In Hegel’s Naturalism, Terry Pinkard undertakes the task of giving an account of Hegel’s philosophical anthropology. The claim that Pinkard defends is that, for Hegel, human beings are ‘self-interpreting animals’ who are naturally inclined to be at one with themselves, and can only attain this goal through their participation in a historically developing social space.

In the first part of the book (chapters 1 and 2), Pinkard argues that Hegel is what he calls a ‘disenchanted Aristotelian naturalist’ (19). Hegel is an Aristotelian naturalist, as Pinkard sees it, because Hegel holds that there is a continuum between the natural world and human beings. Humans, on this view, are, basically, highly complex animals. Hegel’s Aristotelian naturalism is, however, a disenchanted one because Hegel denies that nature as a whole functions teleologically. What Pinkard especially wants to show is that, for Hegel, the key difference between human beings and animals is not a metaphysical one; it is not, e.g., that human beings have an immaterial soul. Rather the difference is a practical one. It lies in what human animals do, namely, reflect about themselves.

In the second part of the book (chapters 3–7) Pinkard treats what might be called Hegel’s social philosophy. Chapter 3 deals with Hegel’s conception of the ultimate end of man. Pinkard here makes the above-mentioned central claim that, for Hegel, the ultimate end consists in being at one with oneself, and that this goal can only be achieved in a social space (106). In chapters 4 and 5, Pinkard describes two important historical configurations of this social space according to Hegel: the ancient Greek social order and the social order of the ancien régime. Pinkard shows the different ways in which, for Hegel, an individual can achieve unity with herself in these configurations, but also demonstrates how these configurations fail to make a complete unity with oneself possible. Chapter 6 deals with the social space of Post-French Revolution Europe. Pinkard here discusses Hegel’s understanding of civil society, the nation state, and the effect the market has on modern ethical life. In the last chapter, Pinkard shows why, for Hegel, the social configuration of the modern nation state is likewise fraught with weaknesses. Pinkard concludes his book with a general claim about Hegel’s view of the relation between philosophical problems and society, namely, that philosophical problems arise in a given social space, and that they do not admit of a theoretical, but only of a practical resolution. In this context, Pinkard rejects the view that Hegel sought to bring philosophy to a close in his own system. Rather, according to Pinkard, Hegel sees philosophy as an ongoing process.

Pinkard’s book is well written and introduces a fresh take on Hegel’s account of human nature. Admirably, Pinkard does not fall into the trap of hiding behind Hegelian jargon. Rather he undertakes the laudable, and difficult, project of reframing Hegel’s thought in contemporary language. In so doing, Pinkard accomplishes the equally difficult task of communicating a clear stance on Hegel’s thought. The result is thought provoking. As read through Pinkard’s lens, Hegel turns out to be not so much a thinker who understands humanity in light of an already established idealist metaphysical theory, but rather a thinker who views theories as unfolding out of man’s attempt to make sense of himself and his place in the natural world.

However, as we see it, there are various problems associated with Pinkard’s reading of Hegel. We identify three main problems. First, the precise meaning of the term ‘Aristotelian naturalism’ remains elusive. Second, it is unclear which group Pinkard is addressing with this book. Third, Pinkard blurs the lines between providing a faithful rendition of Hegel’s thought and constructing a contemporary anthropology inspired by Hegel. We will discuss these problems in turn.

Pinkard does not define the term ‘naturalism’ anywhere in his book. The first two chapters suggest that he takes the term to designate the position that there exists nothing over and above the material world. For instance, in the first chapter, Pinkard argues that Hegel is an Aristotelian naturalist because he takes human beings to be only gradually distinct from animals (18–19). Further, Pinkard claims that Hegel would opt for a naturalist-materialist account of human agency over a dualist account (30). However, if ‘naturalism’, for Pinkard, indeed designates the position that there exists nothing over and above the material world, then we do not see how this naturalism is Aristotelian. After all, Aristotle thinks that the operation of thinking, which sets us apart from non-rational animals, requires the presence of an immaterial intellect (the agent intellect) (DA: 3.5). Hence, if Hegel indeed adopts the naturalist view, as Pinkard seems to claim, that human mindedness is something material, then the label ‘Aristotelian naturalism’ is misleading.

