Walter Glannon argues that our proposal for routine recovery (also known as conscription) of transplantable cadaveric organs is unacceptable “even if the consequence of [continuing to require consent] would be fewer organs for transplantation and fewer lives saved.”Footnote 1 After carefully reviewing his counterarguments, we conclude that, although some of them have merit, none are sufficiently strong to warrant abandoning this plan. Below we respond to each of Glannon's concerns.
Impact of Routine Recovery on Organ Sales
In one of our editorials we stated that under routine recovery there would be “no need to consider paying for organs.”Footnote 2 Glannon points out that routine recovery would not eliminate the possibility of buying organs from living vendors (note that one who sells is not a donor) and therefore that ethical concerns about organ sales would persist. We agree. What we meant and should have said in our editorial is that under routine recovery there would be no need to consider paying for cadaveric organs. But the fact that our proposal would not eliminate the possibility of organ sales and the ethical quandaries that accompany them has no bearing on its acceptability.
Glannon's Major Objections to Routine Recovery
Glannon cites two major objections to routine recovery of transplantable cadaveric organs. The first is that this plan “could compromise physicians' duty of care to critically ill patients with viable organs” (p. 331). The second is that routine recovery without consent might adversely alter the dying process. These alleged problems could potentially harm dying patients, their surviving loved ones, or both. We now review and respond to each of these objections.
Concerns about End-of-Life Care under Routine Recovery
Glannon suggests that if the requirement for consent for cadaveric organ recovery were eliminated, “[t]his could put intensivists in a conflict of interest between their primary duty to critically ill patients with viable organs and their secondary duty to promote transplantation” (p. 331). Glannon also suggests that given the urgent need of potential transplant recipients, under routine recovery “there might be a tendency to prematurely withdraw life support from and not give appropriate care to patients” (p. 331). For the reasons outlined below, we believe that these concerns are unfounded.
First, we disagree that “intensivists” or any other physicians caring for patients who are potential organ sources have a “secondary duty to other patients as organ recipients” (p. 335). Over 20 years ago Dr. Levinsky pointed out that, “In caring for an individual patient, the doctor must act solely as that patient's advocate,”Footnote 3 a position we support strongly. The physician is unable to do this if she is asked to balance the interests of one patient against those of another. This realization has led to the widely accepted practice that the team caring for the dying patient must be totally independent of the team that cares for transplant recipients and procures organs.Footnote 4 When this guideline is followed, there should be no conflict of interest for treating physicians. And despite Glannon's claim to the contrary, removing the requirement for consent to posthumous organ recovery would in no way compromise the ability to achieve independence of critical care physicians and recovery teams.
Second, the fear of premature withdrawal of care is not unique to routine recovery.Footnote 5 There is growing support for the view that when it is known that the decedent had wanted to be an organ donor, that wish should be honored.Footnote 6 In such cases there is just as much reason to be worried about inappropriate withdrawal of care as there would be under routine recovery. And this should not be a concern at all if the teams responsible for care and recovery are entirely separate, as good practice dictates.
Third, we recommend that routine recovery be limited to brain dead subjects; in these cases, death is declared on the basis of neurological criteria and before ventilatory support is withdrawn. This restriction would eliminate the possibility that routine recovery could lead to premature withdrawal of life support or conflicts of interest for treating physicians because support would not be withdrawn before organ recovery and the subjects would be dead. Although tissue oxygenation may be maintained for a short time by mechanical ventilation and circulatory support, it is incorrect to refer to this as life support because the former patient is no longer alive.
Finally, it is important to note that even if the treatment decisions of some physicians were influenced by an awareness of the great need for organs, the expected effect of this would be to maintain rather than reduce support of patients nearing brain death in order to maintain organ viability.
Glannon asserts that routine recovery could compromise end-of-life care in three other ways. The first of these alleged problems involves the administration of potentially harmful medications (designed to preserve organ quality) prior to withdrawal of life support. Here it is important to distinguish clearly organ donation after cardiac death (DCD) from that following brain death. The organ protection techniques Glannon mentions are administered before death only in DCD cases. If, as we advocate, the application of routine recovery were limited to cases in which brain death has been declared, there would be no possibility of hastening death or causing other harm because the subject would already be dead.
The second alleged problem relates to the status of patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or persistent vegetative state under routine recovery. Again, as long as routine recovery were limited to cases of brain death, there would be no risk that the policy would jeopardize the care of patients in these two groups, as members of neither are dead.
Finally Glannon asserts that “conscription of cadaveric organs would probably … result in longer waits before life-sustaining care was withdrawn” (p. 332). We disagree. After life support is withdrawn from dying (but still living) patients, the determination of death is based on cardiopulmonary rather than neurological criteria. Under our proposal, such patients would not be eligible for routine organ recovery because this plan would be limited to cases of brain death (in which ventilatory support continues). Therefore, routine recovery would not affect the timing of withdrawal of support from live patients. And although we agree that there are legitimate reasons for questioning the “dead donor rule,”Footnote 7 routine recovery of organs after brain death adheres to its principle.
