Privacy, democracy, and crises in the digital age

In contrast to other forms of information, digitized data can be easily collected and juxtaposed from different sources and devices. Digital data are mostly cross-readable, and user data collected on social media can be triangulated with other data generated by users’ behavior on streaming or online shopping platforms to form accurate and well-rounded information about users’ preferences, attitudes, and behavior (Saglam Reference Saglam2022). In addition, some studies have shown that digital transformation is anchored in an economic structure that incentivizes data generation with little concern for privacy, social rights, or democracy (Culpepper and Thelen Reference Culpepper and Thelen2020; Zuboff Reference Zuboff, Longhofer and Winchester2023).

Democracies have responded by legally protecting citizens’ online data from government exploitation, especially in light of increasing concerns regarding the authoritarian uses of digital technologies (Diamond Reference Diamond2019; Freedom House 2018; Glasius and Michaelsen Reference Glasius and Michaelsen2018; Keremoğlu and Weidmann Reference Keremoğlu and Weidmann2020; Kendall-Taylor, Frantz and Wright Reference Kendall-Taylor, Frantz and Wright2020). As reported by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘[a]s more social and economic activities are placed online, the importance of privacy and data protection is increasingly recognized. Equal concerns are the collection, use, and sharing of personal information with third parties without the notice or consent of consumers’ (UN DESA 2022: 180).

Data from the Digital Society Project (DSP) show an increase in the number of democracies over the last 20 years that have enacted laws geared toward protecting citizens’ online data from governments (see Figure 1). However, the same data also show significant variation in the extent to which laws restrict government access to citizens’ online data (see Figure 2).

Figure 1.

More countries have adopted online privacy laws over time.

Figure 2.

Map of the content of privacy regulation across countries (both democracies and non-democracies). The bluer shades indicate more protective laws.

Source: V-dem online graphing tool (V-Dem n.d.).

Few efforts have been made to uncover the political causes of this variation. Existing works primarily offer legalistic and often descriptive accounts of privacy laws in a limited number of cases, with a few exceptions (Carrillo and Jackson Reference Carrillo and Jackson2022; Chavarría-Mora Reference Chavarría-Mora2025; Lim and Oh Reference Lim and Oh2025) that have paid particular attention to a comparison of privacy laws in the US and continental Europe. For instance, Whitman argues that different culturally embedded conceptions of privacy underlie the stark differences between European and US privacy regulations (Whitman Reference Whitman2003). Custers et al. provide a descriptive account of privacy laws in the EU before 2018 (Custers, Dechesne, Sears, et al. Reference Custers, Dechesne, Sears, Tani and Van der Hof2018). Notwithstanding their merits, these studies do not engage with potential politicosystemic variations that might influence such variations.

The pandemic has further crystallized the nexus between digitization, democracy, and privacy and illustrated how legal responses to crisis situations differ among democracies. Several studies have examined the impact of privacy violations and emergency legal instruments on the quality and future of democracy. For instance, colleagues in the V-Dem project painted a mixed picture of promising and worrying global trends affecting democracy amid the pandemic. However, they have not systematically engaged in the variations among democracies. Instead, they highlight the democracy-adherent performance of high-income Western democracies and the innovation of medium- and low-income democracies (Edgell and Lachapelle Reference Edgell and Lachapelle2021). Kneuer and Wurster (Reference Kneuer and Wurster2022) make a strong point for a research agenda that investigates particular areas of vulnerability to emergency situations in democracies, adherence to democratic procedures in implementing crisis-mitigation policies, the justification or framing of government responses, and a comparison of democratic and authoritarian responses (Kneuer and Wurster Reference Kneuer and Wurster2022). They theorized how the pandemic could have affected different democratic procedures, such as elections and civil freedoms, in the long run (ibid.). Greitens illustrates how pandemic responses are more proportional and respectful of democratic principles in established democracies but facilitate backsliding in weaker democracies (Greitens Reference Greitens2020).

