I

German politicians from every camp regarded the Treaty of Versailles not only as the greatest burden Germany ever had to bear, but as a menace in itself, because of its War Guilt clause which became a major threat to the stability of the Weimar Republic, and also for its economic punishment, e.g. reparation payments. The armament limitationsFootnote ¹ and in particular the naval provisions stuck out even more, because they injured German pride – still a major issue at the time even in politics – and became a constant reminder that Germany was not treated on a basis of equality by the Allies. On the one hand, the ‘glorious’ Imperial Navy was reduced to a shadow.Footnote ² On the other hand, the Navy became the first focal point for German calls for Gleichberechtigung (equality) and also marked the first breach and eventual demise of the Versailles Treaty.

From the perspective of western politicians, however, naval limitations on Germany were necessary and completely justified. Britain in particular was haunted by the threat to its naval supremacy in a strong German Navy. Tirpitz's pre-war concept of the Risikoflotte was exactly this spectre. Unrestricted submarine warfare became the concrete embodiment during the Great War. The prohibition of submarines in Article 191 of the Versailles Treaty exemplifies Britain's vivid memory of unrestricted submarine warfare with its shocking effects on mercantile shipping, i.e. the Allies lost over 3,000 ships to the German U-boats during the First World War.Footnote ³

Restrictions on submarine warfare became one of the two core elements of interwar naval negotiations and also part and parcel of Britain's agenda as the dominant naval power. Restrictions on battleships are the other big objective of British interwar naval negotiations. The psychology of threat and deterrence was very important in both areas. The introduction of the first German (pocket) battleships of the Deutschland class built after the First World War, from 1933 onwards, is a good example. The threat perceived by Britain and portrayed by Germany far outweighs the military capabilities of these ships. The credo on which they were built – faster than anything heavier and stronger than any faster ship – mirrors the importance of psychological threat, when in reality these ships were not much heavier than heavy cruisers with similar combat attributes.

Restrictions on battleships and submarines can be found in the most prominent places in all subsequent naval negotiations, e.g. the 1922 Washington Naval Treaties.Footnote ⁴ At the London naval conference, 1930, a six-year capital shipbuilding holiday from 1931Footnote ⁵ and binding rules for submarine warfare stand out as achievements.Footnote ⁶ At the second London naval conference, 1936, Japan made the direct link between either the abolition of all offensive naval weapons i.e. the battle fleets,Footnote ⁷ or a vast expansion of its own submarine fleet, for defensive purposes.Footnote ⁸ Both the USA and the British Empire attached the greatest importance to the battleship, the epitome of their superiority.Footnote ⁹ Apart from the fact that Japan refused to accept British and US naval superiority – its claim to equality and US and British refusal of the same became the principal reason for the failure of the second London naval conferenceFootnote ¹⁰ – this Japanese position is one of the earliest indications that smaller powers had found a way to evade the dominance of the two major naval powers, in building submarine fleets. Along with Japan, Italy, and France, Germany was one of the smaller naval powers, if only because of a short but glorious past in the Tirpitz era. In a purely bilateral context the Anglo-German naval agreement must be seen in this context of apprehension that Germany could become a major naval contender again. On the international stage a serious naval arms race was looming in the 1930s, with all the negative effects on state finances and world peace. The British government desperately wanted to avoid this arms race, which was considered as the second worst option, just short of war itself. International armament limitation agreements were seen as the way to achieve this.

II

Against this background, this article will ask the following questions. First, how did preceding naval agreements influence the conclusion of the Anglo-German naval agreement. Secondly, what were the reasons for Germany to conclude it? Thirdly, what were the reasons for Britain to conclude it? Fourthly, how does it fit into the larger strategy of arms limitations? And, finally, what part did the Anglo-German naval agreement play in the overall strategy of Germany and Britain in the interwar years? In order to come to a conclusion about the reasons behind the agreement it is the thesis of this article that it is essential to include later changes and additions to the agreement. This part has been very much neglected in previous analyses. Particularly the reasons behind the termination shed light upon the motives for initially concluding the Anglo-German naval agreement. For the British side this article will argue that the Anglo-German naval agreements fit into this general policy line of trying to limit naval armament through international agreements and that it actually fitted into the overall British policy of bringing Germany back into the circle of European powers as an equal partner. For Hitler's Germany it was the abortive step toward an eternal alliance between the two Arian races.

III

The most recent secondary literature exclusively concerned with the Anglo-German naval agreement was written in the 1970s. This might serve as the first reason why after more than thrity years of silence a reappraisal of this agreement seems necessary.

D. C. Watt's ‘The Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935’Footnote ¹¹ is a very good guide to primary sources, although due to the publication date some important British sources were not available then.Footnote ¹² This is probably the only deficiency of this article. Although there is a certain bias towards the British side of events, it remains a very good indicator for relevant contemporary biographies and newspaper articles. The only other work which deals solely with the agreement is É. H. Haraszti's Treaty-breakers or Realpolitiker? The Anglo-German naval agreement of June 1935.Footnote ¹³ It covers the period and negotiations immediately preceding the agreement, including a comprehensive and accurate political and strategic analysis. Unfortunately, none of the subsequent changes and additions to the 1935 agreement are mentioned, which is essential to evaluate the effects of the agreement. Nevertheless, this book has a very good appendix of printed primary sources up to 1935.

