The 100th anniversary of the constitutional revolutions in Iran and the Ottoman Empire in 2006 and 2008, respectively, has occasioned a plethora of scholarly activity in recent years. While Nader Sohrabi's book came out in the midst of such publications, which were mostly collections of essays, it does not belong to the commemorative wave. It was conceived more than two decades ago and is the fruit of painstaking research that lasted as long. An academic entrepreneur might have published this research as three separate books, a triad that could define a career. It is a rich and masterfully written study and an important contribution to the literature on constitutionalism and sociopolitical dissent in the Middle East.
The three components of the book are: a historical–sociological analysis of revolutions at the turn of the 20th century, including the implications for and manifestations in the Middle East of a global revolutionary model; a detailed narrative analysis of the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary dynamics in the Ottoman Empire during 1908–09; and a parallel examination of the constitutional transformations in Iran during 1905–09. The analytical categories that Sohrabi employs are the global, the regional, and the local. In a magisterial article published in 1995 in the American Journal of Sociology (Nader Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia, 1905–1908,” American Journal of Sociology 100 [1995]: 1383–1447), a pilot for the book, Sohrabi analyzed the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian constitutional revolutions in their global context against the backdrop of world revolutions in general and constitutionalism in particular. In Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran, he expounds on the global dimension of the tripartite (global–regional–local) framework in the introduction and the first chapter, which introduces the Young Turk revolution. The bulk of the book, however, which comprises three additional long chapters on the Young Turk revolution and two equally long chapters on Iran's constitutional revolution, is devoted to the local. The regional perspective is more diffuse but becomes deliberate in the chapters on Iran. Sohrabi does what many Middle East historians do in general surveys and in the classroom, providing an elaborate account of the preconditions and course of Ottoman sociopolitical transformations before analyzing the road to Iran's constitutional revolution and counterrevolution in comparative perspective to the Ottoman Empire.
The author invokes a global “master-frame” (p. 135) at the beginning of the 20th century, which, he contends, represented neither a fulfillment of the class-based popular French revolutionary model nor a dress rehearsal for the Russian revolution. For the Ottomans and Iranians, the contingency that animated the revolutionary fervor in the Middle East was the 1905 defeat of Russia by Japan, a reforming state that had achieved a constitutional system. The example of the Russian revolution and the contingency of the Japanese victory were relevant to a host of revolutions (e.g., Mexican, Chinese). Sohrabi's argument is that the global wave of revolutions and the diffusion of the idiom of constitutionalism inflected regional and local contingencies to produce specific revolutionary dynamics and outcomes. His analysis of revolutionary change in the Middle East revolves around the hypothesis that the desire to strengthen the state and not an intrinsic commitment to liberalism impelled the revolutionary movements. Constitutionalism was an end, not a means to create a liberal polity. The revolutions in the Ottoman Empire and Iran did not have a defined class base. In both, Islamic thought invested constitutionalism with a meaning and imparted to it a thrust, albeit along different trajectories.
The unfolding of the constitutional movement in the Ottoman Empire was facilitated by an established tradition of state centralization and military institutionalization, by the nature and extent of educational reforms, and, first and foremost, by the empire's social structure in which non-Muslims had numerical strength and European backing. Sohrabi, like others before him, portrays Ottoman constitutionalism as a planned movement emanating from the thought and propaganda of the Young Ottomans in the 1860s and 1870s. Unlike the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks, who in Sohrabi's analysis become synonymous with the CUP, do not represent an elite but rather a bureaucratic–military–intellectual middle class with blocked career paths bent on revamping governance and strengthening the state. In their quest to achieve scientific “state efficiency (p. 34),” the Young Turks turned against Islam, or at best paid opportunistic lip service to Islam.
In Iran's constitutional revolution, in contrast, Sohrabi posits Islam as a pivotal force even as he rejects Shiʿi exceptionalism, often invoked to establish a relationship between Shiʿi doctrine and “clerical” influence in Iran. Owing to Iran's inadequate institutional development, the shahs’ patrimonial household remained strong, as did the religious leadership, at the expense of a rationalized bureaucracy. Thus, Iran's emergent constitutionalist coalition (intellectuals, merchant groups, and popular committees) had to appeal to the men of religion for a leadership role. Rather than seeking the overthrow of the monarchy as in the Ottoman Empire, Sohrabi argues, Iranian constitutionalists invoked traditional notions of justice to place limits on the monarch. Within these traditional parameters, contingency (as opposed to planned agency) became paramount in the Iranian revolution.
Sohrabi points to a distinction between the Ottoman and Iranian constitutional movements with regard to popular participation, an important element of the global revolutionary wave. In the Ottoman Empire, he maintains, popular resistance of the kind organized in July 1908 in Macedonia was defused by the regime after the CUP came in control of the cabinet. The CUP was distrustful of popular participation, even as it touted equal citizenship as the ultimate goal of the revolution. The instrumentalization of popular groups, like the instrumentalization of Islam, is overstated in Sohrabi's analysis of the Young Turk movement. Paradoxically, in Iran, where the constitutionalists could not harness a diffuse executive and were able to create only a stratified legislature, they mobilized popular grievances about taxes and abuse of state power effectively to bring about political change. In the end, both constitutional revolutions confronted religiously inspired counterrevolutions. Iran's revolution was mired in this reaction, while the CUP defeated a counterrevolutionary coalition.
The book offers the most detailed existing narrative of the revolutionary junctures in the Ottoman Empire and Iran. Newspapers and journals constitute the lion's share of the source materials. The day by day reading and analysis of multiple newspapers builds the narrative of the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary upheavals in both empires. Extensive research in the Ottoman archives has allowed a relatively more textured analysis of the Young Turk revolution. Sohrabi has not spared any effort to read, compile, and statistically analyze documents to produce fresh information. One example is a detailed and original account of Young Turk purges in the bureaucracy and the military. In the case of Iran, where similar state records do not exist or are not accessible, there is greater reliance on the works of intellectuals and contemporary accounts. The book debunks facile generalizations based on more selective readings of similar source materials.
Unlike most scholars who have written on the period, Sohrabi shuns European documentary sources without an explanation. Nor does he refer to a host of relevant secondary sources or engage with existing scholarship in any deliberate or sustained way. (This is emblematic in the absence of a bibliography in the book.) He certainly does not pick up any scholarly squabbles. One does not quite know if this has to do with collegial sensitivity, or if he views such engagement as a distraction, or because of a deep Rankean bias toward history-writing.
The indulgence in narrative detail will serve future scholars well. The more general reader may be frustrated by the discipline that Sohrabi exercises in his deep and focused narrative. The author is aware of the collateral questions that his account raises and the avenues it leads to, but refrains from pursuing them, with caveats about topics that “should receive commentary at another time (p. 267),” or are “set aside for now (p. 274),” or ”should be dealt elsewhere (p. 275).” Sohrabi promises to take up one of these topics muted in the book as his next project, namely, Turkish nationalism during the Young Turk era. This certainly is a subject that awaits the kind of meticulous and theoretically informed research that Sohrabi accomplishes in Revolution and Constitutionalism.
Anything that would make this book longer would likely have made it unwieldy and possibly unpublishable given the presses’ increasing sensitivities about length of manuscripts. Organizing the research as more than one monograph might have had the added benefit of allowing the author to situate the two revolutions in a deeper diachronic context, complementing the unique and innovative synchronic approach that the study embodies with its minute historical detail, theoretical generalization, and comparative vantage.