However, few studies have investigated the impact of democracy and its dimensions on privacy violation patterns in democratic countries. Engler et al. pursued this line of investigation in 34 European countries and concluded that variations in the degree of democracy and political liberalism are behind variation in the extent to which these countries violated citizens’ rights (Engler, Brunner, Loviat et al. Reference Engler, Brunner, Loviat, Abou-Chadi, Leemann, Glaser and Kübler2021). Maati and Švedkauskas investigated whether the degree of democratic backsliding and liberalism influenced how governments framed and justified digital surveillance measures during the pandemic (Maati and Švedkauskas Reference Maati and Švedkauskas2020). Some advocacy organizations have also documented that a higher pre-pandemic quality of democracy and liberal institutions shielded citizens’ rights from government infringement (Saravakos and Archontas Reference Saravakos and Archontas2022).

The focus of these works on the liberal dimension of democracy is unsurprising considering the close association between liberal institutions, practices, and individual rights, both historically and intuitively. Yet existing work offers little insight as to how the liberal dimension fares vis-à-vis other dimensions of democracy in relation to civil rights and liberties. Focusing on online privacy protection, we have formulated several hypotheses below, not only on how the general quality of democracy can affect online privacy protection but also on how the different dimensions of democratic rule might relate to online privacy protection in democracies.

Which dimension of democracy would lead to better privacy protection laws?

Seminal works on democratic theory have proposed several (procedural) criteria that qualify democratic rule. More recent theorization has focused on distilling various dimensions of democracy by focusing on institutional arrangements and procedures culminating in the exercise of democracy. We derived different theoretical expectations regarding the impact of different dimensions of democracy on a country’s online privacy regulations. The V-Dem dataset is a pioneering project in this line of theorization (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen et al. Reference Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Good God, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Krusell, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Natsika, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig, Wilson and Ziblatt2023a). The V-Dem encompasses five holistic indices for democracy; the electoral democracy index is the main measure of democracy and closely reflects Dahl’s (Reference Dahl1989: 108–114) procedural criteria of ‘polyarchy’; the electoral democracy Index – V-Dem’s main measure of democracy – is an ‘essential element of any other conception of representative democracy’ (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen et al. Reference Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt2023b: 45). The other four indices differentiate among the liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian dimensions of democracy.

Democratic, fair, and competitive elections, as well as freedom of expression and association, are essential elements of polyarchy (V-Dem’s ‘electoral democracy’); these elements constitute the ‘inner sanctum’ of all democracies (Ibid, 44). We expect democracies that fulfill Dahl’s criteria to have online privacy laws that protect citizens’ online privacy. Thus, we formulated the following hypothesis:

In addition to the seminal differentiation between democracies/polyarchies and dictatorships, we can differentiate further components of democratic rule (Reference DahlDahl 2000 [1998]; Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1943). While free, fair, and competitive elections, as well as freedom of expression and association, are essential elements of every (electoral) democracy as its ‘inner sanctum,’ the degree of the liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian components can differ among democracies. Some of these democratic components may coexist in an autocratic context (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen et al. Reference Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt2023b, Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning et al., Reference Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning and Teorell2016: 582).

Core criteria for democracy include rights, but they only do so to the extent that such rights guarantee citizens’ freedom ‘to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment’ (Dahl Reference Dahl1982, Reference Dahl1989). Freedom of association and expression are examples of rights that are integral to electoral democracy; without these rights, freedom from expression with no fear of punishment cannot exist. Major streams of democratic theory and the V-Dem data consider some fundamental rights – for instance, the right to expression and assembly – as the definitional criteria of democratic rule.

However, democracies vary in the extent to which some individual rights exist (Dahl Reference Dahl1989: 223); they also manifest different degrees of control over executive power (O’Donnell 1998: 113–115). V-Dem’s democracy indices are in line with this view, and the liberal component of democracy emphasizes the protection of individual rights against both the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen et al. Reference Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt2023b). By stressing the protection of civil liberties, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and checks and balances, this component measures how strong (institutional) barriers are against the extensive exercise of executive power. Among all dimensions of democracy, we expect the liberal to be the strongest associate to strong online privacy protection laws since civil rights are at the center of this understanding of democracy. Thus, the following hypothesis was proposed:

Democracies also vary in the extent of citizenship participation (Pateman Reference Pateman2014). The participation dimension of democracy stresses the importance of citizens’ active political participation at all levels; it emphasizes engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies (Barber Reference Barber1988; Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen et al. Reference Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt2023b: 45; Fung and Wright Reference Fung and Wright2003; Moon, Birdsall, Ciesluk et al. Reference Moon, Birdsall, Ciesluk, Garlett, Hermias, Mendenhall, Schmid and Wong2006).