There are some important books which focus on naval policy in the interwar period. J. Dülffer's Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau, 1920–1939 covers the German case very thoroughly.Footnote ¹⁴ The description of different currents and personalities in the German Admiralty and the extensive use of primary sources were an essential guide to this paper. S. Roskill's Naval policy between the wars: the period of reluctant rearmament 1930–1939 fulfils the same function for the British side of the argument.Footnote ¹⁵ It provides a comprehensive and thorough argument and is a brilliant guide to primary sources. Phillips Payson O'Brien's work is somewhere in between these two works.Footnote ¹⁶ It has a wider perspective, taking pre-First World War naval policy as a basis for comparing later naval policy. The main focus is on the British side. The analysis of imperial defence, Anglo-American relations, and comparative building programmes is sufficiently complete and informative. M. Alch's Germany's naval resurgence: British appeasement and the Anglo-German Naval agreement, is a very extensive work on the interwar period in general and naval issues in particular.Footnote ¹⁷ The very wide scope of this work gives a coherent picture of all historical events, but remains in some places superficial. Because the Anglo-German naval agreement is not the sole subject of this work it lacks real depth in the analysis and reasoning behind the agreement. W. K. Wark's The ultimate enemy: British intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 gives a specialized angle on the information accessible to the British government.Footnote ¹⁸ Although it is neither solely concerned with naval matters nor with the Anglo-German naval agreement, it makes important points for naval relations, in particular by putting the British Admiralty's view that the Deutsches Reich could not be considered as a serious naval opponent. G. C. Peden, in British rearmament and the Treasury: 1932–1939, gives a similarly specialized angle on British defence preparations, this time from the perspective of the Treasury and corresponding budgetary policies. It gives a comprehensive picture of British financial considerations and shows that one of the primary reasons for the policy of appeasement, which with the benefit of hindsight was so flawed, was the dominant argument in the Treasury that the ‘fourth arm of defence’ was a stable economy and a balanced budget. Just like Lawrence R. Pratt's book East of Malta, west of Suez – Britain's Mediterranean crisis Peden also gives deep insights into Britain's imperial and worldwide responsibilities in the Far East, the Mediterranean, for the Dominions, and India.Footnote ¹⁹ The understanding of such ‘indissoluble connections’, but also the financial and military drain that followed from them, is crucially important to understanding Admiralty policy over the Anglo-German naval agreement, and also the bigger picture of appeasement policy to which the imperial defence rationale contributed to a considerable extent. Another important book is J. Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 1935–1939, particularly because of his ‘ohne England’ thesis.Footnote ²⁰ Studies with general relevance for the subject are G. C. Peden, ‘Sir Warren Fisher and British rearmament against Germany’,Footnote ²¹ M. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, 1935–1945,Footnote ²² G. Schmidt, The politics and economics of appeasement: British foreign policy in the 1930s,Footnote ²³ and G. L. Weinberg's two volumes on Nazi Germany.Footnote ²⁴ Most of the above contributions follow the chronological order of events which are not necessarily helpful in understanding how Anglo-German naval relations developed and how the Anglo-German naval agreement came about. Therefore, this article is structured thematically, i.e. the legal analysis in part IV and the military and political fields of analysis in the chapters on the two countries (parts V and VI).

IV

In June 1935, Ribbentrop announced bluntly at his first meeting with Foreign Secretary John Simon in London that the British should either accept the historic decision of the German chancellor for a 100:35 naval ratio between Britain and Germany – first mentioned to him during the previous Berlin visit in MarchFootnote ²⁵ – as the basis of future negotiations, or the German delegation would leave. Everyone in the German delegation, except Ribbentrop perhaps, thought this was the end of the Anglo-German naval negotiations, but within forty-eight hours the British government had decided to accept the German offer.Footnote ²⁶ The foreign secretary – then Samuel Hoare – and Ribbentrop signed the agreement on 18 June 1935.Footnote ²⁷

Were the British taken by surprise and fooled into this agreement? Hardly, because the more general remit on the basis of which the Foreign Office was working was to ‘facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement’Footnote ²⁸ envisaged for the second London naval conference later in 1935. Germany was supposed to take part,Footnote ²⁹ which would bring it effectively back into the circle of the naval powers. A few examples might serve to illustrate the spirit in which the Anglo-German agreement was concluded. ‘The German government will not insist on the incorporation of the ratio mentioned [35 per cent] in such future general treaty.’Footnote ³⁰ The reference to an envisaged general settling of the armament question and the confidence that the British government would respect the agreement with the German government is a good indication that the German representatives at London were left in no doubt that the permanence of the Anglo-German naval agreement would be guaranteed. There is no time limit in the agreement which was absolutely extraordinary for an international treaty at the time

The submarine clauses give a similar impression of acceptance of British supremacy.

