intended to apply for an indefinite period, “to an unknown number of future instances and to the acts of an unknown number of persons, and merely states certain attributes which any such action ought to possess” (p. 14; see also pp. 35 and 130). These abstract rules embody the knowledge and traditional experience that have been generated and transmitted over time. Thus, they are a device, a tool for coping with human ignorance and uncertainty. Abstract rules are the guides in a world in which most things are unknown (i.e., limits of reason and lack of knowledgeFootnote 9; see p. 8). The big advantage of such rules—together with other impersonal and abstract mechanisms such as competitive markets—is the utilization of factual knowledge widely dispersed among thousands of individuals (i.e., fragmentation of knowledge [Hayek Reference Hayek1973, p. 14; 1976, p. 8]). The task of public authorities is the enforcement of abstract rules of just conduct, the preservation of a rule-governed spontaneous order (end-independent and purpose-free kosmos instead of taxis/organization with its end-governed character):
Only if applied universally, without regard to particular effects, will they serve the permanent preservation of the abstract order, a timeless purpose which will continue to assist the individuals in the pursuit of their contemporary and still unknown aims. Those rules which are common values serve the maintenance of an order of whose existence those who apply them are often not even aware. (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 17)
The key features of such negative rules restraining individual action are their generalization and universal applicabilityFootnote 10 (see Kant’s test of unversalizability, the Categorical Imperative: the principle of treating all under the same rules). Moreover, they are end-independent and purpose-free, which means they serve unknown particular ends. Therefore, they are mainly responsible—together with the constitutional state—for forming and preserving a spontaneous order, or, in Böhm’s terminology, a private law society.
What rules of just conduct in fact do is to say under what conditions this or that action will be within the range of the permissible; but they leave it to the individuals under these rules to create their own protected domain.… Since the consequences of applying rules of just conduct will always depend on factual circumstances which are not determined by these rules, we cannot measure the justice of the application of a rule by the result it will produce in a particular case. (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 37)
Negative rules of just conduct are primarily prohibitions of unjust behavior; in addition, it is feasible to judge actions only by rules, not by particular results. Particular results of a socio-economic process—which follow from the application of rules to an individual case—cannot be regarded as just or unjust (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 32). So, negative rules do not impose any duties or obligations on anyone. Von Hayek notes: “Justice is not concerned with those unintended consequences of a spontaneous order which have not been deliberately brought about by anybody. The rules of just conduct thus merely serve to prevent conflict and to facilitate co-operation by eliminating some sources of uncertainty” (p. 38).
Von Hayek’s problem with social justice is that it rolls back the transition from a small face-to-face society to an abstract and spontaneous order of the Great Society. It will inevitably lead towards an end-connected tribal society (teleocracy), and gradually destroy the rule-connected open society (nomocracy) (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 38). In this regard, von Hayek speaks of distributive justice as an ‘atavism’ and as Rousseauian nostalgia: “They are an atavism, a vain attempt to impose upon the Open Society the morals of the tribal society which, if it prevails, must not only destroy the Great Society” (p. 147). He continues: “Our present moral views undoubtedly still contain layers or strata deriving from earlier phases of the evolution of human societies—the small horde to the organized tribe, the still larger groups of clans and the other successive steps towards the Great Society” (p. 42). The (alleged) revival of ‘tribal ethics’ with its persistent conflict between tribal morals and commutative justice of the Great Society, with its clash between the sense of loyalty and the sense of negative justice (p. 147), and with its all-pervading loyalty to particular groups and communities, is the greatest obstacle to a universal application of rules of just conduct. Such a revival of ancestral sentiments and organizational thinking is, according to von Hayek, highly related to the ideologies of socialism and nationalism. They are the main driving forces behind the prevalent constructivist rationalism and the decline in the understanding of the operation of markets (p. 134). Social justice, with its anthropomorphism and personification of justice and society (Hayek Reference Hayek1973, p. 26; 1976, p. 75) “serves [at least from a Hayekian perspective] to support deep-seated emotions that are threatening to destroy the Great Society” (p. 133; i.e. threat of the totalitarian state).Footnote 11
As von Hayek says, a gradual transformation from commutative to distributive justice is currently taking place. This self-acceleratingFootnote 12 process threatens most values of a free society, since distributive justice is wholly incompatible with the rule of law and with freedom under the law. In the end, it will directly lead to socialism and despotism, subordinating citizens to authority, and placing the duty of justice on authorities with power to command and coerce people (i.e., totalitarian trend). In the words of von Hayek: social justice serves as “the Trojan Horse through which totalitarianism has entered” (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 136).
The appeal to social justice and the demand of a just distribution of wealth leads to government action and intervention on behalf of special interest groups (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 65). These particular rent-seeking groups “have learnt to employ the open sesame of ‘social justice’” (p. 67) and succeeded in “clothing their demands with the aura of legitimacy … by representing them as a requirement of ‘social justice’” (p. 141). In consequence, the call to society and public authorities in the name of social justice, and the misuse of the term “distributive justice,” have opened the floodgates “to the demand by all who found their relative position threatened that their position be protected by government action” (p. 140). Moreover, it promotes the belief that long-established positions create a just expectation that they will persist, and it reinforces the idea that we morally deserve what we have earned in earlier periods (p. 93). Hence, social justice leads to the protection of habitual and familiarized positions and entrenched vested interests—often camouflaged as an appeal to social justice and often disregarding the common interest of society (see, for example, p. 96). In addition, it leads to a struggle of power of organized interests in which arguments of social justice serve merely as pretexts for claims for privileges. Thus, they will destruct the Great Society with its freedom of discrimination from within (i.e., fragility of the liberal open society).
