What does it mean to be a non-Jew in an officially Jewish state? Given the fact that approximately one-quarter of Israel's population is Arab (those Palestinians and their descendants who remained in Israel after 1948), this question has spurred a good deal of scholarship. It also has important real-world political, social, and economic implications for both Jews and Arabs in Israel. There is an inherent tension between Zionism (Jewish ethnonationalism) and democracy—particularly when it comes to Israel's indigenous Arab minority.
Three recent books address this question from different perspectives. Ilan Peleg and Dov Waxman's Israel's Palestinians is a work of political science research and advocacy that deftly identifies the problem and then offers specific recommendations to resolve it. Oded Haklai's Palestinian Ethnonationalism in Israel is a methodologically and conceptually more rigorous work of comparative politics that examines Palestinian citizens as a case study of ethnonationalist political mobilization. The two books complement each other quite well. Both make the case that Palestinian citizens are a distinct ethnonationalist group: Haklai explains how and why their political mobilization and demands have increased over time, while Peleg and Waxman evaluate the policy implications, and propose that Palestinian citizens be recognized by the state as a minority group with collective cultural and political rights and some autonomy. Avery Kolers's Land, Conflict, and Justice is the outlier here. A dense work of normative theory by a political philosopher, the book does not address Palestinian citizens specifically, but rather articulates an interesting and complex theory of territorial rights that is then applied to the broader Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Kolers offers a detailed proposal for radically redefining identity categories and geopolitical boundaries in Israel, Palestine, and beyond.
In a book that is well written and compelling, if a bit repetitive, Peleg and Waxman argue that “the fundamental cause” of the conflict between Jews and Arabs within Israel “lies in the character of the Israeli state itself. The State of Israel can best be described as a ‘Jewish Republic,’ a state exclusively dedicated to what it views as Jewish interests, not to the interests of all its citizens (including its Palestinian citizens)” (p. 133). The authors, quite concerned with this state of affairs, declare their political agenda up front. In addition to describing and analyzing the contentious relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, they seek “to sound an alarm, to warn that, unless immediate dramatic action is taken,” the situation will deteriorate to the point that “the country's stability, and the quality of its democracy [will be] seriously at risk” (p. vii).
Israel's Palestinians is divided into two sections. Part I, “The Conflict Within,” is a case study of the Palestinian minority in Israel and its relationship with the Israeli state and Jewish majority. Peleg and Waxman detail the political and socioeconomic position of Israel's Palestinian citizens and chronicle the evolution of Palestinian politics over time, from the “quiescence” of the 1950s to the assertive demands for equality or autonomy being articulated today. They explore the cultural and political implications of the general Jewish mistrust toward Palestinian citizens, who are often viewed as a potential “fifth column.” The authors examine the question of whether the Arab minority has become radicalized, particularly in light of the violent October 2000 riots and the 2006–7 “Vision Documents” by Palestinian Israeli nongovernmental organizations, which openly challenged the nature and legitimacy of the state. The authors argue—and convincingly demonstrate with a wealth of data and academic studies—that Israel's Arabs, despite enjoying formal political equality, are second-class citizens. In their words, Palestinian citizens of Israel have long suffered from “inequality, neglect, and discrimination” (p. 44). And equally as significant for the long-term health of Israel's democracy, the authors note that most Arab citizens “do not think of themselves as Israeli” (p. 29).
With the problem fully articulated, Part II explores ways of “Managing the Conflict.” Peleg and Waxman put Israel's “ethnic democracy” in the comparative context of other deeply divided societies, presenting a detailed and sophisticated review of the literatures of ethnonationalist conflict and democratic institutional design that would be useful in any comparative politics course. They examine—and reject—“Jewish ethnocracy” and single-state binationalism, the solutions that tend to be proposed by advocates on the right and left. Instead, the authors suggest a “middle ground” alternative: Israel should accommodate its indigenous ethnonationalist minority and redefine itself as “both the Jewish state and a state for all its citizens” (p. 179). They offer 10 specific policy proposals to achieve this goal, including giving Palestinians “functional and non-territorial autonomy,” particularly in the realm of education; improving Palestinians' economic status via larger allocations of resources and laws that guarantee equality in housing and employment; formal power-sharing arrangements within government institutions; and symbolic changes that would “bolster a sense of shared citizenship,” such as adding new stanzas to the national anthem and an inclusive national holiday (pp. 183–87). The proposals are plausible, if politically controversial; many of them have long been advocated by moderate Israeli Jews and Arabs.
