After offering his submission to Chinggis Khan in 1201, Jebe became one of the nascent Mongol Empire's foremost generals until his death which modern scholars suggest occurred in 1223 or shortly thereafter.Footnote 1 That is the point at which Jebe essentially disappeared from the historical record. What makes his disappearance particularly odd is that it occurred shortly after he accomplished one of the most famous military feats of the entire medieval period; commanding a fairly small Mongol force as it advanced thousands of kilometers through Iran and the Caucasus. His army won battles, and took hostile cities on its way to defeating an overwhelming, combined force of Kipchaks and Russians at the Kalka River in May, 1223. The remnants of Jebe's forces then apparently linked up with Jochi, Chinggis Khan's eldest son, in the Volga-Ural region before returning to Mongolia.Footnote 2 One might imagine that after such a feat, the brilliant general would become a subject of such great interest that, whether he survived the campaign or died during it, any subsequent stage of his career, or the nature of his death, would merit mention. Scholars have remained somewhat perplexed by the historical record's haziness on Jebe's ultimate fate.Footnote 3 This has meant that, while we acknowledge he was one of the most important leaders in the first decades of the Mongol Empire, he is generally confined to being the subject of relatively lengthy footnotes and short encyclopedia entries.Footnote 4 This paper, however, presents the argument that thirteenth century material does in fact indicate how Jebe died and it has simply escaped identification until now. After providing background on the source problems encountered with Jebe in particular, and a brief sketch of his life and career, I will present a contemporary account of his death, various elements of which find corroboration in a range of thirteenth and fourteenth century sources. The scope of this essay is limited – it does not exhaustively explore Russian and Chinese scholarship which deals with the Mongols, but this is pardonable because there are, as far as I was able to determine, no publications in either language that treat the person or fate of Jebe Noyan as specific themes.Footnote 5 I am confident however, that further research on the main issue analyzed in this paper – one that very much highlights the complexities of Mongol Empire historiography – could only subsequently benefit through the contributions and feedback of Russian and Chinese experts.
Lacunae and Omissions: Problems with the Source Material on Jebe Noyan
That the unification of the steppe and subsequent growth of the Mongol Empire after 1206 owed a great debt to the strategic competence of generals such as Jebe is widely acknowledged. Paul Ratchnevsky noted that Chinggis Khan's victories over the most powerful states in Asia in the early years of the empire cannot be completely ascribed to the superiority of Mongol cavalry or the use of steppe tactics such as feigned retreats which were not actually Chinggisid innovations. Rather, his successes often resulted from his tendency to promote men to high command based on demonstrated ability rather than birth, which resulted in experienced, loyal officers who owed their promotions to the khan. Referring to three of the most prominent of Chinggis Khan's generals, Ratchnevsky argued that there were no brilliant and cooperative leaders like Muqali, Sübe'etei, or Jebe in the camps of their Khwarazm and Jin foes.Footnote 6 Yet, when the editors of In the Service of the Khan, a biographical compendium of Mongol Empire and Yuan Dynasty figures, chose to include Muqali and Sübe'etei, they did not provide a biography of Jebe. His exclusion might seem unjustified;Footnote 7 the editors point out that the contributions of Muqali and Sübe'etei were so immense that their descendants continued to form part of the ruling elite throughout the Mongol-Yuan period, but the same can be put forward regarding Jebe's descendants. The Ilkhanate administrator and historian, Rashiduddin, observed that Jebe's brother, sons, nephews, and grand-nephews were military commanders in the Ilkhanate during his own time. One of Jebe's family members had been a governor in the reign of Ögödei, and his relatives were still “at present” important figures in the service of Khubilai Khan's Yuan state.Footnote 8
If Jebe's significance was remembered long after his lifetime, we can be confident that it was no less acknowledged during his own lifetime. In 1221, the Song emissary Zhao Hong stayed at the Mongol court and met with Muqali who was acting as Guo Wang, or regent, while Chinggis Khan was engaged against Khwarazm foes thousands of kilometers to the west. The emissary not surprisingly concluded that Muqali was the second most powerful man in the empire, since the khan had entrusted him with a royal title and supreme command of military operations against the Jin Dynasty. However, in Zhao Hong's estimation, Jebe was roughly tied with a certain governor for having the third highest level of authority in the fledgling empire – he had been given command of the crack troops among Chinggis Khan's followers.Footnote 9
That Jebe, considered to be one of the highest officials of the state in 1221, abruptly departs from the sources a handful of years later poses something of a mystery. Indeed, the fragmentary nature of material on Jebe would make him a difficult subject for a full biographical sketch. Though his highly mobile campaign deep in hostile territory over the course of 1220–1223 that culminated in the Battle of Kalka is the fodder of great military history case studies, not enough is known about Jebe the person; there are simply too many lacunae in the primary sources, particularly with regard to his death or any activity after the Kalka engagement. In no small part, this is because there is no biography of Jebe in the Yuan Shi, the history of the Yuan Dynasty composed in the fourteenth century from official records. Military commanders of comparative importance in Chinggis Khan's reign such as Muqali, Sübe'etei, Bo'orchu, and Boroqul were the subject of biographies. Peculiarly, we also encounter the biography of one Ishmael, a somewhat obscure subordinate of Jebe. From this material we receive some information about both of them, but apparently Jebe himself did not warrant a separate biography.Footnote 10 Of course, this could simply represent an oversight by the compilers of the Yuan Shi; among the 24 official dynastic histories, the Yuan Shi is notorious for its hasty compilation, errors, and incompleteness.Footnote 11 Regardless of the reason, his omission has contributed to Jebe's remaining a shadowy figure. This can be redressed to some extent by a description Rashiduddin provided of the general and his family members. However, right after detailing the “killing and pillaging” campaign against the Russians in 1223, the author falls silent about any further activity undertaken by Jebe himself.Footnote 12 This essay will now outline Jebe Noyan's activity up to his ostensible final campaign, before presenting evidence for the precise circumstances of his death – all of which should allow us a fuller picture of this important historical figure.