To return to the implications of market mechanisms, it is plausible, from a Hayekian perspective, that the concept of justice is not applicable to the results of a spontaneous order: the outcomes of market processes are simply not unjust, because “Those shares are the outcome of a process the effect of which on particular people was neither intended nor foreseen by anyone when the institutions first appeared” (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 64).
There is no need morally to justify specific distributions (of income or wealth) which have not been brought about deliberately but are the outcome of a game that is played because it improves the chances of all. In such a game nobody ‘treats’ people differently and it is entirely consistent with respecting all people equally that the outcome of the game for different people is very different. (p. 117)
In a free and pluralistic society, which lacks a common hierarchy of ends, the market order does not serve a single order or hierarchy of ends; its activities are not directed by a unique scale of ends (Hayek Reference Hayek1976, p. 107). The market order, or, as von Hayek describes it, the “game of catallaxy,”Footnote 13 is a wealth-creating and poverty-eliminating game. It is a challenging competition played by individuals according to rules and decided by superior skill, talent, strengths, and fortune. Von Hayek notes: “A catallaxy is thus the special kind of spontaneous order produced by the market through people acting within the rules of the law of property, tort and contract” (p. 109). “Even in a game with equal chances for all players there will be some winners and some losers” (p. 126). “In such a game in which the results for the individuals depend partly on chance and partly on their skill, there is evidently no sense in calling the outcome either just or unjust” (p. 126). Justice is simply the wrong criterion to evaluate market processes. As von Hayek states, only the conduct of the players and the rules of the game—but not the results of the economic contest—can be just or unjust (see p. 70). The market order is a game partly of skill and partly of chance, with unpredictable outcomes (determined by skill and luck) and with winners and losers at the same time. What justice requires are the fairness of the game and the exclusion of cheating, fraud, oppression, coercion, and monopoly powers.Footnote 14 “The remunerations which the individuals and groups receive in the market are thus determined by what these services are worth to those who receive them … [and they are totally unrelated to needs and merits]” (p. 76). “[A]ll that counts is the (marginal) value the services have to those to whom they are rendered.… based on the values the services have to the user and not on an assessment of merit earned” (p. 92). Von Hayek is convinced that all “the attempts to ‘correct’ the results of the market in the direction of ‘social justice’ have probably produced more injustice in the form of new privileges, obstacles to mobility and frustration of efforts that they have contributed to the alleviation of the lot of the poor” (p. 139). Thus, it is essential—at least from a Hayekian perspective—to abide by the market result also when it turns against us.
In short: Von Hayek denotes distributive or social justice as an “atavism”Footnote 15 (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996b), as an “illusion” (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996e; Reference Hayek and Kerber1996c, p. 63), and as a “weasel-word” (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996j, p. 277)—mainly used by constructivists.Footnote 16 As a consequence, he pleads for a “market economy without any attributes.” According to him, social justice is often introduced as a way to legitimize special interests and exclusive privileges, and to grant permissions and exceptions (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996d, p. 252; Reference Hayek and Kerber1996b, p. 181). Due to its vulnerability to the misuse of rent-seeking groups, social justice is irreconcilable with a market economy in the terms of von Hayek (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996d, p. 258); that is, the market as a self-regulating, spontaneous order Footnote 17 (kosmos) (for example, see Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996g, p. 263) and as a product of cultural evolution (see Hayek Reference Hayek1973, p. 8; and Reference Hayek and Kerber1996h) relying on abstract, impersonal, and negative general rules or prohibitions independent of particular purposes,Footnote 18 and on the notion of negative freedom (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996i, p. 230; Reference Hayek1979, p. 130).
Let us summarize von Hayek’s main reasons for dismissing the concept of social justice (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996e, p. 197). First, social justice (and its constructivist organization) reduces productivity, economic efficiency, and, therefore, the overall wealth of a society—by not drawing on competition as a discovery procedure (Hayek Reference Hayek2002; Reference Hayek1979, p. 67) and by not drawing on the decentralized individual knowledge and know-how (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996b, p. 191; Reference Hayek and Kerber1996c, p. 61).Footnote 19 Second, social justice and the accompanying (authoritative) process of correcting redistribution to the benefit of certain population groups (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996b, p. 189) is necessarily attached to coercion and state interventionism, resulting in a threat to individual liberty (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996b, p. 191; Reference Hayek and Kerber1996e, p. 194; Reference Hayek and Kerber1996i, p. 236Footnote 20). Third, social justice cannot be realized due to the fact that a common criterion of justice is missing. There is no objective criterion of distributive justice, and it seems unlikely that a common consent on what justice involves will be reached (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996b, p. 182; Reference Hayek and Kerber1996i, p. 236). By unilaterally and authoritatively prescribing a definition of justice and the way to implement a program of social justice, the problem of pretence of knowledge (Hayek Reference Hayek2007, p. 100; Reference Hayek and Kerber1996a) arises. It is not feasible for the planning authorities to take full account of the countless changing individual needs of consumers; no one can survey the socio-economic process as a whole. Concretely, nobody knows what a just income distribution has to look like, and an externally imposed scale of incomes is necessarily connected with the violation of consumer sovereignty and will lead to totalitarian mastery (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996e, p. 197). Von Hayek even claims that distributive justice leads to economic dictatorship (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996e, p. 198).
However, von Hayek is not dismissing the concept of justice as a whole; rather, although he is highly critical of the concept of (re)distributive or social justice, he defends the concept of commutative justice: justice of rules, procedures, and institutions (Hayek Reference Hayek2007, p. 113). Although it is not appropriate to meaningfully assess the results of the market process according to values of social or distributive justice (i.e., market outcomes are from an ethical perspective that is morally neutral, and the market process itself is anonymous and ethically indifferent), it is indeed permissible to evaluate the market behavior of each of the market transaction partners. Therefore, the market game—von Hayek often refers to the market game as “catallaxy” (i.e., exchange game)—is liable to (procedural) justice requirements.