Again, these clauses seem to imply a cordial, even trusting, relationship, of which the German signature under the rules on ‘submarine warfare’ is further proof i.e. ‘Germany undertakes from now on that she will abstain in any future war from the unrestricted use of the submarine for blockade purposes.’Footnote ³² These provisions were unlimited in time, too. Hence there are good indications that the first Anglo-German naval agreement was concluded by two willing parties.

The second Anglo-German naval agreement, 1937, gives a different impression. It could either be interpreted as dull routine or rather more critically as evidence of growing mistrust. This interpretation is supported by one of the final clauses: ‘The present agreement shall remain in force until the 31^st December 1942.’Footnote ³³ After only two years, no one was thinking about a ‘permanent and definite’ agreement, as in 1935.

This first change in the agreement was initiated by the British on the basis of Article 25 (1) – the ‘escape’ clause on grounds of national security. The French and the US government in concordance with His Majesty's Government, on 30 June 1938, changed Article 25 of the Second London Naval Treaty concerning maximum capital ship tonnage, increasing it from 35,000 to 45,000 tons.Footnote ³⁴ An increase in capital ship tonnage was a very serious step. The battleship was still considered the most powerful naval weapon.Footnote ³⁵ A tonnage increase in this category was bound to result in more powerful ships, if not an arms race.

In December 1938, the second change took place when the German government announced that it would exercise its right to build up to the submarine tonnage of the British Commonwealth. This was not a consequence of the previous change, but a separate development which did not come as a surprise to the British government, as Admiralty documents show.Footnote ³⁶ The reasons given by the German government were: ‘The development in the situation in the recent months’,Footnote ³⁷ and more precisely ‘the information before them regarding the extent of the construction of heavy cruisers by the Soviets’.Footnote ³⁸ Because of this the ‘National Security’ clauses in the 1937 Anglo-German naval agreement were invoked, with the intention of expanding the submarine fleet and of converting the 4th and 5th planned German cruiser from light to heavy.Footnote ³⁹

The British reply to these German decisions came with curt politeness.Footnote ⁴⁰ A suggestion of early talks was made and scheduled for 30 December in Berlin, but such naval discussions never got off the ground.Footnote ⁴¹ The important point to notice is the deterioration in tone and atmosphere.Footnote ⁴² The concession that German submarine expansion would be gradualFootnote ⁴³ and that the Reich would only build up to 65 per cent of the Royal Navy by 1939Footnote ⁴⁴ was not much of a consolation to the British delegation. Both sides knew that Germany was building vessels as fast as it could and the Kriegsmarine was in no position to expand much faster anyway. In the submarine category it had reached the 35 per cent limit, which meant that for future expansion beyond that point, tonnage had to be transferred from other categories,Footnote ⁴⁵ mainly from light cruisers.Footnote ⁴⁶ The emphasis on submarine building points towards political implications of the naval talks in Berlin. First, there was ‘the absolute wish of the Führer to use to the full the opportunities granted to Germany in the 1935 agreement’.Footnote ⁴⁷ Secondly, the British side realized that German (submarine) naval armament did not just serve defensive purposes, which was still considered the main task of submarines, but with bigger boats had developed an offensive potential which could threaten British sea communications.Footnote ⁴⁸ The repetition of the British First World War trauma of unrestricted submarine warfare seemed to become more likely as a future scenario.

The abrogation in April 1939 was only one consequent step further down the road of growing mistrust. Anglo-German relations had definitely deteriorated. The official reason of the Deutsches Reich for terminating the agreement was that the 35 per cent ratio was accepted on the basis that Great Britain was excluded for ever as a possible enemy.Footnote ⁴⁹ Britain had broken the mutual trust by preparations for war after the 1938 Munich agreement, counting Germany publicly in the circle of potential enemies.Footnote ⁵⁰ For the British government, the abrogation of the Anglo-German naval agreement was proof of Germany's war intentions and a flagrant breach of a voluntarily concluded ‘permanent and definite’ treaty.

V

On a general political level there were several reasons for the British government to conclude the naval agreement with the German Reich. Influential circles empathized with the German attitude against Versailles and saw the treaty driven by French victor's justice. There was also the realization that there had to be a ‘general settlement’ including Germany, at some point, in order to reach equilibrium in Europe, if not the world. Foreign Secretary Simon had considered arguments like this for years. His hopes of reaching a satisfactory general European settlement diminished when the Nazis came to power and the first signs of tension and atrocities became apparent. After his first visit to Berlin in March 1935 he remarked, ‘Berlin leaves the anxious visitor with a sense that he has had a whiff from the bottomless pit.’ However, he still clung to his final aim of lasting peace.