The Life and Campaigns of Jebe Noyan to 1223
Jebe's name was originally Jirqo'adai when, as a member of the Besüt tribe, he fought as a client of the Tayičiʾut people. These were some of the earliest and bitterest enemies of Temüjin, the future Chinggis Khan, in his war for supremacy over the Mongolian steppe. With their decisive defeat in 1201, Jirqo'adai fell into Temüjin's hands. The Secret History of the Mongols tells us that when Temüjin demanded to know who had killed his horse in the preceding battle, the prisoner admitted to the deed but also pointed out that if he were executed, his death would amount to nothing. If he were spared, however, he would become a loyal servant. Temüjin was impressed by the prisoner's frankness, stating that such a man was worthy to be his companion and renaming him Jebe to commemorate the incident.Footnote 13 This was a play on words, with ‘Jebe’ meaning either weapon or arrow.Footnote 14 Rashiduddin's account is somewhat different. In his version, Jebe escaped the defeat of the Tayičiʾut, becoming a wandering exile but eventually Temüjin's followers came upon him by chance. Bo'orchu pursued him on a horse that belonged to the future khan, but Jebe managed to kill the animal with an arrow before fleeing. Reduced by necessity, he turned himself over to Temüjin a few days later and pleaded that if his life were spared, he would provide his new master with many dun horses as recompense for the one he killed.Footnote 15 Ratchnevsky opined that this less tidy narrative was probably the more factual.Footnote 16
Regardless of the exact details, the sources agree Jebe joined Temüjin after his surrender and pardon. Initially given command of ten men, he was promoted to the command of a hundred, then a thousand, and finally a tümen (ten-thousand men).Footnote 17 Thus he transitioned from hunted refugee to prominent noyan – an aristocratic military commander. In 1204 he was taking what would become his characteristic vanguard role, riding with scouts to spy on Temujin's Naiman enemies and clashing with their advance parties.Footnote 18 The Secret History has the Naiman khan ask who the men pursuing his scouts are, and being met with the answer that they are the ‘four hounds’ - Jebe, Sübe'etei, Jelme, and Qubilai.Footnote 19 While this reads like a poetic device, such canine designations were actually made official in 1206 when Temüjin, having unified the steppe, gathered together the Mongolian tribes and proclaimed himself Chinggis Khan. Distributing honours among his loyal retainers, he appointed Jebe among the 95 commanders of thousand-man units and named him among his four dogs who had been indispensable in the defeat of his rivals.Footnote 20 It seems that no general was entitled to control of a greater number of troops than one thousand in 1206, but Chinggis Khan apparently gave Jebe and another of the four hounds, Sübe'etei, specific permission to exceed this number.Footnote 21
As Chinggis Khan's wars expanded from the Mongolian steppe to the wider Eurasian continent, Jebe continued to act the role of relentless, hound-like pursuer of the khan's enemies. While tracking down Merkit refugees who had fled from the Mongolian steppe, Jebe led Mongol forces into the land of the Uighurs, whose ruler quickly submitted to Chinggis Khan's authority in 1209. Some escaped farther west after Jebe defeated them, but Sübe'etei ultimately caught up with the Merkit refugees and destroyed them in the land of Kangli in the eastern Kipchak steppe.Footnote 22 When Chinggis Khan went to war with the overwhelming forces of the Jin Dynasty based in northern China in 1211, it was Jebe's vanguard which opened the Juyong Pass so that Mongol forces could invade Chinese territory. According to the Yuan Shi, this was accomplished through the treacherous complicity of a Jin general, but according to the Secret History Jebe feigned retreat to lure the Jin forces from a strong defensive position before suddenly attacking them.Footnote 23 Rashiduddin and the Secret History agree on the stratagem Jebe later employed to capture the Jin's eastern capital of Dongjing (modern Liaoyang). After a failed assault he moved rapidly away from it (either six or ten days distant) so that those in the town were lulled into a false sense of security. After reducing their loads to the minimum, his cavalry wheeled about, advancing day and night and sometimes walking their horses by the reins in the direction of Dongjing. Appearing out of nowhere, they rushed upon the unprepared defenders.Footnote 24
As the war against the Jin dragged on, Jebe was dispatched westward in pursuit of refugees from the steppes. These were led by Güchülük, a Naiman prince who had fled his father's defeat at Chinggis Khan's hands in 1204. Ultimately he had usurped power in the Qara Kitai Empire and was ruling it when Jebe suddenly arrived at the head of 20,000 men in 1217. The Mongol forces defeated Güchülük who fled again until he was ultimately hunted down and killed by Jebe's subordinate, Ishmael, in 1218.Footnote 25 Throughout the former domains of the Qara Kitai, Jebe, by making public Chinggis Khan's precept of religious freedom, was seen as a liberator who had freed the largely Muslim population from the rule of a Buddhist idolater. On Jebe's order, Ishmael travelled through the region carrying Güchülük's head and the Qara Kitai was soon brought under Mongol authority.Footnote 26
Jebe had quickly brought swathes of territory under Mongol rule and the spreading rumour of his power and success clearly aroused the distrust of Chinggis Khan. After all, Jebe had once been his adversary, and Chinggis Khan did not suffer competitors for his authority. Rashiduddin's account records that at this point Chinggis Khan sent a message to Jebe warning him against overconfidence since that trait had brought down his rivals, including Güchülük. Jebe returned from the conquered region, bringing as gifts a thousand dun horses with white mouths, resembling the one he had killed while an enemy of Chinggis Khan.Footnote 27 With this rather dramatic, unspoken gesture of loyalty, Jebe seems to have put doubts to rest, because when war broke out with the Khwarazm Empire in the same year, due to the massacre of Chinggis Khan's merchants in Otrar, the general continued to occupy a leading operational role.