In this regard, Vanberg (Reference Vanberg, Held, Kubon-Gilke and Sturn2006) distinguishes three levels of potential justice considerations: 1. rules of the game (i.e., justice of order of rules/constitution of the market)Footnote 21; 2. moves of the game (i.e., justice of behavior, regarding codes of conduct of market players); and, 3. results of the game (i.e., justice of outcomes of market mechanisms).Footnote 22 As stated by von Hayek and Vanberg, the rules of the game have to be mainly negative, abstract, and universally applicable. Their task is to legally frame and regulate the market as an arena of voluntary exchange and cooperation for mutual benefits. Formal rules and institutions have to be based on consensual constitutional interests, and they have to be mutually and voluntarily agreeable. Under the condition that the rules of the game are fair and, overall, are acceptable, and that the behavior of each participant complies with the rules of the game, the results of the game have to be taken as they are (i.e., there is no such thing as a redistribution according to social justice criteria).Footnote 23 The outcomes of an ex ante specified course of the game have to be accepted with all their inequalities and randomness; i.e., the results of market mechanism evade their evaluation entirely, according to justice criteria. Or, in other words, it is not permissible to apply moral categories to the outcomes of market processes, as von Hayek states (1996d, p. 258; 1996e, p. 200). It is possible only to agree on procedural justice; yet, there is no guarantee of overall advantages and gains once the rules of the game have been implemented. Each game involves several risks and potential losses that have to be taken into account (ex post correction or redistribution is not permissible once an agreement of rules and procedures has been reached). What is important is that the results of the game come into being under fair and just conditions, and that each individual pursues his or her self-interests within the legally defined framework (i.e., rule-based adherence and compliance with the legislation). In sum: justice of procedures and rules (i.e., universal applicability of consensual rules independent of special interests)—yes; justice of (equal/egalitarianFootnote 24) results and outcomes, including just wages, just prices, and a just income distributionFootnote 25—no! Von Hayek clearly favors the concept of commutative justice, and he abhors distributive or social justice focusing solely on outcomes and reallocation (see Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996i, p. 235).Footnote 26
Fundamental to von Hayek’s concept of commutative justice are the previously mentioned abstract general rules, the freedom to enter into contracts regarding contract law, private property, and a socio-economic and legal framework, or an (impersonal) order of rules guaranteeing the universal applicability and the equal compliance to rules (i.e., fairness of the game), and the prevention of fraud and deception.Footnote 27 In addition, they should guarantee the equal and impartial treatment and non-discrimination of persons. By doing so, commutative justice is able to increase the overall wealth of a society and, thus, the general well-being of an average individual—even the poor are much better off in a market society fulfilling the criteria of von Hayek, compared to a centrally administered economy. According to von Hayek, commutative justice has no regard for personal needs and individual merits (in the sense of Verdienst and Bedürfnis) (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996b, p. 186; Reference Hayek and Kerber1996e, p. 196; Reference Hayek1960, p. 231).Footnote 28 What is important is the (economic) value of a performance in the view of a recipient (Hayek Reference Hayek and Kerber1996e, p. 196).Footnote 29 Each payment correlates to the worth of a performance—pointing again at the importance of the principle of equivalence. Although it is not advisable, from a Hayekian perspective, to correct the (distributive) outcomes of market processes or to intervene in the market mechanism itself, as (process-political) distributive justice would do, there remains one way open for social reforms: changing or correcting the rules of the game or reforming the Ordnungspolitik-level, as Eucken claims.Footnote 30
III. THE ORDOLIBERAL SYNTHESIS OF COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Eucken’s Theory of Justice
Contrary to von Hayek, Walter Eucken’s concept of justice is multi-dimensional, incorporating commutative and distributive justice elements as well as justice of rules, procedures, and institutions elements.Footnote 31 Although Eucken is aware of the inherent problems of distributive or social justice—namely, the potential institutionalization of discretionary powersFootnote 32 via opening gateways for special-interest groups, leading into a Hayekian ‘Road to Serfdom’ (slippery slope argument)—he is also conscious of the social question,Footnote 33 and of the so-called “working poor” as major consequences of the industrial revolution. Thus, Eucken and other Ordoliberals endeavor to overcome the societal crisis of the present and the (new) social question—which are interlinked with the problem of socio-economic power—by granting social security, a minimum subsistence level regarding basic social care, and, if needed, guaranteed minimum wages, and so they are referring to redistributive instruments as well (even though the focus remains on commutative justice).
It is striking that Eucken does not provide the reader with a clear-cut and distinct definition of (social) justice. He does not offer a unified concept of justice, and the normative-philosophical foundations remain fairly vague (a similar accusation is, by the way, applicable to Eucken’s concept of liberty). Nonetheless, Eucken’s understanding of justice is integrated in his dual criteria requirement, which has to be fulfilled by an ordoliberal socio-economic order: such an order has to be functioning/efficient and humane at once (the latter is often used as a synonym for Kantian freedom and social justice).