Simon was facing stiff parliamentary opposition at home with the invitation of German naval representatives to London. Not least because of this and also because of the larger political background and Germany's diplomatic isolation at the time Simon intended the naval agreement to be a gesture of good will towards Germany. He had to put up with some opposition in diplomatic circles, too, as Eric Phipps's reply to his letter suggests, but the general line seems to go fairly uncontested: ‘Whilst it is important not to drive the inhabitant of the bottomless pit into a corner by giving him the impression that we also are definitely against him, it is equally important to avoid giving him excessive encouragement.’Footnote ⁵² It is probably fair to conclude that the British government had come to the decision that a revision of the Versailles Treaty and proper replacement in legal terms was overdue in 1935. ‘The matter of Germany's naval claims is, of course, a part of the whole question of German rearmament and of her claim to “Gleichberechtigung”.’Footnote ⁵³ The Anglo-German naval agreement must therefore be seen as a first step towards this envisaged ‘general settlement’.

Britain was also aiming for at least one very concrete result from the Anglo-German naval agreement, namely Germany's support for the British position at the upcoming second London naval conference. It was certainly a great support for the Admiralty to have a binding agreement with at least one of the participants. Negotiations with the other parties, particularly France, would be much easier with concrete figures of German naval planning at hand. ‘It is unlikely, however, that much progress can be made in further discussions with France until it is known what would be the probable demands of Germany if she is to be part of any future convention on naval limitations.’Footnote ⁵⁴

In political terms certainty about German naval planning was of great importance. As Erich Raeder put it:

The particular background to this argument of an increase in British bargaining strength lay to a considerable extent outside the old world and in the Japanese claims for naval parity.Footnote ⁵⁶

The Anglo-German naval agreement was also a tool within the general framework of limiting German armament production.Footnote ⁵⁷ The British Admiralty was asked to formulate its opinion about the German ratio proposal.Footnote ⁵⁸ Most of the senior naval officers in the Admiralty had experienced action against the then Imperial German Navy in the First World War. What was offered before the First World War as a possible ratio between the Royal Navy and the Imperial German Navy was 16:12, or at best 16:10. In either case, the Royal Navy would have been considerably worse off than was the case with Hitler's 35 per cent proposal. It is not hard to understand that most of the senior British naval officers thought they could live with a German fleet of that size:

Moreover, it was well known that strategic naval planning in the Weimar time was directed against France. The aim of the Reichsmarine was to achieve parity with France. In terms of the British fleet this would roughly have meant a 50 per cent ratio. This was repeatedly pointed out by Raeder to Hitler.Footnote ⁶⁰ Hence, the 35 per cent ratio in the naval agreement was seen as the most favourable deal possible.Footnote ⁶¹

Therefore, the Admiralty's verdict was entirely in favour of the German proposal.Footnote ⁶³ The predominance of the Royal Navy was not threatened.Footnote ⁶⁴

The question of the U-boat is another point and a psychological gamble in itself. In principle Hitler agreed with the British government's position that submarines should be prohibited, but only under the precondition that the other naval powers committed themselves to the same cause.Footnote ⁶⁵ Japan and France, however, regarded their submarine fleets as essential to their national security. There is one important distinction in submarine armament which has to be understood to grasp the capabilities of these boats as well as the expectations Japan, France, and Hitler, too, had for them. Small boats were regarded as an effective and cheap means of coastal defence. The first German 250 ton U-boats ordered in 1935 are good examples of such boats. The second category is larger ocean-going submarines with greater endurance in terms of fuel, fresh water, ammunition and food stocks. These are the boats which would be used in attack operations as ‘Wolf packs’ against mercant shipping in the Atlantic. These are the boats Karl Dönitz meant when he wrote: ‘The U-boat is essentially an offensive weapon.’Footnote ⁶⁶

The voluntary German self-limitation to 45 per cent was seen by the Germans themselves rather less as a concession than as a precedent to naval expansion beyond the 35 per cent.Footnote ⁶⁷ The 45 per cent ratio was agreed upon the basis of a British submarine tonnage of 52,700 tons.Footnote ⁶⁸ It is clear that the German delegation attached great importance to the submarine arm. The British, on the other hand, did not raise too strong an objection. The effective counter-measure to unrestricted submarine warfare was the convoy system as proven in the First World War.Footnote ⁶⁹ In addition to this, the development of the Asdic or Sonar system was assumed by naval experts to minimize the submarine threat. This was the foundation on which the British Admiralty based their negotiation tactics. The U-boat problem was considered to be negligible if not already solved. Only on this basis does the subsequent action of the Admiralty make sense. They had a binding treaty which would have enabled them to force disarmament upon the Deutsches Reich. It is true that in the case of submarines, the 100 per cent provision could be invoked by the Germans, but by definition the maximum would be the British submarine tonnage. Continuing this counterfactual argument, a unilateral decommissioning of British submarines would have forced Germany to comply.

Even the strategic argument can be discarded. The submarine was not essential to British naval strategy. The main duty of the fleet was the defensive task of protecting sea communications. To fulfil this duty, the submarine would definitely have to be of the larger type, because a large radius of action was needed. This type of vessel, however, is inherently offensive and not very suitable for convoy protection. Light cruisers or destroyers fulfilled this kind of duty much more effectively in the British fleet. The few larger submarines operating with the fleet and the smaller craft for defensive purposes at home did not amount to the Washington limit of 52,700 tons. As such the Admiralty had complete freedom to reduce submarine tonnage. This conclusion was even reached in the naval memorandum on the Anglo-German naval agreement: ‘Apart from the psychological aspect of the question, the only other way to ensure reasonable limitation of German submarine building is to keep our own tonnage as low as possible.’Footnote ⁷⁰ But this course was not taken, because it was not seen as necessary. The only possible explanation is that the Admiralty did not consider the U-boat as a serious threat anymore.