In 1219, as the main body of Chinggis Khan's forces advanced against the Khwarazm cities, mainly along the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, the Secret History relates that Jebe was dispatched in his characteristic ‘vanguard’ role deep into enemy territory in pursuit of Shah Muhammad II. Sübe'etei was sent in support of Jebe, and Toquchar followed in support of Sübe'etei.Footnote 28 From this point until Jebe's abrupt departure from the sources around 1223/1224, it seems that he was in the role of senior commander of the campaigns that took Mongol forces through Persia, the Caucasus, and ultimately into the Kipchak steppe and the borders of the Russian principalities. Rashiduddin's account has Jebe dispatching Sübe'etei with troops before a battle which suggests the hierarchy, and modern historians view Jebe as the probable leader.Footnote 29 In 1220, with the swift fall of several cities and their garrisons, Khwarazm resistance collapsed spectacularly and Shah Muhammad fled over the Oxus toward Iran with Jebe and Sübe'etei in hot pursuit. He finally took refuge on an island in the Caspian Sea where he died at the end of 1220, overwhelmed by the enormity of his empire's fall and the loss of his followers. The pursuit had been so relentless that the sultan had at one point left an island – opting to relocate to a safer one – at the moment that Jebe's soldiers arrived on its shores searching for him.Footnote 30 With his victory, Jebe had now chased the rulers of two empires to their deaths and should probably be viewed as Chinggis Khan's most effective military commander. Undoubtedly, the loss of the Khwarazm Shah must have played no small part in the collapse of unified resistance in his former territories of Khorasan and Central Asia.
Jebe and Sübe'etei, rather than halting or withdrawing, advanced northward around the Caspian Sea and into the Kipchak Steppe, far ahead of other Mongol forces. Sübe'etei's biography in the Yuan Shi holds that he was the one who proposed this expedition, asking and receiving permission to conquer the Kipchak from Chinggis Khan.Footnote 31 Rashiduddin's accounts regarding the inspiration for the expedition are different. The historian states in one passage that Chinggis Khan had already given the order to invade the Kipchak Steppe when he first sent Jebe in pursuit of the Khwarazm Shah.Footnote 32 However, another passage, apparently relating a message from Jebe and Sübe'etei to the khan, implies that they had orders to return to Mongolia after several years but in the meantime were free to conquer as many lands as they could – which means the khan would have given them only the vaguest guidelines for how to conduct their ensuing campaign.Footnote 33 How many troops they had at their disposal is another uncertainty. Juzjani, a hostile contemporary based in the Sultanate of Delhi, suggests that Jebe and Sübe'etei had 60,000 troops – at least when they began pursuing the Khwarazm Shah.Footnote 34 Al-Nasawi who was in the entourage of the Khwarazm Shah's son, and who engaged in fighting the Mongols, reports that the two commanders had 30,000 troops when they set out, which agrees with Rashiduddin's numbers, so it is likely more accurate.Footnote 35 The account of the Armenian cleric, Vardan Areveltsi, holds that they numbered only 20,000 when they invaded the Caucasus and battled the Georgians in 1221, and that when they returned the following year, they veered around Georgia and Armenia to avoid the large number of enemies that had mustered.Footnote 36 It could be that they had 30,000 troops when they first pursued the Shah but had to make do without the tümen of Toquchar (who had been assigned to operate with them) after he was killed besieging Nishapur in November 1220.Footnote 37 In any case, it seems slightly futile to try to gage the precise numbers of troops under Jebe and Sübe'etei from 1221–1223 because they were engaged in continual fighting with resultant casualties. They were also being reinforced, frequently taking prisoners, and gaining auxiliaries from those who submitted.Footnote 38 Ibn al-Athir, a hostile contemporary, relates that as these Mongols moved westward, great numbers of Muslim and infidel soldiers joined them, including “trouble-makers who wanted to plunder and do mischief”.Footnote 39
What can be observed with certainty, in my view, is that the popular trend in modern scholarship to designate Jebe and Sübe'etei's campaign as a “raid” or “reconnaissance in force”Footnote 40 is contradicted by statements in the sources. Rashiduddin's aforementioned account of a message from the two Mongol commanders to the khan makes their intention the conquest of as many regions as possible before returning to Mongolia in a few years.Footnote 41 Hostile and pro-Mongol accounts alike attest that they slaughtered those who resisted but placed prefects in towns which submitted, such as Hamadan which later rebelled because of the severity of taxation.Footnote 42 Juvaini, a pro-Mongol contemporary, plainly stated that they subjugated Tabriz and Nakhchivan, among other places, as they moved through the Caucasus region, and that they returned to Iran briefly to massacre those who had overthrown recently established Mongol governors. They also regularly handed over letters and official seals (tamgha) to local rulers who submitted.Footnote 43 If they failed to subjugate the entire region, this had less to do with intended goals and more to do with the ostensibly insufficient number of troops at Jebe and Sübe'etei's disposal to carry out the task, along with the stiff resistance and rebellious tendencies of the local populations. In such a situation, the commanders often had to content themselves with plunder and massacre to at least eliminate future resistance.
That Mongol forces did push so far across hostile territory to link up with Chinggis Khan's son Jochi made a strong impression on friendly and hostile chroniclers alike.Footnote 44 A fourteenth century Georgian chronicler noted with amazement that this army defeated the Georgians and advanced into the Kipchak Steppe despite having only bows, unshod horses, and no armour.Footnote 45 The Mongols’ victories and ability to get out of the Caucasus alive owed much to the determination and ruthless ingenuity of their commanders, Jebe and Sübe'etei, as Ibn al-Athir's account demonstrates. In 1222, having veered around Georgia on their way northward toward Derbent, the Mongol forces besieged Shamakhi. The Mongols made an ersatz ramp to the top of the walls out of the corpses of livestock and slain local people. They fought with the townspeople over the course of three days as the ramp gradually decomposed and collapsed. Even after this failure, the Mongols continued to attack until the town was overrun. Unable to find a safe pass through the northern passes (which were presumably filled with defenders), they asked the shah of Derbent to send envoys for truce talks. When these arrived, the Mongols executed one and threatened the others to lead them to safety. They were shown an easy route through which to escape. Coming down through the mountains, they then faced an army of Alans (Ossetians) and Kipchaks waiting for them. Unable to overpower these combined forces, the Mongol leaders bribed the Kipchaks to abandon their allies, citing their shared ethnicity as a reason for an alliance. The Kipchaks abandoned their allies after receiving gifts and assurances of peace, leaving the Mongols to defeat the Alans piecemeal. The Mongols, with Alan prisoners, then chased down the unsuspecting Kipchaks and slaughtered them.Footnote 46 Thus the Mongols successfully arrived in the steppes north of the Black Sea, sacking Sudak in the Crimea in the winter of 1222–1223 as Kipchak refugees fled to seek help from the Rus.Footnote 47
Through hard fighting, ruses, and psychological warfare, Jebe had managed to lead his troops into the steppe for the final stage of the campaign. Yet despite keeping his army together so that many Mongols eventually linked up with Jochi's forces in 1224, I contend that there is very good evidence that Jebe himself was not among the survivors.