In general, Eucken’s competitive order is a major constituent in approaching (social) justice: the formation of incomes—based on the notion of private property as an eminent pre-condition of liberty, and the freedom to enter into contracts—is subject to the control and sanctioning mechanisms of competition and liability (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, pp. 275, 279, 317). Moreover, the competitive order, with its focus on Ordnungspolitik, is responsible for dissolving market powers, for controlling monopolies, cartels, trusts, and syndicates, and for preventing the abuse of discretionary powers mainly used by rent seekers. See Eucken’s constituent and regulative principles in Eucken (Reference Eucken2004, p. 254). Consequently, an approximately power-free socio-economic order guarantees a relatively just income distribution by taking scarcities and shortages into consideration, but not market powers (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, p. 316).Footnote 34 To put it differently: market processes that stick to ordoliberal principles are, in general, fair and just. Such an order not only promotes the overall wealth of a society (see the above section on von Hayek); it also adheres to the principle of performance and capability (Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzip), and, what is most important, it is in accordance with justice of contracts and exchange (Vertrags- and Tauschgerechtigkeit). The freedom to enter into contracts—another important constituent principle established by Eucken—ensures the compliance of voluntarily closed transactions and businesses; commutative justice, thus, enables the fair exchange of economic goods (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, p. 315).
Hence, justice is, in a certain way, equivalent to the outcomes of market processes, provided that power structures (and especially the abuse of powers) are absent, competition on the merits (Leistungswettbewerb) is implemented within the ordoliberal framework and guaranteed by the state authorities, and market transactions are carried out voluntarily by equal transaction partners (i.e., buyers and sellers alike) in a state of private autonomy (see Reference Böhm and BöhmBöhm’s [1980] concept of a private law society). On those conditions, referring to the ordoliberal topic of power, economic cooperation and the division of labor ensure a level of efficiency and productivity that enhances the public good.
From an ordoliberal (and Hayekian) perspective, the market is regarded as a democratic judge; market processes incorporate in a certain way democratic elements (Röpke Reference Röpke1949, p. 61; Reference Röpke1942, p. 142; Reference Röpke1950, p. 205; Böhm Reference Böhm and Böhm1980, p. 119; Eucken Reference Eucken, Schneider and Harbrecht1996, p. 340). Market results are seen as a democratic plebiscite (depending on consumer’s free choices), given that it is a voluntary and reciprocal organization of exchanges with mutual benefits, and that it takes place within a socio-economic order of complete competition (vollständiger Wettbewerb) and a minimized level of power and dependencies. Provided that all these requirements are met, the Ordoliberals speak of a market democracy in which the consumer is the sovereign and the director of the economic process, and in which the producers have to follow and answer the consumer’s wishes and preferences (consumarchy; see Röpke Reference Röpke1942, p. 142; Reference Röpke1950, p. 205). That is the ideal portrayal of the competitive order envisioned by Ordoliberalism (in the long run).
So far, similarities in the Hayekian and the ordoliberal concepts of justice exist. But, many Ordoliberals go one step further in the direction of social justice; they accredit the inevitability of distributive justice elements and, as a result, they deviate from the Hayekian notion of commutative justice.
The Ordoliberals are not unworldly, quixotic, or utopian,Footnote 35 and they are fully aware of the existing problems. Eucken and others are not oblivious to possible socio-ethical deficiencies and market failures that can occur within the ordoliberal competitive order (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, p. 291). Thus, it is likely that deficiencies with regard to income distribution generated by market mechanisms can occur (p. 318). In this instance, a (market-conforming) correction is needed in order to prevent social cases of hardship (pp. 300 and 318). Accordingly, Eucken develops in his book Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Principles of Economic Policy) certain regulating principles; e.g., the correction of negative external effects,Footnote 36 social policy (Eucken Reference Eucken1953, p. 24), and income policy, particularly progressive taxation according to the ability-to-pay principleFootnote 37 as one instrument for state-controlled redistribution (Dietze, Eucken, and Lampe Reference Dietze, Eucken and Lampe1942, p. 89). The aim is to secure a minimum standard of living—in special cases, even minimum wagesFootnote 38 are appropriate (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, p. 303), and, in general, exploitative wages are prohibited (Dietze, Eucken, and Lampe Reference Dietze, Eucken, Lampe, Goldschmidt and Wohlgemuth2008 p. 110). Additionally, Eucken strives to implement a humane labor market, which is characterized by a far-reaching balance between employees and employers, ethically tolerable working conditions, and an elimination of re-feudalization. Notably, Eucken admits that labour is not a commodity (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, p. 322)! Eucken writes:
What matters is that the labour market is organized in a humane fashion. In this regard, the following aspects have to be considered: the workman does not sell himself as a person, he does sell his services. In order to avoid exploitation, re-feudalization (Vermachtung) has to be counteracted. The relationship between [labor market] partners should be balanced. Provision for security and retributive justice is not left to the goodwill of individuals or left to chance, in a manner of speaking; rather it is subject to Ordnungspolitik. (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, p. 322; translated by the author)
Hecker (Reference Hecker2008, p. 213) observes correctly that Eucken integrates basic elements of social justice into his principles of economic policy, and that a fundamental openness exists within Eucken’s competitive order in terms of market-conform socio-political corrections and redistributions—naturally within certain boundaries (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, p. 301).Footnote 39
Reallocation can occur only in respect of those goods that have been produced at an earlier stage; so, redistribution has to leave enough leeway for private initiatives and economic freedom, including freedom of choice and decision (depending on motivation, commitment, and performance incentives set by the institutional framework). Eucken is convinced that the ordoliberal competitive order fulfils this criterion of functionality and efficiency. Moreover, it satisfies the criterion of humanity, as well: by increasing the overall wealth of a society via an adequate economic policy and constitutional design, the amount of distributional goods and services increases likewise. What is essential here is to broaden and widen the general participation or sharing in the rising prosperity.
