Appearing just before the financial crisis of 2007 emerged in the United States and spread around the world, this is a timely book. It is also provocative in trying to do something no one has done before, namely provide a comprehensive political economy analysis of several centuries of financial crises and their effects on the development of financial systems. It aims to bridge the gap between the modern economics literature on finance and growth, and more traditional historical studies. The economics literature tends to consist of econometric analyses of large cross-country datasets from recent decades, and pays little attention to earlier history. Historical studies of financial development tend to be country- or region-specific, lack any general analysis of what drives changes in financial systems, and draw few policy implications for the present. Philip Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal do, I think, bridge the gap, at least for general readers who are the target audience.
The book starts off by saying, “Financial markets are an extraordinary engine for promoting investment and innovation and for making economies expand,” an old and valid point, but they quickly add that “financial development often brings crises in its wake” (pp. 2, 4). The authors' stance is that financial crises, defined as widespread failures to honor financial contracts, are an inevitable consequence of financial development, sparing neither strong nor weak financial systems. Given the inevitability of financial crises, a major issue explored in the book is whether crises are creatively destructive—leading to long-run improvements in financial systems—or simply destructive.
The political economy analysis of the book is built on three factors said to be critical for financial development: “the level of government debt, the size of the middle class, and the amount of information that is available for parties to perform financial transactions” (p. 6). Two of them hint at why financial crises are inevitable. If a government runs up a debt beyond its ability to service it with contractual interest and principal payments, it will be tempted to default in one way or another. This seems to be a common cause of financial crises in countries with predatory governments and weak financial systems, two conditions that often go together.
In stronger financial systems with nonpredatory governments, which also go together, crises result more from asymmetric information. The 2007 crisis provides a good example. Investors in mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations based on them did not know that mortgage bankers had relaxed lending standards for so-called sub-prime borrowers to the extent they had. Then many sub-prime borrowers, ones who never should have gotten mortgage loans based on normal lending standards, began to default on their mortgage payments. Securities based on the mortgages plunged in value, credit markets seized up, major financial institutions took huge losses, and CEO heads rolled in financial centers. A prescient passage in the book mentions the “extraordinarily lax regulation of mortgage markets in Western democracies” (p. 201) as illustrative of the sorts of reasons financial crises will not go away.
The third key factor in financial development, the size of the middle class, is the most novel feature of the authors' analysis. Financial crises are turning points, but will the turns taken after them be for better or worse? The argument of the book is that the outcome depends on the size of middle class. The middle class seems to be defined as a class with individual and collective collateral that can be used to obtain loans, but one that is relatively undiversified and reliant on “local” institutions for financial services (see. fn. 17, pp. 237–38). Such a middle class, particularly the entrepreneurs and investors in it, tends to suffer disproportionately from financial crises that interrupt the flow of credit. The poor do not suffer much because they have neither collateral nor much stake in the financial and economic systems. The rich do not suffer because they are well diversified and can move their money across international boundaries. The authors argue that a large middle class—the larger the better—will demand financial reforms that improve the system after crises. Politicians, governments, and financial organizations respond to these demands, and crises become destructively creative.
The authors' emphasis on the size of the middle class on the surface seems well taken. They note that Latin American countries have relatively smaller middle classes than Europe and North America, and also retarded financial development and a long history of financial crises demonstrating more destruction than creative destruction. But probing deeper, why is it that some countries and parts of the world have larger middle classes than others? The authors do not say. And is it really true that the middle class suffers most from financial crises while the rich and the poor are relatively unscathed by them? At one point (p. 90), the authors suggest that the rich even benefit from financial crises because they can swoop in and purchase the assets of the middle class at bargain prices. This would seem to imply that the rich in a country have an interest in promoting financial crises, an interesting idea that is not explored in the book. Perhaps the rich, too, suffer from financial crises, so they do not spend a lot of time trying to cause them.
A problem of the analysis is that the classes seem rather monolithic. I suspect that some in every class suffer from financial crises while others benefit in some ways. All the mortgage foreclosures in the United States today are allowing people in all classes to purchase or rent housing more cheaply. Another problem is that the middle class is never measured. What is a large one? What is a small one? The same is true of information and government debt. What is the right amount of government debt? How much is too much? We are not told.
Despite these shortcomings, Surviving Large Losses is a step forward in the social-scientific analysis of financial crises and historical financial development.