In his discussion of human happiness (chapter 3), Pinkard seems to allow for another sense of the term ‘Aristotelian naturalism’. He states that, for Hegel, human nature determines the ends that are worthy of human pursuit (91). This is, of course, the basic idea of Aristotelian meta-ethics, and a contemporary variety of it has come to be known as ‘Neo-Aristotelian meta-ethical naturalism’. An adherent of this latter view makes no claim about the entire inventory of the world, i.e., whether it contains only material or also immaterial items. What he or she claims is rather that certain items––namely, moral properties––are reducible to natural properties. In other words, he holds that we can say something illuminating about what we ought to do by considering our natural make-up. As we see it, interpreting Hegel as an Aristotelian meta-ethical naturalist is an avenue worth exploring. However, in order to do so, one would have to show that Hegel grounds ethics in human nature in roughly the same way as Aristotle does. It is well known that Aristotle employs the idion ergon-argument (EN: 1.7) in this context, according to which, if engaging in some activity A is expressive of the essence of a living being F, then engaging in A is good for that F. Thus, in order to show that Hegel is an Aristotelian meta-ethical naturalist, one would have to show that Hegel also endorses something like the idion ergon-argument. However, Pinkard does not consider this argument anywhere in his book, and so attributing Aristotelian meta-ethical naturalism to Hegel remains unsupported. To sum up, once we separate two meanings of the term ‘Aristotelian naturalism’, we see that it is either a misnomer or that there is not enough support to apply it to Hegel’s thought.

The second problem we see with Pinkard’s book is the problem of the target audience. As we view it, the book appears to be written neither for the novice nor for the expert. It cannot be an introductory read because it does not adequately present alternative readings of Hegel’s thought on human nature. For instance, Pinkard simply offers a rudimentary sketch of the classical monistic interpretation of Hegel and dismisses it without argument (18–19). Yet the book does not seem to us to be for an expert audience either. For the expert will demand that Pinkard support his interpretation with detailed textual analysis. Not infrequently, however, it is either unclear how the textual evidence that Pinkard provides is supposed to support his reading, or we find what seems to us to be clear evidence against his interpretation. We here consider three examples.

The first example is Pinkard’s claim, made with reference to the Addition (Zusatz) to Encyclopedia II, §246, that ‘when Hegel discusses animals, he also calls them “idealists”’ (19). Pinkard claims that Hegel considers animals to be idealists because they ‘devour things’ (19). This claim is important for Pinkard’s interpretation. He infers from it that matter must be real, for Hegel, and that, therefore, Hegel’s idealism ‘is not the thesis that everything is mental or spiritual in its makeup’ (24). But this reading of the passage is problematic for two reasons. First, it should be noted that, in the passage in question, Hegel does not explicitly call animals ‘idealists’, as Pinkard states. Rather Hegel considers the metaphysical thesis that we cannot know things in reality because ‘they are absolutely impenetrable (fest) to us’ (EN: §246), and he argues that this thesis can be easily falsified by looking at how animals relate to reality: they devour things. As we see from this example, Pinkard does not explain the steps he takes to arrive at his interpretation.

Pinkard’s interpretation of the passage in question is problematic for another reason. As we see it, Hegel’s remarks about idealism in the very same passage can be taken to suggest that, for Hegel, material things qua material do not truly exist. In other words, Hegel can here be taken to in fact endorse the very idealism that Pinkard thinks should not be attributed to Hegel. Hegel writes that ‘true idealism consists in nothing else but laying down that the truth about things is that as such immediately single, i.e. sensuous things, they are only a show [nur Schein], an appearance’. Hegel then contrasts what he calls ‘the universal aspect of things’ with this show or appearance. He writes: ‘this universal aspect of things […] is in contrast to the transient phenomenon, the noumenon, the true, objective, actual nature of things themselves, like the Platonic Ideas’. This is, admittedly, a difficult passage that allows for various interpretations. What is clear to us, however, is that it can be taken to contradict Pinkard’s contention that, on Hegel’s view, ‘not […] everything is […] spiritual in its makeup’. What Hegel calls the ‘universal aspect of things’ seems to refer to something that is immaterial. If we combine this with Hegel’s claim that the universal is ‘the true, objective, actual nature of things’, then one might attribute to Hegel the claim that ‘everything is […] spiritual in its make-up’. Rather than endorsing this interpretation here, we want to point out that it is equally possible, and that careful textual analysis ought to consider it.