In other words, commutative justice necessarily requires its completion in the form of distributive justice, at least from an ordoliberal point of view. The need for help and un-indebted states of emergency calls for a conception of justice that goes beyond (procedural) justice of exchange and contracts based on equality of exchange and the principle of equivalence (i.e., equal give and take, reciprocity, cooperation among equals). Equally important is the principle of subsidiarity gained from Catholic social ethics. According to that principle, the main emphasis lies on self-responsibility, self-help, and communal or club-like help and solidarity (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, p. 312; Röpke Reference Röpke1942, p. 259; Reference Röpke1949, p. 179; Reference Röpke1961, p. 249; Rüstow Reference Rüstow and Boarman1955, p. 54). Inconsistent with the principle of subsidiarity are paternalism and a mentality of patronizing public welfare and care. In consequence, most of the Ordoliberals highlight individual responsibility and the importance of (state-run) security systems while criticizing the evolution of the modern (interventionist) welfare state (see Eucken Reference Eucken2004, p. 319; Röpke 1965, p. 175; Reference Röpke1942, pp. 261 and 271; Reference Röpke1949, pp. 171 and 255; Reference Röpke1961, pp. 75, 226, and 244; Rüstow Reference Rüstow1957, pp. 171 and 178). The redistribution has to act according to certain principles. First, many Ordoliberals draw a distinct boundary of reallocation; they set a limit of redistribution of income and wealth when economic investment activities are negatively affected. Second, social policy as the bearer of redistribution should not be carried out in an isolated, selective, and ad hoc manner (i.e., constitutional Ordnungspolitik instead of Punktualismus and Prozesspolitik). Third, it has to meet the standard of market conformity (i.e., market-conforming redistribution). Fourth, redistributive social and income policy should avoid centralistic and interventionist tendencies of the modern welfare state. Fifth, the execution of social policy should be free of discrimination and the granting of privileges.Footnote 40
Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow: Justice of the Starting Conditions
Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow round up the ordoliberal theories(!) of justice. It is, therefore, appropriate to say a few words about so-called “extended Ordoliberalism” or sociological neoliberalism. At the heart of Rüstow’s and Röpke’s understanding of justice lies so-called “justice of the starting conditions.” In his book Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, Röpke speaks up for equal starting conditions and equal opportunities.Footnote 41 In this context, he pleads for highly progressive inheritance taxes. Additionally, social justice consists of a broad distribution and diffusion of private property, a fight against the concentration of property in the hands of a few people or companies, and a fight against diverging income disparities (Röpke Reference Röpke1942, p. 356; Reference Röpke1961, p. 348). However, Röpke does not rely solely on fair and just starting conditions. He is also an advocate of justice of performance (Leistungsgerechtigkeit) (Röpke Reference Röpke1949, p. 74): the principle of equivalence between performance and counter-performance (guaranteed by the ordoliberal competitive order) is essential as well as a meritocratic societal hierarchy (according to individual performances). In this regard, Röpke opposes (material) egalitarianism (Röpke Reference Röpke1950, p. 65) and social leveling—although he does not totally condemn socio-political redistribution. He admits that these measurements underlie the principle of market conformity.
Likewise, the ordoliberal concepts of justice are highly related—once again—to the topic of societal crisis of the present (Gesellschaftskrisis), a state of massification, disintegration, and proletarianization. In complete accordance with Eucken and Rüstow, Röpke demands (limited) redistribution, which removes excessive inequalities. Extreme fortune and income disparities exceeding a certain line endanger social cohesion and societal stability (see Böhm Reference Böhm1937, p. 114). Social inequalities are one major source of social upheavals. Social conflicts hinge on the economic (in)equality between social classes. Hence, in order to avoid self-destructive socio-economic imbalances, Röpke pleads for a distributive policy (Distributionspolitik) in the form of a (more) equal (yet not egalitarian) division of property and income distribution (Röpke Reference Röpke1942, p. 299). The best way to reach this ordoliberal goal is to promote the accumulation of assets and capital of the lower and middle classes (in combination with justice of the starting conditions). As a result, that kind of social policy will lead to de-proletarianization and de-massification, and it will contribute to solving the social question and the societal crisis of the present. Ordoliberal social policy (à la Röpke and Rüstow) is not only distributive policy; it is a policy of de-proletarianization (Politik der Entproletarisierung), as well. Here, the main focus lies on enabling emancipation and independency as the basic fundament for autonomous, self-reliant, and mature Kantian citizens. This emancipatory social policy serves as a surrogate for a lesser compensatory social policy (see also Eucken’s attempt to overcome the social question in Reference Eucken and StiftungEucken [1948] and [2001])!
Like Röpke, Rüstow also emphasizes the significance of equal opportunities and justice of the starting conditions (i.e., assimilationFootnote 42 of the starting conditions). The societal status should depend solely on each individual’s meritocratic achievements. While pointing at the weight of equal starting conditions, Rüstow explicitly negates the equality of outcomes (Rüstow Reference Rüstow and Boarman1955, p. 68). In his masterpiece, Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart, he admits that equality at the beginning (i.e., equality of opportunity) is an indispensable qualification of justice; however, equality at the end (i.e., justice of results; end-state justice—see Nozick Reference Nozick2006, p. 201) is (relatively) negligible (Rüstow Reference Rüstow1957, p. 90). One major aspect of achieving equality of the starting conditions is via education policy,Footnote 43 and especially via establishing a system of scholarships (Rüstow 2001, p. 149; see also Röpke Reference Röpke and Hohmann1988, p. 260).Footnote 44 A further public task is to radically constrain the law of inheritance.Footnote 45 Both facets aspire to combine justice of the starting conditions with the meritocratic performance principle (i.e., Leistungskonkurrenz).Footnote 46
Röpke and Rüstow characterize (social) justice as a meta-economic value and as a value that is highly correlated with freedom (e.g., Rüstow 2001, p. 153). Thus, justice forms a unified whole, an irenic formula, with liberty!