Concerns about the Impact of Routine Recovery on the Dying Patient and Her Family
Glannon asserts that “[h]aving the choice to donate on behalf of a loved one may enable a family to construct meaning from their loss by understanding the death of the patient as an opportunity to benefit others in need…. [In this way] donating organs results in … psychological benefits for families” (pp. 333–4). He further suggests that routine recovery “may fail to appreciate the emotional distress of families” (p. 334) and might actually exacerbate the family's pain because it would “preclude the choice that can enable families to work through this difficult period” (p. 334). Glannon concludes, “The needs of those in end-stage organ failure are urgent and should be met, but not by disregarding families' emotional distress [which routine recovery of cadaveric organs would do]” (p. 334). Given these concerns, he supports an opting-in approach that requires consent for posthumous organ procurement.
We recognize that routine recovery may be distressing to some families and we agree that granting permission to procure life-saving organs from a recently deceased loved one can be comforting and beneficial for close family members. But these benefits are not sufficient to justify giving the family (or the individual before death) control over this process; there are costs associated with this approach and these must also be considered. If everyone (or almost everyone) said yes when asked for permission to recover organs from a recently deceased relative, the cost to society of following an opting-in policy would be very small and the balance of cost versus benefit would favor continuing this policy. But because many families say no, the cost of adhering to an opting-in approach is extremely high: that is, an unnecessary loss of lives that could be saved through transplantation but for want of an organ. Given this situation we need to make a choice: We can either continue to allow families to decide so as not to exacerbate their distress and to provide them the possibility of benefiting through consent, or we can sacrifice these potential benefits in the interest of saving more lives. We cannot have it both ways. Here it is worth recalling that when dealing with endangered people who wish to live, saving lives is generally the highest priority.Footnote 8 Therefore, for us the choice is easy: Because saving lives is much more important than minimizing emotional distress, and because more lives would be saved under routine recovery than are saved under opting-in, we believe that the former policy is clearly superior to the latter. The fact that some families would prefer to have a choice here is understandable, but family control should not be supported when the cost of allowing it is so great.
There is precedent for our view. Consider forensic autopsy (about which the family has no choice) and compulsory military service.Footnote 9 Were the family (in the former case) or the individual (in the latter) free to choose, those who do not wish to participate could avoid emotional distress by saying no, whereas those who are willing to participate may benefit by saying yes. For example, families that consent to forensic autopsy might feel good they helped to catch a killer and volunteer soldiers might feel good that they chose to risk their lives for their country. Nevertheless, our society has decided that investigating a homicide and sometimes maintaining a large army are so important that it cannot leave participation in these matters to public discretion even though this eliminates the possibility of families or individuals benefiting by saying yes. In our view, saving lives through organ procurement (and transplantation) is at least as important as these other communitarian goals and should be handled similarly.
It is possible that, like families who consent under opting-in, affected families would benefit under routine recovery by knowing that the organs of their loved ones had saved the lives of others. Analogously, we suspect that many parents of drafted soldiers who died in combat were proud of their lost children even though they did not volunteer. Furthermore, because most deaths are ineligible for organ donation, only a small percentage of families have the opportunity to benefit from consenting to posthumous organ recovery from a relative. Under routine recovery, everyone who supports this plan could potentially experience psychological rewards generated by their communitarian action, just as do people who sign donor cards under opting-in.
Glannon also claims that “[e]liminating consent would leave it entirely up to physicians to determine the extent of care appropriate for the patient. This would mean a return to absolute physician paternalism. It would also raise the question of whether the interests and needs of potential transplant recipients trumped the interests and needs of critically ill patients without organ failure” (p. 333). We fail to see why routine recovery of cadaveric organs should generate such concerns. Routine recovery would be applicable only to patients who are already dead. Furthermore, as previously noted, this plan would not interfere with the separation of critical care and organ recovery physicians. Thus routine recovery would not affect the level of care deemed appropriate for or delivered to dying patients. In addition, it would not remove the need for surrogate consent before removing life support, and it would have no effect whatsoever on other areas of medical practice. Thus, it is not true that implementation of routine recovery would lead to a “return to absolute physician paternalism” (p. 333).
Glannon argues that, “[i]f we respect people's choices about continuing or withdrawing life-sustaining care, and if agreeing to or refusing organ donation is a choice made during this time, then it would be difficult to exclude consent regarding donation from these choices” (p. 335). The implication is that if we honor one choice we must honor the other because these issues arise at almost the same time. We fail to see the logic here. There is no reason why we cannot continue to require consent for withdrawal of life-sustaining care, as we should, while at the same time eliminating the requirement for consent prior to cadaveric organ recovery.
We agree with Glannon that, “[i]f I retain some cognitive and affective capacity when dying, the belief that my organs will be taken from my body, transplanted, and save and extend the lives of others can give me a sense of purpose as I confront my imminent demise” (p. 334). But this would be equally true under routine recovery. In this regard Perry asks, “Does the opportunity not to do something of benefit to others make doing it of increased moral worth than doing it where such an opportunity does not exist?”Footnote 10 We believe that the answer to Perry's Socratic question is no. Based on this we also disagree with Glannon's assertion that, “[w]ithout consent, organ procurement could not coherently be described as a ‘contribution’ to the social or human community” (p. 335). Did the military conscripts who died in WWII not make a contribution to their country? Do taxpayers not contribute to society because they have no choice in the matter?