Peleg and Waxman conclude the book by positing, convincingly, that the crisis of Jewish–Arab relations within Israel and the external Israeli–Palestinian conflict are symbiotically linked, and thus can only truly be resolved simultaneously and comprehensively. Here, the authors make an important contribution to the vast literature on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which tends to treat Israel as a “black box” and ignores Israel's own Palestinian population.
Haklai approaches the question of Israel's Palestinian minority as a comparative political scientist concerned with cross-national applicability and causality explanations. His book is a theoretically informed, methodologically self-conscious historical analysis of the development and changing nature of Palestinian ethnonationalism in Israel over time. Haklai has theory building as one of his goals; he develops a solid conceptual framework and applies it in an original and convincing causal explanation for Palestinian ethnonationalist mobilization in Israel. A major question for this author concerns how we can explain change in the orientation and actions of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, from their relative complacence in the early years to full ethnonationalist self-consciousness and political mobilization beginning in the 1990s. Haklai demonstrates that Arab citizens have had feelings of resentment against the Israeli state dating back to its founding. So why did they not mobilize from the beginning, as the “grievance” and relative-deprivation schools of ethnic conflict would suggest? In a qualitative study that utilizes the literatures of ethnic conflict, social movements, and new institutionalism, he creates a qualitative explanatory model that focuses on institutions, state capacity, state–society relations, opportunity structures, and human agency. He argues that changes in the Israeli state and economy, the party system, and intra-Jewish politics opened up new opportunities for ethnonationalist mobilization (for both Jewish and Palestinian Israelis).
In the substantive chapters of Palestinian Ethnonationalism in Israel, Haklai briefly examines the prestate period, where much of Israel's institutional and political structure was formed; he uses the remainder of the book to present his theoretically informed historical analysis (and within-case comparison) of Palestinian Israeli political mobilization and action from 1948 to the present. He examines the lack of Palestinian mobilization during the strong-state period of the Military Administration over Arab citizens (1949–66); the rise of the Israeli Communist Party, which sought accommodation rather than separation between Jews and Arabs; the collapse of Labor hegemony and the new political and economic opportunities it created for Jews and Arabs alike; and the “ethnonationalist turn” that exploded onto the scene (at the beginning of the Second Intifada) with the October 2000 riots by Palestinian citizens and the state's harsh response—both of which underscored the great distance and distrust between Israeli Jews and Arabs. Like Peleg and Waxman, Haklai analyzes the four controversial “Vision Documents” that articulated a new and arguably radical Palestinian self-consciousness, and discusses the important differences between the documents and their various authors.
Haklai does an admirable job of analyzing the rise of the Islamist movement in Israel, including its rival southern and northern streams and their different stances on cooperation with the Israeli state. Although he does not make the point explicitly, the Islamist movements' project of “replacing the state” in providing services to Palestinian citizens, more than any other trend in Palestinian ethnonationalism, may prove to be the most subversive to Zionism and Israel. Haklai's final chapter is devoted to important changes in state–society relations, including the rise of the independent judiciary as a counterweight to the Knesset; government agencies that tend to privilege Jewish interests; and the increasingly fragmented party system that facilitates greater expression of ethnonationalist and exclusivist sentiments (for both Jews and Arabs).
Part of Haklai's project is to place Israel squarely within a comparative context. He applies his analytical framework briefly to examples from postcommunist Europe, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere in the Middle East, and in so doing does a good job of demonstrating that Israel is not idiosyncratic. In numerous cases, Haklai observes, “the state seeks to promote the interests of ethnonational majorities over minorities” (p. 176). His approach throughout is that of the dispassionate social scientist. This is the book's great strength, but also its weakness. The brief Conclusion, with its mere four-paragraph discussion of “policy implications,” is disappointing. Unlike Peleg and Waxman, Haklai refuses to offer recommendations for addressing the challenges to both Zionism and democracy posed by the increasingly contentious Jewish–Arab divide in Israel. Declaring that any solution is unlikely in the foreseeable future given the current state of Israeli politics, he declines to suggest one. Instead, he concludes with the prediction that tensions “are likely to remain intractable,” leading to an intensification of Palestinian activism and demands (p. 178).