IV. META-ANALYTICAL COMPARISON
In total, the ordoliberal theories(!) of justice consist of several elements and try to incorporate (ex ante) commutative as well as (ex post) distributive justiceFootnote 47—referring both to justice of rules as well as to justice of outcomes and results. It is a rule-based liberalism that emphasizes procedural justice, but, at the same time, it is, by tendency, a certain form of end-state and outcome-oriented liberalism, as well. It combines commutative justice elements (i.e., Tausch-, Vertrags- and Leistungsgerechtigkeit) with distributive justice elements (Verteilungsgerechtigkeit). Karsten (Reference Karsten1985, p. 174) seems to be right when he states that Eucken and other Ordoliberals take a middle position between Nozick’s, von Hayek’s, and Rawls’ theories of justice.Footnote 48 This eclectic and syncretistic mixture of elements stemming from dissimilar theoretical backgrounds departs from the pure Hayekian notion of commutative (economic) justice. One reason for this eclecticism might be that the Ordoliberals aspire to implement an order that is economically and ethically justifiable. Thus, they provide the reader with an integrated approach combining the advantages of competition with concerns for social justice and equity. We can detect the ideal market mechanism with its minimization of economic and political power and with its fairly materialized market price as the result of complete competition. The price mechanism functions as a calculating machine, and it is an effective communication channel linking producers’ and consumers’ needs in a complex and anonymous economy. Furthermore, we can detect the performance-related payment of each factor of production and an income distribution corresponding to each individual market performance, yet not depending on market power structures. Such a competitive order, with its unique incentive patterns, will ideally enhance the rapid and speedy enforcement and spreading of innovations, and it will lead to an increase in productivity, promoting the overall wealth of a society (i.e., productivity of freedom). The lower and middle classes will especially benefit from this positive amendment of social welfare. Hence, competitive markets are essentially socially advantageous (see Böhm Reference Böhm1964, p. 234; i.e., social productivity of self-interest).
Most Ordoliberals are aware that the primary distribution of income via concurrence and market mechanisms is economically efficient, and, from a commutative-justice perspective, just. But they are also conscious that the results of fair and (commutatively) just market processes are not necessarily and per se just from a distributive-justice perspective. These outcomes are not compatible with the Kantian principle of universalization and generalization. The income distribution of the markets is, at first glance, socially blind. In consequence, a correction or redirecting of the income distribution is required—so many Ordoliberals claim.Footnote 49 It is necessary to complement the market-steered justice of performance (Leistungsgerechtigkeit) with other norms of justice. Especially, the ordoliberal concern for the worst-off (see Thielicke/von Bismarck 1979)Footnote 50 and the obligatory overcoming of absolute material poverty demand an ex-post facto correction of income distribution. As a result, many Ordoliberals command not only progressive taxation, they also command a minimum configuration of vital resources and the safeguarding of the minimum subsistence level. In other words, the society has to provide basic protection and shelter for the ‘losers’ of the market game with regard for those individuals and their efforts that are not appreciated and rewarded by market processes (i.e., necessities of life or, in German, Bedarfs- or Bedürfnisgerechtigkeit [justice of needs]). This includes security against severe physical privation and certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all, and precludes security of a given standard of life or of the relative position. In this context, Röpke establishes his concept of economic adjustment or adaption interventions (Anpassungsinterventionen; see Röpke Reference Röpke1949, p. 376). The goal of such market-conforming interventions is to ‘protect,’ in a certain sense, the workers from the vicissitudes of market forces, and to grant relief and solidary help to the victims of institutional change with its multi-variant processes of adjustment—without violating the market’s ability to adapt. This kind of redistribution aims at enabling a dignified life. So, questions of redistribution and issues of social or distributive justice are indeed taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the main focus is on commutative justice, and the limits of redistribution are highlighted by Eucken, Röpke, and Rüstow, especially with regard to the modern welfare state. The best social policy, from an ordoliberal perspective, is the introduction or maintenance of the competitive order, complemented by anti-poverty measures and basic (mandatory) social insurance systems. In addition, the distributive-justice concept of Ordoliberalism is quite rudimentary, elementary, and somewhat vague and indeterminate; a revision in the sense of modification and actualization is applicable and could incorporate, for example, societal rights of participation and inclusion as instruments for citizenship (i.e., integrating the vulnerable into a society of human dignity; in German: Mitwirkungs- or Teilhaberechte).Footnote 51
The fundamental difference to the Hayekian concept of justice is the ordoliberal incorporation of distributive-justice elements—although they are not in the center of the ordoliberal theories—and the not-at-all-neglected outcome-oriented perspective on social policy.Footnote 52 This perspective, however, does not include equal, in the sense of egalitarian, results. Von Hayek, on the other side, completely rejects social and distributive justice as well as outcome-oriented state interventions. His focus is on formal rules and commutative justice as characteristics of a rule-of-law government instead of an arbitrary government (Hayek Reference Hayek2007, p. 113; see also von Hayek’s model constitution in Hayek Reference Hayek1979). As stated above, von Hayek is convinced that a free economy can simply obtain commutative justice, while distributive justice is characteristic of organizations and socialism. It is the kind of justice prevalent in military and bureaucratic organizations and in a ‘command society’, particularly in a totalitarian system of lack of freedom, slavery, and personal despotism (Hayek Reference Hayek, Goldschmidt and Wohlgemuth2008, p. 642). Remarkable is the fact that the previously mentioned quotes from Hayek are borrowed from von Hayek’s inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg, in which he stresses the parallels in thinking of his own account and the ordoliberal one. Von Hayek is here—when he refers to social justice—either indirectly and implicitly criticizing Eucken et al., or he is simply not aware of the underlying subtle differences between Ordoliberalism and the position held by him.