Glannon asks us to contemplate a brain injured (but not dead) patient with little hope for recovery. He claims that under routine recovery “the transplant team theoretically could remove the organs without contacting the family. By the time they arrived at the hospital, life support would already have been withdrawn, the patient would already have been declared dead, and his organs would already have been removed from his body.” Once again Glannon misconstrues the targets and implications of routine recovery. First, his vignette portrays donation after cardiac death under which life support is withdrawn from a living patient in the operating room; if cardiac death ensues, organs may be recovered. But as emphasized above, routine recovery would come into play only after brain death is declared—a determination that is made before the decedent is taken to the operating room. Furthermore, routine recovery would not eliminate the need to obtain consent for withdrawing support from a live patient. Withdrawal without consent is illegal and tantamount to murder. Even if routine recovery were extended to deaths based on cardiopulmonary criteria (medically equivalent to DCD), it would never eliminate the need to obtain consent for withdrawing life-sustaining care.
Glannon also asks, “To what extent would people be willing to waive the opportunity to make decisions that confer meaning on death in order to increase the supply of organs and save more lives?” (p. 334). Many years ago people did just this when they stood by while choice about forensic autopsy was eliminated. There have been no recent widely publicized complaints about this practice, one in which the potential for inflicting family distress is just as great as it would be under routine recovery. And a military draft was once accepted as necessary even though the loss of a son or daughter would be much more painful than the removal of one of their organs after death. We suspect that with time and education, routine recovery of cadaveric organs would become similarly acceptable. Additional support for this hypothesis comes from the results of a survey suggesting that a sizable minority of the U.S. public would already accept this plan.Footnote 11
Finally, Glannon states: “The fundamental issue is not how a family chooses to act in this situation, but simply having this choice” (p. 334). We strongly disagree. This statement is reminiscent of what Erich Loewy calls a “minimalist model [of human association] in which communities exist solely or at least largely to safeguard the autonomy of their members.”Footnote 12 Loewy argues that, although respect for individuals is important, the interests of the community and the individual are tightly intertwined. Therefore, there must be a balance between the needs of the individual and those of the community and “that only through this balance can an enduring, developing and healthy community persist.”Footnote 13 Loewy also asserts that community members are linked by common goals and are obligated to each other and to the community that nurtures them. Because we share this perspective, we believe that it is wrong to consider only the impact of removing choice on the family of the decedent—it is also essential to contemplate the effect of routine recovery on the lives of patients dying from end-stage organ disease. Therefore, for us “the fundamental issue” is not whether or not families have a choice, but rather which organ procurement policy provides the most favorable balance of harm and benefit for all involved parties. In our view, the answer is clearly routine recovery. Given that Glannon agrees that people have communitarian obligations, that the needs of patients with end-stage organ disease are “urgent,” and that “the dead are beyond any benefit or harm” (p. 333), his support for absolute family control, at the cost of fewer lives saved, is hard to understand.
A Demonstrative Case
Suppose the young accident victim in Glannon's hypothetical case progresses to brain death. There is a 10-year-old child with fulminant liver failure who, without a liver transplant, will soon die. The accident victim's liver is deemed suitable for this dying young patient. Were routine recovery in effect, the liver would be recovered and transplanted, thereby saving the child's life. But because we now operate under an opting-in system, the victim's family is asked for permission. Sadly, they refuse because they cannot bear the thought of removing an organ from their recently deceased loved one. Glannon would probably say this is most unfortunate, perhaps even morally wrong, but still we must abide by the family's wishes so as not to exacerbate their emotional pain. Our view is very different. We believe that the family should have no say in the matter, regardless of the emotional distress organ recovery would cause, because, if we fail to procure this liver, a child will pay with her life. For us, this cost is much too high.
Conclusion
All approaches to legitimizing organ procurement have drawbacks. The key is to choose the one with the greatest balance of good versus harm. The biggest problem with opting-in, the plan Glannon favors, is that too many people say no when asked for consent to postmortem organ recovery, and this leads to loss of life-saving organs. Routine recovery of cadaveric organs would eliminate this tragic waste of precious human resources and increase the number of lives saved, but at the risk of exacerbating the emotional distress experienced by family members who have recently lost a loved one. Although Glannon suggests that routine recovery may also cause harm by presenting a conflict of interest for critical care physicians, we have argued that this concern is unfounded, in large part because this plan would apply only after brain death has been declared. We are left then with having to choose between a less efficient plan that protects families' feelings (i.e., opting-in) versus a more efficient plan that would save more lives but upset some surviving relatives (i.e., routine recovery). In our view, the balance of benefit versus harm here comes down heavily in favor of the latter. Given a choice between not exacerbating emotional distress and saving life, we will choose life every time and we are surprised that any thoughtful people would choose otherwise.