Not only was it considered unnecessary to limit submarine tonnage, the Admiralty discerned even some advantage in a relatively large German submarine arm. A higher percentage of German submarines i.e. beyond 35 per cent, would have to be taken from another category of ships.Footnote ⁷¹ If we recall the Admiralty's preoccupation with the battleship as the backbone of their naval strategy this additional submarine tonnage would ideally be taken from the German battleship category. This hope was not realized and German battleship tonnage amounted to about 40 per cent of the British when the last battleship, the Tirpitz, was laid down in 1940/1.Footnote ⁷² Instead, the tonnage came from light cruisers.Footnote ⁷³ This was the British Commonwealth's largest single category with 192,200 tons.Footnote ⁷⁴ Therefore it was very easy for the Germans to remove some tonnage from this category. The voluntary German transfer to submarines must have been seen by the British naval experts as a windfall gain.

On the basis of British strategic planning this German move could only be attributed to old-fashioned, inadequate German naval doctrine dating back to the last war. Even if all this must be regarded as merely a by-product of the general negotiating tactics for the Anglo-German naval agreement, the account of the hunt for the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee shows that the British admirals saw fast surface raiders as a much greater danger than submarines.Footnote ⁷⁵ In comparison, submarines were considered sitting ducks i.e. slow under water and therefore vulnerable to attacks even from smaller surface vessels and with unreliable and short-distance weaponry, i.e. torpedoes. Evidence for this strand of argument could also be seen in the increase in British submarine tonnage after the Anglo-German naval agreement, which was interestingly enough not predicted in the building programme submitted to the Germans in 1935. The number given as reference for German submarine tonnage in 1938 was 70,000 tons,Footnote ⁷⁶ as against just above 40,000 tons in the 1935 building programme.Footnote ⁷⁷ A proportionate increase in German submarine tonnage had to be expected. Even without the 1938 German announcement to parity in submarines with Britain, a large increase in German U-boat numbers was therefore effectively encouraged by the Admiralty. An increase in U-boat tonnage did not concern them too much and was more welcome than an increase in any other category.

Considering the Empire's defence requirements the European naval theatre was not the prime concern. Japan was a far bigger threat to the Empire.Footnote ⁷⁸ ‘At present time [1935] Japan's total naval strength by tonnage is about 64% of ours, and Germany's is less than 11%. In the vital matter of capital ships, the percentages are 57% and 15%.’Footnote ⁷⁹ The Admiralty set out some objectives which had to be fulfilled to make the German 35 per cent offer acceptable to British security needs in the UK: ‘That we should be called upon to fight Germany and Japan simultaneously without allies is a state of affairs to the prevention of which our diplomacy would naturally be directed.’Footnote ⁸⁰ Consequently the Anglo-German naval agreement would be the means of British diplomacy to mollify Germany. The main fleet would then have a free hand in the Far East. The percentage of the Royal Navy which would be available to oppose Japan would be rather greater than 65 per cent, because the French Navy could supplement the British Home Fleet. Furthermore, Japanese naval efficiency was assumed to be around 80 per cent of the British,Footnote ⁸¹ which would enhance naval superiority in the Far East even further.

In terms of resource allocation between the services the Far East was vital for the Royal Navy.Footnote ⁸² The Air Force had become the main defence of the British mainland. But for Far Eastern possessions this was not possible, because of the still limited capabilities of contemporary aircraft. The Navy was the uncontested defender of the Empire. In light of the contest of resources between the Navy and the other services, it was in the interest of the Navy to paint a picture of relative tranquillity in the European theatre. Their strong voice in favour of the Anglo-German naval agreement could be attributed to their anxiety to keep the Deutsches Reich satisfied and therefore quiet. Only a greater stress on imperial defence could guarantee further financial support for the Navy. ‘An embryonic, alternative foreign policy was derived by the Admiralty from the [Anglo-German Naval] agreement, symbolized by Admiral Chatfield's views on the unwisdom of any British commitment to stop German aggression in Eastern Europe.’Footnote ⁸³ This might be called an early version of appeasement policy towards Germany, but on the basis of a weighted rearmament against Japan. Imperial defence was the key issue for the admirals. Continental matters did not, in their view, threaten British interests.Footnote ⁸⁴