Here, it is necessary to add two preliminary comments to avoid doubt and misunderstandings. First, the essay clearly pursues a (descriptive-) comparative goal, elaborating the points of fine differences inside neoliberalism. With this contrasting purpose in mind, it seems legitimate to emphasize and highlight the gaps, and to stress the points of refined distinction as a rhetorical device. However, this does not mean that the positions held by von Hayek, Eucken, Rüstow, and Röpke are mutually incompatible. A sharp contrast and a diametrical opposite cannot be proved. To the contrary, a wide range of parallels do exist—particularly between (the late) Franz Böhm, a further member of the Freiburg School, Eucken, and von Hayek.Footnote 53 Moreover, both strands of neoliberalism can be regarded as predecessors (and representatives) of modern constitutional economics, and they gave fresh impetus to New Institutional Economics (see the works of Vanberg Reference Vanberg2008a and Reference Vanberg and Vanberg2008b, and Wohlgemuth Reference Wohlgemuth2008). Nevertheless, the differences do not have to be obliterated; the distinctions, even those that are delicate and gradual, have to be recognized.Footnote 54 The second preliminary comment is that there is no unified ordoliberal theory of justice or a homogenous and unitary understanding of justice; rather, (more or less) individual answers to the social question and to social justice exist, no doubt. Moreover, a complete accordance between Eucken, Rüstow, and Röpke is far from certain.Footnote 55 But, and that is essential, both Eucken and Rüstow/Röpke are integrating redistributive elements into their theories of justice. Here, a common ground and a similarity between Eucken, Rüstow, and Röpke can be reached. At the same time, this is also the point of departure and demarcation when comparing Eucken, Rüstow, and Röpke, on the one hand, and von Hayek, on the other. The best social policy, according to the members of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, is the introduction and preservation of the competitive order. They favor the integration of the question of social justice into their concept of Ordnungspolitik. The social question is regarded as a result of insufficient competition, as a result of a state of re-feudalization (Vermachtung), and as a failure of the state to implement and maintain the institutional framework. The social question, social justice, and the question of private power in a free society are, therefore, interlinked (so far, the approaches of Ordoliberalism and von Hayek are more or less equivalent). In addition, Ordoliberalism (in the broader sense) incorporates a (slightly) outcome-oriented perspective on social policy. Eucken’s regulatory principle of income policy, for example, aims at correcting the results of market processes (i.e. income redistribution via progressive taxation). Urgent (basic) needs and a minimum subsistence level have to be guaranteed via a state-run and redistributive social policy. Moreover, Eucken does not condemn worker participation, trade unions, and state-run welfare institutions complementary to private insurance companies. In special circumstances, even minimum wages are allowed (see Eucken’s regulative principles incorporating, for example, the internalization of external effects, a redistributive income policy—progressive taxation—in order to correct socially unacceptable market outcomes, and the setting of minimum wages).
Von Hayek, on the contrary, rejects any outcome-oriented state interventions, and he logically rejects (the ordoliberal) synthesis of commutative and distributive justice. Von Hayek is highly critical of redistribution via progressive taxation, and he abhors minimum wages: according to him, a minimum subsistence level has to be guaranteed; however, without intervening in market processes and without (ex post) correcting market results. He clearly differentiates between securing one’s livelihood, a minimum subsistence level, and protection against severe deprivation (i.e., minimum income), on the one hand, and minimum wage regulations or wage floors, on the other (for example, Hayek Reference Hayek1960, p. 285; Reference Hayek and Hohmann1988, p. 406; Reference Hayek1976 p. 87).Footnote 56 Von Hayek’s argument is by far more consistent and stringent, compared with the ordoliberal ones. His theory of justice rests clearly on commutative justice while excluding all forms of distributive justice. The ordoliberal mixture of distributive and commutative justice elements, to the contrary, (slightly) opens the gateway for special interest groups, and it provides the state with discretionary leeway for economic policy interventions.
It is now possible to sum up the parallels and differences in the theories of justice: both Ordoliberalism and von Hayek emphasize Ordnungs- instead of Prozesspolitik, and both rely on competition on the merits, the principle of market conformity, and the (Kantian) private law society with its freedom of privileges and discrimination; more importantly, both warn against the dangers of the welfare state (see, for example, Röpke Reference Röpke and Hohmann1988, and Hayek Reference Hayek and Hohmann1988) and the dangers of socialism and totalitarianism. Moreover, both prefer the principles of subsidiarity, self-responsibility, self-help, and communal or club-like help and solidarity instead of (forced) national assistance and state-run welfare organizations. All these commonalities are due to the fact that both Ordoliberalism and von Hayek—at least in their early years—fought all kinds of totalitarian ideologies. They all shared similar values, pursued similar goals, and fought on similar frontline positions. However, the applied means and the adopted specific route towards the (shared) goals were slightly different. Among the differences are:
1. Von Hayek’s problem of knowledge vs. the ordoliberal problem of power. Von Hayek regards markets as processes of coordinating decentralized, widely dispersed, and incomplete knowledge responsible for the allocation of factors of productivity. He supposes a division of labor as well as a division of knowledge. In this regard, market mechanisms as discovery procedures are superior, and gain advantage in increasing the overall wealth of a society and, thus, reaching the goal of (commutative or economic) justice.Footnote 57 The ordoliberal approach is dissimilar: they approach justice via the problem of power and the topic of Gesellschaftskrisis. According to Ordoliberalism, social justice, the social question, and the reduction and prevention of the misuse of socio-economic powers are highly interlinked. Re-feudalization (among others) is one major source of injustice.
