In the mid-1990s, I visited the late Sayyid Jalal Ashtiyani, the eminent philosopher who earned the title “The Living Mulla Sadra,” at his home in Mashhad, Iran. We had discussed a variety of issues pertaining to Islamic philosophy when he suddenly said in a frustrated tone of voice: “Enough of writing commentary upon commentary. You younger generation of scholars should do something new.”
What Ashtiyani had in mind is precisely the type of philosophical discourse Mohammad Azadpur offers in his book, Reason Unbound: On Spiritual Practice in Islamic Peripatetic Philosophy. While breaking from tradition is simple, finding a way to be engaged with modernity through a hermeneutical process from within the tradition is rather complex. Reason Unbound has achieved this delicate task by highlighting the more neglected aspects of Islamic philosophy as well as its ability to enter into a serious dialogue with modern Western philosophy.
Azadpur's project is twofold: first, to show that practical wisdom has always been a component of the philosophy of Muslim Peripatetics; second, that such an integral component of philosophizing can also be found in the Western philosophical tradition. Stating, “I adopt Pierre Hadot's view that the Greeks, in their own conceptualization of what constituted their philosophic project, saw philosophy as primarily the practice of spiritual exercises aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom,” the author postulates that “Islamic Peripatetic philosophers understood what they inherited from the Greeks” (p. 7).
Regardless of the extent to which Muslim Peripatetics emphasized reason and rationalism, catharsis of character, purification of the self, and the “inner jihad” remained an intricate component of philosophizing. References to the practical component of philosophy are often implied in the titles of Peripatetic works such as Avicenna's Shifaʾ (Healing) or Tusi's Tajrid al-Aqaʿid (Catharsis of Belief), both of which are highly analytical works.
Azadpur makes a convincing argument that the goal of Muslim Peripatetics was not only to inform but also to transform. However, it is not entirely clear why he attributes this goal only to Peripatetics, as practical wisdom and the transformative aspect of Islamic philosophy is an inherent part of almost all of the philosophical schools, be it the Illuminationists (ishrāqī) or Transcendent Philosophy (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyya).
Alluding to some of the shortcomings of modern Western readings of Islamic philosophy, which rely purely on the discursive aspects of this tradition, Azadpur continues with a thorough discussion of Henry Corbin and Heidegger, their phenomenological views on “things themselves,” and Corbin's application of spiritual hermeneutics (taʾwīl) to Islamic philosophy.
To support his views, Azadpur quotes Muhsin Mahdi, who states that Peripatetics offer “a genuine form of rationalism that is free of modern philosophy's excessively narrow construct of human reason.” However, Azadpur's assessment that Peripatetics offered a genuine form of rationalism needs to be clarified here. While the Peripatetics’ embracing of the spirit of rationalism is to be celebrated, the majority of Peripatetics, with the exception of a few figures such as Ibn Rawani, Ibn Rushd, and perhaps Zakariya Razi, considered reason to be ultimately subservient to revelation and scripture.
Just as the Peripatetics’ concept of rationalism is subject to debate, the title of the book under consideration, Reason Unbound, raises its own questions. Generally speaking, reason has never been unbound in the Islamic philosophical tradition; the ultimate goal of the Peripatetics, for example, was to show how reason and revelation could be reconciled. The boundaries of reason in the Islamic philosophical tradition are well established: reason shall always remain subservient to revelation. Given this axiom, Reason Bounded seems a more appropriate choice of title for the book as well as more reflective of the argument Azadpur is advancing.
As al-Ghazali realized during his pursuit of truth and certitude, genuine forms of rational inquiry will soon collide with revelation-based philosophical wisdom. In fact, it was the perceived excess of the Muʿtazilites and Peripatetics that led to the emergence of the Ashʿarites. Later Muslim philosophers preferred the title ḥākim (a divine sage) to faylasūf (philosopher), signaling that they sought to distance themselves from discursive thought.
In the last few decades, several books comparing Heidegger and Islamic philosophy have appeared, most of them focusing on later Islamic philosophy, especially that of Mulla Sadra. It is therefore refreshing that Azadpur offers a comparison between Islamic Peripateticism and Heidegger's phenomenology (Chapter 6). Eschatologically speaking, Being-towards-beyond-death, which characterizes the spirit of Islamic philosophy, versus Heidegger's concept of Dasien as Being-towards-death, is a very promising area of scholarship. More evolved perceptions of the concept of the soul, which grew out of early Muslim philosophers’ dualistic understanding of the soul versus body and toward one of self-consciousness, presence, and an ontological level of reality capable of ascending and descending, are a major theme in later Islamic philosophy. Azadpur does a good job of showing how the ascendance of the soul requires a practical, moral, and spiritual component.
Despite a few pedantic issues raised previously, Reason Unbound is a welcome addition to the field of Islamic philosophy. This is exactly the type of scholarship that is required to make the Islamic philosophical tradition relevant to modern and contemporary philosophical discourse.