Another example of a lack of adequate textual analysis is Pinkard’s presentation of Hegel’s discussion of the opposed views of materialism and dualism (30). Pinkard suggests with reference to the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes that Hegel’s own view, that of ‘Aristotelian naturalism’, has a close proximity to materialism. He says that, as Hegel sees it, ‘if our theoretical choices really were indeed restricted to either a purely naturalist-materialist account of mindful agency or a dualist account we would have to opt for the naturalist-materialist account’ (30). Yet there is at least one passage, namely, from Encyclopedia III, §389, that suggests a very different picture of Hegel’s relation to materialism. Hegel here writes that ‘Not only is the soul for itself immaterial, it is the universal immateriality of nature, the simple ideal nature of the life of nature’. Thus, it seems to us that in order to make his controversial materialist interpretation of Hegel convincing, Pinkard would have to explain away what looks like a commitment to anti-materialism.

Our last example of lacking textual analysis is Pinkard’s interpretation of the famous claim in the Phenomenology that ‘everything hangs on apprehending and expressing the truth not merely as substance, but also equally as subject’ (PhG: 3.23).Footnote ¹ As Pinkard sees it, this claim is Hegel’s

First, it remains unclear to us how this quote is connected with the will. A glance at the context of the quote shows that the passage in question does not even mention the will. Moreover, Pinkard takes Hegel’s talk of ‘substance’ to refer to a ‘set of substances’. But what justifies the move from the singular to the plural? Pinkard does not say. The move suggests that Hegel is, in fact, an ontological pluralist who accepts the reality of a multitude of primary substances. While this is a possible account of Hegel, it is controversial (for an opposing view, see, e.g., Horstmann 1990), and Pinkard does not provide a defence of it.

We would now like to address another problem regarding Pinkard’s Hegel’s Naturalism. At times, Pinkard blurs the line between providing an exegesis and constructing a new theory inspired by Hegel. For instance, Pinkard writes that

This passage is about self-reflection, and the suggestion seems to be that human beings can engage in it due to certain features of their brain. We find nothing in Hegel’s texts that suggests an explanation of self-reflection in these terms. Pinkard seems to be making a claim that is inspired by Hegel rather than about Hegel, but Pinkard does not make this evident. Another instance of this seems to us to be the following passage:

This is clearly a claim about Hegel’s dialectic. However, it is highly contentious that Hegel’s dialectic can be assimilated to a Wittgensteinian therapeutic approach to philosophical problems, as Pinkard here claims. One might connect these two philosophical programs in a new synthesis, but in order to present this as a legitimate interpretation of Hegel’s own philosophy extensive argument is needed.

It should be noted that Pinkard is aware of the hermeneutic difficulties associated with his reading of Hegel. At the beginning of his book, he alerts us to the fact that he ‘does not talk like Hegel’ and that, therefore, one might object ‘fine and good, but what you just said isn’t Hegel’ (xi). But he points out that using Hegelian jargon will not do either. We completely agree with Pinkard on this score. We think, however, that a clear distinction needs to be drawn between what the text explicitly says and what the interpretation of the commentator is. As we see it, Pinkard does not always make this distinction evident.

These criticisms should not detract from the overall high quality of Hegel’s Naturalism. Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel’s anthropology is interesting and raises a range of exciting questions. Nonetheless, we are of the overall opinion that Pinkard has not succeeded in disarming the critic who says ‘This is all fine and good, but it’s not Hegel’.