2. Von Hayek’s ‘impossibility theorem’ (it is simply not feasible to reach a unique, consensual, and generalizable definition of positive (distributive) justice) vs. the ordoliberal multi-faceted concept of justice regarding commutative vs. distributive justice. Von Hayek clearly opposes the redistribution by progressive taxation, and favors proportional taxation (unlike Ordoliberalism).Footnote 58 He clearly opposes the ex post correction of market results via fiscal policy and all other measures related to distributive justice (unlike some representatives of Ordoliberalism). He clearly opposes (interventionist) social policy and state-run social security systemsFootnote 59 (unlike some Ordoliberals), which will lead to economic dictatorship (according to von Hayek, all distributive justice measures are compulsory tools of egalitarian and socialist redistribution). He neglects the moment of Gesellschaftskrisis, which is at the heart of Ordoliberalism in the broader sense (especially Rüstow and Röpke aim at the de-proletarianization, de-massification, and the disempowerment of interest groups; therefore, they aim at an emancipatory social policy with a broad distribution of assets and an adequate education policy). He opposes the principle of equality of opportunities and the ordoliberal concept of justice of the starting conditions (unlike Rüstow and Röpke; see Hennecke Reference Hennecke2008, pp. 113 and 121).Footnote 60 In short: distributive justice elements can be found only in the ordoliberal version(s) of neoliberalism; and it is the unique balancing act between commutative and distributive justice that is a characteristic feature of German neoliberalism.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As stated in the introduction, variations and disparities between von Hayek and Ordoliberalism can be found on diverse levels: philosophy of science, setting dissimilar priorities, social philosophy, genesis of norms, and notion of freedom. In this paper, I have analyzed another potential dimension of differences—which is, by the way, interlinked with the opposed conceptions of genesis of norms—the ordoliberal and the Hayekian theories of justice with its differing setting of priorities; that is, von Hayek’s commutative justice concept vs. the ordoliberal mixture of commutative and distributive justice.
The Ordoliberals believe that true social benefits of their competitive order derive inherently from the long-term stability of competitive markets by suppressing arbitrary and disorderly political and economic power, by eliminating monopolistic and oligopolistic structures, and by the ceaseless functioning of individual freedom and competition (Rittershausen Reference Rittershausen2007, p. 9). Contrary to von Hayek, who is convinced that the weasel-word “social” itself is an excuse to disguise a collectivist and, hence, an anti-social agenda (e.g., social justice/social market economy), many Ordoliberals take the view that market-conforming interventions as well as redistributive ‘interventions’ are indispensable in order to overcome the (new) social question.Footnote 61 As a consequence, they implement ‘regulating principles,’ which are designed, on the one hand, to stabilize and sustain the competitive order, and, on the other hand, to correct certain shortcomings of the market (in modern terms: market failures). To these belong the stringent control of monopoly power, the public regulation of severe supply-side anomalies such as mass unemployment, the redistribution of income through a progressive tax system, and, last but not least, the corrections of socio-economic externalities due to large discrepancies between short-term profits and personal self-interests and the long-term common or collective good. In particular, the essays originated from the interdisciplinary cooperation within the Freiburg resistance circles against national-socialism contain certain redistributive measurements and social policy advice (In der Stunde Null 1979; Dietze, Eucken, and Lampe Reference Dietze, Eucken and Lampe1942 and Reference Dietze, Eucken, Lampe, Goldschmidt and Wohlgemuth2008). The aim of a Christian-based society is a functioning and humane socio-economic order. Such an order strives for fostering self-responsibility and proactive individual initiative. It rests on small- and medium-sized companies, and it precludes the ruling of interest and para-governmental rent-seeking groups. However, equally important is the prevention of unjust distributions of income, assets, and property. It is the explicit goal of social policy to provide for humane employment with equally just payment, to avoid exploitation, mass poverty, and unemployment. Eucken, for example, endorses supply-anomaly interventions by subsidizing minimum wages and by guaranteeing a minimum subsistence level (Eucken Reference Eucken2004, pp. 185, 303, and 321). Especially important are progressive taxes. Moreover, he—in complete accordance with Constantin von Dietze and Adolf Lampe, both members of the Freiburg (resistance) Circles—pleads for equal market positions with regard to the exercise of power and influence between employers and employees (Eucken Reference Eucken and Eucken1999, p. 21; Reference Eucken2004, p. 322). Only when the status of a balance of power has been reached on labor markets, and when employers and employees are able to negotiate their working conditions at an equal level and with true freedom of contract, is it possible to minimize exploitation; reduce asymmetric, patriarchal, and paternalistic employer–employee relationships; decrease dependencies and the misuse of power; and realize social peace within a society. Therefore, it is one key element of social policy to support labor unions until they are equally powerful as the federation of employers, or to downgrade the level of power of employers until they have as little power as labor unions. Both parties of the labor market should be equally powerful—provided they do not dominate economic processes and they do not exert pressure on political decision-making processes. It is a remarkable fact that Ordoliberalism connects its theories of justice with its elaborations on liberty and power (see also Forst Reference Forst2007, p. 270).
With all these dissimilarities in mind, it is possible to draw a distinction within neoliberalism (that is, in total, neoliberalism is no monolithic block): Von Hayek’s evolutionary liberalism must be separated from German Ordoliberalism in general and the Freiburg School of Law and Economics and sociological neoliberalism in particular. In addition, these dissimilarities challenge the stimulating thesis that von Hayek can be described as an Ordoliberal (see Kolev Reference Kolev2010). Thus, the work of Ordoliberalism should not be viewed through Hayekian lenses only; it deserves an economic-ethical perspective as well!