The 1223 Campaign and the Circumstances of Jebe Noyan's Death
Jebe and Sübe'etei's expedition attracted much attention so that authors stemming from different cultural backgrounds and geographical regions recorded aspects of it. Russian (more properly, Rus) sources provide the most detailed descriptions for the campaign in the spring of 1223, which culminated in a Russian-Kipchak force fighting the Mongols at the Kalka.Footnote 48 In the thirteenth century Synodal Transcript of the Novgorod First Chronicle we find an account of Jebe's death that has merely escaped identification up to the present.Footnote 49 The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, while not mentioning Jebe, provides many details that provide a fuller picture of the sequence of events surrounding his death.Footnote 50
Both chronicles agree that following Mongol attacks, several Kipchak chieftains fled to the Russian princes and appealed for a military alliance on the grounds that the Mongols would invade Russia subsequently if not stopped in Kipchak territory. Having found the argument convincing, a great number of princes gradually assembled their troops, along with their nomadic Kipchak allies, at the Dnieper in late spring. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle specifically indicates that the meeting point of the various contingents was near Khortytsya, an island at the southern endpoint of the Dnieper rapids.Footnote 51 Suggestions that the armies gathered on the island rather than on the western bank of the DnieperFootnote 52 make little sense from the strategic and logistical standpoint of a cavalry force which included nomads. During the march and while the Russians were assembling, the Mongols sent envoys to entice them to abandon their Kipchak allies. When three envoys were killed, a second group arrived to simply tell the Russians to do battle with them, and God would judge all. These envoys were released.Footnote 53 The account is credible; the first message remarkably resembles the earlier one that the Kipchaks received which enticed them to desert their Alan allies the previous year. The second resembles the standard message that the Mongols delivered to those who refused to submit across the whole of Eurasia.Footnote 54 Having given warning, the Mongols advanced toward the Russian positions.
The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle relates that when news arrived that Mongol forward units were coming to the eastern side of Dnieper to view the Russian forces and their ships, several Russian princes, including the teenage Danilo of Galicia, rushed to the opposite riverbank to view the hitherto unknown enemy. Apparently not impressed by the equipment of the nomadic archers, some disparaged them as “simple people”, even more so than the Kipchaks, but one of those present is recorded to have warned them that the Mongols were actually formidable warriors.Footnote 55 This reminds one of the Georgian chronicler's description of these Mongols having bows, lacking armour, and riding unshod horses. After making their first observations, younger princes started urging the senior princes to give the order to attack.Footnote 56
Russian forces under “Mstislav” forded the Dnieper and launched an assault on the Mongol forward units according to the Novgorod First Chronicle. It does not help the historian's task that the three princes sharing the highest authorityFootnote 57 during the campaign were all called Mstislav – namely Mstislav III Romanovich of Kiev, Mstislav of Chernigov, and Mstislav Mstislavich the Bold of Galicia – and neither chronicle consistently indicates which one them is intended. Yet the circumstantial evidence makes it clear that this must have been Mstislav the Bold; it was he who had strongly pushed the other princes to join the alliance with the Kipchaks in the first place. His father-in-law was the Kipchak chieftain, Kotyan, and the subsequent text makes clear that the Mstislav who launched this initial attack did so in close cooperation with Kipchaks.Footnote 58 The sixteenth century Nikonian Chronicle specifically indicates it was Mstislav the Bold.Footnote 59
The sudden Russian attack overwhelmed these frontier forces, with many of them killed and others retreating eastward with their commander (or voivode as the annalist put it) to the top of a Kipchak kurgan. Unable to flee or hold out, the Mongols buried their commander alive on the kurgan before it was overrun, apparently hoping to save his life until he could later be rescued. However, Kipchak troops then begged Mstislav the Bold permission to search the kurgan for this leader, whom they guessed had been buried. Presumably, they had to push for the opportunity because doing so meant halting and losing valuable time when the enemy appeared to be on the run, but the request was granted. Kipchaks eventually pulled the Mongol commander from his hiding place and killed him. The Novgorod First Chronicle twice indicates that the name of the slain Mongol commander was “ГемябЂг” – Michell and Forbes transliterated this as “Gemya-Beg”.Footnote 60 The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle does not repeat this episode but certainly agrees with the general picture – two princes named Mstislav crossed the river to attack and the others followed in a great rush. The Mongol forces were defeated and pursued far into the steppe as enormous herds of cattle fell into Russian hands.Footnote 61 Both sources agree that the Mongols fled for eight or nine days until they turned to make a stand at the Kalka River.
Linguistic and Circumstantial Evidence that Gemya-Beg is Jebe Noyan
We have good reason to conclude that the above-mentioned Mongol commander, captured and executed by the Kipchaks, was Jebe Noyan himself. Turning to the name “ГемябЂг” which has been transliterated in various ways,Footnote
62
it is open to interpretation how the initial consonant was intended by the medieval chronicler since the letter “Г” (glagol) could produce a velar laryngeal fricative (h in “hard”) or velar stop (g in “go”).Footnote
63
While Gemya-Beg, Hamabek, or hypothetically Hyemya-Beg, do not resemble Jebe Noyan, they all bear a noteworthy resemblance to how a Rus chronicler might render “Yämä Beg” as it would originate from Turkic-speaking Kipchaks.Footnote
64
While the commander's name appears as Jäbä (
) throughout Rashiduddin's work,Footnote
65
and as Jebe (Noyan) in the Secret History and Yuan Shi, many other sources provide his name in the “Turkicisized” form of Yämä.Footnote
66
The thirteenth century Persian authors Juvaini, al-Nasawi, and Juzjani all render his name as (
) which could be variously transliterated as Yama, Yeme, Yemah, etc.Footnote
67
In the Georgian Hundred Years Chronicle his name is given as Iama with the observation that he was also known as Jebo.Footnote
68
So while East Asian sources persistently provided his Mongol name, sources from regions affected by Jebe's westward campaign tended to record a widely-used Turkicisation of his name. Eastern and Western sources alike intermittently vary between providing only his personal name or opting to add his title “noyan”.Footnote
69
Regarding this Mongol title which perhaps originated from Chinese, Pelliot noted that it signified a chief of high military or civil rank, and was rendered in Turkic languages as “bäg”. That bey/beg is the Turkic equivalent of ‘noyan’ is widely acknowledged by scholars.Footnote
70
Such being the case, it seems likely that the Rus chronicler was trying to approximate a name that reached Russians through Turkic-speaking Kipchak intermediaries: Hyemya Beg – Yämä Beg. That is, Jebe Noyan.