The ideal extent of participation is, however, debated in democratic theory, and not all lines of theorization agree that more participation necessarily leads to better democratic politics (Dahl Reference Dahl1989). Without considering important nuances, one could divide this debate between a view that considers unlimited participation – widespread participation outside of election times – as a catalyst for political inefficacy and bad decisions (Dahl Reference Dahl1989; Lewis Reference Lewis2013; Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1943) and another view that holds widespread participation as a guarantee of citizen representation and rights (Pateman Reference Pateman2012, Reference Pateman2014). The first results in policy paralysis; the second in enhancing citizens’ representation, control of the agenda, and general influence on politics.

We derive two competing hypotheses regarding the effect of increased participation on online privacy protection laws. Higher levels of participation could lead to the overpoliticization of privacy concerns. One could argue that high politicization, with its focus on public contestation, can be accompanied by a reduction in individual privacy protection. On the other hand, in political systems where participatory principles are consistently upheld, citizens may experience privacy not merely as an individual right but as a collective guarantee that their voices can be expressed without fear of penalization or reprisal, which may in turn lead to stronger privacy protection. The following two hypotheses are derived from these arguments:

The deliberative aspect of democratic rule focuses on public debates and political decision-making (Bächtiger, Dryzek, Mansbridge et al. Reference Bächtiger, Dryzek, Mansbridge and Warren2018; Dryzek Reference Dryzek2002) as well as whether public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decision-making (Bühlmann, Merkel, Müller et al. Reference Bühlmann, Merkel, Müller and Wessels2012; Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen et al. Reference Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt2023b; Morlino Reference Morlino2011). The ideal of this principle of democratic decision-making is a respectful dialogue among informed and competent political participants who are open to persuasion and willing to give public justifications for their positions on matters of public goods while acknowledging and respecting counterarguments (Habermas Reference Habermas1992; Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli et al. Reference Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli and Steenbergen2005). Thus, one can argue that individual freedoms and privacy rights are prerequisites for individuals participating in political dialogue as autonomous actors as well as helping build mutual respect and trust among participants in a deliberation process. Deliberation might include mutual respect regarding public goods, including privacy rights. However, privacy rights are not at the center of the deliberative dimension of democracy, which is geared more toward the achievement of effectively sharing public goods; participants can come to an agreement after a process of reason-based deliberation (Held Reference Held2006). The following hypothesis was thus formulated:

Major strands of democratic theory consider at least minimal equality, particularly equality of votes, among citizens to be necessary as the very foundation of democratic rule (Reference DahlDahl 1990 [1970]: 8–11). The question of egalitarianism – equal access to resources and an equal distribution of rights among social groups – has been largely debated regarding whether it is a consequence of democratic rule (Acemoglu and Robinson Reference Acemoglu and Robinson2006; Boix Reference Boix2003). However, more recent works have stressed egalitarianism as an integral component of democracy and have highlighted its importance for democratic stability (Rau and Stokes Reference Rau and Stokes2025).

