Ross A. Kennedy's new study, The Will to Believe, is an engaging and thorough examination of the political and intellectual issues and debates surrounding Wilson's wartime diplomacy. Domestically, Kennedy frames policy disagreements as a conversation among liberal internationalists, pacifists, and Atlanticists about such issues as the causes of power politics, military preparedness, neutrality, the treatment of Germany, and the prospects for reforming the postwar international order. Internationally, he focuses on Wilson's efforts to strike a balance between the desire to aid Britain and the Allies without alienating Germany. Intellectually, Kennedy is devastating in his critique of Wilson's vague, largely incoherent, and ultimately unworkable ideas about transcending power politics with some form of collective security system. This is a lot of material to cover, but Kennedy does so effectively, placing most of his analysis in the context of what he convincingly argues was “the fundamental paradox of Wilson's security strategy—the paradox of practicing power politics to end power politics” (102). Nowhere were the paradoxes and contradictions more evident than in Wilson's policies toward Germany, both before and after American entry into the war, and his plans for the postwar world.

Prior to 1917 official American neutrality did not imply indifference to the war's outcome. Even those who argued about other critical issues generally agreed that a German victory would be extremely undesirable. Seen as an autocratic, militaristic, and ambitious state largely responsible for the war's outbreak, Germany was considered the greater long-term threat to American interests. The need to defend against a triumphant and undemocratic Germany would likely militarize American society and dash any hopes of creating a more peaceful international order. There was, however, disagreement about the magnitude of German defeat desired. Wilson's diplomatic efforts before 1917 “aimed to persuade the Germans to accept defeat and the allies to accept less than a decisive victory” (99). The call for “peace without victory” reflected the preference for a German loss, but not a crushing one.

The dilemma for Wilson was finding a way to aid the Allies while remaining an honest, neutral peace broker in the eyes of the Germans. Kennedy shows how struggles over the American response to Britain's economic blockade and Germany's submarine warfare reflected the difficult geopolitical tightrope Wilson needed to walk in dealing with the belligerents while keeping an eye on the postwar settlement and order. These problems were only compounded after American entry into the war. From that point on, the United States pursued the goals of “containing Germany's power, preventing the Allies from crushing the Reich, and convincing Germany to accept the legitimacy of a new world order based on the defeat of their ambitions.” Unfortunately, as Kennedy demonstrates, these objectives were “incompatible” (123).

Kennedy is particularly merciless when he turns his attention to Wilson's plans, if they can be called that, for a new world order based on the principles of collective security. Though all of the major criticisms have been made before, the almost surreal gap between the lofty rhetoric and the reality of what nations were willing to do remains stunning. Even enthusiastic advocates of collective security shied away from its most essential element—committing nations to use force even when their vital national interests were not threatened. Collective security's underlying assumption that all nations have a vested interest in the preservation of peace everywhere was obviously an idea that people liked to believe, even when their actions demonstrated that they clearly did not believe it. This lack of genuine belief in collective security became painfully clear when the time came to create an organization based on its principles. Contrary to initial hopes, the League of Nations “began operation as an alliance directed at Germany.” From the outset the League was a reflection of the very power politics it was supposed to transcend. As an effort to transform the international order it was doomed long before America's ultimate failure to join. One problem was that the treaty “contained escape clauses allowing nations to avoid participation in the enforcement of collective security” (182). The more fundamental problem, as Kennedy emphasizes repeatedly, was “the dubiousness of collective security theory,” its underlying fallacy that all nations have an equal interest in the preservation of peace everywhere (158).

Wilson and others were not completely unaware of the paradoxes, contradictions, and ambiguities involved in American diplomacy toward Germany and the League. There was, however, widespread confidence that the United States could achieve the unachievable because it was a different kind of nation. Unlike the scheming elites of the old world, the United States was moral advocate on behalf of general interests of humanity, untainted by the crass motives that drove others. America was exceptional, and the rest of the world knew it. Wilson was certain that the world had “absolutely unquestioning confidence … in the people of America” (194). The assumption of American exceptionalism infiltrated virtually every aspect of American policy. It was apparently impossible for Wilson and others to imagine that the rest of the world not share America's image of itself. Even the United States’ allies cringed at its moral self-righteousness.

All of this only begins to scratch the surface of this fine book. Whether one is interested in the domestic or international dimensions of American diplomacy during World War I, Kennedy's Will to Believe is a must read. But like all good history there is much here even for those not interested in the specifics of Wilsonian diplomacy per se. Kennedy displays, for example, a good knowledge of contemporary international relations theory that allows him to place many of the specific issues in a broader context. As a case study in the enduring dilemmas of American foreign and national security policy as well as international relations more generally, it deserves a wide audience.