Imperial defence contains further incentives for the conclusion of the Anglo-German naval agreement. To fix the German Navy at a certain, relatively low level would permit an adequate imperial defence. Shortly after the Anglo-German agreement Japan would no longer be bound by the limits of the Washington and London naval treaties. This certainly made the British Admiralty more anxious to come to an agreement with Germany, even under conditions which would not have been acceptable a few years before. In this the Admiralty was certainly in concordance with its political leadership: ‘We must keep out of troubles in Central Europe at all costs. July twenty years ago stands out as an awful warning.’Footnote ⁸⁵ The comparison of the continental situation with July 1914 weighed heavily on British European policy. Public opinion in the form of the pacifist movement and the ‘Peace Ballot’ was strongly in favour of this policy.Footnote ⁸⁶ French encirclement policy against the Deutsches Reich rang every possible alarm bell with British politicians:Footnote ⁸⁷ ‘this has been the fashionable Gallic policy ever since the war … and, as the history of reparations shows, it has not been very successful’.Footnote ⁸⁸ Neither did Simon expect encirclement to be very successful in the future: ‘Joining hands with France and Russia and the rest in a ring round the smoking crater [Germany] will not necessarily stop the explosion.’Footnote ⁸⁹ The Anglo-German naval agreement was the implementation of the British third way between on the one side French encirclement and on the other German unilateral rearmament. It was a genuine offer which incorporated the longstanding British experience in the naval sphere.

British officials realized that there would probably be no way around the 35 per cent as it stood.

From the British view there was still enough negotiating space left to conclude a mutually beneficial agreement. The 35 per cent would be accepted as a screen, but the British building programmes would be the core of a future agreement. As Simon saw it,

Simon neither wanted to give up hope of moderating the Nazi regime in Germany, nor did he have sufficient trust in the reliability and wisdom of the French.Footnote ⁹⁴ The internal British documentation of the Anglo-German naval discussions shows this clearly: ‘it would be a mistake to withhold acceptance merely on the ground that other powers might feel some temporary annoyance at our action’.Footnote ⁹⁵ The inclusion of the Deutsches Reich in a European security system instead of French antagonistic policy was the important point for the British government to keep. The Anglo-German naval agreement was therefore deliberate British policy and, as the above sources show, not something the British government was rushed or duped into by the Germans. The policy was that of reconciliation and the Anglo-German naval agreement was deliberately chosen to be the first step in that direction. That the actual outcome was contrary to the old coalition policy was clear. The break up of the Stresa front against German rearmament was not anticipated. Simon's plan must have been that this would never happen, because the other powers would be reconciled by the beneficial outcome of the British action for European peace. Not everything, however, worked out as planned by the British government.

VI

From a conservative standpoint there must have been considerable doubt in Germany whether the figure of 35 per cent was realistic. First, in terms of the purpose of such a fleet, i.e. beyond the claim for Gleichberechtigung, for what reason did the Reich need such a big fleet? Secondly, was the Reich capable of finding the resources for such a doubtless costly project in view of its shattered finances? And thirdly, when the Reich realized the expenses it was facing, would it not backtrack to much lower figures anyway?

The conclusion was that given the background of missed opportunities in the past, i.e. a 300,000 men army, Britain would not call the bluff if such it was. Seen from the other side, one reason for Germany to conclude the agreement is quite clear: even if they could not build up to the limit, they had the legal right to do so. In the beginning, therefore, the Anglo-German naval agreement was more about the German legal claim to go beyond the limits of the Versailles Treaty than about actual German naval rearmament. In the guidelines for the German delegation to London, it says under ‘basic items which are not negotiable’: ‘Qualitative equality of Germany in all categories of ships … consequently the abrogation of Part V. of the Versailles Treaty concerning the Navy.’Footnote ⁹⁷ Immediately after that, the 35 per cent ratio is put down as a non-negotiable point.Footnote ⁹⁸ ‘Hitler then expressly informed the members of the delegation that no further concessions were to be made, and that if necessary they should break off negotiations and return without the desired success.’Footnote ⁹⁹ This uncompromising stance on the key issues does not seem to be a good negotiation tactics. However, even the British Admiralty judged that ‘We have received the impression that the German government genuinely considers that they have made a generous and self-sacrificing decision.’Footnote ¹⁰⁰ In consequent correlation with general German policy, the major goal for the Reich to achieve was an official sanction from the British government for its breaking the Versailles Treaty. The German representatives saw the British signature as the accomplishment of the most important aim of post-war German policy: ‘Part V. of the Versailles Treaty … was finished. German equality in the armament sector was realised.’Footnote ¹⁰¹ The message Britain wanted its allies to see in this agreement was that even Nazi Germany could be bound to armament limitation if treated fairly and that there was a prospect of a peaceful future. What remained despite good intentions was exactly what the German diplomats thought they had achieved, namely Germany's release from Versailles and what it was meant to prevent, namely German rearmament.

In January 1939, the Z-Plan was signed by Hitler.Footnote ¹⁰² This long-term production plan for the German Navy reached up to 1947 and beyond, to a final target. It entailed the building of the so-called Weltmachtflotte, comprising 25 battleships, 8 aircraft carriers, 162 U-boats for ocean warfare, just to name the most striking figures. This fleet was essentially designed for Hitler's conception of German world hegemony. Internal consolidation of the regime in Germany would be followed by European expansion and finally German world domination. For this plan to succeed he would need a fleet to support far-reaching German territorial possessions all over the world for the time after continental expansion.Footnote ¹⁰³ Moreover, conflict might arise on the way to this Endziel (final aim) among the current naval and colonial powers. Therefore the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) would also have to be able to fight off those opponents. It does not need too much imagination to name these opponents as the Royal Navy and the US Navy.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ The Z-Plan was therefore in part the implementation of the future scenario which had been considered inconceivable – the revival of the Anglo-German antagonism.