An equal distribution of rights and resources among different social groups in a democracy – the egalitarian dimension of democracy – indirectly relates to better privacy rights and protection from online surveillance by governments. While the liberal dimension is directly concerned with minimizing executive powers, the egalitarian component aims to prevent inequalities from ‘inhibit[ing] the exercise of formal rights and liberties’ (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen et al. Reference Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt2023b, 46), even if this equality evokes tension with the utilitarian logic entrenched in earlier strands of democratic theory. Therefore, we hypothesize that higher levels of egalitarianism positively affect online privacy protection laws and expect this relationship to be weaker than that linking liberalism to stronger privacy protection:

We tested the above hypotheses over a long period as well as during the COVID pandemic crisis. All political regimes, including democracies, have the capacity to suspend several rights, including privacy rights. This phenomenon has been well documented in the securitization literature (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde Reference Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde1998), particularly in the literature examining digital surveillance during the global public health crisis of COVID (Maati and Švedkauskas Reference Maati and Švedkauskas2020). We expect higher levels of democracy to mediate the negative effects of the COVID crisis on online privacy protection laws. We also expect democracies with stronger liberal dimensions to be more immune to the deterioration of online privacy protection. We examined the above hypotheses to look at the effect of different democratic dimensions on online privacy protection laws during both normal and crisis situations.

Regime-type and online privacy laws: an unexpected tale

The empirical findings presented in this section paint a mixed picture of how the different dimensions of democracy relate to online privacy protection laws in times of normality and crises. In ‘normal’ pre-pandemic times, the degree of polyarchy – the general electoral democracy measure – is positively associated with formal online privacy protection from the government as seen in Table 1 (Model 1). Our analysis also exposes liberalism and participation as the only democratic dimensions significantly related to formal online privacy protection in pre-pandemic times in Table 2 (Model 2).

Table 1.

Model 1 – the association between the degree of democracy and online privacy protection laws pre-pandemic (2000–2018)

Table 1. Long description

A table with one row and five columns. The columns are labeled Model, Adjusted R square, R square change, Sum of squares, GDP_prepandemic, and Polyarchy_prepandemic. Row 1: Model 1, Adjusted R square 0.201, R square change 0.215, Sum of squares 22.781, GDP_prepandemic -0.126, Polyarchy_prepandemic 0.521*

Notes: *p < 0.001, dependent variable: Privacy law pre-pandemic.

Table 2.

Model 2 – he association between different democracy dimensions and online privacy protection law pre-pandemic (2000–2018)

Table 2. Long description

A table with 2 rows and 8 columns comparing the association between different democracy dimensions and online privacy protection laws pre-pandemic (2000-2018). The columns are Model, Adjusted R square, R square change, Sum of squares, GDP_pre-pandemic, Liberal dimension pre-pandemic, Participatory dimension pre-pandemic, Deliberative dimension pre-pandemic, and Egalitarian dimension pre-pandemic. Row 1: Model, 2. Row 2: Adjusted R square, 0.192; R square change, 0.228; Sum of squares, 24.155; GDP_pre-pandemic, -0.114; Liberal dimension pre-pandemic, 0.322*; Participatory dimension pre-pandemic, 0.311**; Deliberative dimension pre-pandemic, -0.011; Egalitarian dimension pre-pandemic, -0.006.

Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, dependent variable: Privacy law pre-pandemic

While we expected the liberal dimensions to manifest the strongest positive effect on citizens’ online privacy protection against government infringements, this relationship, surprisingly, was found to have a weaker statistical significance than that of the participatory dimension. In section ‘Which dimension of democracy would lead to better privacy protection laws?’, we presented two competing hypotheses on how heightened participation could relate to online privacy protection. We argue that participation can be negatively associated with such protection, since heightened politicization could hinder the development of individual protection or positively associated with citizens’ enhanced ability to set the political agenda. The above results not only support the latter view but also invite further reflection on why such an association is more significant than that of the liberal dimension despite the latter being theoretically more directly relatable to more protective privacy laws.

Consistent with our expectations, Model 3 shows a strong association between changes in the degree of polyarchy, the general measure of democracy, between 2016 and 2021, as well as changes in formal online privacy protection during the pandemic. Consistent with our hypothesis, democracies that witnessed an improvement in their overall quality were more likely to witness positive changes in the quality of their online privacy protection laws during the pandemic.Footnote ³ We infer that, on average, democratic backsliding regression in a democracy’s general measure of democracy is associated with worse outcomes of online privacy protection laws during the pandemic. However, this association was stronger in normal pre-pandemic times than during the COVID pandemic crisis because crises trigger emergency measures in democracies, regardless of their overall quality. However, the democracies that had consolidated better quality democratic tendencies in the years preceding the pandemic witnessed positive changes in their online privacy protection laws during the pandemic (Table 3).

