Bob Sullivan and Ian Dennis have produced a masterful collection of essays on a topic of tremendous, and increasing, importance: the preventive use of criminal law. It is almost a commonplace at this moment to say that governments in Western democracies are governing through fear, that citizens are kept in a heightened state of anxiety by their governments, as well as by popular media and those who benefit most from sustaining a constant state of insecurity within the citizenry of such states. In such conditions, security sells, and enable governments to do things they could never otherwise get away with—curtailment of such basic rights as the rights of assembly and peaceful protest, the right to privacy of communications, mobility rights, etc. In addition to countless new regulations and restrictions, the ever-expanding reach of both domestic and foreign surveillance systems, the increased use of national security as a cloak for greater government secrecy, and the myriad of other techniques now employed by governments in the name of providing security in an insecure world, such states have also turned to their criminal justice systems as a tool for preventing harm.
Just as the populations of Western democracies are told that they face an existential crisis from global terrorism (a claim that is false, in fact), they are simultaneously told that they must fear the criminal element in their communities as well. The popular representation of criminals—as dangerous, violent predators lying in wait for their next innocent victims—is, of course, as far from the truth as are claims that terrorists are lurking in every corner just waiting for a chance to impose death and devastation upon us all. The vast majority of crimes are non-violent. A very large percentage of recidivists are imprisoned for technical violations—violations of previous orders of the criminal law system, rather than for new substantive offences. Even in crimes of violence, almost all victims know their perpetrators; the risk of ‘stranger danger’ is statistically insignificant compared with the risk of violence at the hands of family members (usually fathers, husbands, brothers, boyfriends, or sons), inter- and intra-gang violence, spontaneous violence stemming from situational conflicts, intoxication, and so on. And, perhaps the greatest irony of all, those who benefit from fear of crime have been able to create and sustain a high level of insecurity concerning crime despite the fact that actual criminality—the rate of all crimes, including violent ones—has been steadily declining for decades in most jurisdictions.
It is only against this backdrop that one can fully appreciate the issues addressed in Seeking Security. For, on the face of it, what could be wrong with using the criminal law as one of many tools with which to combat crime? What could be wrong with trying to prevent crimes before they happen, rather than waiting until after they have occurred and using the law only to punish those who commit them? Surely if we are entitled to criminalize any conduct x, we may also criminalize attempting to x or risking x. These latter measures are preventive, and surely we may use law to try to prevent ex ante the commission of those acts we have determined to be worthy of public condemnation and punishment ex post. Indeed, in declaring some kinds of conduct to be criminal wrongs, and attaching the threat of punishment to their commission, are we not, fundamentally, trying to secure that fewer instances of those kinds of conduct are, in fact, done? If the use of criminal law is justified, at any point and to any degree, by its potential to reduce wrongful harms being done, i.e., by its deterrent effect, then we have already accepted that we may use the law preventively. We have already accepted, in the words of the book’s subtitle, that we may Pre-Empt[] the Commission of Criminal Harms. Using criminal law to do so is just one of many ways that societies legitimately seek security. Even more strongly, a state which did not use all the legitimate means at its disposal to protect its citizens from suffering preventable wrongfully inflicted harms would, for that very reason, be subject to justifiable criticism: it would have failed one of its most basic duties to its members.
And yet, when such luminaries as Malcolm Thorburn, Shlomit Wallerstein, A.P. Simester, Jeremy Holder, Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, R.A. Duff, John Stanton-Ife, Peter Ramsay, Lucia Zedner, Martin Wasik, Jonathan Rogers, and the editors of Seeking Security all think there are pressing issues involved in the preventive use of criminal law, we are compelled to look beyond the face of things. Though each looks at different aspects of the recent increased use of criminal law to pre-empt crime ex ante rather than punish it ex post—identification, surveillance and profiling; the imposition of obligations to disclose information about the criminal intentions of others; the rise and variety of prophylactic crimes; the role of harm and the anticipatory perspective in criminalization decisions; the relation between risk and culpability in inchoate crimes; the relation between autonomy and preventive uses of the law; the use of preventive orders; the use of the precautionary principle in decisions to incarcerate; risk assessments, expertise and competence of criminal courts; tests for dangerousness; the relation between self-defence and crime prevention; and the limits of state action against innocent persons in the war on terror—all are struggling to find the limiting principles that should guide state officials who would employ the criminal law in preventive or prophylactic ways.
Together, the essays demonstrate the breadth of the problems created by the preventive turn in criminal law: the press toward criminalizing conduct ever more remote from any substantive wrong, the difficulties of the increased reliance on risk assessments and judgments of dangerousness, the potential for wrongdoing by state agents in the wars on crime and terror, the social costs of laws requiring persons to report on the criminal activities of others, the dangers posed by the increased claims to power by states in the name of providing security, etc. They also reveal the depth of disagreement amongst criminal law theorists: some of the authors are much more sanguine about the preventive turn than others, they disagree about whether preventive uses can be reconciled with retributive constraints on punishment, and they disagree about how far states should be permitted to go in addressing the insecurity they themselves have, if not manufactured, at least exaggerated for political gain.
Most of the authors offer not just critical reflections on their subject matter—and acute analyses of the, sometimes subtle, changes to our understanding of criminal law and its role in a just society that are wrought by defining crimes in increasingly inchoate modes. They also offer positive prescriptions and recommendations which, if followed, would supply principled limits on the ever-expanding reach of the criminal law into more and more innocent conduct, and would restrain the worst abuses of state power that are purportedly justified by the need to provide security in an insecure world. Yet, in the end, this is not an optimistic book. It is, instead, a cautionary tale about precautionary reasoning in the realm of criminal law.
Sullivan and Dennis have produced a very good book. Seeking Security is a collection of essays greater than the sum of its parts (which all anthologies aspire to be, but so few actually are). It will reward careful reading by anyone interested in contemporary criminal law theory or moral, social and political philosophy, as well as providing rich fodder for anyone interested in understanding how even liberal democracies can lose their way in times of insecurity. I highly recommend it.