One may ask whether there was a relationship between the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and the Z-Plan of 1939? The Z-Plan could be seen as being the logical result of consistent desire for unrestricted German naval rearmament coupled with expansionism. In this context, there could be two reasons for the German government to conclude the Anglo-German naval agreement. First, it sanctioned a fourfold increase in German naval strength in 1935. This falls well into line with naval planning for a German Navy after Versailles as well as with the general trend of German military expansion. Most importantly, it is the stated aim of the German delegation for the Anglo-German negotiations in 1935.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Secondly, it would provide good cover for Hitler's real intentions, namely to build the Weltmachtflotte. However, there is no evidence for such plans in 1935, although the first stages of the Z-Plan could be fitted into the limitations under the naval agreement,Footnote ¹⁰⁶ but this is due to the very small German Navy in 1935. The conclusion which can legitimately be drawn from this is that the 35 per cent ratio was not an acute limitation for the Kriegsmarine. Yet, plans for a Weltmachtflotte beyond 35 per cent cannot be deduced from this. The chaotic implementation of the Z-Plan proves this. The Z-Plan might have been based on some of Hitler's vague preconceptions of the future. However, I would argue that this is still worlds apart from actual naval planning, and did not influence the Anglo-German Naval negotiations in 1935.

The U-boat-Waffe (German submarine service), however, had always been part of post-Versailles German naval planning, and the main advocate for a strong U-boat arm was Dönitz. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the newly commissioned U-boat arm. He had developed the ‘wolf pack’ submarine tactics. However, just as in the British Admiralty, there was considerable doubt in the Seekriegsleitung (German Admiralty) whether the U-boat could deliver the same disruption to allied merchant shipping as in the First World War:

The main reference in this quotation is to the protocol on unrestricted submarine warfare signed with the 1935 agreement. The tactical background is British convoy shipping and progress in tracking techniques, i.e. sonar. The submarine was certainly not regarded as the decisive military weapon which Dönitz pleaded it could become if he received about 300 ocean-going vessels.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ The go-ahead for the alternative building programme in favour of surface ships is the best proof of this.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ Even Hitler's comments that the U-boat arm would break British resistance in a future war must be regarded as nostalgic, rather than based on up-to-date naval expertise.Footnote ¹¹⁰ Only in 1943, when there was obviously no longer hope of successful surface warfare and the devastating impact of submarine warfare had delivered results, were all naval resources put into the expansion of the U-boat arm.Footnote ¹¹¹

Despite all doubts about the effectiveness of the U-boat, the German delegation attached great importance to the submarine ratio in 1935. The claim to Gleichberechtigung stands out from the overall 35 per cent ratio. The 45 per cent self-limitation of the Germans seems out of order with a solely expansionist aim. This course was taken for three reasons. First, submarine parity supports the general political aim of Gleichberechtigung. Secondly, the 45 per cent would provide the Navy with enough freedom to build submarines, just in case Dönitz was right. However, lastly, and most importantly, it left open the political option for a stick and carrot policy towards Britain. Germany could either slowly build up to 45 per cent, or expand the U-boat arm very quickly beyond 35 per cent up to 45 per cent and 100 per cent if necessary. Which course the German government took would remain a question of political strategy. The political decision was taken not only against the U-boat arm, but against the whole of the Kriegsmarine. The Heer and the Luftwaffe were to enjoy priority. The Navy, therefore, was never seriously in a position to challenge the Royal Navy and was never meant to. In terms of resources the projected aim of the Deutsches Reich was to become the dominant continental power. The Anglo-German naval agreement has to be seen in this greater context:

In exchange, Hitler wanted British acceptance of German continental hegemony. Hitler's ‘Mein Kampf’ is full of Germany's potential, past, and future enemies on the continent.Footnote ¹¹³ The idea of divided spheres of interest between the Reich and the Empire is just one example. Britain was supposed to be the maritime power in Hitler's scheme. ‘As it was, he persuaded himself that if he left the command of the sea to us, we would leave the command of the land to him.’Footnote ¹¹⁴ Hence, it was a conscious decision to leave naval hegemony to the British Empire. Not so much because of Hitler's benevolence, but because British ships would also not be able to disturb Hitler's continental expansion.

