Roger Backhouse (Professor of the History and Philosophy of Economics at the University of Birmingham) and Mauro Boianovsky (Professor of Economics at Universidade de Brasilia) offer us in this interesting book a detailed historical analysis of a critical development in macroeconomics, the search for disequilibrium microfoundations. They chose to structure their narrative around the publication of two important books: Don Patinkin’s 1956 Money, Interest and Prices and Michael Woodford’s 2003 Interest and Prices. They nonetheless go back to John Maynard Keynes’s 1936 General Theory and the early attempts of interpreting it by authors such as John Hicks and Franco Modigliani, as well as to the work of Oskar Lange, all relevant to understanding Patinkin’s contribution (chapter three). Additionally, they jump in time a little ahead of Woodford’s book by very briefly noting, in the concluding chapter (chapter ten), two issues: first, that the consensus represented by this book is far from complete because there are dissenting post-Keynesian macroeconomists; and, second, by also mentioning that the 2008 crisis brought greater turmoil to macroeconomics.
The narrative that Backhouse and Boianovsky construct is one of a series of diverse developments in an intricate network that, for different reasons and purposes, became associated with “disequilibrium macroeconomics.” We should not downplay the complex web of connections among economists spread in the United States, Europe, and Japan, trying to forge alliances in developing Keynesian understandings of the economy, a network illustrated in a nice figure in the book's introduction (chapter one, figure 1.2)—a figure that, for being static, hides additional complexities of the temporal precedence of some connections over others, an aspect well explored in the subsequent chapters. A consequence of this diverse set of interests is that many adjectives were used to describe these theories: “non-market clearing,” “non-Walrasian,” “non-tâtonnement,” “fixed-price,” “equilibrium with rationing,” or “disequilibrium models,” and the authors discuss this terminology problem in chapter one.
The first chapter sets up the main elements of the overall argument of the book, which takes issue with the potted history of (mainstream) macroeconomics often told by practicing economists: with the risk of oversimplification, it is a history that associates the birth of macroeconomics with Keynes, followed by a split between the different interpreters of Keynes—the neoclassical synthesis and the Cambridge–UK Keynesians (later labelled “post-Keynesians”). The Keynesian consensus of the neoclassical synthesis was shaken first by the monetarist attack, with Milton Friedman and his allies, and then finally buried by the new classical assault of Robert Lucas and his fellow travelers, in the wake of the stagflation of the 1970s. Mainstream macroeconomists then took Lucas’s call for microfoundations seriously. They adopted rational expectations and the “equilibrium discipline” and developed his agenda in two different routes: a “classical” one, in which fluctuations are optimal responses of optimizing agents, represented by the real business cycle theory of Edward Prescott, Finn Kydland, and others; and a “Keynesian” branch, labelled “new Keynesian,” that introduced market imperfections that rendered fluctuations socially costly (see Mankiw Reference Mankiw1989 for an early practitioner’s representation of the Lucasian followers). Finally, the potted history goes, these two branches converged and were synthesized in the so-called new neoclassical synthesis (perhaps better known as “dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium,” DSGE, macroeconomics). The authors forcefully argue that this potted history is not only silent about the disequilibrium macroeconomics, but as such it misses very important developments that helped transform modern macroeconomics. The authors thus question the attempts by practitioners of co-opting past developments into neatly defined schools of economic thought. In this fight for a richer understanding of microfoundations, Backhouse and Boianovsky join forces with two other books on the history of microfoundations that came out recently and with different takes on this issue: a volume that I co-edited (Duarte and Lima Reference Duarte and Lima2012) and John King (Reference King2012). These three volumes offer complementary, and sometimes conflicting, views on the history of microfoundations without exhausting all the elements that deserve the attention of historians.
The first chapter is preceded by a Dramatis Personae with selected biographical information on the leading figures of disequilibrium macroeconomics, which is indeed useful information that helps readers navigate the interconnected web of authors and discussions analyzed in the book. Chapter two, entitled “Macroeconomics after Keynes,” starts with an overview of major economic developments roughly since the 1930s, discussing theoretical developments side by side with such real-world events as the government interventions that were an integral part of what came to be called the “Keynesian revolution,” economic growth in the 1960s, the stagflation of the 1970s, and the “great moderation” of the 1990s and the 2000s. While I understand that a chapter like this helps to set a rather ample stage of macroeconomic developments that is particularly useful for a general audience, I found the initial discussion followed by a presentation of theories of money and inflation, from Keynes to Woodford and passing by Milton Friedman, A. W. (Bill) Phillips, and Edmund Phelps, then followed by an overview of growth theory from Robert Solow to Lucas and Paul Romer, a lengthy detour to a book that had already set in the previous chapter its scope and focused aims. The feeling of a detour was reinforced by the last section of this chapter (“The Search for Rigorous Microfoundations for Macroeconomics”), which retook some matters already presented in the introductory chapter to set the stage once again for the discussion to follow about the search for disequilibrium macroeconomics.