Circumstantial evidence supports this conclusion. As mentioned, the Novgorod First Chronicle indicates that the Kipchaks pleaded with Mstislav for a chance to stop and search the kurgan for the enemy commander. This implies that as the initial attack east of the Dnieper unfolded, and the Mongol forward units went into retreat, the Kipchak troops were targeting this commander. They must have been searching for him personally and therefore knew he was unaccounted for on the kurgan. That the Mongols attempted the desperate tactic of burying their leader alive implies that he was a very important person – his death had to be avoided at all costs. The tactic is reminiscent of the Secret History account of Chinggis Khan as a youth hiding from enemies in a river with only his mouth above the surface, though the Rus chronicler could not have known this.Footnote 71 That the chronicle provides a Turkic rendering of both the name and title of the commander supports the account of Kipchaks identifying him to their Russian allies. The chronicle also devotes rather vivid detail to this particular episode in an otherwise laconic account of the campaign which suggests that the writer and his Russian informants had some inkling that the slain Mongol voivode was an important figure, though it is unlikely that they realised just how important.
We might be surprised that Jebe Noyan, rather than an otherwise unattested subordinate officer, would be in the forward observing units when the initial Russian attack occurred. Yet, the account of his military career up to 1223 indicates that he operated in a vanguard role, leading from the front and taking great personal risks. Rashiduddin records that in an earlier battle with the Georgians during this western expedition, Jebe went ahead to set an ambush with five thousand troops, while ordering Sübe'etei to simulate a retreat with the main army. When the Georgians went in pursuit, Jebe and his troops struck the enemy from the rear. Rashiduddin concludes, “This was their custom in most battles”.Footnote 72 Thus, it is not at all unlikely that Jebe would be ahead of the main army with a smaller body of troops when fighting erupted, since we are told that was his modus operandi during the entire preceding campaign.
At the Dnieper, Jebe's troops may have been simply carrying out reconnaissance in preparation for a ruse or seeking to draw the enemy into a chase, but the suddenness of the Russian-Kipchak attack and the number of enemies overwhelmed them. Though the Russian accounts use formulaic numbers that are seldom taken literally, the number of principalities that sent contingents would alone suggest the army must have been sizeable, particularly when combined with nomadic allies.Footnote 73 Rashiduddin's brief account states that when the Mongols saw how numerous the enemy were, they retreated.Footnote 74 The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle's account of Mongols being cut down deep into the steppe as enormous herds of cattle were seized does not read like a flawlessly executed feigned retreat – at least not initially.Footnote 75 In fact it bears a resemblance to an eye-witness account al-Nasawi provided of a battle between Mongols and the forces of Jelal al-Din, the son of the defeated Khwarazm Shah. His account states that after a fierce engagement, the Mongols went into headlong flight, abandoning their plunder, weapons, and even their provisions (livestock). The Khwarazm cavalry and local peasantry pursued the Mongols who continued to flee with no impressive trap being sprung, nor did they eventually turn around and put their pursuers to flight.Footnote 76 This episode, among many others, serves to illustrate that not all Mongol retreats were brilliantly orchestrated ruses – sometimes they really were just fleeing. We also know that the Russians and their Kipchak allies were no strangers to steppe tactics. So whatever plan Jebe might have intended when his forces first approached the enemy on the Dnieper, it was probably not to end up buried alive on a kurgan with vengeful Kipchaks searching for him. It could be that Jebe simply misjudged his opponents or that the overconfidence for which Chinggis Khan censured him at last proved fatal.
The available sources are in agreement that ultimately the Mongols won a crushing victory. After retreating for more than a week, they at last turned to make a stand upon crossing the Kalka, thought to be the Kalmius which flows into the Sea of Azov near modern Mariupol. This is supported by the hilly landscape which played a role in the battle – the narrow approaches in the river valley would have also been a factor in the Mongols’ decision to make a stand there.Footnote 77 The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle tells us that Mstislav the Bold and his underling Danilo of Galicia forded the river to engage the Mongols without informing the other two high commanders because there was great discord between them.Footnote 78 We could also speculate that Mstislav's first attack at the Dnieper had met with so much success that he was trying to obtain all the glory again. The first Mongol regiments they encountered retreated but then the pursuing Galician troops ran into a shower of arrows, and this time they broke and fled.Footnote 79 The Kipchaks, who had apparently been operating alongside them like at the Dnieper, appeared in headlong flight, crashing through the camp of the other Russian contingents which were thrown into disorder.Footnote 80 Though the Novgorod First Chronicle kindly puts sole blame on the Kipchaks for spreading disorder and panic among the unprepared Russian troops on the western bank of the river, Mstislav the Bold and Danilo's forces must have been fleeing at about the same time. We know that both princes survived the defeat, Mstislav “barely escaping” after cutting away the boats behind him to foil his pursuers when he at last reached the Dnieper.Footnote 81 We know that Kotyan escaped too because he later appeared in Hungary at the head of thousands of Kipchak refugees, offering their military services to Bela IV.Footnote 82
It is meaningful that in a battle from which so few Russian princes and ordinary troops returned home (purportedly one out of ten),Footnote 83 the aforementioned leaders escaped. It implies that the Galicians and Kipchaks, who were the first to engage and subsequently flee, were heavily represented among the survivors of the entire campaign. Consequently we can assume that much of the information on the course of the campaign was provided by Galician survivors, and perhaps much of it even has its origin in the reminiscences of the surviving princes and their close retainers. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, for instance, focuses on personal details about Danilo's own experiences in the battle, including that he had been wounded but only “felt it” when he took a drink.Footnote 84 Such personal, sensory details would appear to be based on the accounts of people who directly experienced them. Concerning the account of the death of Jebe Noyan, this all has an important implication. The Galicians and Kipchaks who fled first, and therefore survived the unfolding disaster at the Kalka, comprised the same groups that first attacked on the eastern bank of the Dnieper and put the Mongol forward units to flight. The account of Jebe Noyan's being discovered and killed on a kurgan, found in the Novgorod First Chronicle, likely originated from individuals who had personally taken part and witnessed the entire episode unfold – perhaps even from Mstislav the Bold or his retainers.