However, the fall-back option was a fairly small yet powerful German Navy consisting of two elements. First, a smaller version of the imperial German battle fleet, which had caused the British Admiralty so much worry, with now superior and modern naval technology e.g. pocket battleships or super battleships of the Bismarck class. Secondly, the revival of the U-boat arm and the spectre of unrestricted submarine warfare was an important psychological weapon. This was the other First World War trauma which could be utilized. Despite considerable firepower this German Navy was no match for the Royal Navy. The deterrence function is therefore of a psychological nature rather than an actual material threat. The aims of the German delegation to London would therefore seem to have been twofold. First, Ribbentrop had to achieve a tacit British agreement to Hitler's ‘spheres of interest concept’ which was inherent in the deliberately moderate 35 per cent proposal. This was meant as an incentive for Britain to accept German continental expansion. Secondly, he had to safeguard a large enough German Navy to teach the Royal Navy some respect in the form of deterrence to become not too involved with continental matters. Consequently, the acceptance of the 35 per cent ratio was interpreted by Hitler as meaning that he could talk to the British in terms of geopolitics and therefore it was seen as a start of a deeper understanding.

The Anglo-German naval agreement would be the way towards a deeper understanding with the British. Therefore Ribbentrop could answer the question for the duration of the agreement with ‘Ewig’.Footnote ¹¹⁶ This was translated into ‘a permanent and definite agreement’,Footnote ¹¹⁷ but the symbolic importance could be seen as so great that the direct translation of ‘eternal or for ever’Footnote ¹¹⁸ which the German interpreter refused to take might seem more appropriate. On what kind of basis could one conclude an eternal agreement, having the internal conviction of the truth of Nazi ideology? Ribbentrop, probably speaking in the words of his master,Footnote ¹¹⁹ and as the only delegation member who was a close associate of Hitler, might have been the only one who understood their full meaning. This could be taken as the strongest indictor yet for the mindset on the basis of which the negotiations were conducted. Therein lay what Nazi foreign policy had been aiming at, namely the chance for an alliance of the two great Germanic peoples.Footnote ¹²⁰ The race motive is so essential to Nazi ideology that it does not seem to be too far fetched to see it as a motive for the conclusion of the Anglo-German naval agreement too. Hence, the Anglo-German naval agreement went beyond maritime matters into German alliance-seeking policy with Britain. This ‘marriage proposal’ function is quite similar to British ‘gesture politics’, suggested previously, but definitely with this peculiar folkish almost emotional motivation.

VII

‘Anyone who undertakes an examination of the present alliance possibilities for Germany … must arrive at the conclusion that the last practicable tie remains with England.’Footnote ¹²¹ This conviction had been the basis of Hitler's foreign policy. Hitler wanted to re-establish the Deutsches Reich in its ‘rightful’ position as a world power. This was the non-negotiable core of Hitler's concept. For this purpose, he wanted Britain as an ally. The 1935 Anglo-German naval agreement falls into this ‘mit[with]-England’ phase and had a special function in Hitler's plans. It was the bridgehead for further steps with Britain on the common road towards each nation's rightful position in the world, i.e. ‘Germany will either be a world power or there will be no Germany.’Footnote ¹²² War was, therefore, inevitable in Hitler's concept, as the former British ambassador to Berlin points out. ‘With Hitler in power there was no escaping war. Hitler never intended the ultimate end to be other than war.’Footnote ¹²³ Peace was equated with the status quo of the Weimar years. This was not acceptable to Hitler.

In contrast to this, ‘the British leadership had a completely different understanding of the solution for the European problem than Hitler, and was not very likely to support the basic concept of the German dictator for it’.Footnote ¹²⁴ Hitler therefore changed his course slightly. ‘No longer in alliance with England, as planned in the “Mein Kampf” concept, but simply without [England], he sought to realize his “Programme”, but if possible not against [England].’Footnote ¹²⁵ As it became increasingly obvious that Britain could not be disinterested in German expansionism in Eastern Europe, the abrogation on the naval agreement became the last warning before conflict became inevitable. As Hitler had told Chamberlain earlier, that would be the last step before going to war with Britain.Footnote ¹²⁶

Back in 1935, however, the world power Britain was committed to taking a step towards the humiliated but yet again dangerous Reich. This first step was the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. The analysis of the British position has shown that this rapprochement was a deliberate policy, initiated and driven by the British foreign secretary Sir John Simon, to break the deadlock over disarmament and prevent further polarization in the European theatre. Britain's main aim was peace, not solely for altruistic reasons, but obviously to preserve the Empire, too. The abrogation of the agreement in 1939 was public notice of the failure of British as well as German strategy.Footnote ¹²⁷ It is important to realize that for both sides the psychological component was more important than actual military outcomes. Two protagonists of the time bring this out in their last words on this topic. ‘Guarantee us peace and peaceful evolution in Europe, and Germany will find that she has no more sincere and, I believe, more useful friend in the world than Great Britain.’Footnote ¹²⁸ This was the core British value, put by Henderson. Hitler's words on the subject are equally revealing:

This shows the irreconcilable opposites, of which the abrogation of the Anglo-German naval agreement was the outward sign. The consequent course would lead both nations into the most horrendous conflict in history. The Anglo-German naval agreement must, hence, be seen as a period of superficial understanding between the Reich and the Empire, i.e. a superficial proximity which could not become a deeper alliance without either of the two sides giving up fundamental positions, even values and beliefs, on war and peace, race and nation, and Empire and Reich.