The subsequent chapters are organized somewhat chronologically and around major developments of the disequilibrium macroeconomics, discussing the works of Patinkin, Robert Clower, Axel Leijonhufvud, Solow and Joseph Stiglitz, Robert Barro and Herschel Grossman, Jean-Pascal Bénassy, Kenneth Arrow, Takashi Negishi, Frank Hahn, Jacques Drèze, Edmond Malinvaud, and many other contributors. There is an intervening chapter on the equilibrium microfoundations of Robert Lucas (chapter five), important to understanding both the works of Phelps and of Barro and Grossman and the paths they chose for their ensuing research. Chapter nine surveys important developments in disequilibrium macroeconomics after the 1970s (although some other works in this period were already mentioned in the preceding chapters), showing how this research agenda was still active many years after the coming of the new classical macroeconomics. Finally, the concluding chapter nicely brings together all that has been discussed and ponders the importance of the non-Walrasian theories to the transformation of modern macroeconomics.
The authors chose to explore this literature by writing what they called a “history of macroeconomic theory.” By this, they mean that they will not address the empirical discussion that might be associated with it, something somewhat surprising, given the authors’ emphasis on real-world developments in chapter two and the fact that an important effort of developing the Keynesian macro was represented by the construction of the large-scale macroeconometric models by authors such as Lawrence Klein and Franco Modigliani, to name just a few. But, by a “history of macroeconomic theory,” Backhouse and Boianovsky do not mean to write a doctrinal history by reading canonical texts and organizing them in a particular way. To the contrary, the narrative they wrote is rich because they make extensive use of the archival resources available for some of their protagonists: Patinkin, Clower, and Leijonhufvud (all part of the economists’ papers project at Duke University). They complemented this with the personal archives of E. Roy Weintraub and with correspondence they had with other protagonists: Solow, Barro, Malinvaud, Drazen, Harcourt, Grandmont, and Hahn. This very laudable effort naturally has a downside, which is a somewhat unbalanced history: while some chapters nicely combine theoretical exposition with a rich historical context (as in chapters four and eight, on Clower and Leijonhufvud and on the relationship of micro- and macroeconomics), several others sometimes stick more closely to presenting theoretical debates. This testifies to the urgent need for the francophone community of historians of economics to have an initiative of archiving materials of the many economists analyzed in this book (and other contemporaries).
The challenges to make sense of the theoretical developments of this broad literature of disequilibrium macroeconomics are surely substantial. Nonetheless, I felt that many other interesting questions could have been addressed, had the authors looked into these developments as efforts to build models (instead of theories), which are very peculiar tools used for producing knowledge (Boumans Reference Boumans2005; Morgan Reference Morgan2012). In particular, the role of the empirical evidence in this story is perhaps rather important—beyond the testing of alternative theoretical hypotheses and beyond the argument made by the authors that the disequilibrium macroeconomics was not a response to the stagflation of the 1970s. As the authors show, several of the economists contributing to this literature had a clear concern with the real world and wanted to strengthen Keynesian macroeconomics in particular ways (such as having a better understanding of real-world market transactions). But there also were more theoretically inclined people trying to expand general equilibrium models to include things such as money, uncertainty, and time in order to derive macroeconomic implications from microeconomic behavior and end the gulf between micro- and macroeconomics (a literature discussed in chapter seven). So I believe that an interesting perspective would be to borrow the distinction that Weintraub and Mirowski (Reference Weintraub and Mirowski1994) used in a different context, and tease out more clearly how ideas of pure (perhaps closer to “technical”) and applied model-building work shaped this literature. My sense is that this is a crucial element in the spread of these ideas and the importance that the Barro and Grossman 1971 model acquired (something pointed out twice on, p. 72 and p. 187). There are mentions of these elements here and there in the book, but they do not structure the narrative (the fact that in several passages “macroeconomic theories” and “macroeconomic models” are used interchangeably testifies to this interpretation).
The modeling aspect seems also very important to a deeper understanding of Clower’s and Leijonhufvud’s refusal to see Barro and Grossman as following in their footsteps (this is a point hinted at in places in the book), concurrent with their aim (particularly Clower’s) to form alliances and create a stronger identity for the group. The perspective of model building could also perhaps shed more light on the difficulties of this literature to motivate young researchers to get involved in the open problems or questions it had over time, and would ask for more caution with the argument that equilibrium macro succeeded (and thus disequilibrium macro lost ground) because “it was technically easier to incorporate formal models of inter-temporal choice and inflation expectations” (p. 186). This is a rather controversial historical argument that downplays the challenges to incorporate these elements into, and to find solution methods to, these equilibrium models. That claim invites us to consider an aspect not fully explored in the book, which is the ability of the contributors to this literature to engage students in their research agenda and sustain an active community over time.