Kolers presents a complicated, mostly abstract, and often unwieldy normative theory of territorial rights and justice (which consumes more than 160 pages of text). The “core thesis” of Land, Conflict, and Justice is rendered in language that is intelligible only within the context of the author's own unusual definitions, which often stand outside of conventional political science understandings: “A territorial right exists if and only if an ethnogeographic community demonstrably achieves plenitude in a juridical territory; this right grounds independent statehood only if there is no competing right and the territory is a country” (p. 5). A more detailed examination and critique of Kolers' abstract theory of territory is beyond the scope of this review. What concerns us here is the theory's applicability to empirical cases. Unfortunately, his theory becomes highly problematic when applied (in the final 30 pages) to the case of Israel/Palestine.
Along with Peleg and Waxman, Kolers views the conflict as an organic whole that must be resolved in its entirety; otherwise, Israel's Palestinian minority will remain as second-class citizens. He rejects both the binational one-state solution (as do Peleg and Waxman) and also the conventional two-state solution based on the 1967 lines, arguing that neither reflects the actual “ethnogeographies” of the peoples involved. His own policy recommendations, however, are seemingly disconnected from the empirical reality of the conflict and its actors. Kolers proposes to redivide 1948 Palestine into three discrete territories within a single, “ethnogeographically pluralist” sovereign state, so that each group maintains its own identity. Jewish Israelis comprise one of the groups, but curiously, the author separates Palestinians into two distinct entities: Bedouins (whom he seems to privilege on ecological grounds) and Palestinians, who, he asserts, have an “agrarian ethnogeography” that should be protected from the pressures of “global capital” (p. 210). In what might be interpreted as Orientalist paternalism, the author's seemingly romantic notion of Palestinian peasants ignores the large numbers of Palestinians who are in fact urban (both in the West Bank and Gaza, and within Israel itself).
In Kolers's proposal, Bedouin territorial control would extend beyond the Negev into the deserts of Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in order to achieve ethnogeographic unity with their kinsmen. With this, the author ignores the norms and constraints of the contemporary Westphalian international order and the sovereign interests of the neighboring Arab states. He seems to assume that these states would willingly accept the redrawing of their borders for the sake of territorial justice. Kolers also proposes that Israel relinquish its port city of Eilat for a Palestinian land bridge, and suggests that losing its access to the Red Sea would be acceptable to Israel in exchange for Jewish settlement blocs in the West Bank. In short, his recommendations, extracted from his cumbersome normative theory, are empirically implausible as they fail to take into account the realities of Israeli and Palestinian politics or international relations. In the end, Kolers's project is a thought-provoking philosophical exercise. It may be suitable for an advanced course in political theory, but its value to comparative politics or to any serious discussion of the challenges facing Israelis and Palestinians is highly limited.
These three books were published prior to the outbreak of the Arab Spring, which has generated tremendous instability on Israel's borders and has increased the sense of insecurity among Jewish Israelis. The Arab Spring has also facilitated a heightened political consciousness and restiveness among Palestinians within and outside Israel. In recent months, an intense debate about mandatory military service in Israel has come to the fore; although it has focused primarily on the traditionally exempted Ultra-Orthodox Jews, the place of Palestinian citizens has been part of the discussion as well. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is the country's melting pot, integrating Jewish immigrants and Israelis of all social classes into Israeli society. IDF service leads to employment opportunities, government loans, and other benefits, while not serving has negative cultural and economic consequences. Bedouin and Druze have long served in the IDF, but the vast majority of Palestinian citizens are exempt for security reasons—perpetuating the ethnonationalist and cultural divide between Arab and Jewish citizens and exacerbating the mutual alienation that Haklai and Peleg and Waxman so ably demonstrate. Most Palestinian citizens have no desire to serve in the IDF, but now, even nonmilitary national-service options are being rejected by some in the Arab community, who do not wish to be associated with their state.
All three books argue implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, that the status quo of Israel as an “ethnic democracy”—a state and society that privileges one ethnonationalist group over another—is not sustainable in the long run morally, politically, or demographically. Developments since the publication of these books seem to underscore the authors' assertions.
