How did the world's earliest multinational corporation make first contact with a fiercely independent, fledgling government at the far reaches of international commerce? With a hastily assembled embassy of five crewmen, secondhand goods purchased from Portuguese merchants, and an overweening sense of purpose. The improbable success of this encounter, which initiated a centuries-long relationship, is one of many episodes relayed by Adam Clulow in his book chronicling the interactions between the Dutch East India Company—also known as the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC)—and the Tokugawa shogunate in early-seventeenth-century Japan. What reads as a tragicomedy of errors for a corporate Gulliver in a peripheral island nation is actually a telling narrative on the perils of improvisation, duplicity in business transactions, and asserted cultural superiority.
In contrast to existing corporate histories with a linear chronology of events, Clulow provides two protagonists, the VOC and the shogunate, and structures their interactions around three powers granted by Article 35 of the VOC charter: diplomacy, violence, and sovereignty (p. 15). What Clulow aims to show, and largely achieves, is that compared with Europe's aggressive imperialism in other areas and later centuries, the VOC's approach to the Japanese was much more accommodating. Within a few decades of first contact, “the Tokugawa regime succeeded in fencing in the company, constraining its activities and transforming it into an obedient servant” (p. 18). This was due not to a lack of technology or military might, which the VOC was eager to use against weaker foes, but to the longer-term objective of securing a place within the lucrative East Asian trade network (p. 146). The VOC was, despite its hybrid nature combining shareholders and colonial possessions, first and foremost a profit-driven institution, and this was best served by its acting as an intermediary exchanging Chinese goods for Japanese silver.
The first three chapters, on the VOC's use of diplomatic means to engage with Japan, highlight the company's proclivity for deceit and the occasional brilliance of its local administrators. To facilitate official dealings with the shogunate, the VOC fabricated the existence of a Dutch monarch (note: the United Provinces was a republic at the time); when this became a liability for timely transactions, the company attempted—and failed—to substitute its Batavia-based governor-general (pp. 37, 93). Only after discarding diplomatic channels in lieu of quasi vassalage did the VOC obtain legal recognition and a reliable revenue stream (p. 104). Yet these machinations also underscore the surprising flexibility of Tokugawa samurai, who created a place within its political framework for a Western, nonstate entity (p. 118).
The next two chapters focus on the VOC's attempts to use violence around Japanese waters to improve its position vis-a-vis the shogunate. One explanation offered by Clulow is that the VOC's relative pacifism was an attempt to rehabilitate its reputation for piracy, which was condemned by the Japanese and punished with disproportionate force (p. 145). This, coupled with its precarious status within the Japanese feudal hierarchy, progressively decreased the company's freedom of movement as the shogunate expanded its jurisdiction over commercial traffic intended for Japan. Dutch jurisprudence and precedents notwithstanding, the VOC surrendered a high-ranking official to Japanese authorities following an incident involving a Japanese ship in the company's Taiwanese colony. The following two chapters expand on this event, which culminated in the colony's capture by a dissident Chinese warlord and is representative of the loss of sovereignty that the VOC viewed as one of its fundamental rights.
The author interprets the inability of the VOC to exercise its three powers—diplomacy, violence, and sovereignty—as a failure to persuade a non-European nation of a “different world order” (p. 220). The “potent suite of arguments presented by Grotius in Europe had faltered when transferred across to Japan,” and lost in the translation were the differences between piracy and privateering, between expropriation and legal transference under duress (p. 166). At the same time, the bindings that kept the VOC in check in Japan may have allowed it to earn decades of profits; on this point, the book remains silent. What may also surprise readers unfamiliar with the company's history is that the VOC was much less bungling and benign in its interactions with other nations; such a comparison could have been drawn more explicitly. Company information such as the extent of its piracy-privateering activities, its total revenue over time and geographic spread, and a timeline of international milestones extending past the 1600s would also have been useful.
Similarly, while the Tokugawa shogunate is portrayed in a consistently sympathetic light, viewing its behavior within the narrative structure of the three VOC charter powers betrays a slight Eurocentric bias. The shogunate was a minor Asian power, largely secure only within its borders; knowing more about its motivations may provide greater insight into its dealings with the VOC and other groups, including the Chinese and Portuguese. Finally, for the quantitatively oriented, having some sense of magnitudes—such as tables of trade volumes for Japan and the types of commodities exchanged between it and the VOC and other partners—would help in gauging the relative economic and bargaining power of the book's protagonists. That said, Clulow has written a focused and well-researched book that sits comfortably at the intersection of fictional accounts like David Mitchell's The Thousand Autumns of Jacob de Zoet (2010) and macrohistories like Andre Gunder Frank's ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age (1998) and Kenneth Pomeranz's The Great Divergence (2000). It is a welcome addition to the literature.