Returning, however, to the Battle of the Kalka, it was a protracted affair even after the Mongols moved on the offensive and put the Kipchaks and Galicians to flight. Ibn al-Athir states that though the Russians were unprepared when the Mongols fell upon them, “both sides held firm in a way that was unheard of”, the battle lasting several days before the Russians were slaughtered.Footnote 85 The tenor of his account agrees with the Novgorod First Chronicle which states that Mstislav of Kiev and two other princes refused to retreat, building a stockade from planks of wood on a hilltop and managing to hold out against Mongol assaults for several days. It was then that the Mongols opted to negotiate a surrender, sending one of their brodniki allies, a commander named Ploskynia, to promise ransom for princes who surrendered.Footnote 86 When the three princes decided to surrender, they were bound and handed over to the Mongols, after which the stockade was taken and the troops slaughtered.Footnote 87
Here the chronicle mentions two enemy commanders, besides Ploskynia, present at the siege of the stockade and it might readily be assumed that these were Jebe and Sübe'etei. Their names are given as Tsigirkan (Цьгырканъ) and Teshukan (Тешюканъ).Footnote 88 I contend that these names, often taken in the literature to be those of subordinate commanders,Footnote 89 are actually mere corruptions of the Turkic forms for Chinggis Khan and his eldest son, Jochi Khan, who had been commissioned with the subjugation of the Kipchak steppe and other northwestern regions.Footnote 90 Whoever provided the firsthand information for this part of the account seems to have mistakenly equated the Mongol commanders present outside the stockade with those being named as the supreme rulers of the Mongol state. This could imply that during the surrender negotiations, those present on the Mongol side provided a letter and tamgha, explaining whose authority they represented. In any case, neither of the two Mongol commanders’ names help us to identity Jebe Noyan, whereas the name of the commander killed on the kurgan east of the Dnieper is a match. The two commanders present at the siege could just as well have been Sübe'etei and Jebe's subordinate, Ishmael. The chronicle notes that the captive Russian princes were placed underneath planks, upon which the Mongol commanders celebrated their victory feast.Footnote 91 Perhaps one of the captured princes was preserved until he was taken to Jochi to be executed, judging by a statement in the Yuan Shi.Footnote 92
Those Russians who fled back to the Dnieper fared little better than those in the stockade. The Novgorod First Chronicle lists six princes of various principalities killed during the prolonged retreat, including one of the high commanders, Mstislav of Chernigov, and his son.Footnote 93 Henry of Livonia, a chronicler based in distant Riga, had heard details of the disaster, recounting that the Tatars (Mongols) pursued the Russians for six days across the open steppes killing them in the tens of thousands.Footnote 94 If any survivors managed to reach the shores of the Dnieper near Khortytsya, they would have found that the ships were gone, having been cut away by Mstislav the Bold in his own earlier escape.
Though the defeat was catastrophic from a Russian perspective, and some Rus merchants even loaded their ships with merchandise and set out for the Sultanate of Rum in the aftermath,Footnote 95 there are hints that the campaign and its aftermath held a sour note for the Mongols as well. We have only one reference in the chronicles to a subsequent attack on a specific Russian territory; namely, a Mongol detachment slaughtered the population of Novgorod-Siverskyi which came out to greet them with a cross.Footnote 96 They made no attempts to impose their rule, the Novgorod First Chronicle noting, “And they turned back from the river Dnieper, and we know not whence they came, nor where they hid themselves again”.Footnote 97 Subsequently, while returning south through the Volga region, they were ambushed by the Volga Bulgars and suffered very heavy casualties, though Ibn al-Athir suggests that perhaps 4,000 troops survived the attack, managing to eventually link up with Mongol forces to the east. The Arab chronicler adds that after this the Kipchaks soon returned to their territory and resumed their normal fur trade which had been temporarily interrupted by the Mongols.Footnote 98 This stands in direct contrast to a sanguine assessment in the Yuan Shi that the Kipchak had been “subdued” during the campaign.Footnote 99 When Friar Julian visited Greater Hungary on the Volga in the mid-1230s, it was still free of Mongol rule. He reported that the local inhabitants had defeated the Mongols in their first battle,Footnote 100 all of which supports Ibn al-Athir's claim. So any idea that the westward campaign of Sübe'etei and Jebe was an unmitigated success is unfounded. The Mongols were unable to impose their rule anywhere west of the Volga until they returned in overwhelming force in the later 1230s.
In the aftermath of Jebe and Sübe'etei's expedition, Chinggis Khan himself had a new-found respect for the Kipchak. A Song Chinese ambassador to the Mongol court in 1234 reported that the Kipchak were still offering strong resistance, using a great river (the Volga, presumably) for defense. The ambassador also wrote that when Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) was still alive he used to suggest that it would require ten years to defeat the Kipchak, and therefore they had to be merely held in check while the Jin were defeated in China, after which a serious attack could be mounted. Indeed, the ambassador related, the Mongols feared the warlike Kipchaks above their other enemies and believed if they were not defeated, a figurative fire would spread across the steppe.Footnote 101 When describing the planning of the major western campaign in 1235, following the defeat of the Jin, the Secret History laconically notes that Sübe'etei had been “put in a difficult situation” while previously campaigning against the peoples of the northwest including the Rus and Kipchaks. Thus Ögödei designated many princes to support him in the ensuing campaign.Footnote 102 Such assessments from the top leadership of the Mongol Empire in the years following the Mongol campaign of 1223–1224 hint that it was not viewed as a complete success. If we consider the psychological blow that Jebe's being taken prisoner and executed must have had, high estimations of the Kipchak make considerable sense. This also suggests, perhaps, a personal vendetta that may have driven Sübe'etei to lead a return in force to the region after the Jin were finally defeated in the 1230s.
