Sophie Richardson's wonderful book sheds light on a poorly understood dimension of Chinese foreign policy, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence—peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in others' internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit. Richardson's thesis is that the Principles “set particular and predictable limits on the choices available to Chinese foreign policy makers” (p. 5). Her case is the bilateral relationship between China and Cambodia from the 1950s up to about 2008. Richardson presents a credible alternative to traditional schools of international relations theory by demonstrating how China placed—indeed, voluntarily constrained—itself in its international interactions from the 1950s to the present. She shows how this framework explains otherwise perplexing instances of China's foreign policy behavior, past and present. Her argument explains the perennial mutual mistrust between Beijing and Washington and provides a searing indictment of Americans' refusal to understand—let alone accept—China's behavior on in its own terms.
Richardson argues that Chinese foreign policy behavior represents rational self-interest, but within a set of constructed constraints quite different from what realists might predict: “Beijing's policies consistently created a variety of options for Phnom Penh” (p. 197), often at a variance with Beijing's preferred outcome. And although there are a number of occasions when the Principles were not followed, Richardson argues convincingly that this was attributable to unanticipated exogenous shocks (i.e., the Korean War) or domestic turmoil (i.e., the radical foreign policy of the Cultural Revolution, 1966–68 and 1974–76).
There are, however, some parts of the book that I found less convincing than others. The first is Richardson's treatment of conditionality. China is fond of saying that it offers foreign assistance without attached conditions, thus providing an alternative to Washington Consensus–based contingencies from Western sources. I agree with Richardson that there is a genuine conceptual and empirically realized difference between the two types of foreign assistance. Yet it seems that Richardson is uncharacteristically credulous of Chinese claims of “no strings attached.” Chinese “conditions” include awarding infrastructure-building contracts to Chinese companies, lobbying for policy decisions that benefit Chinese interests within the recipient country, and market access for Chinese goods, as well as adherence to—and support of—Chinese policies toward Taiwan and Tibet (which are embedded within the Chinese understanding of the Principles themselves). And Richardson's views on conditionality allow her to conclude that “China has provided considerable support to Cambodia's economic independence” (p. 193). The view from many inside (and outside) Cambodia is precisely the opposite, that China “owns” an ever-growing part of the Cambodian economy.
Like Richardson, I believe that the only way to wade through the mess of Sino-Cambodian relations between 1974 and 1978 is to do so with an eye on the domestic politics in both states, each of which was undergoing its own revolution that was fundamentally a negation of the other (autarchic socialist utopianism in Cambodia, economic reform and opening in China). But some of the linkages she makes feel forced. For example, Richardson claims that had Zhou Enlai been able to retain his power in the face of declining health and challenges from leftists, it is likely that Sihanouk could have thwarted the radicalization of the Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchéa. It seems to me that the die had been cast well before 1974: Khmer Rouge “liberated areas” of Cambodia had begun to resemble Democratic Kampuchea as early as 1972, as Khmer Rouge policy toward its own administered population hardened (and before Zhou's health took a turn for the worse). And it is difficult to believe that even someone with the stature of Zhou could influence people such as Pol Pot and Nuon Chea, whose worldviews were not amenable to self-reflection or even, as we now know, to pragmatic self-preservation.
Finally, Richardson's argument becomes weaker and more difficult to apply to the 1979–92 period, particularly between 1983 and 1985. This is not surprising, as Cambodia ceased to exhibit characteristics necessary for the Principles to function effectively, such as commonly accepted borders, and saw the emergence of competing armies and parties, each with sovereign claims. Thus, her analysis becomes vulnerable to charges of “China adhered to the Principles … except when it didn't.” I personally accept her argument, but it could have been made more forcefully.
Richardson closes her book with a summary of Sino-American relations and follows it with a devastating critique of U.S. misperceptions toward China, a topic that cries out for more conceptual and analytical analyses, which would do well to use this chapter as a starting point.
This gem of a book should be widely read by undergraduates, graduate students, policy makers, and particularly anybody who is interested in Chinese foreign policy and Sino-Cambodian relations.