Additionally, the modeling perspective would problematize in some ways the argument that “the search for non-Walrasian microfoundations left a deep mark on macroeconomics” because “by the end of the 1990s, some of the ideas that arose out of the search for disequilibrium microfoundations formed the basis for a widespread consensus on how to construct macroeconomic models” (p. 186). I am not denying that disequilibrium macro was an active research topic well into the late 1980s and the 1990s, as the authors clearly show in the book, nicely concluding that bibliometric evidence of citation of papers (presented in the book) should be read with caution when one discusses the impact of a set of ideas in a community. I am particularly concerned here with the link made between disequilibrium macro and the new neoclassical synthesis of Woodford. The argument made is that Julio Rotemberg (PhD from Princeton, 1981) acknowledged that his rational expectations equilibrium model of price setting “is … a relative of the Barro–Grossman (1976) model” (quoted on p. 175). The suggestion is that as Rotemberg co-authored with Woodford important papers that later became the basis of Woodford’s 2003 book, there is a link from Barro and Grossman to the new neoclassical synthesis. But I see it as a weak link, and the fact that the authors pointed out that Woodford himself saw no connection on this matter to disequilibrium macro and wrote a survey of macroeconomics with no place given to this literature provides some weight against the significance of that link. In the same way, the fact that imperfect competition was central to disequilibrium macro, with Oliver Hart (Reference Hart1982) citing the work of Jean-Pascal Bénassy and being enlisted as part of the New Keynesian camp by N. Gregory Mankiw and David Romer (1991) does not necessarily make imperfect competition a lasting contribution of disequilibrium macro to the new neoclassical synthesis. Both suggestions are plausible but require additional elements to be established. There is indeed a history to be explored of the origins of the New Keynesian literature and its connection to disequilibrium macroeconomics.
I would like to make some additional specific comments on the book. First, there are here and there statements that deserved a more careful documentation or explanation. Just as examples, there is the suggestion that Herbert Simon perhaps framed Leijonhufvud’s thinking, despite not appearing in the book’s index (p. 58). There is also a suggestion that “though some [macroeconomists] were aware of the general equilibrium literature, most … took little notice of it” (p. 122), and that Solow’s influence as Woodford’s advisor encouraged the latter to integrate sticky prices into inter-temporal general equilibrium models (p. 178)—whether this is or is not true is hard to establish and it fails to recognize that Solow was the official advisor, but Timothy J. Kehoe was Woodford’s de facto supervisor (Duarte Reference Duarte, Davis and Wade Hands2012, p. 222n9).
Second, the chapter on Lucas and the discussion on the real-business cycle (and perhaps the new neoclassical synthesis) seemed to me to be more extensive than what was needed for the arguments about the disequilibrium literature. Third, and related to the previous point, two issues are not well developed in this part: one is the choice of not describing the Lucas critique paper (p. 97), which is perhaps critical to the disequilibrium macro too, and in fact using the essence of this critique a few paragraphs later (though the stability of parameters in the face of new shocks is imprecise as the meaning of these “shocks” is not defined); another is that the discussion on calibration (p. 173) overemphasizes the role of microeconomic evidence to pin down parameters and could give an incorrect impression to some readers on how to calibrate the parameters of the model that are not estimated from this evidence (see, for example, Kydland and Prescott Reference Kydland and Prescott1991; Boumans Reference Boumans, Snowdon and Vane2002; and Duarte Reference Duarte, Davis and Wade Hands2012). Fourth, the authors sometimes stick too closely to the protagonists’ accounts of things (either in published materials or in the archives or personal correspondence) and in a few places missed the opportunity to refer more extensively to the existing historiography—for instance, Esther-Mirjam Sent (Reference Sent2002) is a nice complement to their discussion on John Muth (p. 94), and a reference to the symposium about Woodford’s book, organized by Boianovsky and published in JHET in 2006, would complement their discussion on this book, as Kevin Hoover (Reference Hoover2010) would probably do as well.
Finally, I think it is important to mention that the term “DSGE” is a tricky one. The authors wrote that DSGE models became the dominant approach to doing macroeconomic theory during the 1980s (they have in mind the real-business cycle literature). It is true that, technically, real-business cycle models are DSGE, but this label was not used at the time—and this technical meaning of DSGE was applied mostly by econometricians comparing alternative dynamic models based on individuals’ optimization problems (Sims Reference Sims1996 is the first occurrence in the articles archived in JSTOR). However, over time this term became much more associated with one particular type of such models: one that has Keynesian features like price rigidity, as epitomized by the works of Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichembaum, and Charles Evans (2005), and Frank Smets and Raf Wouters (2003), models allegedly emergent out of the synthesis of the real-business cycle and new Keynesian macroeconomics (see Duarte Reference Duarte, Davis and Wade Hands2011 for a discussion of these models).
To conclude, this is a very nice book written by two specialists on the history of macroeconomics, and one that brings to the fore a crucial development that transformed the area: the disequilibrium literature. They offer us a rich account of different actors, with different goals, forging alliances and developing communities mostly geared to transforming Keynesian understandings of the economy. It is a history around Keynes and Keynesianism, as it is a history of monetary models crying for dynamic aspects and of uncertainty and time in macroeconomic models. It is rightly not a history of progress, and a narrative that compellingly makes the case that “the search for non-Walrasian foundations for macroeconomics … was never homogeneous” and that “bracketing macroeconomists into well-defined ‘schools,’ though frequently done, is difficult” (p. 185). It is thus a forceful invitation for furthering the history of macroeconomic models.