An all-important question remains: do other sources offer an alternative version of Jebe's fate? In fact there are some, mostly ambiguous, statements that could be interpreted as offering an alternative. The Secret History states that when Ögödei Khan went to war against the Jin in 1231, he sent Jebe in the vanguard.Footnote 103 This is not taken to be credible by modern scholarsFootnote 104 and with good reason, as it seems to be the singular reference to Jebe's doing anything at all after the westward campaign. It also originates from a source that, though historically conscious, was “a partisan narrative” reflecting certain agendas and outlooks of the thirteenth century imperial court in which it was produced; it is also one laden with “anachronisms” – enough that scholars have questioned its historicity to varying degrees.Footnote 105 The Secret History seems to write the death of Toquchar, Chinggis Khan's son-in-law, out of history. He was one of the co-commanders advancing with Jebe and Sübe'etei through Persia at the outset of the westward expedition until his death at the siege of Nishapur, which led to terrible consequences for the rebellious citizens.Footnote 106 In the Secret History, Toquchar is punished for plundering and dismissed from his command by Chinggis Khan – no mention is made of his death at Nishapur or anywhere else.Footnote 107
The biography of Jebe's subordinate, Ishmael, in the Yuan Shi provides an actual reference to Jebe's death in vague terms. It states that they defeated the Russian prince, Mstislav, defeated the Kangli, and subdued the Kipchak. Then it briefly reports, “The army return[ed], Jebe die[d]”.Footnote 108 By the time that Ishmael linked up with Chinggis Khan, in roughly 1225, it is clear from the biography that Jebe was already dead.Footnote 109 One clue is that Ishmael presented the campaign plunder to the khan, rather than Jebe. Secondly, Chinggis Khan makes a wistful remark to his retainers about how Jebe often used to say that Ishmael had a mighty reputation despite his small body.Footnote 110 There is also the curious issue in the biography of Ishmael handing over a captive Russian prince, apparently Mstislav, to Jochi. This would have occurred earlier in 1224, during the link-up between Jochi's forces and those who had survived the westward expedition.Footnote 111 Why, we must ask, would Ishmael be performing this task if Jebe were still alive and presumably present? Granted, the biography indicates that Jebe gave this order to Ishmael, but it is curious that Jebe never participates in activities or seems to be present when his forces make contact with Jochi or Chinggis Khan. Moreover the statement on his death lacks details, even in regard to when it occurred, so that it can hardly be seen as a more reliable account than the graphic version of events found in the Novgorod First Chronicle.
In the Persian sources, there is ambiguity. After describing the week long defeat of the Russians and Kipchaks, Rashiduddin's account states the Mongols returned to Chinggis Khan, but Jebe is not named in particular as a returnee.Footnote 112 Earlier, however, in providing an introduction to the passage on this westward campaign, we read, “Now what did the two commanders, Jäbä and Sübädäi do and what territories did they take before they returned home to Genghis Khan via the Qipchaq Steppe?”Footnote 113 This conflicts with the Chinese account that seems to indicate Jebe was already dead when Ishmael gave the plunder to Chinggis Khan. Moreover, I do not think it has to be taken very seriously. When describing a certain officer named Börkä, Rashiduddin in two places mentions that he had been assigned to Jebe and Sübe'etei's campaign by Chinggis Khan but died early in its course.Footnote 114 Yet, Rashiduddin in another place makes the quizzical remark, “. . .After Genghis Khan's death, when Börkä, Jäbä, and Sübütäi came to Iran and returned via the Temür Qahalqa [Iron Gates], they went to Ögödai Qa'an's presence and made obeisance”.Footnote 115 The passage muddles everything, including in whose reign the western expedition even happened, and includes at least one officer who was definitely not alive at the time offering obeisance to the khan, presumably in Mongolia. Such statements indicate that Rashiduddin may have included Jebe as well, either by accident or intentionally.
The mortality rate for top leaders in the Mongol army was high; a Chinese emissary in 1233–1234 noted that more than half of the highest military leaders were already dead.Footnote 116 The Persian sources often mention the deaths of these leaders in detail, even if they were killed by enemy. As mentioned, Persian sources report that one of the major leaders of the westward campaign, Toquchar, was killed at Nishipur and that Börkä died. So if Jebe was killed by the Kipchaks, could there be special grounds for discretion about the matter in sources written under Mongol auspices? I believe there are certain circumstances that might have surrounded his death in taboo. It would be disgraceful for a Mongol, especially one of Jebe's stature, to end his life in enemy hands; a Georgian noble related to Ibn al-Athir that when they took a Mongol prisoner, he immediately started beating his own head with a rock until he died. “He refused to allow himself to be taken”.Footnote 117 We must remember Rashiduddin's observation, around the year 1300, that many of Jebe's kinsmen were still high officials in the Yuan and Ilkhanate states. Even if writers such as Rashiduddin and Juvaini knew the facts, they could have preferred to simply avoid recording them. Juvaini, who worked in an official capacity for the Mongols from the 1240s, was encouraged by his friends to write a history of the Mongol Empire while he was on a mission to Karakorum in 1252–1253.Footnote 118 So he was writing only decades after the events and would have been in a good position to provide information on the campaign in 1223–1224. Though he provides copious details on Jebe and Sübe'etei's campaign through Iran and the Caucasus, upon his description of the Mongol army passing north of Derbent, the author omits any details on what happened in the Kipchak Steppe and Volga region. He details no battles with the Kipchaks, Russians, or Bulgars, simply jumping ahead to “the army” linking up with Jochi (1224) in the eastern Kipchak territories and proceeding eastward to Chinggis Khan – curious enough that Boyle noted the omission.Footnote 119 Juvaini's reticence perhaps makes more sense when we consider that Baiju was the highest-ranking Mongol leader in the Middle East during at least some of the period when he composed his history. Baiju had replaced Chormaqan Noyan as the second military governor of the Middle East in roughly 1242. We are told that he was a relative of Jebe.Footnote 120 Arguments from silence are hardly the strongest form of evidence, but the curious and persistent reticence on Jebe's activity after the battle of the Kalka is difficult to ignore.