Table 3.

Model 3 – the effect of changes in the quality of democracy 2016–2021 on the change in online privacy protection laws during the pandemic

Table 3. Long description

A table with five columns and one row. The columns are labeled Model, Adjusted R square, R square change, Sum of squares, Zscore (GDP_change), and polyarchy_change. The row data is as follows: Model 3, Adjusted R square 0.030, R square change 0.052, Sum of squares 0.454, Zscore (GDP_change) 0.084, polyarchy_change 0.219*.

Notes: *p < 0.05, dependent variable: Change in Privacy law, 2018–2021.

Surprisingly, and in contrast to our hypotheses, changes to the liberal dimension of democracy did not show any statistically significant effect on how online privacy protection laws changed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, changes in the egalitarian and participatory dimensions of democracy are associated with the tendency to protect citizens’ online privacy from government infringement during crises (Table 4).Footnote ⁴ In other words, while democracies have managed questions about online privacy during the public health crisis differently, those that had witnessed a deterioration in the degree of the egalitarian dimension before the pandemic had, on average, less protective changes to their online privacy protection laws during the pandemic.

Table 4.

Model 4 – the effect of changes in liberal, egalitarian, and participatory dimensions of democracy 2016–2021 on the change in online privacy protection laws during the pandemic

Table 4. Long description

A table with one row and eight columns. The columns are labeled Model, Adjusted R square, R square change, Sum of squares, GDP change, Liberalcomp_change, Participcomp_change, delibcomp_change, and egalcomp_change. The row data is as follows: Model 4, Adjusted R square 0.105, R square change 0.155, Sum of squares 1.365, GDP change 0.102, Liberalcomp_change 0.151, Participcomp_change 0.224, delibcomp_change -0.295, egalcomp_change 0.295.

Notes: *p < 0.05, dependent variable: Change in Privacy law, 2018–2021.

Moreover, we observed surprising results when we tested how different dimensions of democracy relate to within-subject variations in online privacy protection laws. In the 55 democracies that witnessed a change in the quality of their online privacy law anytime between 2000 and 2021, the general measure of democracy—the electoral democracy index—did not relate to the extent of legal protection of citizens’ online privacy (Table 5); the egalitarian dimension proved stronger than the liberal dimension in predicting better and more protective privacy laws (Table 6).

Table 5.

Model 5 – within-case variation of democratic quality and its effect on within-case variation in online privacy protection laws 2000–2021

Table 5. Long description

A table with six columns and six rows, comparing model statistics for democratic quality and online privacy protection laws. The columns are labeled Model, Intercept, GDP, Polyarchy, Random intercept, Repeated-measures AR rho, -Log likelihood, and BIC. The rows present data for Model 5. Row 1: Model, 5. Row 2: Intercept, -1.780. Row 3: GDP, 0.122. Row 4: Polyarchy, 0.194. Row 5: Random intercept, 0.320*. Row 6: Repeated-measures AR rho, -0.096. Row 7: -Log likelihood, -1086.913. Row 8: BIC, -1044.895.

Notes: *p < 0.05, dependent variable: Privacy law change, (2000–2021).

Table 6.

Model 6 – within-case variation of democracy dimensions and their effects on within-case variation of online privacy protection laws 2000–2021

Table 6. Long description

A table with 1 row and 11 columns comparing the effects of different democracy dimensions on online privacy protection laws. The columns are Model, Intercept, Liberal Dimension GDP, Participatory Dimension, Deliberative Dimension, Egalitarian Dimension, Random Intercept, Repeated Measures AR Rho, -Log Likelihood, and BIC. Row 1: Model 6, Intercept -1.780, Liberal Dimension GDP 0.084, Participatory Dimension 0.684, Deliberative Dimension -0.096, Egalitarian Dimension 0.891, Random Intercept 0.241, Repeated Measures AR Rho 0.974, -Log Likelihood 1115.767, BIC 1052.740.

Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, dependent variable: Privacy law change, (2000–2021).

These findings suggest that the relationship between the different dimensions of democracy and the protection of individual rights from governmental infringement might vary unexpectedly during normal and crisis times. The extent to which a democratic system stresses individualism and general checks on executive power is positively related to more protective online privacy laws; however, this relationship seems surprisingly insignificant in our analysis of the protection of such rights during crises that provoke infringements on citizens’ privacy rights. In contrast to the liberal component, the egalitarian and participatory components showed consistent positive effects on formally protecting citizens’ online privacy, both in general and during emergencies.

Within-case analyses further complicate the relationship between democracy, its dimensions, and online privacy regulations. The lack of a significant association between changes in the general levels of democracy and online privacy laws might point to a non-linear relationship between democracy and privacy protection. While cases that enjoy higher levels of democracy tend to enjoy higher levels of formal online privacy protection, in our data, a general improvement of democratic quality within a democracy seems to be irrelevant for privacy protection. Instead, a particular improvement in the egalitarian and liberal components seems to strongly predict an improvement in online privacy laws in existing democracies. Again, our within-case analysis points to the importance of the egalitarian dimension for privacy protection, even when compared with the liberal dimension.

Democracy, liberalism, and (online privacy) laws: some critical reflections and a call for further research

Our study revealed a nuanced and multifaceted relationship between democracy and formal online privacy protection, offering both expected and surprising insights. In pre-pandemic times, the general measure of democracy—polyarchy—was positively associated with stronger formal privacy protection, reaffirming the role of democracy in safeguarding individual rights. However, the participatory dimension was a more statistically significant predictor of protective privacy laws than the liberal dimension, challenging the conventional emphasis on liberalism as the primary democratic safeguard of individual rights. This suggests that increased citizen participation enhances privacy protection. During the pandemic, the dynamics of democracy and online privacy laws shifted. While changes in the overall quality of democracy (the electoral democracy index, as measured by the V-Dem data) remained positively associated with privacy protection, this relationship weakened compared to pre-pandemic times. More notably, improvements in the egalitarian dimension of democracy were strongly linked to better privacy protection, highlighting its critical role during crises and inviting further exploration of the mechanisms underlying this relationship. Conversely, changes in the liberal dimension did not show a consistent relationship with the development of privacy laws during the pandemic, suggesting that its influence may be context-dependent.

Policymakers and scholars have traditionally prioritized the liberal dimension of democracy; however, our findings suggest that the egalitarian and participatory dimensions warrant greater attention, particularly in the context of crises or exogenous shocks. Our findings underscore a key distinction: While the liberal dimension is important for privacy protection in ‘normal’ times, participatory and egalitarian dimensions gain prominence during crises. This underscores the adaptability of democratic structures to address individual rights under various circumstances. Furthermore, the strong predictive power of the egalitarian dimension for better privacy laws in the long-term analysis of democracies with fluctuating privacy protections highlights the importance of achieving better equality in democracies as well as how it positively affects privacy rights. Understanding these dynamics can contribute to designing more inclusive and resilient democratic systems capable of safeguarding individual rights during both stable and turbulent times.

Based on our (in part) surprising results regarding the regulation of online privacy rights in different democracies, we call for further comparative research into other formal laws to enhance theory-building in this field. Do the relationships found here also exist when examining other formal laws? Further research employing multiple measures of democracy, both type and degree, is needed to test the validity of the arguments discussed above. In addition, we need more research to answer whether regime type, degree, or both matters. Without diluting the importance of examining formal laws, we already know that especially autocratic regimes are often reluctant to implement their privacy laws and readily violate citizens’ privacy without a legal basis. Therefore, additional research testing whether our findings extend to the realm of implementation is urgently needed. This is also important when investigating how the content of online privacy laws has (differently) evolved in authoritarian and democratic regimes over the last few decades. Addressing these questions will help us better understand the functioning of different political regimes and the role that formal regulations play in different contexts regarding the living conditions of citizens.