Hegel lectured on logic between 1818 and 1831. During the last year of his life, Hegel's son Karl took Hegel's course on logic and turned his student notes into a manuscript. This manuscript came into the possession of a private collector, whose descendents revealed it to the Hegel Archives only a few decades ago. The text was first published in German, by Meiner, as recently as 2001. Butler's clear and smooth translation of this text now allows a larger group of readers to get acquainted with Hegel's logic. Whereas the text is certainly more accessible than either the Science of Logic or the first part of the Encyclopaedia, it remains far from reader-friendly, as Butler notes in his introduction. In line with the Encyclopaedia Logic, the lecture begins with an introductory section in which Hegel distinguishes three possible stances toward objectivity, which can be explained by the fact that Hegel drew on this work during his lectures. The division of the lecture into sections on Being, Essence and the Concept is also well-known. However, Butler's translation is based on some decisions that deviate considerably from both the translation of the Encyclopaedia and from what is customary. Thus, he translates ‘an sich’ as ‘upon itself’ rather than ‘in itself’ for reasons that I find not really convincing, especially since he does not take into account that the expression ‘an sich’ as used by Kant replaced the longer ‘considered as it is in itself’, an expression in which ‘an’ already seems to have lost the original spatial meaning that Butler wishes to retrieve. Another peculiarity is Butler's translation of ‘der Begriff’ as ‘the self-concept’. Evidently, Hegel uses this term in a manner that is quite different from the common meaning of the term. I agree that Hegel has in mind something that is much more reflective and dynamic than the term ‘concept’ expresses, but I am not sure if this alone calls for—or warrants—a translation that runs the risk of alienating potential readers.