Conclusions
The strongest evidence suggests that Jebe Noyan died at the hands of the Kipchaks on or near a kurgan situated east of the Dnieper, in the rough vicinity of Khortytsia Island, a little over a week before the Battle of the Kalka took place. Regarding the dating of this event, we turn to Berezhkov's expertise. He notes that the Novgorod First Chronicle in the Laurentian Codex states that the defeat occurred on the day of the holy martyr Jeremiah in the year 1223. The Synodal Transcript provides the following year (because of the tendency of medieval Russian chroniclers to use two dating styles), but echoes that the defeat unfolded on the martyr's feast day which was certainly May 31. We can be reasonably certain that this date refers to when the Mongols turned the tide at the Kalka – it was a Wednesday and occurred after a chase of eight or nine days. The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle notes that the crossing of Dnieper to attack the Mongols occurred on a Tuesday which corroborates the aforementioned timeframe of the chase and Kalka battle.Footnote 121 So we have a reliable date for Jebe's death: Tuesday, May 23, 1223.
If Jebe Noyan died in the initial engagement with the Russian-Kipchak forces, this holds a range of implications. It appears rather misguided to view his campaign as a litany of one-sided victories when he was captured and executed in its course. We might reappraise Sübe'etei's role in this campaign as well when he consider the turbulent situation in which he took sole command – that he was able to win a decisive victory after his senior commander had been killed testifies to the remarkable military genius and presence of mind which he would continue to demonstrate from China to Hungary over the next decades. Lastly, we have to reassess the performance of the Kipchaks and Russians in this confrontation with the Mongols. Though defeated, they left a lasting impression on the victors. C. de Bridia's unique account of the battle, which might well come from Mongol informants, states, “Blood ran on both sides up to the horse's bridles, according to those who took part in this war”.Footnote 122
The highest Mongol leaders regarded the Russians, Kipchaks and other peoples west of the Ural with caution in the aftermath of the westward expedition. This explains why overwhelming force was brought to the region when the Mongols finally returned in the 1230s. In fact, Ögödei Khan expressed the desire to personally lead the campaign until he was talked out of it by Möngke at the assembly in 1235.Footnote 123 Thus, any notion that the great westward advance that ultimately terminated in Hungary in 1242 was a minor sideshow, low on Mongol priorities, must be dismissed as indefensible.
A final issue has to be addressed. How has the identification of Jebe Noyan as the slain commander described in the Novgorod First Chronicle been missed by scholarship up to the present? While it generates surprisingly little interest in secondary literature, Charles Halperin found the episode of the killing of “one Gemiabeg” to be very intriguing and drew attention to it in his own analysis of the chronicler's account. Moreover, he offered that the Mongols and Russians were likely communicating in some form of Turkic, plausibly Kipchak, as evinced by the negotiations at the Kalka and in the versions of Mongol names in the chronicle.Footnote 124 However, he did not argue that Gemiabeg was a Turkic form of Jebe Noyan. Paul D. Buell at one point seems to hint at the conclusion laid out in this essay, though without expanding on it. He wrote of the western campaign: “Sübe'etei continued on into the Russian steppe [. . .] where he fought a battle with the Russians in 1223 at the Kalka [. . .] River. At that time, or shortly before, Jebe died”.Footnote 125 That he noted Jebe might have died “shortly before” the Kalka suggests to me that Buell may have had the Gemya-Beg episode in mind. In another entry, Buell entertained the possibility that Jebe was ‘killed’ in action north of the Caspian rather than simply dying a natural death.Footnote 126 If a famous commander of an army simply disappears from history during a particularly brutal campaign, we should consider that he might have been killed, but actually Buell's viewpoint is quite unusual in the secondary literature that I was able to view.Footnote 127
I contend, however, that the primary reason that Jebe was not identified has to do with a phenomenon that Thomas T. Allsen observed. The linguistic problems posed by sources on the Mongol Empire have resulted in a type of compartmentalisation in its study. The natural consequence of this is that scholars have tended focus on the local conditions in a certain area under Mongol influence, without seeing how they connect to a larger set of developments.Footnote 128 This problem grows less pronounced for modern scholars, but it was a serious issue in the nineteenth century when western scholarship began producing lengthy histories of the Mongol Empire. The proper identification was not made in the nineteenth century so it simply continued to be missed. Jebe was hiding out in the open, or perhaps half-buried on a kurgan, as it were.
Abraham Constantine Mouradgea d'Ohsson was able to use a wide range of Russian, Persian, and Arabic sources in his history of the Mongols written in the first half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, he mentioned the episode in the Novgorod First Chronicle, describing the Kipchaks capturing and killing “le chef des avant-postes” but he never made a connection to Jebe Noyan.Footnote 129 Howorth, writing a popular history for an English-speaking readership, relied on Nikolay Karamzin's History of the Russian State (1816-1826) for the episode of the Kalka campaign. In describing the initial confrontation east of the Dnieper, he simply transliterated the name of the slain Mongol commander as Hamabek, neither making a connection to Jebe nor recognizing the presence of a noble title.Footnote 130 When we consider the huge influence that the works of d'Ohsson, Howorth, and Karamzin had on subsequent generations of western scholars, it is easy to see how their tendency to make no connection between Hamabek and Jebe Noyan has persisted.
The long-term inaccessibility of East Asian source material to all but specialists in the West may have contributed to the issue. The Secret History was “rediscovered” by the Russian Archimandrite Palladius in the late nineteenth century and small parts of it were made available in Russian. This only changed in the mid-twentieth century owing to the translation works of Erich Haenisch and Paul Pelliot. Regarding the Chinese sources, one could be forgiven for being under the impression that they contained some detailed account of Jebe's death – there is a persistent statement found in secondary literature, apparently not based on any credible source, that Jebe died of “a fever” on his return from the western campaign.Footnote 131
What we actually encounter is silence or ambiguity surrounding Jebe's fate. He essentially leaves the world of activity in 1223, but for a single statement in the Secret History. Only one account – that found in the Novgorod First Chronicle – provides a vivid description of his last moments, his name and title travelling through Turkic-speaking intermediaries and becoming slightly garbled by the chronicler's hand. Moreover, the account must have been written within a few years of the events themselves – the episode ends in the oldest extant version with the Mongols leaving Russia and disappearing to some unknown region.Footnote 132 The scribe or scribes had no idea they would return in roughly fourteen years to brutally subjugate the Kipchak Steppe and Kievan Rus.Footnote *
